Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will" by Randolph Clarke, Justin Capes and Philip Swenson

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Almeida, M. and M. Bernstein, 2003. “Lucky Libertarianism,” Philosophical Studies, 113: 93–119. (Scholar)
Alvarez, Maria and John Hyman, 1998. “Agents and their Actions,” Philosophy, 73: 219–45. (Scholar)
Balaguer, Mark, 1999. “Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View,” Philosophical Studies, 93: 189–211. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will,” Noûs, 38: 379–406. (Scholar)
Berkeley, George, 1710 [1998]. A Treatics Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broad, C. D., 1952. Ethics and the History of Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Capes, Justin A., 2017. “Freedom with Causation,” Erkenntnis, 82: 327–338. (Scholar)
Campbell, C. A., 1957. On Selfhood and Godhood, London: George Allen & Unwin. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1966. “Freedom and Action,” in Freedom and Determinism, Keith Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, 11–44. (Scholar)
–––, 1971. “Reflections on Human Agency,” Idealistic Studies, 1: 33–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1976a. “The Agent as Cause,” in Action Theory, Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 199–211. (Scholar)
–––, 1976b. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
–––, 1978. “Comments and Replies,” Philosophia, 7: 597–636. (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, 1993. “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,” Noûs, 27: 191–203. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action,” Philosophical Topics, 24 (2): 19–48. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. “Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More,” Philosophical Explorations, 2: 20–41. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 356–85. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a. “Freedom of the Will,” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 369–404. (Scholar)
–––,. 2003b. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Are We Free to Obey the Laws?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 389–401. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. “Alternatives for Libertarians,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 329–48. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel C., 1978. “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want,” in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books, 286–99. (Scholar)
Donagan, Alan, 1987. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell, 2000. Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Boulder: Westview Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. “Free Will, Chance, and Mystery,” Philosophical Studies, 113: 153–80. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “Toward a Plausible Event-Causal Indeterminist Account of Free Will,” Synthese, 196: 127–144. (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard and Andrei A. Buckareff, YEAR. “Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency,” Philosophical Studies, 112: 135–45. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, 1995. “Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker,” Faith and Philosophy, 12: 119–25. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 66: 828–39. (Scholar)
Franklin, Christopher, 2011a. “The Problem of Enhanced Control,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89: 687–706. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b. “Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument,” Philosophical Studies, 156: 199–230. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 1989. “Reasons Explanations of Action: An Incompatibilist Account,” Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 17–46. (Scholar)
–––, 1990. On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997. “Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency,” Journal of Ethics, 1: 85–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 386–405. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent,” in Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy, eds. Christoph Lumer and Sandro Nannini, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 243–55. (Scholar)
–––, 2008. “In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations,” Journal of Ethics, 12: 229–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice up to the Agent?” in Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, David Palmer (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 15–26. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. “Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal Account,” Journal of Ethics, 20: 219–28. (Scholar)
Griffith, Meghan, 2005. “Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to van Inwagen,” Philosophical Studies, 124: 261–69. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions,” Acta Analytica, 22: 16–28. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Why Agent-Caused Actions are Not Lucky,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 43–56. (Scholar)
Goetz, Stewart, 1988. “A Noncausal Theory of Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49: 303–16. (Scholar)
–––, 1997. “Libertarian Choice,” Faith and Philosophy, 14: 195–211. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. “Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,” in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (eds.), London: Routledge, 156–86. (Scholar)
Haji, Ishtiyaque, 1999a. “Indeterminism and Frankfurt-type Examples,” Philosophical Explorations, 2: 42–58. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b. “Moral Anchors and Control,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29: 175–204. (Scholar)
–––, 2000a. “Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck,” Journal of Ethics, 4: 211–35. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b. “Libertarianism and the Luck Objection,” Journal of Ethics, 4: 329–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2000c. “On the Value of Ultimate Responsibility,” in Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Ton van den Beld (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 155–70. (Scholar)
–––, 2001. “Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 82: 178–200. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action,” Philosophical Explorations, 7: 131–48. (Scholar)
Hodgson, David, 2012. Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hyman, John, 2015. Action, Knowledge, and Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jacobs, Jonathan D. and Timothy O’Connor, 2013. “Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics,” in Mental Causation and Ontology, S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 173–92. (Scholar)
Kane, Robert, 1985. Free Will and Values, Albany: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1989. “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50: 219–54. (Scholar)
–––, 1994. “Free Will: The Elusive Ideal,” Philosophical Studies, 75: 25–60. (Scholar)
–––, 1996a. “Freedom, Responsibility, and Will-Setting,” Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 67–90. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b. The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a. “On Free Will, Responsibility and Indeterminism,” Philosophical Explorations, 2: 105–21. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b. “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism,” Journal of Philosophy, 96: 217–40. (Scholar)
–––, 2000a. “The Dual Regress of Free Will and the Role of Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 57–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b. “Free Will and Responsibility: Ancient Dispute, New Themes,” Journal of Ethics, 4: 315–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2000c. “Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 157–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 406–37. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Agency, Responsibility, and Indeterminism: Reflections on Libertarian Theories of Free Will,” in Freedom and Determinism, eds. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 70–88. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007a. “Libertarianism,” in Four Views on Free Will, by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Oxford: Blackwell, 5–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b. “Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas,” in Four Views on Free Will, by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Oxford: Blackwell, 166–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. “Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 381–404. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a. “Acting ‘Of One’s Own Free Will’: Modern Reflections on an Ancient Problem,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114, Part 1: 35–55. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b. “New Arguments in Debates on Libertarian Free Will: Responses to Contributors,” in Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, David Palmer (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 179–214. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. “On the Role of Indeterminism in Libertarian Free Will,” Philosophical Explorations, 19: 2–16. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “The Complex Tapestry of Free Will: Striving Will, Indeterminism and Volitional Streams,” Synthese, 196: 145–160. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1046-8 (Scholar)
Levy, Neil, 2011. Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lowe, E. J., 2008. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. “Substance Causation, Powers, and Human Agency,” in Mental Causation and Ontology, S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 153–72. (Scholar)
Mawson, T. J., 2011. Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed, New York: Continuum Press. (Scholar)
Mayr, Erasmus, 2011. Understanding Human Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McCall, Storrs, 1994. A Model of the Universe, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
McCann, Hugh J., 1998. The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. “Making Decisions,” Philosophical Issues, 22: 246–63. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred R., 1992. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios,” Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 123–41. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. Review of The Significance of Free Will, Journal of Philosophy, 95: 581–84. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a. “Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will,” Philosophical Explorations, 2: 96–104. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b. “Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck,” Social Philosophy & Policy, 16: 274–93. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. Motivation and Agency, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Libertarianism, Luck, and Control,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86: 381–407. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. Free Will and Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
O’Connor, Timothy, 1995. “Agent Causation,” in Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Timothy O’Connor (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 173–200. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Why Agent Causation?” Philosophical Topics, 24(2): 143–58. (Scholar)
–––, 2000a. “Causality, Mind, and Free Will,” Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 105–17. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. “Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 337–55. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. “Freedom with a Human Face,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 207–27. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a. “Agent-Causal Power,” in Dispositions and Causes, Toby Handfield (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 189–214. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b. “Degrees of Freedom,” Philosophical Explorations, 12: 119–25. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. “Free Will and Metaphysics,” in Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, David Palmer (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 27–34. (Scholar)
O’Connor, Timothy and John Ross Churchill, 2004. “Reasons Explanation and Agent Control: In Search of an Integrated Account,” Philosophical Topics, 32: 241–53. (Scholar)
Palmer, David, 2016. “Goetz on the Noncausal Libertarian View of Free Will,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 5: 99–107. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming. “Free Will and Control: A Non-causal Approach,” Synthese, first online 30 May 2020. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02701-4 (Scholar)
Pereboom, Derk, 2001. Living Without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004. “Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?” Philosophical Topics, 32: 275–86. (Scholar)
–––, 2007. “Hard Incompatibilism,” in Four Views on Free Will, by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, Oxford: Blackwell, 85–125. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pink, Thomas, 2004. Free Will: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Reid, Thomas, 1788 [1969]. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Rowe, William L., 1991. Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2003. “Alternate Possibilities and Reid’s Theory of Agent-Causation,” in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Impartance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. David Widerker and Michael McKenna, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 219–34. (Scholar)
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