Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Personal Identity" by Eric T. Olson
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Ayer, A. J., 1936, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Gollancz. (Scholar)
- Ayers, M., 1990, Locke, vol. 2, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Baker, L. R., 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Behan, D., 1979, ‘Locke on Persons and Personal Identity’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9: 53–75. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, A. and C. Buford, 2009, ‘Thinking Animals and Epistemology’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90: 310–314. (Scholar)
- Campbell, S., 2006, ‘The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 339–358. (Scholar)
- Campbell, T. and J. McMahan, 2010, ‘Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 285–301. (Scholar)
- Carter, W. R., 1989, ‘How to Change Your Mind’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19: 1–14. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1976, Person and Object, La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
- DeGrazia, D., 2005, Human Identity and Bioethics, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Garrett, B., 1998, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Glover, J., 1988, I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity, London: Penguin. (Scholar)
- Heller, M., 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hirsch, E., 1982, The Concept of Identity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hudson, H., 2001, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘I Am Not an Animal!’, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, D., 1739 [1978], Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978; partly reprinted in Perry 1975. (Scholar)
- Jinpa, T., 2002, Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy, London: Routledge Curzon. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M., 1987, ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy, 84: 59–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘“Human Beings” Revisited: My Body is not an Animal’, in D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, ‘Remnant Persons:
Animalism’s Undoing’, in S. Blatti and P. Snowdon (eds.),
Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity,
Oxford University Press: 89–127. (Scholar)
- Langford, S., 2014, ‘On What We are and How We Persist’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95: 356–371. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, ‘A Defence of Anti-Criterialism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47: 613–630. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in A. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. I, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. (Scholar)
- Locke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2nd ed., first published 1694); partly reprinted in Perry 1975. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 1996, Subjects of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, ‘The Probable Simplicity of
Personal Identity’, in Personal Identity: Simple or
Complex?, G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. (Scholar)
- Ludwig, A. M., 1997, How Do We Know Who We Are?, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mackie, D., 1999, ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’, Philosophical Studies, 95: 219–242. (Scholar)
- Madden, R., 2016, ‘Human Persistence’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 16(17); available online. (Scholar)
- Martin, R., 1998, Self Concern, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Martin, R. and J. Barresi (eds.), 2003, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1997, ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Merricks, T., 1998, ‘There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time’, Noûs, 32: 106–124. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1971, ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’, Synthèse, 22: 396–413; reprinted in Perry 1975 and in Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Nichols, S. and M. Bruno, 2010, ‘Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study’, Philosophical Psychology, 23: 293–312. (Scholar)
- Noonan, H., 1998, ‘Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy’, Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 302–318. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Personal Identity, second edition, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism’, Analysis, 70: 93–98. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘The Complex and Simple Views of Personal Identity’, Analysis, 71: 72–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, ‘Personal Identity: The Simple and Complex Views Revisited’, Disputatio, 11: 9–22. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Olson, E., 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, ‘Thinking Animals and the
Reference of “I”’, Philosophical Topics,
30: 189–208. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a, ‘An Argument for Animalism’, in Martin and Barresi 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, ‘Was Jekyll Hyde?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 328–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, What Are We? A Study in Personal
Ontology, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, ‘In Search of the Simple View’, in Personal Identity: Simple or Complex?, G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, ‘The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning’, Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Supplement), 52: 24–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, ‘What Does It Mean To Say That We Are Animals?’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(11–12): 84–107. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, ‘The Zombies Among Us’, Noûs, 52: 216–226. (Scholar)
- Olson, E. and K. Witt, 2019, ‘Narrative and Persistence’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49: 419–434. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review, 80: 3–27; reprinted in Perry 1975. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, ‘Lewis, Perry, and What Matters’, in The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in Identity, H. Harris (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press; reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, ‘We Are Not Human Beings’, Philosophy, 87: 5–28. (Scholar)
- Penelhum, T., 1967, ‘Personal Identity’, in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Volume 6), P. Edwards (ed.), New
York: Macmillan. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, Survival and Disembodied Existence, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 1972, ‘Can the Self Divide?’ Journal of Philosophy, 69: 463–488. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Puccetti, R., 1973, ‘Brain Bisection and Personal Identity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24: 339–355. (Scholar)
- Quinton, A., 1962, ‘The Soul’, Journal of Philosophy, 59: 393–403; reprinted in Perry (ed.), 1975. (Scholar)
- Rea, M. (ed.), 1997, Material Constitution: A Reader, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Rigterink, R., 1980, ‘Puccetti and Brain Bisection: An Attempt at Mental Division’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10: 429–452. (Scholar)
- Rovane, C., 1998, The Bounds of Agency, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1918, ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’. Monist, 28: 495–527 and 29: 32–63, 190–222, 345–380; reprinted in R. Marsh (ed.), Logic and Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), and in D. Pears, ed., The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985) [page numbers from the latter]. (Scholar)
- Schechtman, M., 1996, The Constitution of Selves, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity’, Philosophical Explorations, 4(2): 94–110; reprinted in Martin and Barresi 2003. (Scholar)
- Schroer, J. W. and R. Schroer, 2014, ‘Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity’, Philosophical Studies, 171: 445–469. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1963, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7: 269–285. (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, ‘Identity, Properties, and Causality’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 321–342. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, ‘Self and Substance’, in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 11), J. Tomberlin (ed.): 283–319. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, ‘Self, Body, and
Coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(Supplementary Volume), 73: 287–306. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, ‘Persons, Animals, and Identity’, Synthese, 163: 313–324. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘On What We Are’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, S. Gallagher (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, ‘Against Simplicity’, in
Personal Identity: Simple or Complex?, G. Gasser and M.
Stefan (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sider, T., 2001a, Four Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001b, ‘Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis’, Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 15: Metaphysics): 189–209. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, ‘Against Parthood’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 8), K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 237–293. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1990, ‘Surviving Matters’, Noûs, 25: 297–322. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P., 1990, ‘Persons, Animals, and Ourselves’, in The Person and the Human Mind, C. Gill. (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, ‘Persons and Personal
Identity’, in Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and
Value, S. Lovibond and S. G. Williams (ed.), Oxford:
Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G., 2008, ‘Against Narrativity’, in his Real materialism and Other Essays, 189–207, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, R., 1984, ‘Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory’, in Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Thomson, J. J., 1997, ‘People and Their Bodies’, in Reading Parfit, J. Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Unger, P., 1979, ‘I do not Exist’, in Perception and Identity, G. F. MacDonald (ed.), London: Macmillan; reprinted in Rea 1997. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Identity, Consciousness, and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, ‘The Survival of the Sentient’, in Philosophical Perspectives, 14: Action and Freedom, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, All the Power in the World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, P., 1990, Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, ‘Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity’, in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 11: Mind, Causation, and World): 305–319; reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wilkes, K., 1988, Real People, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1956–7, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: 229–252; reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review, 79(2): 161–180; reprinted in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Wollheim, R., 1984, The Thread of Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, D., 1998, ‘Criteria of Identity and the
“Identity Mystics”’, Erkenntnis, 48:
281–301. (Scholar)