Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Personal Identity and Ethics" by David Shoemaker

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1989, “Should Ethics Be More Impersonal?” The Philosophical Review, 98: 439–484, reprinted in Dancy 1997, pp. 251–289. (Scholar)
Agich, George J., and Jones, Royce P., 1986, “Personal Identity and Brain Death: A Critical Response,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 15: 267–274. (Scholar)
Anomaly, Jonny, 2008, “Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit,” Dialogue, 47: 331–350. (Scholar)
Apter, Andrew, 1991, “The Problem of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity, and the Double Brain,” Philosophical Psychology, 4: 219–248. (Scholar)
Atkins, Kim, 2008, Narrative Identity and Moral Identity: A Practical Perspective, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Baker, Lynn Rudder, 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “When Does a Person Begin?”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 22: 25–48. (Scholar)
Beck, Simon, 1989, “Parfit and the Russians,” Analysis, 49: 205–209. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Our Identity, Responsibility and Biology,” Philosophical Papers, Private Issue: 3–14. (Scholar)
Becker, Gerhold K., ed., 2000, The Moral Status of Persons: Perspectives on Bioethics, Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi. (Scholar)
Bělohrad, Radim, 2014, “Can We Do Without a Metaphysical Theory of Personal Identity in Practice?” Prolegomena: časopis za filozofiju, 13: 315–334. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Subjective Theories of Personal Identity and Practical Concerns,” Organon 22: 282–301. (Scholar)
Belshaw, Christopher, 2000, “Identity and Disability,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17: 263–276. (Scholar)
Belzer, Marvin, 1996, “Notes on Relation R,” Analysis, 56: 56–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction,” Social Philosophy & Policy: 126–164. (Scholar)
Black, Oliver, 2003, “Ethics, Identity and the Boundaries of the Person,” Philosophical Explorations 6: 139–156. (Scholar)
Black, Sam, 2001, “Altruism and the Separateness of Persons,” Social Theory and Practice, 27: 361–385. (Scholar)
Blatti, Stephan and Snowdon, Paul F., eds., 2016, Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, & Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bradford, J. and Smith, S.M., 1979, “Amnesia and Homicide: the Padola Case and a Study of Thirty Cases,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 7: 219–231. (Scholar)
Bradley, Ben, Feldman, Fred, and Johansson, Jens (eds.), 2013, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Braude, Stephen, 1995, First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 3: 37–54. (Scholar)
Brill, H. Skott, 2003, “The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity, and the Twinning Dilemma,” Social Theory and Practice, 29: 419–30. (Scholar)
Brink, David O., 1990, “Rational Egoism, Self, and Others,” in O. Flanagan and A. Rorty, eds., Identity, Character, and Morality, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 339–378. (Scholar)
–––, 1997a, “Self-Love and Altruism,” Social Philosophy & Policy, 14: 122–157 (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons,” in Dancy 1997, pp. 96–134. (Scholar)
Broome, John, 1991, “Utilitarian Metaphysics?” in Jon Elster and John E. Roemer, eds., Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 70–97. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Weighing Lives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Brown, Mark T., 2001, “Multiple Personality and Personal Identity,” Philosophical Psychology, 14: 435–447. (Scholar)
Buchanan, Allen, 1988, “Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17: 277–302. (Scholar)
Burley, Justine and Harris, John, eds., 2002, A Companion to Genethics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Butler, Joseph, 1736, “Of Personal Identity,” in The Analogy of Religion, reprinted in Perry 1975, pp. 99–105; page references are to the reprinted version. (Scholar)
Campbell, Tim, and McMahan, Jeff, 2010, “Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 285–301. (Scholar)
Carter, W.R., 1982, “Do Zygotes Become People?” Mind, 91: 77–95. (Scholar)
Chadwick, Ruth, 2000, “Gene Therapy and Personal Identity,” in Becker 2000, pp. 183–194. (Scholar)
Chan, Jonathan K. L., 2000, “Human Cloning, Harm and Personal Identity,” in Becker 2000, pp. 195–207. (Scholar)
Chappell, Timothy, 1998, “Reductionism About Persons; and What Matters,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98: 41–57. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “The Relevance of Metaphysics to Bioethics: A Reply to Earl Conee,” Mind, 109: 275–279. (Scholar)
Chiong, W., 2005, “Brain Death without Definitions,” Hastings Center Report, 35: 20–30. (Scholar)
Chong, Kim-chong, Tan, Sor-hoon, and Ten, C.L., eds, 2003, The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches, Chicago, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
Cockburn, D., ed., 1991, Human Beings (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 29), New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Conee, Earl, 1999, “Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion,” Mind, 108: 619–646. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Reply to Timothy Chappell,” Mind, 109: 281–283. (Scholar)
Dainton, Barry, 1992, “Time and Division,” Ratio, 5: 102–128. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, ed., 1997, Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Daniels, Norman, 1979, “Moral Theory and the Plasticity of Persons,” Monist, 62: 265–287. (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen, 1982, “Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XII: 247–255. (Scholar)
Degaynesford, Maximilian, 2001, “Review of The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics,” Mind, 111: 170–174. (Scholar)
DeGrazia, David, 1999a, “Persons, Organisms, and the Definition of Death: A Philosophical Critique of the Higher-Brain Approach,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 37: 419–40. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, “Advance Directives, Dementia, and 'the Someone Else Problem',” Bioethics, 13: 373–391. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31: 413–442. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Is it Wrong to Impose the Harms of Human Life? A Reply to Benatar,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 317–331. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel, 1976, “Conditions of Personhood,” in Rorty 1976, pp. 175–196. (Scholar)
Dresser, Rebecca, 1986, “Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law,” Arizona Law Review, 28: 373–405. (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2004, “Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy,” Monist, 87: 489–511. (Scholar)
Elliot, Robert, 1993, “Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy,” Bioethics, 7: 27–40. (Scholar)
Feser, Edward, 2005, “Personal Identity and Self-Ownership,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 22: 100–125. (Scholar)
Fields, Lloyd, 1987, “Parfit on Personal Identity and Desert,” Philosophical Quarterly, 37: 432–441. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, and Speak, Daniel, 2000, “Death and the Psychological Conception of Personal Identity,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV: 84–93. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry G., 1988, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Furberg, Elisabeth, 2012, “Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What is the Problem?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 37(1): 60–73; first published online 2011, doi:10.1093/jmp/jhr055 (Scholar)
Gaita, Raimond, 2003, “Narrative, Identity, and Moral Philosophy,” Philosophical Papers, 32: 261–277. (Scholar)
Gallagher, Shaun (ed.), 2011, The Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Garrett, Brian, 1992, “Persons and Values,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 337–345. (Scholar)
Gendler, Tamar Szabo, 2002a, “Critical Study of Carol Rovane's The Bounds of Agency,” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 64: 229–240. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, “Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 34–54. (Scholar)
Glannon, Walter, 1998, “Moral Responsibility and Personal Identity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 35: 231–249. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Genes and Future People, Boulder, CO: Westview. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Identity, Prudential Concern, and Extended Lives,” Bioethics, 16: 266–283. (Scholar)
Green, Michael, and Wikler, Daniel, 1980, “Brain Death and Personal Identity,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 9: 105–133. (Scholar)
Hacking, Ian, 1991, “Two Souls in One Body,” Critical Inquiry, 17: 838–867. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Haksar, Vinit, 1991, Indivisible Selves and Moral Practice, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
Haugen, David, 1995, “Personal Identity and Concern for the Future,” Philosophia, 24: 481–492. (Scholar)
Heathwood, Chris, 2011, “The Significance of Personal Identity to Abortion,” Bioethics, 25: 230–232. (Scholar)
Hedden, Brian, 2019, “Rationality and Synchronic Identity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97: 544–558. doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1502795 (Scholar)
Hershenov, David, 2005, “Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?” Mind, 114: 31–59. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Death of a Person,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 31: 107–120. (Scholar)
Hershenov, David B., and Delaney, James J., 2010, “The Metaphysical Basis of a Liberal Organ Procurement Policy,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 303–315. (Scholar)
Hershenov, David, and Koch-Hershenov, Rose, 2006, “Fission and Confusion,” Christian Bioethics, 12: 237–254. (Scholar)
Himma, K.E., 2003, “What Philosophy of Mind Can Tell Us About the Morality of Abortion: Personhood, Materialism, and the Existence of the Self,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17: 89–109. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “A Dualist Analysis of Abortion: Personhood and the Concept of Self Qua Experiential Subject,” Journal of Medical Ethics, 31: 48–55. (Scholar)
Holland, S., Lebacqz, K., and Zoloth, L., eds., 2001, The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, MIT Press. (Scholar)
Hutto, D.D. (ed.), 2007, Narrative and Understanding Persons (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 60), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Jaworska, Agnieszka, 1999, “Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28: 105–138. (Scholar)
Jaworski, Peter M. and Shoemaker, David, 2018, “Me and Mine,” Philosophical Studies, 175: 1–22. (Scholar)
Jecker, Nancy S., 2016, “Advance Care Planning: What Gives Prior Wishes Normative Force?” Asian Bioethics Review, 8: 195–210. (Scholar)
Jeske, Diane, 1993, “Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical Review, 102: 1993. (Scholar)
Johansson, Jens, 2007, “Non-Reductionism and Special Concern,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85: 641–657. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What is Animalism?” Ratio, 20: 194–205. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Parfit on Fission,” Philosophical Studies, 150: 21–35. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Animal Ethics,” in Blatti and Snowdon 2016, pp. 283–302. (Scholar)
Johnston, Mark, 1987, “Human Beings,” Journal of Philosophy, 84: 59–83. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Fission and the Facts,” Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 369–397. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Reasons and Reductionism,” The Philosophical Review, 101: 589–618. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves,” in Dancy 1997, pp. 149–179, reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003, pp. 260–291. (Scholar)
Kamm, F.M., 2005, “Moral Status and Personal Identity: Clones, Embryos, and Future Generations,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22: 283–307. (Scholar)
Kaufman, Frederik, 2000, “Thick and Thin Selves: Reply to Fischer and Speak,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV: 94–97. (Scholar)
Kennett, Jeanette, and Matthews, Steve, 2002, “Identity, Control and Responsibility: the Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder,” Philosophical Psychology, 15: 509–526. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Unity and Disunity of Agency,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 10: 305–312. (Scholar)
Kind, Amy, 2004, “The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future,” Metaphilosophy, 35: 536–553. (Scholar)
Klaming, Laura and Pim Haselager, 2013, “Did my brain implant make me do it? Questions raised by DBS regarding psychological continuity, responsibility for action and mental competence,” Neuroethics, 6: 527–539. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, Christine M., 1989, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 18: 101–132. (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity, 2^nd edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Kuczewski, Mark G., 1994, “Whose Will is it Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics,” Bioethics, 8: 27–48. (Scholar)
–––, 1999,“Commentary: Narrative Views of Personal Identity and Substituted Judgment in Surrogate Decision Making,” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 27: 32–36. (Scholar)
Kuhse, Helga, 1999, “Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 9: 347–364. (Scholar)
Kuhse, Helga, and Singer, Peter, 1990, “Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status,” in Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, and Pascal Kasimba, eds., Embryo Experimentation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 65–75. (Scholar)
Lane, Robert, 2003, “Why I Was Never a Zygote,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41: 63–83. (Scholar)
Lee, Win-Chiat, 1990, “Personal Identity, the Temporality of Agency and Moral Responsibility,” Auslegung, 16: 17–29. (Scholar)
Lent, Alfred C., 2010, “Personal Identity and Ethics” Teaching Philosophy, 33: 89–94. (Scholar)
Levine, Carol, 2003, Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Bioethical Issues, 10^th edition, New York: McGraw Hill. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1971, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–11. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Survival and Identity,” in Rorty 1976, pp. 17–40. (Scholar)
Lindemann, Hilde, 2001, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Lizza, John P., 1993, “Multiple Personalities and Personal Identity Revisited,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44: 263–274. (Scholar)
Locke, John, 1694, “Of Identity and Diversity,” in Essay Concerning Human Understanding, reprinted in Perry 1975, pp. 33–52; page references are to the reprinted version. (Scholar)
Lubcke, Poul, 1993, “What Matters? On Parfit's Ideas of Personal Identity and Morality,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 28: 99–114. (Scholar)
Lucretius, 1951, De Rerum Natura, trans. R.E. Latham, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. (Scholar)
Luttrell, Steven, and Sommerville, Ann, 1996, “Limiting Risks by Curtailing Rights: A Response to Dr. Ryan,” Journal of Medical Ethics, 22(2): 100–104; reprinted in Levine 2003. (Scholar)
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1984, After Virtue, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition,” in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (eds.) 1989, Why Narrative?, Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Critical Remarks on The Sources of the Self,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 187–190. (Scholar)
Madell, Geoffrey, 1981, The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
Marquis, Don, 1989, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 183–202. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “A Future Like Ours and the Concept of Person: A Reply to McInerney and Paske,” in Louis P. Pojman and Francis J. Beckwith, eds., 1998, The Abortion Controversy, 2^nd ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 372–386. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Brill's Objections to the Future of Value Argument,” Social Theory and Practice, 31: 105–114. (Scholar)
Martin, Raymond, 1987, “Memory, Connecting, and What Matters in Survival,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 82–97. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Identity, Transformation, and What Matters in Survival,” in Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin (eds.) 1991, Self and Identity, New York: Macmillan, pp. 289–301 (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Self-Interest and Survival,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 165–184. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Having the Experience: The Next Best Thing to Being There,” Philosophical Studies, 68: 63–79. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, and Barresi, John, eds., 2003, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
Matthews, Steve, 1998, “Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood,” Philosophical Psychology, 11: 67–88. (Scholar)
McClennen, Edward F., 1990, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
McInerney, Peter K., 1990, “Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?” Journal of Philosophy, 87: 264–268. (Scholar)
McMahan, Jeff, 1995, “The Metaphysics of Brain Death,” Bioethics, 9: 91–126. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Measor, Nicholas, 1978, “Persons, Indeterminacy and Responsibility,” The Philosophical Review, 87: 414–422. (Scholar)
Noonan, Harold, 1989, Personal Identity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 302–318. (Scholar)
Oderberg, David S., 1997, “Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26: 259–298. (Scholar)
Olson, Eric T., 1997a, “Was I Ever a Fetus?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 95–109. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “An Argument for Animalism,” in Martin and Barresi 2003, pp. 318–334. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Ethics and the Generous Ontology,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 259–270. (Scholar)
Olson, Eric T. and Witt, Karsten, 2019, “Narrative and Persistence,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49: 419–434. (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 1971, “Personal Identity,” The Philosophical Review, 80: 3–27. (Scholar)
–––, 1972, “Later Selves and Moral Principles,” in Alan Montefiore, ed., Philosophy and Personal Relations, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 137–169. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Lewis, Perry, and What Matters,” in Rorty 1976, pp. 91–107. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Comments,” Ethics, 96: 832–872. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “The Unimportance of Identity,” in Henry Harris (ed.), Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Patton Jr., Michael F., 2002, “Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Directives,” Southwest Philosophy Review, 18: 65–72. (Scholar)
Perry, John, 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “The Importance of Being Identical,” in Rorty 1976, pp. 67–91. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
Persson, Ingmar, 1992, ,“The Indeterminacy and Insignificance of Personal Identity,” Inquiry 35: 271–283. (Scholar)
–––, 1995,“Genetic Therapy, Identity, and the Person-Regarding Reasons,” Bioethics, 9: 16–31. (Scholar)
Peters, Ted, 2001, “Embryonic Stem Cells and the Theology of Dignity,” in Holland, Lebacqz, and Zoloth 2001. (Scholar)
Prince, Morton, 1905, The Dissociation of a Personality, London: Longmans, Green. (Scholar)
Puccetti, Roland, 1988, “Does Anyone Survive Neocortical Death?” in Zaner 1988. (Scholar)
Quante, Michael, 1999, “Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 9: 365–381. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Personal Identity as Basis for Autonomy,” in Becker 2000, pp. 57–75. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, Personal Identity as a Principle of Biomedical Ethics, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
Radden, Jennifer, 1996, Divided Minds and Successive Selves, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XLVIII: 5–22; reprinted in J. Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 286–302. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
Reid, Thomas, 1785, “Of Memory,” in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, reprinted in Perry 1975 as “Of Identity” (pp. 107–112) and “Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity” (pp. 113–118); page references are to the reprinted version. (Scholar)
Ricoeur, Paul, 1991, “Narrative Identity,” in D. Wood, ed., On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg, ed., 1976, The Identities of Persons, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Rovane, Carol, 1993, “Self-Reference: The Radicalization of Locke,” Journal of Philosophy, 90: 73–97. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, The Bounds of Agency, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Review of Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality,” Ethics, 110: 863–868. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Genetics and Personal Identity,” in Justine Burley and John Harris, eds., A Companion to Genethics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 245–252. (Scholar)
Ryan, Christopher James, 1996, “Betting Your Life: An Argument Against Certain Advance Directives,” Journal of Medical Ethics, 22(2): 95–99; reprinted in Levine 2003. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 1982, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., 1982, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, pp. 103–126. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schechtman, Marya, 1996, The Constitution of Selves, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Review of The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics,” Ethics, 109: 919–922. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity,” in Martin and Barresi 2003, pp. 238–259. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Personal Identity and the Past,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 12: 9–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Diversity in Unity: Practical Unity and Personal Boundaries,” Synthese, 162: 405–23. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Personhood and the Practical,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 271–283. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Scheffler, Samuel, 1979, “Moral Independence and the Original Position,” Philosophical Studies, 35: 397–403. (Scholar)
–––, 1982a, “Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XII: 229–246. (Scholar)
–––, 1982b, “Reply to Darwall,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XII: 257–264. (Scholar)
Schultz, Bart, 1986, “Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism,” Ethics, 96: 721–745. (Scholar)
Sher, George, 1979, “Compensation and Transworld Personal Identity,” Monist, 62: 378–391. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, David W., 1999, “Selves and Moral Units,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80: 391–419. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Reductionist Contractualism: Moral Motivation and the Expanding Self,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30: 343–370. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension,” Social Theory and Practice, 31: 51–75. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Personal Identity and Practical Concerns,” Mind, 116: 316–357. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Moral Responsibility and the Self,” in Gallagher 2011, pp. 487–518. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Ecumenical Attributability,” in Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism,” in Blatti and Snowdon 2016, pp. 303–327. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, Sydney, 1970, “Persons and Their Pasts,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 7: 269–285. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Critical Notice of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons,” Mind 94: 443–453; reprinted (and slightly abridged) as “Parfit on Identity,” in Dancy 1997, pp. 135–148. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Shun, Kwong-loi, and Wong, David B., eds., 2004, Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Sider, Theodore, 2001a, Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001b, “Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,” Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 189–209. (Scholar)
Siderits, Mark, 2003, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons, Aldershot: Ashgate. (Scholar)
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