Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Intentionality" by Pierre Jacob

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

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Anscombe, G.E.M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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Baker, L.R., 1993, “Metaphysics and mental causation,” in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Bayne, T., and Montague, M. (eds.), 2011, Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bell, D., 1990, Husserl, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Block, N., 1995, “On a confusion about a function of consciousness,” in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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Brentano, F., 1874 [1911, 1973, 1995], Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
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Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: Chicago University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Chisholm, R. M., 1956, Perceiving: a Philosophical Study, reprinted in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
Chomsky, N., 2000, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Church, A., 1956, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Volume 1), Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Churchland, P.M., 1989, A Neurocomputational Perspective, The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D., 1998, “The extended mind,” Analysis, 58 (1): 7–19. (Scholar)
Clark, A., 2008, Supersizing the Mind, Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Crane, T. (ed.), 1992, The Contents of Experience, Essays on Perception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Intentionality as the mark of the mental,” in A. O’Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Elements of Mind, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Intentionalism,” in A. Beckermann and P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1980, Essays on Events and Actions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Dehaene, S., 2014, Consciousness and the Brain, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J. and Sergent, C., 2006, “Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10: 204–211. (Scholar)
Dennett, D.C., 1969, Content and Consciousness, London: Routledge and Kean Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, Brainstorms, Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Quining qualia,” in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little Brown. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, Kinds of Mind, New York: Norton. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, From Bacteria to Bach and Back Again, New York: Basic Books. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1969, Seeing and Knowing, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, “The intentionality of cognitive states,” in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Change blindness,” Philosophical Studies, 120: 1–18. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “What change blindness teaches about consciousness,” Philosophical Perspectives, 21 (1): 215–220. (Scholar)
Dreyfus, H.L. (ed.), 1982, Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dummett, M., 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language, New York: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Frege and Husserl on reference,” in M. Dummett The Seas of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: The Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Field, H., 1978, “Mental representation,” in N. Block, (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
Fodor, J.A., 1981, “Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology,” in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, The Language of Thought, New York: Crowell. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, LOT2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Føllesdal, D., 1982a, “Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects,” in H.L. Dreyfus (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1982b, “Husserl’s notion of Noema,” in H.L. Dreyfus (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Frege, G., 1892 [1952], “On sense and reference,” in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952. (Scholar)
Grice, P., 1957, “Meaning,” reprinted in P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1989. (Scholar)
Guttenplan, S. (ed.), 1994, A Companion Volume to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Haugeland, J., 1981, “Semantic Engines: an Introduction to Mind Design,” in J. Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design, philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Mind embodied and embedded,” reprinted in J. Haugeland, J. Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. (Scholar)
Husserl, E. 1900 [1970], Logical Investigations (English translation by J.N. Findlay), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 1913, Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Halle: Niemeyer. (Scholar)
Jacob, P., 1997, What Minds Can Do, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Jeshion, R. (ed.), 2010, New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1978, “Dthat,” in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, H. Wettstein, and J. Perry (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 1993, Mind and Supervenience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Kingsbury, J., Ryder, D. and Williford, K. (eds.), 2011, Millikan and Her Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Kistler, M., 2000, “Source and channel in the informational theory of mental content,” Facta philosophica, 2 (2): 213–235. (Scholar)
Kripke, S. 1972 [1980], Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “A puzzle about belief,” in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979.
–––, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Loewer, B., 1987, “From information to intentionality,” Synthese, 70: 287–317. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “A guide to naturalizing semantics”, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion Volume to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
MacDonald, G. and Papineau, D. (eds.), 2006, Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mally, E., 1912, Gegenstandtheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik, Leipzig: Barth. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1984, “De re sense,” in C. Wright (ed.), Frege, Tradition & Influence, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
McGinn, C., 1989, Mental Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Problems of Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Meinong, A., 1904, “Über Gegenstandtheorie” (English translation: “The theory of objects”), in R. Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. (Scholar)
Mill, J.S., 1884, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, New York: Harper. (Scholar)
Millikan, R.G., 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological Objects, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, On Clear and Confused Ideas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Varieties of Meaning: the 2002 Jean-Nicod Lectures, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Language: a Biological Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Naccache, L. and Dehaene, S., 2007, “Reportability and illusions of phenomenality in the light of the global neuronal workspace model”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30: 518–520. (Scholar)
Neander, K., 1995, “Misrepresenting and malfunctioning,” Philosophical Studies, 79: 109–41. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, A Mark of the Mental, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Parsons, T., 1980, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Peacocke, C., 1983, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Does perception have nonconceptual content?” The Journal of Philosophy, 98: 239–64. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 1993, The Essential Indexical and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Intentionality (2),” in S. Guttenplan, (ed.), A Companion Volume to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. (Scholar)
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Putnam, H., 1974, “The meaning of ‘meaning’,” in H. Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. II, Language, Mind and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Information and the mental,” in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, Representation and Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Renewing Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V.O., 1948, “On what there is,” reprinted in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. (Scholar)
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Recanati, F., 2010, “Singular thought: In defence of acquaintance,” in R. Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Rorty, R., 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Rosenthal, D., 1986, “Two concepts of consciousness,” in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. (Scholar)
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–––, 2005, Consciousness and Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Rowlands, M., 1999, The Body in Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Searle, J., 1980, “Minds, brains and programs,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–24. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Intentionality (1),” in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion Volume to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Shea, N., 2018, Representation in Cognitive Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Zalta, E.N., 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)

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