Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Intention" by Kieran Setiya
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- Alonso, F., 2020, ‘Planning on a Prior Intention,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 18: 229–265. [Alonso 2020 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, ‘The Limits of Partial Doxasticism,’ Erkenntnis, 72: 326–345. (Scholar)
- Alvarez, M., 2010, Kinds of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Anscombe, G. E. M., 1963, Intention, second edition,
Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, ‘The Causation of
Action,’ reprinted in Human Life, Action, and Ethics,
M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds.), Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005, pp.
89–108. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, ‘Practical Inference,’
reprinted in Human Life, Action, and Ethics, M. Geach and L.
Gormally (eds.), Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005, pp.
109–147. (Scholar)
- Archer, A., 2017, ‘Do We Need Partial Intentions?’ Philosophia, 45: 995–1005. (Scholar)
- Asarnow, S., forthcoming, ‘Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action,’ Erkenntnis. (Scholar)
- Audi, R., 1973, ‘Intending,’ Journal of Philosophy, 70: 387–403. (Scholar)
- Baier, A., 1970, ‘Act and Intent,’ Journal of Philosophy, 67: 648–658. (Scholar)
- Beddor, B. and Pavese, C., forthcoming, ‘Practical Knowledge without Luminosity,’ Mind. (Scholar)
- Bok, H., 1996, ‘Acting without Choosing,’ Noûs, 30: 174–196. (Scholar)
- Bratman, M., 1985, ‘Davidson’s Theory of
Intention,’ reprinted in Faces of Intention, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 209–224. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, ‘Cognitivism about Practical Reason,’ reprinted in Faces of Intention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 250–264. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, ‘Valuing and the Will,’ reprinted in Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 47–67. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009a, ‘Intention, Belief, and
Practical Rationality,’ in Reasons for Action, D. Sobel
and S. Wall (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
13–36. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009b, ‘Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,’ Ethics, 119: 411–443. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009c, ‘Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,’ in Spheres of Reason, S. Robertson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, Planning, Time, and Self-Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Broome, J., 2001, ‘Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope With Incommensurable Values?’ in Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, C. W. Morris and A. Ripstein (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–120. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, ‘Reasons,’ in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, R. J. Wallace, et al. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28–55. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, Rationality Through Reasoning, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Brunero, J., 2007, ‘Are Intentions Reasons?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88: 424–444. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘Self-Governance, Means-End Coherence, and Unalterable Ends,’ Ethics, 120: 579–591. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, ‘Intention Persistence,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
- Burge, T., 1988, ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge,’ Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649–663. (Scholar)
- Campbell, L., 2018a, ‘An Epistemology for Practical Knowledge,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 159–177. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018b, ‘Two Notions of Intentional
Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s
Intention,’ British Journal for the History of
Philosophy, 26: 578–602. (Scholar)
- Chang, R., 2002, ‘The Possibility of Parity,’ Ethics, 112: 659–688. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, ‘Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity,’ in Reasons for Action, D. Sobel and S. Wall (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 243–271. (Scholar)
- Chislenko, E., 2016, ‘A Solution for Buridan’s Ass,’
Ethics, 126: 286–310. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, ‘Akratic Action under the Guise of the Good,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 606–621. (Scholar)
- Cullity, G., 2008, ‘Decisions, Reasons, and Rationality,’ Ethics, 119: 57–95. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1963, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 3–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, ‘How is Weakness of the Will
Possible?’ Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 21–42. (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, ‘Agency,’ reprinted in
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980, pp. 43–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, ‘Freedom to Act,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 63–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, ‘Intending,’ reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 83–102. (Scholar)
- Davis, W., 1984, ‘A Causal Theory of Intending,’ reprinted in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 131–148. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, ‘Reasons and Psychological Causes,’ Philosophical Studies, 122: 51–101. (Scholar)
- Falvey, K., 2000, ‘Knowledge in Intention,’ Philosophical Studies, 99: 21–44. (Scholar)
- Ferrero, L., 2006, ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink Tomorrow,’ in Rationality in Belief and Action, E. Baccarini and S. Prijic-Samarzija (eds.), Rijeka: Filozofski Facultet, pp. 95–127. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor,’ Philosophers’ Imprint, 10. [Ferrero 2006 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, ‘Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?’ Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 1: 70–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, ‘Intending, Acting, and Doing,’ Philosophical Explorations, 20 (Supplement 2): 13–39. (Scholar)
- Ford, A., 2011, ‘Action and Generality,’ in Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F. Stoutland (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 76–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, ‘The Arithmetic of Intention,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 129–143. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, ‘On What is in Front of Your Nose,’ Philosophical Topics, 44: 141–161. (Scholar)
- Frost, K., 2014, ‘On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit,’ Philosophical Review, 123: 429–484. (Scholar)
- Gibbons, J., 2010, ‘Seeing What You’re Doing,’
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3: 63–85. (Scholar)
- Ginet, C., 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldstein, S., 2016, ‘A Preface Paradox for Intention,’ Philosophers’ Imprint, 16. [Goldstein 2016 available online] (Scholar)
- Grice, H. P., 1971, ‘Intention and Uncertainty,’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 5: 263–279. (Scholar)
- Haase, M., 2018, ‘Knowing What I Have Done,’ Manuscrito, 41: 195–253. [Haase 2018 available online] (Scholar)
- Hampshire, S., 1959, Thought and Action, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1976, ‘Practical Reasoning,’ reprinted in
The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997, pp. 149–177. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, ‘Willing and Intending,’
in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, R. E. Grandy and R.
Warner (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
363–380. (Scholar)
- Holton, R., 2008, ‘Partial Belief, Partial Intention,’ Mind, 117: 27–58. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hursthouse, R., 2000, ‘Intention,’ in Logic, Cause and Action, R. Teichmann (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 83–105. (Scholar)
- Hyman, J., 2014, ‘Desires, Dispositions and Deviant Causal Chains,’ Philosophy, 89: 83–112. (Scholar)
- Kolodny, N., 2008, ‘The Myth of Practical Consistency,’ European Journal of Philosophy, 16: 366–402. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Aims as Reasons,’ in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, S. Freeman, R. Kumar, and and R. J. Wallace (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 43–78. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C., 2008, ‘Acting for a Reason,’ in The
Constitution of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
207–229. (Scholar)
- Langton, R., 2004, ‘Intention as Faith,’ in Agency and Action, J. Hyman and H. Steward (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 243–258. (Scholar)
- Lavin, D., 2013, ‘Must There Be Basic Action?’
Noûs, 47: 273–301. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, ‘Action as a Form of Temporal
Unity: On Anscombe’s Intention,’ Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 45: 609–629. (Scholar)
- Levy, Y., 2018, ‘Why Cognitivism?’ Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 48: 223–244. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, ‘Disjunctivism about Intending,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 161–180. (Scholar)
- Marcus, E., 2012, Rational Causation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Marušić, B., 2015, Evidence and Agency,
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Marušić, B. and Schwenkler, J., 2018, ‘Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism,’ Analytic Philosophy, 59: 309–340. (Scholar)
- McCann, H., 1991, ‘Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,’ reprinted in The Philosophy of Action, A. Mele (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 204–222. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1995, ‘Knowledge and the Internal,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 877–893. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘What is the Content of an Intention in Action?’ Ratio, 23: 415–432. (Scholar)
- Mele, A., 1992, Springs of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Moran, R., 2004, ‘Anscombe on “Practical
Knowledge,”’ in Agency and Action, J. Hyman and
H. Steward (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
43–68. (Scholar)
- Moran, R. and Stone, M., 2009, ‘Anscombe on Expression of Intention,’ in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, C. Sandis (ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 132–168. (Scholar)
- Mulder, J., 2018, ‘Why Intentions?’ Ratio,
31: 51–64. (Scholar)
- Muñoz, D., 2018, ‘Thinking, Acting, Considering,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96: 255–270. (Scholar)
- Newstead, A., 2006, ‘Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent’s Knowledge,’ in Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays, S. Hetherington (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 183–202. (Scholar)
- O’Brien, L., 2007, Self-Knowing Agents, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Paul, S., 2009, ‘How We Know What We’re Doing,’
Philosophers’ Imprint, 9.
[Paul 2009 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Deviant Formal Causation,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 5: 1–23. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014a, ‘Embarking on a Crime,’ in Law and the Philosophy of Action, E. Villanueva (ed.), Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 101–124. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014b, ‘Diachronic Incontinence is a Problem in Moral Philosophy,’ Inquiry, 57: 337–355. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, ‘Good Intentions and the Road to Hell,’ Philosophical Explorations, 20: 40–54. (Scholar)
- Pears, D. F., 1985, ‘Intention and Belief,’ in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–88. (Scholar)
- Pickard, H., 2004, ‘Knowledge of Action without Observation,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104: 203–228. (Scholar)
- Piñeros Glasscock, J. S., 2020, ‘Practical Knowledge
and Luminosity,’ Mind, 129: 1237–1267. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J., 1955, ‘Two Concepts of Rules,’ Philosophical Review, 64: 3–32. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 2005, ‘The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1: 1–28. (Scholar)
- Ridge, M., 1998, ‘Humean Intentions,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 35: 157–178. (Scholar)
- Rödl, S., 2007, Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ross, J., 2009, ‘How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason,’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4: 243–281. (Scholar)
- Russell, D., 2018, ‘Intention as Action Under Development: Why Intention is Not a Mental State,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 742–761. (Scholar)
- Schapiro, T., 2011, ‘Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis,’ Journal of Ethics, 15: 147–167. (Scholar)
- Schwenkler, J., 2011, ‘Perception and Practical Knowledge,’ Philosophical Explorations, 14: 137–152. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, ‘Understanding “Practical
Knowledge,”’ Philosophers’ Imprint, 15.
[Schwenkler 2011 available online] (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Setiya, K., 2007a, Reasons without Rationalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007b, ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,’ Ethics, 117: 647–673. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, ‘Practical Knowledge,’ Ethics, 118: 388–409. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, ‘Practical Knowledge Revisited,’ Ethics, 120: 128–137. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Reasons and Causes,’European Journal of Philosophy, 19: 129–157. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, ‘Knowing How,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112: 285–307. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, ‘Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism,’ in Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, M. Vargas and G. Yaffe (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56–82. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016a, ‘Anscombe on Practical Knowledge,’ in Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 156–168. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016b, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Shah, N., 2009, ‘How Action Governs Intention,’
Philosophers’ Imprint, 8.
[Shah 2009 available online] (Scholar)
- Shpall, S., 2016, ‘The Calendar Paradox,’ Philosophical Studies, 173: 293–307. (Scholar)
- Sinhababu, N., 2013, ‘The Desire-Belief Account of Intention
Explains Everything,’ Noûs, 47:
680–696. (Scholar)
- Small, W., 2019, ‘Basic Action and Practical Knowledge,’ Philosophers’ Imprint, 19. [Small 2019 available online] (Scholar)
- Smith, M. N., 2016, ‘One Dogma of Philosophy of Action,’ Philosophical Studies, 173: 2249–2266. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P., 1980–1, ‘Perception, Vision, and Causation,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 175–192. (Scholar)
- Steward, H., 1997, The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tenenbaum, S., 2007, Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, ‘Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense,’ Inquiry, 57: 384–411. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Thalberg, I., 1984, ‘Do Our Intentions Cause Our Intentional Actions?’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 21: 249–260. (Scholar)
- Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Anscombe’s
Intention and Practical Knowledge,’ in Essays on
Anscombe’s Intention, A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F. Stoutland
(eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.
198–210. (Scholar)
- Valaris, M., 2015, ‘The Instrumental Structure of Actions,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 65: 64–83. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. D., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, ‘Introduction,’ in
The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 1–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘What Good is a Will?’ In Action in Context, A. Leist (ed.), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 193–215. (Scholar)
- Vogler, C., 2002, Reasonably Vicious, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Wallace, R. J., 1999, ‘Three Conceptions of Rational Agency,’ reprinted in Normativity and the Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 43–62. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,’ reprinted in Normativity and the Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 82–120. (Scholar)
- Way, J., 2010, ‘Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to
Instrumental Reason,’ Philosophical Studies, 147:
213–233. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, G., 1989, The Intentionality of Human Action,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wolfson, B., 2011, ‘Agential Knowledge, Action, and
Process,’ Theoria, 78: 326–357. (Scholar)