Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Impartiality" by Troy Jollimore

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Archard, David, 1995. “Moral Partiality,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XX: 129–141. (Scholar)
Ashford, Elizabeth, 2000. “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCVII(8): 421–39. (Scholar)
Baier, Kurt, 1958. The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Bales, R. Eugene, 1971. “Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 8(3): 257–65. (Scholar)
Baron, Marcia, 1991. “Impartiality and Friendship,” Ethics 101: 836–57. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Baron, Marcia, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, 1997. Three Methods of Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Barry, Brian, 1989. Theories of Justice, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Benhabib, Seyla, 1987. “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory,” in Benhabib and Cornell 1987: 77–95. (Scholar)
Benhabib, Seyla, and Drucilla Cornell (eds.), 1987. Feminism as Critique, Cambridge: The Polity Press. (Scholar)
Beyleveld, Deryck, 2013. “Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Impartial Reasons to Real Agents,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10(2): 204–226. (Scholar)
Blum, Lawrence, 1980. Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Brandt, Richard, 1954. “The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ in Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15: 407–13. (Scholar)
–––, 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Brink, David O., 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. “Impartiality and Associative Duties,” Utilitas, 13: 2. (Scholar)
Broad, C.D., 1959. Five Types of Ethical Theory, Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co. (Scholar)
Buss, Sarah, 2006. “Needs (Someone Else’s), Projects (My Own), and Reasons,” The Journal of Philosophy, 103: 373–402. (Scholar)
Cannold, Leslie, Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, and Lori Gruen, 1995. “What is the Justice-Care Debate Really, About?” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XX: 357–75. (Scholar)
Chappell, Timothy, 2009a. “Impartial Benevolence and Partial Love,” in Chappell (ed.) 2009b: 70–85. (Scholar)
Chappell, Timothy (ed.), 2009b. The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Cottingham, John, 1983. “Ethics and Impartiality,” Philosophical Studies, 43: 83–99. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. “Partiality, Favoritism, and Morality,” Philosophical Quarterly, 36: 357–73. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Partiality and the Virtues,” in Roger Crisp, ed., How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 57–76. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Medicine, Virtues, and Consequences,” in D. Oderberg and L. Laing, ed., Human Lives, London: Macmillan, pp. 128–143. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a. “Impartiality and Ethical Formation,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010, pp. 65–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b. “Partiality and Impartiality,” in John Skorupski, ed., The Routledge Companion to Ethics. New York: Routledge, pp. 617–27. (Scholar)
Crisp, Roger. 2006. Reasons and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. “Against Partiality,” University of Kansas: The Lindley Lecture. [Crisp 2018 available online] (Scholar)
Cullity, Garrett. 2004. The Moral Demands of Affluence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cummiskey, David, 1996. Kantian Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 2004. Ethics Without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen L, 1983. Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Responsibility within Relations,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 150–168. (Scholar)
Deigh, John, 1991. “Impartiality: A Closing Note,” Ethics 101: 858–864. (Scholar)
Diamond, Cora, 1991. “The Importance of Being Human,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 29: 35–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. “Bernard Williams on the Human Prejudice,” Philosophical Investigations, 41(4): 379–98. (Scholar)
Double, Richard, 1999. “Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 36(2): 149–158. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Gerald, 1974. “Non-neutral Principles,” Journal of Philosophy, 71(14): 491–506. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Ronald, 1977. Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Estlund, David, 2010. “I Will If You Will: Leveraged Enhancements and Distributive Justice,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: pp. 223–241. (Scholar)
Feltham, Brian, and John Cottingham, 2010. Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Firth, Roderick, 1952. “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12(3): 317–345. (Scholar)
Flanagan, Owen, and Jonathan Alder, 1983. “Impartiality and Particularity,” Social Research, 3: 576–596. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry, 1997. “Equality and Respect,” Social Research, 64: 3–15; reprinted in Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 146–55. (Scholar)
Fricker, Miranda, 2007. Epistemic Injustice, Oxford: Clarendon Pres. (Scholar)
Friedman, Marilyn, 1989. “The Impracticality of Impartiality,” Journal of Philosophy, 86: 645–56. (Scholar)
Gaus, Gerald F., 2010, “The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 42–64. (Scholar)
Gauthier, David, 1986. Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
de Gaynesford, Maximilian, 2010. “The Bishop, the Valet, the Wife, and the Ass: What Difference Does it Make if Something is Mine?” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 84–97. (Scholar)
Gert, Bernard, 1998. Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. “Moral Impartiality,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XX: 102–127. (Scholar)
Gewirth, Alan, 1978. Reason and Morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Gilligan, Carol, 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Godwin, William, 1793 [1926]. Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, ed. Raymond Preston. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
–––, 1801 [1968]. Thoughts Occasioned by the Perusal of Dr. Parr’s Spital Sermon, in Uncollected Writings (1785–1822) by William Godwin, ed. J. Marken and B. Pollin, Gainesville, FL: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, pp. 314–5.
Griffin, James, 1986, Well-being, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. Review of Shelly Kagan’s The Limits of Morality, Mind, 99: 129–31. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Value Judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hare, R.M., 1981. Moral Thinking, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Harsanyi, John C., 1977. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” in Sen and Williams, 1982: 39–62. (Scholar)
Henberg, M.C., 1978. “Impartiality,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8(4): 715–724. (Scholar)
Herman, Barbara, 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Hooker, Brad, 1994. “Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck?” Analysis, 54(2): 92–97. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “Impartiality, Predictability, and Indirect Consequentialism,” in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, eds., Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “When is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 26–41. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. “Egoism, Partiality, and Impartiality,” in Roger Crisp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 719–28. (Scholar)
Howard-Snyder, Frances, 1993. “Rule Consequentialism Is a Rubber Duck,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 30: 271–78. (Scholar)
Hume, David, 1978 [1740]. A Treatise of Human Nature, Second edition, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press.
Hurley, Paul, 2009. Beyond Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson Frank, 1991. “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics, 101(3): 461–482. doi:10.1086/293312 (Scholar)
Jeske, Diane, and Richard Fumerton, 1997. “Relatives and Relativism,” Philosophical Studies, 87: 143–57. (Scholar)
Jollimore, Troy A., 2000. “Friendship Without Partiality?” Ratio, 13(1): 69–82. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality, New York: Garland Publishing. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. Love’s Vision, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Jones, Charles, 1999. Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kagan, Shelley, 1989. The Limits of Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Kahane, Guy, 2014. “Evolution and Impartiality,” Ethics, 124(2): 327–41. (Scholar)
Kamm, F.M., 1993. Morality, Mortality, Volume I: Death and Whom to Save From It, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. Morality, Mortality, Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. Intricate Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1964 [1785]. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by H.J. Paton, New York: Harper and Row.
Kapur, Neera Badhwar, 1991. “Why It Is Wrong to be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship,” Ethics, 101: 483–504. (Scholar)
Kavka, Gregory, 1979. “The Numbers Should Count,” Philosophical Studies, 36: 285–294. (Scholar)
Kekes, John, 1981. “Morality and Impartiality,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 18: 295–303. (Scholar)
Keller, Simon, 2004. “Friendship and Belief,” Philosophical Papers, 33(3): 329–351. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. Partiality, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 1979. “Justice as Reversibility,” in P. Laslett and J. Fishkin, ed., Philosophy, Politics and Society, Series 5, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 257–72. (Scholar)
Kolodny, Niko, 2010a. “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010, pp. 169–193. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b. “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38: 37–75. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, Christine, 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Larmore, Charles E., 1987. Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Locke, Don, 1981. “The Principle of Equal Interests,” Philosophical Review, 90: 531–59. (Scholar)
Lord, Erroll, 2016. “Justifying Partiality,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(3): 569–90. (Scholar)
Lovibond, Sabina, 2010. “Impartial Respect and Natural Interest,” Philosophical Topics, 38(1): 143–58. (Scholar)
MacFarquhar, Larissa, 2015. Strangers Drowning: Grappling with Impossible Idealism, Drastic Choices, and the Overpowering Urge to Help, New York: Penguin Press. (Scholar)
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1984. “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” University of Kansas: The Lindley Lecture Series. (Scholar)
–––, 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
McElwee, Brian, 2011. “Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 14: 457–66. (Scholar)
McMahan, Jeff. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling, 1992. “Honoring and Promoting Values,” Ethics, 102: 835–43. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. “Deontology and Agency,” The Monist, 76: 81–100. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. “On Defending Deontology,” Ratio, 11(1): 37–54. (Scholar)
Mendus, Susan, 2002. Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Meyers, Diana Tietjens, 1993. “Moral Reflection: Beyond Impartial Reason,” Hypatia, 8(3): 21–47. (Scholar)
Mill, J.S., 1992 [1861]. Utilitarianism, in On Liberty and Utilitarianism, Knopf: Everyman’s Library, Volume 81.
Miller, Richard W., 1992. Moral Differences, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Monro, D.H., 1950. “Archbishop Fenelon versus My Mother,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 28(3): 154–173. (Scholar)
Mulgan, Tim, 2001. The Demands of Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations. Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nagel, Thomas, 1973. “Rawls on Justice,” Philosophical Review, 82(2): 220–234; reprinted in Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. Equality and Partiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1987. “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16(3): 215–240. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. Equality and Partiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Newey, Charlotte, 2016. “Fairness as ‘Appropriate Impartiality’ and the Problem of Self-Serving Bias,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19: 695–709. (Scholar)
Nielsen, Kai. 1972, “A Defense of Utilitarianism,” Ethics, 82: 113–24. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Justice as a Kind of Impartiality,” Laval Theologique et Philosophique, 50(3): 511–529. (Scholar)
Noddings, Nel, 1984. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
Norcross, Alastair, 2006a. “The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism,” in H. West, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 217–32. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b. “Reasons without Demands: Rethinking Rightness,” in J. Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Oxford University Press, pp. 38–53. (Scholar)
Oldenquist, Andrew, 1982. “Loyalties,” Journal of Philosophy, 79(4): 173–193. (Scholar)
Okin, Susan Moller, 1989a. Justice, Gender and the Family, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
–––, 1989b. “Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice,” Ethics, 99: 229–49. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender.” Ethics, 105: 23–43. (Scholar)
O’Neill, Shane, 1997. Impartiality in Context, Albany: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
Otsuka, Michael, 2000. “Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One,” Analysis, 60(3): 288–93. (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 1978. “Innumerate Ethics,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7(4): 285–301. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, 1997. “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in Baron, Pettit, and Slote (1997): 92–174. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Non-consequentialism and Universalizability,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 50(199): 175–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. The Robust Demands of the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pettit, Philip, and Geoffrey Brennan, 1986. “Restrictive Consequentialism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–55. (Scholar)
Piper, Adrian, 1990. “Higher-Order Discrimination,” in Flanagan and Rorty, ed., Identity, Character and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990, pp. 285–309. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. “Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination,” Ethics, 101: 726–57. (Scholar)
Powers, Madison, 1993. “Contractualist Impartiality and Personal Commitments,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 30(1): 63–71. (Scholar)
Railton, Peter, 1984. “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13: 134–71. (Scholar)
Rawls, John, 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a. “Fairness to Goodness,” in Samuel Freeman, ed., Collected Papers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 267–85. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b. The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/ Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Raz, Joseph, 1990. “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(1): 3–46. (Scholar)
Ridge, Michael, 2010. “Fairness and Non-Compliance,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 194–222. (Scholar)
Sandel, Michael, 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T.M., 1978. “Rights, Goals, and Fairness,” in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–111. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Sen and Williams, 1982: 103–128. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Scheffler, Samuel, 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985. “Agent-Centred Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues,” Mind, 94: 409–19. (Scholar)
–––, 1986. “Morality’s Demands and Their Limits,” The Journal of Philosophy, 83: 531–37. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. Human Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 98–130. (Scholar)
Schwartz, Adina, 1973. “Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods,” Ethics, 83: 294–307. (Scholar)
Sen, Amartya. 2002. “Open and Closed Impartiality,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCIX(9): 445–469. (Scholar)
Sen, Amartya, and Bernard Williams (eds.), 1982. Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, Henry, 1907. The Methods of Ethics, Seventh Edition. London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
Singer, Peter, 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 229–43. (Scholar)
–––, 1974, “All Animals are Equal,” Philosophic Exchange, 5(1), Article 6. [Singer 1974 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2009. The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
Singer, Peter, Leslie Cannold, and Helga Kuhse, 1995. “William Godwin and the Defense of Impartialist Ethics,” Utilitas, 7 (1): 67–86. (Scholar)
Slote, Michael, 1985. Common Sense Morality and Consequentialism, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. “Empathy and Objectivity,” in From Enlightenment to Objectivity: Rethinking Our Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 33–64. (Scholar)
Smart, J.J.C., 1973. “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics,” in Smart and Williams 1973: 1–74. (Scholar)
Smart, J.J.C., and Bernard Williams. 1973. Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Smith, Adam, 1976 [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Stroud, Sarah, 2006. “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” Ethics, 116(3): 498–524. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Permissible Projects, Partiality, and Plural Agency,” in Feltham and Cottingham 2010: 131–149. (Scholar)
Taurek, John, 1977. “Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 293–316. (Scholar)
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Walker, Margaret Urban, 1991. “Partial Consideration,” Ethics, 101: 758–74. (Scholar)
Wiggins, David, 1978. “Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth,” in his Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–86. (Scholar)
Williams, Bernard, 1973. “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in Smart and Williams 1973: 75–150. (Scholar)
–––, 1981. “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in Moral Luck, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–19. (Scholar)
–––, 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “The Human Prejudice,” in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 135–52. (Scholar)
Wissenburg, Marcel, 1999. Imperfection and Impartiality: A Liberal Theory of Social Justice, London: Taylor and Francis. (Scholar)
Wolf, Susan, 1982. “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy, 89: 419–39. Also in Wolf 2015. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. “Morality and Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives, 6: 243–259. (Scholar)
–––, 2015. The Variety of Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Young, Iris Marion, 1987. “Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory,” in Benhabib and Cornell (eds.) 1987: 56–76. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)

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