Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Imprecise Probabilities" by Seamus Bradley
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- Augustin, Thomas, Frank P.A. Coolen, Gert de Cooman, and Matthias C.M. Troffaes (eds), 2014, Introduction to Imprecise Probabilities, John Wiley and Sons. New York. (Scholar)
- Benétreau-Dupin, Yann, 2015, “The Bayesian who knew too much”, Synthese, 192:5 1527–1542. (Scholar)
- Binmore, Ken and Lisa Stewart and Alex Voorhoeve, 2012, “How much ambiguity aversion? Finding indifferences between Ellsberg’s risk and ambiguous bets”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 45: 215–238. (Scholar)
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- Boole, George. 1958 [1854], The Laws of Thought, Dover. New York. (Scholar)
- Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann, 2003, Bayesian epistemology, Oxford University Press. Oxford. (Scholar)
- Bradley, Richard, 2009, “Revising Incomplete Attitudes”, Synthese, 171: 235–256. (Scholar)
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- Bradley, Richard, and Mareile Drechsler, 2014, “Types of Uncertainty”, Erkenntnis. 79: 1225–1248. (Scholar)
- Bradley, Seamus, 2015, “How to choose among choice functions”, Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications, 57–66 URL = <http://www.sipta.org/isipta15/data/paper/9.pdf>. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Vague chance?”, Ergo, 3:20 (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “A counterexample to three imprecise decision theories”, Theoria, 85:1 18–30
- Bradley, Seamus, and Katie Steele, 2014a, “Should Subjective Probabilities be Sharp?” Episteme, 11: 277–289. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014b, “Uncertainty, Learning and the ‘Problem’ of Dilation”, Erkenntnis. 79: 1287–1303. (Scholar)
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- Briggs, R.A., 2014, “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/rationality-normative-utility/>. (Scholar)
- Broome, John, 2000, “Incommensurable Values”, in Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds), 21–38, Clarendon Press. Oxford. (Scholar)
- Bröcker, Jochen, and Leonard A. Smith, 2007, “Scoring Probabilistic Forecasts; On the Importance of Being Proper”, Weather and Forecasting, 22: 382–388. (Scholar)
- Camerer, Colin, and Martin Weber, 1992, “Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5: 325–370. (Scholar)
- Carr, Jennifer, 2015 “Chancy accuracy and imprecise credence”, Philosophical Topics 29 67–81. (Scholar)
- Castro, Clinton and Casey Hart, forthcoming, “The imprecise impermissivists dilemma”, Synthese. (Scholar)
- Cattaneo, Marco, 2008, “Fuzzy Probabilities based on the Likelihood Function”, in Soft Methods for Handling Variability and Imprecision, D. Dubois, M. A. Lubiano, H. Prade, M. A. Gil, P. Grzegorzewski, and O. Hryniewicz (eds), 43–50, Springer. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “A Continuous Updating Rule for Imprecise Probabilities”, in Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge Based Systems, Anne Laurent, Oliver Strauss, Bernadette Bouchon-Meunier, and Ronald R. Yager (eds), 426–435, Springer. (Scholar)
- Chandler, Jacob, 2014, “Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp”, Erkenntnis. 79: 1273–1286. (Scholar)
- Chu, Francis, and Joseph Y. Halpern, 2004, “Great expectations. Part II: Generalized expected utility as a universal decision rule”, Artificial Intelligence, 159: 207–230. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Great expectations. Part I: On the customizability of General Expected Utility”, Theory and Decision, 64: 1–36. (Scholar)
- Clifford, William Kingdom, 1901, “The Ethics of Belief”, in Lectures and Essays, Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock (eds), 2:161–205, 3rd Edition, Macmillan. London. (Scholar)
- de Cooman, Gert, and Enrique Miranda, 2007, “Symmetry of models versus models of symmetry”, in Probability and Inference: Essays in Honor of Henry E. Kyburg Jnr., William Harper and Gregory Wheeler (eds), 67–149, Kings College Publications. (Scholar)
- Cozman, Fabio, 2000, “Credal Networks”, Artificial Intelligence, 120: 199–233. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Sets of probability distributions, independence and convexity”, Synthese, 186: 577–600. (Scholar)
- Cozman, Fabio, and Peter Walley, 2005, “Graphoid properties of epistemic irrelevance and independence”, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 45: 173–195. (Scholar)
- Dardashti, Radin, Luke Glynn, Karim Thébault, and Mathias Frisch, 2014, “Unsharp Humean chances in statistical physics: a reply to Beisbart”, in New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel, and Marcel Weber (eds), 531–542, Springer. Dordrecht. (Scholar)
- Elga, Adam, 2010, “Subjective Probabilities should be Sharp”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 10. (Scholar)
- Elkin, Lee and Gregory Wheeler, 2016 “Resolving peer disagreements through imprecise probabilities”, Noûs, 52:2 260–278. (Scholar)
- Ellsberg, Daniel, 1961, “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75: 643–696. (Scholar)
- Eriksson, Lena, and Alan Hájek, 2007, “What Are Degrees of Belief?” Studia Logica, 86: 183–213. (Scholar)
- Evren, Özgür, and Efe Ok, 2011, “On the multi-utility representation of preference relations”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47: 554–563. (Scholar)
- Ferson, Scott and Lev R. Ginzburg,1996, “Different methods are needed to propagate ignorance and variability”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 54 133–144. (Scholar)
- Ferson, Scott and Janos G. Hajagos, 2004, “Arithmetic with uncertain numbers: Rigorous and (often) best possible answers”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 85 135–152. (Scholar)
- Fine, Terrence L., 1973, Theories of Probability: An Examination of Foundations, Academic Press. New York. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Lower Probability Models for Uncertainty and Nondeterministic Processes”, Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 20: 389–411. (Scholar)
- de Finetti, Bruno, 1964, “Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources”, in Studies in Subjective Probability Studies in Subjective Probability, Henry E. Kyburg and Howard E. Smokler (eds), 97–158, Wiley. New York. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990 [1974], Theory of Probability, Wiley Classics Library, Vol. 1, Wiley. New York. (Scholar)
- Fox, Craig R., and Amos Tversky, 1995, “Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 585–603. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, Bas, 1984, “Belief and the Will”, Journal of Philosophy, 81: 235–256. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Figures in a Probability Landscape”, in Truth or Consequences, Michael Dunn and Anil Gupta (eds), 345–356, Springer. Dordrecht. (Scholar)
- Frigg, Roman, 2008, “Humean chance in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics”, Philosophy of Science, 75: 670–681. (Scholar)
- Frigg, Roman, Seamus Bradley, Hailiang Du, and Leonard A. Smith, 2014, “Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of his Apprentices”, Philosophy of Science, 81: 31–59. (Scholar)
- Fumagalli, Roberto, 2013, “The Futile Search for True Utility”, Economics and Philosophy, 29: 325–347. (Scholar)
- Gärdenfors, Peter, 1979, “Forecasts, Decisions and Uncertain Probabilities”, Erkenntnis, 14: 159–181. (Scholar)
- Gärdenfors, Peter, and Nils-Eric Sahlin, 1982, “Unreliable probabilities, risk taking and decision making”, Synthese, 53: 361–386. (Scholar)
- Genest, Christian, and James V. Zidek, 1986, “Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and Annotated Bibliography”, Statistical Science, 1: 114–135. (Scholar)
- Gilboa, Itzhak, 1987, “Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-additive Probabilities”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16: 65–88. (Scholar)
- Glymour, Clark, 1980, “Why I am not a Bayesian”, in Theory and Evidence, 63–93. Princeton University Press. Princeton. (Scholar)
- Gong, Ruobin and Xiao-Li Meng, 2017 “Judicious judgment meets unsettling update: dilation, sure loss and Simpson’s paradox”, URL = <https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.08946>. (Scholar)
- Good, Irving John, 1962, “Subjective probability as the measure of a non-measurable set”, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress, 319–329. (Scholar)
- –––, 1967, “On the principle of total evidence”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17: 319–321. (Scholar)
- –––, 1974, “A little learning can be dangerous”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25: 340–342.
- –––, 1983 [1971], “Twenty-Seven principles of rationality”, in Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and its Applications Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and its Applications, 15–19. University of Minnesota Press. Minnesota. (Scholar)
- Grize, Yves L., and Terrence L. Fine, 1987, “Continuous Lower Probability-Based Models for Stationary Processes with Bounded and Divergent Time Averages”, The Annals of Probability, 15: 783–803. (Scholar)
- Haenni, Rolf, 2009, “Non-additive degrees of belief”, in Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009: 121–160. (Scholar)
- Haenni, Rolf, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler, and Jon Williamson, 2011, Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks, Synthese Library. Dordrecht. (Scholar)
- Hájek, Alan, 2003, “What conditional probabilities could not be”, Synthese, 137: 273–323. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Arguments for—or against—probabilism?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59: 793–819. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Interpretations of Probability”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/probability-interpret/>. (Scholar)
- Hájek, Alan, and Michael Smithson, 2012, “Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities”, Synthese, 187: 33–48. (Scholar)
- Halpern, Joseph Y., 2003, Reasoning about uncertainty, MIT press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Hammond, Peter, 1988, “Orderly Decision Theory”, Economics and Philosophy, 4: 292–297. (Scholar)
- Harsanyi, John, 1955, “Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and interpersonal comparisons of utility”, Journal of Political Economy, 63: 309–321. (Scholar)
- Hart. Casey and Michael Titelbaum, 2015 “Intuitive dilation?”, Thought, 4 252–262. (Scholar)
- Hartmann, Stephan, and Patrick Suppes, 2010, “Entanglement, Upper Probabilities and Decoherence in Quantum Mechanics”, in EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Mauricio Suárez, Mauro Dorato, and Miklós Rédei (eds), 93–103, Springer. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, James, 2009, “The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief”, in Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009: 49–74. (Scholar)
- Herron, Timothy, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Larry Wasserman, 1994, “The Extent of Dilation of Sets of Probabilities and the Asymptotics of Robust Bayesian Inference”, in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 250–259. (Scholar)
- Hill, Brian, 2013, “Confidence and decision”, Games and Economic Behavior, 82 675–692. (Scholar)
- Hosni, Hykel, 2014, “Towards a Bayesian theory of second order uncertainty: Lessons from non-standard logics”, in David Makinson on classical methods for non-classical problems, Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), 195–221, Springer. Dordrecht. (Scholar)
- Howson, Colin, 2012, “Modelling Uncertain Inference”, Synthese, 186: 475–492. (Scholar)
- Howson, Colin, and Peter Urbach, 2006, Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach, 3rd edition, Open Court. Chicago. (Scholar)
- Huber, Franz, 2009, “Belief and Degrees of Belief”, in Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009: 1–33. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “Formal Representations of Belief”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/formal-belief/>. (Scholar)
- Huber, Franz and Cristoph Schmidt-Petri (eds), 2009, Degrees of Belief, Springer. Dordrecht. (Scholar)
- Huntley, Nathan, Robert Hable, and Matthias Troffaes, 2014, “Decision making”, in Augustin et al. 2014: 190–206. (Scholar)
- James, William, 1897, “The Will to Believe”, in The Will to Believe and other essays in popular philosophy, 1–31. Longmans, Green and Co. New York. (Scholar)
- Jaynes, Edwin T., 2003, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Jeffrey, Richard, 1983, The Logic of Decision, 2nd edition. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Bayesianism with a Human Face”, in Testing Scientific Theories, John Earman (ed.), 133–156, University of Minnesota Press. Minnesota. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Indefinite Probability Judgment: A Reply to Levi”, Philosophy of Science, 54: 586–591. (Scholar)
- Joyce, James M., 1999, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge studies in probability, induction and decision theory, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “How Probabilities Reflect Evidence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 153–178. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief”, in Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009: 263–297. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “A Defense of Imprecise Credence in Inference and Decision”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 281–323. (Scholar)
- Kadane, Joseph B., Mark J. Schervish, and Teddy Seidenfeld, 1999, Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, Mark, 1983, “Decision theory as philosophy”, Philosophy of Science, 50: 549–577. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Decision Theory as Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Keynes, J. M., 1921, A Treatise on Probability, Macmillan. London. (Scholar)
- Konek, Jason, forthcoming “Epistemic conservativity and imprecise credence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Scholar)
- Koopman, B. O., 1940, “The Bases of Probability”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 46: 763–774. (Scholar)
- Kumar, Anurag, and Terrence L. Fine, 1985, “Stationary Lower Probabilities and Unstable Averages”, Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete, 69: 1–17. (Scholar)
- Kyburg, Henry E., 1983, “Rational belief”, The Brain and Behavioural Sciences, 6: 231–273. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Bayesian and non-Bayesian evidential updating”, Artificial Intelligence, 31: 271–293. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Are there degrees of belief?” Journal of Applied Logic: 139–149. (Scholar)
- Kyburg, Henry E., and Michael Pittarelli, 1992, Set-based Bayesianism. (Scholar)
- Kyburg, Henry E., and Choh Man Teng, 2001, Uncertain Inference, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Leitgeb, Hannes, 2014, “The stability theory of belief”, The Philosophical Review, 123: 131–171. (Scholar)
- Levi, Isaac, 1974, “On Indeterminate probabilities”, Journal of Philosophy, 71: 391–418. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, The Enterprise of Knowledge, The MIT Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Ignorance, Probability and Rational Choice”, Synthese, 53: 387–417. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment”, Philosophy of Science, 52: 390–409. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, Hard Choices: decision making under unresolved conflict, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Value commitments, value conflict and the separability of belief and value”, Philosophy of Science, 66: 509–533. (Scholar)
- Levinstein, Ben, forthcoming, “Imprecise epistemic values and imprecise credences”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1986, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance (and postscript)”, in Philosophical Papers II, 83–132. Oxford University Press. Oxford. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind, 103: 473–490. (Scholar)
- List, Christian, and Philip Pettit, 2011, Group Agency, Oxford University Press. Oxford. (Scholar)
- Loewer, B., 2001, “Determinism and chance”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 32: 609–620. (Scholar)
- Lyon, Aidan, 2017, “Vague Credences”, Synthese, 194:10 3931–3954. (Scholar)
- Machina, Mark J., 1989, “Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of Choice Under Uncertainty”, Journal of Economic Literature, 27: 1622–1668. (Scholar)
- Mayo-Wilson, Conor and Gregory Wheeler, 2016, “Scoring imprecise credences: a mildly immodest proposal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93:1 55–78. (Scholar)
- Meacham, Christopher, and Jonathan Weisberg, 2011, “Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89: 641–663. (Scholar)
- Miranda, Enrique, 2008, “A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions”, International Journal of Approcimate Reasoning, 48: 628–658.
- Miranda, Enrique, and Gert de Cooman, 2014, “Lower previsions”, in Augustin et al. 2014, pp. 28–55. (Scholar)
- Moss, Sarah, 2015, “Credal Dilemmas”, Noûs, 49:4 665–683. (Scholar)
- Norton, John, 2007, “Probability disassembled”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58: 141–171. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008a, “Ignorance and Indifference”, Philosophy of Science, 75: 45–68. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “The dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism”, Philosophy of Science, 75: 786–798. (Scholar)
- Oberguggenberger, Michael, 2014, “Engineering”, in Augustin et al. 2014: 291–304. (Scholar)
- Oberkampf, William and Christopher Roy, 2010 Verification and Validation in Scientific Computing, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. (Scholar)
- Pedersen, Arthur Paul, 2014, “Comparative Expectations”, Studia Logica. 102: 811–848. (Scholar)
- Pedersen, Arthur Paul, and Gregory Wheeler, 2014, “Demystifying Dilation”, Erkenntnis.79: 1305–1342. (Scholar)
- Pettigrew, Richard, 2011, “Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/epistemic-utility/>. (Scholar)
- Pfeifer, Niki, and Gernot D. Kleiter, 2007, “Human reasoning with imprecise probabilities: Modus ponens and denying the antecedent”, Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theory and Application: 347–356. (Scholar)
- Quaeghebeur, Erik, 2014, “Desirability”, in Augustin et al. 2014: 1–27. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F. P., 1926, “Truth and Probability”, in The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, 156–198. Routledge. London. (Scholar)
- Rinard, Susanna, 2013, “Against Radical Credal Imprecision”, Thought, 2: 157–165. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “A decision theory for imprecise probabilities”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 15 1–16.
- Ruggeri, Fabrizio, David Ríos and Jacinto Martín, 2005, “Robust Bayesian analysis”, Handbook of Statistics, 25 623–667, Elsevier. Amsterdam (Scholar)
- Sahlin, Nils-Eric, and Paul Weirich, 2014, “Unsharp Sharpness”, Theoria, 80: 100–103. (Scholar)
- Savage, Leonard J., 1972 [1954], The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd edition, Dover. New York. (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, “Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectation”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66: 783–801. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, Jonathan, 2007, “Deterministic Chance?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58: 114–140. (Scholar)
- Schervish, Mark J., Teddy Seidenfeld, and Joseph B. Kadane, 2008, “The fundamental theorems of prevision and asset pricing”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 49: 148–158. (Scholar)
- Schoenfield, Miriam, 2012, “Chilling out on epistemic rationality”, Philosophical Studies, 158: 197–219. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “The accuracy and rationality of imprecise credence”, Noûs, 51:4 667–685. (Scholar)
- Seidenfeld, Teddy, 1988, “Decision theory without ‘independence’ or without ‘ordering’. What’s the difference?” Economics and Philosophy: 267–290. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “When normal and extensive form decisions differ”, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, IX: 451–463. (Scholar)
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- Seidenfeld, Teddy, Joseph B. Kadane, and Mark J. Schervish, 1989, “On the shared preferences of two Bayesian decision makers”, The Journal of Philosophy, 86: 225–244. (Scholar)
- Seidenfeld, Teddy, Mark J. Schervish, and Joseph B. Kadane, 1995, “A Representation of Partially Ordered Preferences”, Annals of Statistics, 23: 2168–2217. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Coherent choice functions under uncertainty”, Synthese, 172: 157–176. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Forecasting with imprecise probabilities”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 53: 1248–1261. (Scholar)
- Seidenfeld, Teddy, and Larry Wasserman, 1993, “Dilation for sets of probabilities”, Annals of Statistics, 21: 1139–1154. (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian, 2011, “Resiliency, Propensities and Causal Necessity”, in Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Antony Eagle (ed.), 529–536, Routledge. London. (Scholar)
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- Smithson, Michael, and Helen Pushkarskaya, 2015, “Ignorance and the Brain: Are there Distinct Kinds of Unknowns?” in Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies, Matthias Gross and Linsey McGoey (eds), Routledge. (Scholar)
- Sorensen, Roy, 2012, “Vagueness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Vagueness/" target="other">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/Vagueness/>. (Scholar)
- Stainforth, David A., Miles R. Allen, E. R. Tredger, and Leonard A. Smith, 2007, “Confidence uncertainty and decision-support relevance in climate models”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 365: 2145–2161. (Scholar)
- Steele, Katie, 2007, “Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ‘risk averse’ preference”, Synthese, 158: 189–205. (Scholar)
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- Talbott, William, 2008, “Bayesian Epistemology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/epistemology-bayesian/>. (Scholar)
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- Vallinder, Aron, 2018 “Imprecise Bayesianism and global belief inertia”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69:4 1205–1230. (Scholar)
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- Vicig, Paolo, and Teddy Seidenfeld, 2012, “Bruno de Finetti and imprecision: Imprecise Probability Does not Exist!” International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 53: 1115–1123. (Scholar)
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