Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Transworld Identity" by Penelope Mackie and Mark Jago
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Adams, R. M., 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 8: 211–231; reprinted in Loux 1979. (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26; reprinted in Kim and Sosa 1999. (Scholar)
- Bottani, A., Carrara, M., and Giaretta, P. (eds.), 2002, Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Brody, B., 1980, Identity and Essence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Catterson, T. T., 2008, “Reducing Reductionism: On a Putative Proof for Extreme Haecceitism”, Philosophical Studies, 140: 149–159. (Scholar)
- Chandler, H., 1976, “Plantinga and the Contingently Possible”, Analysis, 36: 106–109. (Scholar)
- Chihara, C., 1998, The Worlds of Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1967, “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”, Noûs, 1: 1–8; reprinted in Loux 1979, and in Kim and Sosa 1999. (Scholar)
- Coburn, R., 1986, “Individual Essences and Possible Worlds”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein 1986, 165–183. (Scholar)
- Della Rocca, M., 1996, “Recent Work in Essentialism, Part
II”, Philosophical Books, 37: 81–89. (Scholar)
- Divers, J., 2002, Possible Worlds, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Dorr, C., Hawthorne, J., and Yli-Vakkuri, J., 2021, The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal Variation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Evans, G., 1978, “Can There be Vague Objects?”, Analysis, 38: 208. (Scholar)
- Fara, D. G., 2009, “Dear Haecceitism”, Erkenntnis, 70: 285–297. (Scholar)
- Fara, M., and Williamson, T., 2005, “Counterparts and Actuality”, Mind, 114: 1–130. (Scholar)
- Fine, K., 2020, “Comments on Kathrin Koslicki’s
‘Essence and Identity’”, in Metaphysics,
Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine, M. Dumitru (ed.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 429–434. (Scholar)
- Forbes, G., 1980, “Origin and Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 37: 353–362. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “In Defense of Absolute Essentialism”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein 1986, 3–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “A New Riddle of Existence”, in Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 8: Logic and Language), J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 415–430. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Essentialism”, in Hale and Wright 1997, 515–533. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Origins and Identities”,
in Bottani, Carrara, and Giaretta 2002, 319–340. (Scholar)
- French, P., Uehling, T., and Wettstein, H., (eds.), 1986,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Hale, B., and Wright, C., (eds.), 1997, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Haslanger, S., 2003, “Persistence through Time”, in Loux and Zimmerman 2003, 315–354. (Scholar)
- Hawley, K., 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J., and Gendler, T. S., 2000, “Origin Essentialism: the Arguments Revisited”, Mind, 109: 285–298. (Scholar)
- Hazen, A., 1979, “Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic”, The Journal of Philosophy, 76: 319–338. (Scholar)
- Hughes, C., 2004, Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, D., 1967/1979, “Transworld Heir Lines”, in
Loux 1979, 88–109. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975, “How to Russell a Frege-Church”, The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 716–729; reprinted in Loux 1979. (Scholar)
- Kim, J., and Sosa, E., (eds.), 1995, A Companion to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, (eds.), 1999, Metaphysics: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Koslicki, K., 2020, “Essence and Identity”, in Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine, M. Dumitru (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113–140. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 252–355; reprinted in revised form as a monograph by Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell; this is the expanded monograph version of Kripke 1972. (Scholar)
- Leibniz, G. W., 1973, Leibniz, Philosophical
Writings, G. Parkinson (ed.), trans. M. Morris and G.
Parkinson, London: Dent. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, The Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126; reprinted in Loux 1979 and (with additional “Postscripts”) in Lewis 1983. (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”, The Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211; reprinted in Lewis 1983. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell. (Extracts from pp. 39–41 and 84–91 reprinted in Loux 1979, 125–128 and 182–189.) (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Sections 1–3 of Chapter 4 reprinted in Kim and Sosa 1999.) (Scholar)
- Linsky, B., and Zalta, E., 1994, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431–458. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete”, Philosophical Studies, 84: 283–294. (Scholar)
- Loux, M., (ed.), 1979, The Possible and the Actual, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Loux, M., and Zimmerman, D., (eds.), 2003, The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 2002, A Survey of Metaphysics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- McDaniel, K., 2004, “Modal Realism with Overlap”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 137–152; reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, F. Jackson and G. Priest (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 140–155. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C., 1976, “On the Necessity of Origin”, The Journal of Philosophy, 73: 127–135. (Scholar)
- McKay, T., 1986, “Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein 1986, 295–304. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J. L., 1974, “De What Re is De Re Modality?”, The Journal of Philosophy, 71: 551–561. (Scholar)
- Mackie, P., 1987, “Essence, Origin, and Bare Identity”, Mind, 96: 173–201. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “Identity and Extrinsicness: Reply to Garrett”, Mind, 98: 105–117. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Identity, Time, and Necessity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98: 59–78. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Forbes on Origins and
Identities”, in Bottani, Carrara, and Giaretta 2002,
341–352. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Marcus, R. B., 1946, “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 11: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Melia, J., 2003, Modality, Chesham: Acumen Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Mills, E., 1991, “Forbes’s Branching Conception of
Possible Worlds”, Analysis, 51: 48–50. (Scholar)
- Noonan, H., 1983, “The Necessity of Origin”, Mind, 92: 1–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “Wiggins, Artefact Identity and
‘Best Candidate’ Theories”, Analysis, 45:
4–8. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Personal Identity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Personal Identity, Second edition, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 1973, “Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?”, in Logic and Ontology, M. Munitz (ed.), New York, NY: New York University Press; reprinted in Loux 1979. (Scholar)
- –––, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Priest, G., 2010, “Non-transitive Identity”, in Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic, R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 400–416. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1960, “Identifiable Individuals”, The Review of Metaphysics, 13: 684–696; reprinted in Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V., 1976, “Worlds Away”, The Journal of Philosophy, 73: 859–863; reprinted in Quine, Theories and Things, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. (Scholar)
- Robertson, T., 1998, “Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism”, Mind, 107: 729–749. (Scholar)
- Roca-Royes, S., 2016, “Rethinking Origin Essentialism (for
Artefacts)”, in Reality Making, M. Jago (ed.), Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 152–176. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N., 1979, “How Not to Derive Essentialism
from the Theory of Reference”, The Journal of
Philosophy, 76: 703–725. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, Reference and Essence, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein 1986, 75–120. (Scholar)
- ___, 1996, “Trans-World Identification and
Stipulation”, Philosophical Studies, 84:
203–223. (Scholar)
- Sider, T., 2001, Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 1976, “Possible Worlds”, Noûs, 10: 65–75; reprinted in Loux 1979. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Counterparts and Identity”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein 1986, 121–140. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Modalities and Possible
Worlds”, in Kim and Sosa 1995, 333–337. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. F., 1976, “Entity and Identity”, in Contemporary British Philosophy, Fourth Series, H. D. Lewis (ed.), London: George Allen and Unwin, 193–220; reprinted in Strawson, Entity and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, P., 1985, “Plantinga on Trans-world
Identity”, in Alvin Plantinga, J. Tomberlin and P. van
Inwagen (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 101–120; reprinted in van
Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in
Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1967, Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 1990, Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Bare Possibilia”, Erkenntnis, 48: 257–273. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Existence and Contingency”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100: 117–139. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Necessary Existents”, in Logic, Thought and Language, A. O’Hear (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233–251. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1988, Review of Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, The Journal of Philosophy, 85: 329–337. (Scholar)
- Yagisawa, T., 2010, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)