A. Identity and Change

• Botterill, A., 2004, “Temporal Parts and Temporary Intrinsics,” Metaphysica, 5(2): 5–23. (Scholar)
• Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller K., 2006, “Talking About a Universalist World,” Philosophical Studies, 130(3): 499–534. (Scholar)
• Caplan, B., 2005, “Why So Tense About the Cupola?,” Mind, 114(455): 703–708. (Scholar)
• Fiocco, M.O., 2010, “Temporary Intrinsics and Relativisation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91(1): 64–77. (Scholar)
• Francescotti, R.M., 2005, “Constitution and the Necessity of Identity,” Logique et Analyse, 48: 311–321. (Scholar)
• Geach, P.T., 1967, “Identity,” Review of Metaphysics, 21: 3–12. (Scholar)
• Haslanger, S., 1989, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics,” Analysis, 49: 119–25. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, “Persistence, Change and Explanation,” Philosophical Studies, 56: 1–28. (Scholar)
• Hansson, T., 2007, “The Problem(s) of Change Revisited,” Dialectica, 61(2): 265–274. (Scholar)
• Hestevold, H.S., 2008, “Presentism: Through Thick and Thin,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(3): 325–347. (Scholar)
• Hinchcliff, M., 1996, “The Puzzle of Change,” Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, James Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
• Johnston, M., 1987, “The Problem of Persistence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume) 61: 107–135. (Scholar)
• Koslicki, K., 2005, “Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy,” Journal of Philosophy, 102(2): 55–77. (Scholar)
• Lewis, D., 1986, The Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe,” Analysis, 48: 128–130. (Scholar)
• –––, 2002, “Tensing the Cupola,” Mind, 111: 1–13. (Scholar)
• Lombard, L.B., 2006, “Scope Fallacies and the ‘Decisive Objection’ Against Endurance,” Philosophia, 34(4): 441–452. (Scholar)
• Lowe, E.J., 1987, “Lewis on Perdurance Versus Endurance,” Analysis, 47: 152–54. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, “The Problem of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis,” Analysis, 48: 72–77. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, “How Real is Substantial Change?,” Monist, 89(3): 275–293. (Scholar)
• McCall, S. and Lowe, E.J., 2009, “The Definition of Endurance,” Analysis, 69(2): 277–280. (Scholar)
• Merricks, T., 1994, “Endurance and Indiscernibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 41: 165–84. (Scholar)
• Moyer, M., 2008, “Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence,” Synthese, 148(2): 401–423. (Scholar)
• Oderberg, D.S., 2004, “Temporal Parts and hte Possibility of Change,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(3): 686–708. (Scholar)
• Pruss, A. R., 2012, “A Deflationary Theory of Diachronic Identity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(1): 19–37. (Scholar)
• Stone, J., 2003, “On Staying the Same,” Analysis, 63(4): 288–291. (Scholar)
• Tegtmeir, E., 2007, “Three Flawed Distinctions in the Philosophy of Time,” Metaphysica, 8(1): 53–59. (Scholar)
• Wasserman, R., 2003, “The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 413–419. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, “The problem of Change,” Philosophy Compass, 1(1): 48–57. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Teaching and Learning Guide for: The Problem of Change,” Philosophy Compass, 5(3), 283–286. (Scholar)

B. Necessary and Determinate Identities

B.1 Necessary Identities

• Baldwin, T., 1984, “Lowe on Modalities De Re,” Mind, 93: 252–5. (Scholar)
• Barcan Marcus, R., 1947. “The Identity of Indiscernibles in a Strict Functional Calculus of the Second Order,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12: 12–15. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, Modalities:Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Bostock, D., 1977, “Kripke on Identity and Necessity,” Philosophical Quarterly, 27: 313–29. (Scholar)
• Blum, A., 1998. “Identity,” Iyyun, 47: 77–79. (Scholar)
• Hale, B., 2003, “The Necessity of Identity,” The Logica Yearbook 2003, Prague: Filosofia, 21–33 (Scholar)
• Hughes, C., 2008, Kripke, Names, Necessity, and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hugly, P., Sayward C., 1998, “Kripke on Necessity and Identity,” Philosophical Papers, 27(3): 151–159. (Scholar)
• Karmo, T., 1983, “Contingent Non-Identity,” Australasia, Journal of Philosophy, 61: 185–7. (Scholar)
• Keefe, R., 1995, “Contingent Identity and Vague Identity,” Analysis, 55: 183–90. (Scholar)
• Kripke, S., 1971, “Identity and Necessity,” in Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation, New York: New York University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1980, Naming and Necessity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Levinson, J., 1988, “A Note on Categorical Properties and Contingent Identity,” Journal of Philosophy, 85: 718–22. (Scholar)
• Lowe, E.J., 1982, “On the Alleged Necessity of True Identity Statements,” Mind, 91: 579–84. (Scholar)
• McKay, T., 1986, “Lowe and Baldwin on Modalities,” Mind, 95: 499–505. (Scholar)
• Pendlbury, M., 1975, “Necessary identity,” Philosophical Papers, 4: 12–20. (Scholar)
• Salmon, N., 1981, Reference and Essence, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
• Schnieder, B., 2006, “By Leibniz's Law: Remarks on a Fallacy,” Philosophical Quarterly, 56(222): 39–54. (Scholar)
• Wiggins, D., 1986, “On Singling Out An Object Determinately,” in P. Pettit, and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Williamson, T., 1996. “The Necessity and Determinacy of Distinctness,” in S. Lovibond and S. Williams (eds.) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Wilson, M., 1983. “Why Contingent Identity is Necessary,” Philosophical Studies, 43: 301–328. (Scholar)
• Wreen, M., 1998, “Proper names and the Necessity of Identity Statements,” Synthese, 114(2): 319–335. (Scholar)

B.2 Determinate Identities

• Barnes, E., 2009, “Indeterminacy,Identity and Counterparts: Evans Reconsidered,” Synthese, 168(1): 81–96. (Scholar)
• Broome, J., 1984, “Indefiniteness in Identity,” Analysis, 44(1): 6–12. (Scholar)
• Burgess, J., 1990, “Vague Objects and Indefinite Identity,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 263–87. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, “Vague Identity: Evans Misrepresented,” Analysis, 49: 112–19. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, “Vague Objects and Indefinite Identity,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 263–87. (Scholar)
• Cook, M., 1986, “Indeterminacy of Identity,” Analysis, 46: 179–86. (Scholar)
• Copeland, J., 1997, “Vague Identity and Fuzzy Logic,” Journal of Philosophy, 94: 514–34. (Scholar)
• Evans, G., 1978, “Can There Be Vague Objects?,” Analysis, 38: 208. (Scholar)
• French, S., and Krause, D., 1995, “Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy,” Analysis, 55: 20–6. (Scholar)
• Garrett, B., 1988, “Vagueness and Identity,” Analysis, 48(3): 130–44. (Scholar)
• –––, 1991, “Vague Identity and Vague Objects,” Noûs, 25: 341–51. (Scholar)
• Hirsh, E., 1999, “The Vagueness of Identity,” Philosophical Topics, 26: 139–58. (Scholar)
• Johnsen, B., 1989, “Is Vague Identity Incoherent?,” Analysis, 49: 103–12. (Scholar)
• Keefe, R., and Smith, P. (eds.), 1996, Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Lewis, D.K., 1988, “Vague identity: Evans Misunderstood,” Analysis, 48: 128–30. (Scholar)
• Lowe, E.J., 1982, “Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy,” Analysis, 54: 110–114. (Scholar)
• Miller, K., 2006, “Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity,” Erkenntnis, 64(2): 223–230. (Scholar)
• Noonan, H., 1985, “Indefinite Identity: A Reply to Broome,” Analysis, 44(3): 117–21. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, “Vague Identity Yet Again,” Analysis, 50: 157–62. (Scholar)
• –––, 1991, “Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates,” Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 183–93. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, “E.J. Lowe on Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy,” Analysis, 55: 14–19. (Scholar)
• Over, D.E., 1989, “Vague Objects and Identity,” Analysis, 49: 97–9. (Scholar)
• Parfit, D., 1993, “The Indeterminacy of Identity: A Reply to Brueckner,” Philosophical Studies, 70: 23–33. (Scholar)
• Parsons, T., 2000, Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, and Woodruff, P., 1995, “Worldly Indeterminacy of Identity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 171–91. (Scholar)
• Pinillos, N.A., 2003, “Counting and Indeterminate Identity,” Mind, 112(445): 35–50. (Scholar)
• Rassmussen, S.A., 1986, “Vague Identity,” Mind, 95: 81–91. (Scholar)
• Romerales, E., 2008, “Persistence, Ontic Vagueness and Identity: Towards a Substantialist Four-Dimensionalism,” Metaphysica, 9(1): 33–55. (Scholar)
• Stalnaker, R., 1988, “Vague Identity,” in D.F. Austen (ed.), Philosophical Analysis: A Defence By Examples, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Thomason, R., 1982, “Identity and Vagueness,” Philosophical Studies, 43: 329–32. (Scholar)
• Van Inwagen, P., 1988, “How To Reason About Vague Objects” Philosophical Topics, 16: 255–84. (Scholar)
• Wiggins, D., 1986, “On Singling Out an Object Determinately,” in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Williamson, T., 1990, Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)

C. Diachronic Identity Puzzles

• Armstrong, D.M. 1980, “Identity Through Time,” Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause:Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 67–78. (Scholar)
• Baker, L.R., 1997, “Why Constitution is not Identity,” Journal of Philosophy, 94(12): 599–621. (Scholar)
• –––, 2000, Persons and Bodies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 2013, “Three-Dimensionalism Rescued: A Brief Reply to Michael Della Rocca,” Journal of Philosophy, 110(3): 166–170. (Scholar)
• Balashov, Y., 2000, “Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time,” Philosophical Studies, 99: 129–166. (Scholar)
• Baxter, D., 1988a, “Many-One Identity,” Philosophical Papers, 17: 193–216. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988b, “Identity in the Loose and popular Sense,” Mind, 97: 575–82. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else,” Noûs, 35(4): 592–601. (Scholar)
• Broad, C.D., 1923, Scientific Thought, New York: Harcourt Press. (Scholar)
• Frances, B., 2006, “The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism,” Mind, 115(460): 1007–1021. (Scholar)
• Burke, M., 1980, “Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence,” Mind, 89: 391–405. (Scholar)
• –––, 1994, “Deon and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle,” Journal of Philosophy, 91: 129–39. (Scholar)
• –––, 1994, “Copper Statues and pieces of Copper,” Analysis, 52: 12–17. (Scholar)
• –––, 1994, “Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 591–624. (Scholar)
• Butterfield, J., 1984, “Spatial and Temporal Parts,” Philosophical Quarterly, 35: 32–44. (Scholar)
• Carroll, J.W., and Wentz, L., 2003, “A Puzzle about Persistence,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33(3): 323–342. (Scholar)
• Carter W., 1982, “On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms,” Philosophical Studies, 41: 213–30. (Scholar)
• –––, 1983, “Artifacts of Theseus Fact and Fission,” Australasian journal of Philosophy, 61(3): 248–65. (Scholar)
• –––, 1983, “In Defence of Undetached Parts,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 126–143. (Scholar)
• –––, and Heller, M., 1989, “Metaphysical Boundaries: A Question of Independence,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 263–276. (Scholar)
• Cartwright, R., 1975, “Scattered Objects,” in Keith Lehrer (ed.) Analysis and Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 153–171. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, R., 1969a, “The Loose and Popular and the Strict and philosophical Senses of Identity,” in Care, N and Grimm, H, Perception and Identity, Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 82–106. (Scholar)
• –––, 1969b, “Reply to Shoemaker,” in N. Care and H. Grimm (eds.), Perception and Identity, Cleveland: Case Western University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1971, “Problems of Identity,” Identity and Individuation, in Milton K. Munitz (ed.), New York: New York University Press, 3–30. (Scholar)
• –––, 1973, “Parts As Essential to their Wholes,” Review of Metaphysics, 26: 581–603. (Scholar)
• –––, 1976, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
• –––, 1979, “Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies,” Grazier Philosophishe Studien, 7/8: 317–388. (Scholar)
• Cleve, J.V., 1986, “Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 141–56. (Scholar)
• Cortens, A. and O'Leary Hawthorne, J., 1995, “Towards Ontological Nihilism,” Philosophical Studies, 91: 205–219. (Scholar)
• Dau, P., 1986, “Part Time Objets,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 459–74. (Scholar)
• Doepke, F., 1982, “Spatially Coinciding Objects,” Ratio, 24(1): 45–60. (Scholar)
• –––, 1987, “Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation,” Mind, 95: 250–5. (Scholar)
• Donnelly, M., 2011, “Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence,” Philosophical Studies, 154(1): 27–51. (Scholar)
• Elder, C., 1998, “Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 317–331. (Scholar)
• Fine, K., 1994, “Compounds and Aggregates,” Noûs, 28: 137–158. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Things and Their Parts,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23: 61–74. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “The Non-identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter,” Mind, 112: 195–234. (Scholar)
• Gabbay, D., and Moravcsik, J.M., 1973, “Sameness and Individuation,” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 513–526. (Scholar)
• Gallois, A., 1998, Occasions of Identity: The metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, “Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity,” Mind, 95: 57–76. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, “Occasional Identity,” Philosophical Studies, 58: 203–24. (Scholar)
• –––, Gibbard, A., 1975, “Contingent Identity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221. (Scholar)
• Griffin, N., 1977, Relative Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hansson W, T., 2008, “Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and Yet Persist Through Time?,” Metaphysica, 9(2): 235–239. (Scholar)
• Haslanger, S., 1994, “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 339–359. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Persistence Through Time,” in Loux M.J. and Zimmerman D. (eds.), the Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 315–354. (Scholar)
• Haslanger, S., and Kurtz, R.M. (eds.), 2006, Persistence: Contemporary Readings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Hawley, K., 1999, “Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations,” Mind 108: 53–67. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hawthorne, J., Scala, M. and Wasserman R., 2003, “Recombination, Humean Supervenience and Causal Constraints: An Argument for Temporal Parts?,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1: 301–318. (Scholar)
• Heller, M., 1984, “Temporal parts of Four Dimensional Objects,” Philosophical Studies, 46: 323–334. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “Things Change,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 695–704. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Varieties of Four Dimensionalism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71: 47–59. (Scholar)
• Hirsh, E., 1976, “Physical Identity,” Philosophical Review, 85: 357–389. (Scholar)
• –––, 1982. The Concept of Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hudson, H., 1999, “Temporal Parts and Moral Personhood,” Philosophical Studies, 93: 299–316. (Scholar)
• Hughes, C., 1986, “Is a Thing Just the Sum of its Parts?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 86: 213–23. (Scholar)
• Johnston, M., 1989, “Fission and the Facts,” in Philosophical Perspectives 3 (Philosophy of mind and Action Theory), Atascadero: Ridgeview Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “Constitution is not Identity,” Mind, 101: 89–105. (Scholar)
• Jubien, M., 1993, Ontology, Modality and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Kazmi, A., 1990, “Parthood and Persistence,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 16: 227–250. (Scholar)
• Levy, S., 1997, “Coincidence and Principles of Composition,” Analysis, 57: 1–10. (Scholar)
• Lewis, D., 1971, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, Philosophical Papers (Volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Many, but Almost One,” in J.Bacon (ed), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Lombard, L., 1994, “The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and the ‘No-Change’ Objection,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 365–372. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “On the Alleged Incompatibility of Presentism and Temporal Parts,” Philosophia, 27: 253–260. (Scholar)
• Lowe, E.J., 1983, “On the Identity of Artifacts,” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 220–232. (Scholar)
• –––, 1983, “Instantiation, Identity and Constitution,” Philosophical Studies, 44: 45–59. (Scholar)
• –––, and Noonan, H., 1988, “Substance, identity and Time,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 62: 61–100. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, Kinds of Being, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, “Coinciding Objects: In Defense of the ‘Standard Account’,” Analysis, 55: 171–178. (Scholar)
• Markosian, N., 1998, “Brutal Composition,” Philosophical Studies, 79: 95–105. (Scholar)
• Merricks, T., 1998, “There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time,” Noûs, 323: 106–12. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism and Counterpart Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 192–195. (Scholar)
• Miller, K., 2005, “A New Definition of Endurance,” Theoria, 71(4): 309–332. (Scholar)
• Miller, K. and Braddon-Mitchell, D., 2007, “There is no ‘Simpliciter Simpliciter’”,Philosophical Studies, 136(2): 249–278. (Scholar)
• Moyer, M., 2006, “Statues and Lumps a Strange Coincidence,” Synthese, 148(2): 401–423. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, Objects and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Myro, G., 1986, “Identity and Time,” in R. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions Categories and Ends, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 383–409. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, “Time and Essence,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 331–41. (Scholar)
• Needham, P., 2010, “Transient Things and Permanent Stuff,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(1): 147–166. (Scholar)
• Noonan, H., 1976, “The Four Dimensional World,” Analysis, 37: 32–39. (Scholar)
• –––, 1980, Objects and Identity, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “A Note on Temporal Parts,” Analysis, 45: 151–152. (Scholar)
• –––, 1987, “Reply to Grham Spinkes on Temporal Parts,” Analysis, 47: 187–189. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, “Substance, Identity and Time,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 62: 79–100. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Constitution is Identity,” Mind 102: 133–146. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “The Case for Perdurance,” in Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 123–139. (Scholar)
• Oaklander, N., 1992, “Temporal Passage and Temporal Parts,” Noûs, 26: 79–84. (Scholar)
• Oderberg, D.S., 1993, The Metaphysics of identity Over Time, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
• Parsons J., 2000, “Must a Four-Dimensionalist believe in temporal Parts?,” The Monist, 83: 399–814. (Scholar)
• Perry, J., 1970, “The Same F,” Philosophical Review, 79: 181–200. (Scholar)
• Rea, M., 1995, “The Problem of Material Constitution,” Philosophical Review, 104: 525–552. (Scholar)
• –––, (ed.) 1997, Material Constitution, Cornell: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, “Temporal Parts Unmotivated,” Philosophical Review, 107: 225–260. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, “Four-dimensionalism,” in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 246–280. (Scholar)
• Robinson, D., 1982, “Re-identifying Matter,” Philosophical Review, 91: 317–342. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63: 299–319. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, “Matter, Motion and Humean Supervenience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 394–409. (Scholar)
• Sanford, D.H., 2005, “Distinctness and Non-Identity,” Analysis, 65(4): 269-274. (Scholar)
• –––, 2011, “Can a Sum Change Its Parts?” Analysis, 71(2): 235–239. (Scholar)
• Sattig, T., 2008, “Identity in 4D,” Philosophical Studies, 104(2): 179–195. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “Compatibilism About Coincidence,” Philosophical Review, 119: 273–313. (Scholar)
• Shoemaker, S., 2015, “Persistence and Properties,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(3): 433–448. (Scholar)
• Sidelle, A., 1998, “A Sweater Unraveled: Following One Thread of Thought For Avoiding Coincident Entities,” Noûs 32: 423–44. (Scholar)
• Sider T., 2003, Four Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Wahlberg, T. H, 2008, “Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and Yet Persist Through Time?” Metaphysica, 9(2): 235–239. (Scholar)
• Wiggins, D., 2001, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Wilson, R.A., 2009, “The Transitivity of Material Constitution,” Noûs, 43(2): 363–377. (Scholar)
• Wright, S., 2010, “The Leibniz's Law Problem (for Stage Theory),” Metaphysica, 11(2): 137–151. (Scholar)

D. Personal Identity

• Ballie, J., 1990, “Recent Work on Personal Identity,” Philosophical Books, 34: 193–206. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, Problems in Personal Identity, New York: Paragon House Publisher. (Scholar)
• Bermudez, J., 1998, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT. (Scholar)
• Brennan, A., 1988, “Best Candidate Theories of Identity,” Inquiry, 29: 423–38. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, Conditions of Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Brueckner, A., 1993, “Parfit on What Matters in Survival,” Philosophical Studies, 70: 1–22. (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity,” Theoria, 75(1): 28–33. (Scholar)
• Buford, C., 2009, “Memory, Quasi-Memory, and Pseudo-Quasi Memory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(3): 465–478. (Scholar)
• Butler J., 1736, “Of Personal Identity,” in The Analogy of Religion, New York: Cosimo, 2005. (Scholar)
• Campbell, J., 2011, “Personal Identity,” The Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Cartwright, H.M., 1993, “On Two Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Personal Identity,” Synthese, 95: 241–273. (Scholar)
• Chandler, H., 1969, “Shoemaker's Arguments Against Locke,” Philosophical Quarterly, 19: 17–37. (Scholar)
• Chihara, C., 1994, “The Many Persons Problem,” Philosophical Studies, 76: 45–9. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, R., 1976, Person and Object, La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
• Coburn, R., 1960, “Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity,” Analysis, 20: 117–120. (Scholar)
• Cole, D., 1991, “Artificial Intelligence and personal Identity,” Synthese, 88: 399–417. (Scholar)
• Doepke, F., 1996, The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument, Chicago: Open Court Publishing. (Scholar)
• Ehring, D., 1987, “Personal Identity and Time Travel,” Philosophical Studies, 52: 427–33. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, “Nonbranching and Nontransitivity,” Analysis, 50: 268–71. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, “Personal Identity and the R-Relation: Reconciliation Through Cohabitation?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 337–346. (Scholar)
• ––&Ndash;, 2013, “Why Parfit Did Not Go Far Enough,” Philosophical Studies, 165(1): 133–149. (Scholar)
• Eklund, M., 2004, “Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy,” Monist, 87(4): 489–511. (Scholar)
• Elliott, R., 1991, “Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement,” Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 55–75. (Scholar)
• Fuller, G., 1992, “Functionalism and personal Identity,” Personalist Forum, 8: 133–143. (Scholar)
• Garrett, B., 1990, “Personal Identity and Extrinsicness,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 177–94. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Gendler, T.Z., 2002, “Personal Identity and Thought Experiments,” Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 34–54. (Scholar)
• Grice, H.P., 1941, “Personal Identity,” Mind, 50: 330–350. (Scholar)
• Hamilton, A., 1995, “A New Look at Personal Identity,” Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 332–349. (Scholar)
• Hirsch, E., 1991, “Divided Minds,” Philosophical Review 100: 3–30. (Scholar)
• Johnston, M., 1987, “Human Beings,” Journal of Philosophy, 84(2): 59–83. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, “Relativism and the Self,” in Relativism, Interpretation and Confrontation, M. Krausz (ed.), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “Reasons and Reductionism,” Philosophical Review, 101: 589–618. (Scholar)
• Kolak, D., 1993, “The metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity,” American philosophical Quarterly, 30: 39–50. (Scholar)
• Lewis, D., 1976, “Survival and Identity,” in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley: University of Calfornia Press. (Scholar)
• Lowe, E. J., 2011, “Personal Identity,” The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind, London: Continuum International Publishing Group. (Scholar)
• Mackenzie, C., 2009, “Personal Identity, Narrative Integration and Embodiment,” in S. Campbell (ed.), Embodiment and Agency, University Park: Penn State University Press. (Scholar)
• Markosian, N., 2010, “Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity,” in J.K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and H.S. Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
• Merricks, T., 2001, “Realism about Personal Identity over Time,” Philosophical Perspective 15 (Noûs Supplement, 35): 173–187. (Scholar)
• Mills, E., 1993, “Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity,” Mind, 102: 35–51. (Scholar)
• Miri, M., 1973, “Memory and personal Identity,” Mind, 82: 1–21. (Scholar)
• Nagel, T., 1979, “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” in Nagel, T., Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Nelson, J., 1972, “Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions For Identity Through Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 9 (2): 177–185. (Scholar)
• Nichols, S., and Bruno, M., 2010, “Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical Study,” Philosophical Psychology, 23(3), 293–312. (Scholar)
• Ninan, D., 2009, “Persistence and the First Person Perspective,” Philosophical Review, 118(4): 425–464. (Scholar)
• Noonan, H., 1982, “Williams on “The Self and The Future”,” Analysis, 42: 158–63. (Scholar)
• –––, 1983, “Personal Identity and Bodily Continuity,” Analysis, 43: 98–104. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “Wiggins, Artifact Identity and ‘Best Candidate Theories’“,Analysis, 45: 4–8. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “The Only X and Y Principle,” Analysis, 45: 79–83. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity,” Inquiry, 28: 195–230. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, Personal Identity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 1998, “Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy,” Philosophical Quarterly, 48: 302–18. (Scholar)
• –––, 2001, “The Epistemological Problem of Relativism-Reply to Olsen,” Philosophical Studies, 104: 323–36. (Scholar)
• –––, 2003, Personal Identity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• –––, 2010, “The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism,” Analysis, 70(1): 93–98. (Scholar)
• –––, 2011, “The Complex and Simple Views of Personal Identity,” Analysis, 71(1): 72–77. (Scholar)
• Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge MA, Belknap Press. (Scholar)
• Olsen, E., 1994, “Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 173–86. (Scholar)
• –––, 1997, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Olson, Eric T., 2015, “On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 76: 39–56. (Scholar)
• Parfit, D., 1971, “Personal Identity,” Philosophical Review, 80: 3–27. (Scholar)
• –––, 1971, “On the importance of Self-Identity,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 6893–690. (Scholar)
• –––, 1982, “Personal Identity and Rationality,” Synthese, 53: 227–241. (Scholar)
• –––, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1987, “Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons,” in Blackmore and Greenfield (eds.) Mindwaves, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Penelhum, T., 1971, “The Importance of Self-Identity,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 667–678. (Scholar)
• Perry, J., 1972, “Can the Self Divide?,” Journal of Philosophy, 69: 463–88. (Scholar)
• –––, 1975, Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1978, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Williams on the Self and Its Future,” in Introduction to Philosophy, in J. Perry and M. Bratman (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Prior, A.N., 1957b, “Opposite Number,” Review of Metaphysics, 11/12: 196–201. (Scholar)
• Pucetti, R., 1969, Persons, New York: Herder and Herder. (Scholar)
• Robinson, D., 2004 “Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree?-Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism,” The Monist, : 512–536. (Scholar)
• Rorty, A., 1976, The Identities of Persons, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
• Shoemaker, D.W., 2007, “Personal Identity and Practical Concerns,” Mind, 116(462): 317–357. (Scholar)
• Shoemaker, S., 1975, Persons and Their Pasts, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (4): 269–285. (Scholar)
• –––, 2008, “Persons, Animals and Identity,” Synthese, 162(3): 313–324. (Scholar)
• –––, 1999, “Self, Body, and Coincidence,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 73: 287–306. (Scholar)
• Schroer, R., 2013, “Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(4): 339–356. (Scholar)
• Sider, T., 2001, “Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,” Philosophical Perspectives, 15 (Noûs Supplement), 189–209. (Scholar)
• Smith, Q., 1993, “Personal Identity and Time,” Philosophia 22: 155–167. (Scholar)
• Strawson, G., 2015, “‘The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 76: 111–141. (Scholar)
• Unger, P., 1990, Identity, Consciousness and Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• White, S.L., 1991, The Unity of the Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT. (Scholar)
• Williams, B., 1976, Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1975, “The Self and the Future,” in Perry, J. (ed.) Personal Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 179–198. (Scholar)
• Wilkes, K., 1988, Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Vesey, G., 1977, Personal Identity a Philosophical Analysis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)