Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification" by George Pappas
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Alston, William, 1989. Epistemic Justification, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Bach, Kent, 1985. “A Rationale for Reliabilism,” The Monist, 68: 246–263. (Scholar)
- Bergman, Michael, 2006. Justification Without Awareness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- BonJour, Laurence, 1980. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 53–73. (Scholar)
- BonJour, Laurence and Sosa, Ernest, 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
- BonJour, Laurence, 2006. "Replies," Philosophical Studies, 131: 743-759. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick, 1977. Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard, 2001. “Internalism Defended.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 38(1): 1–18; repreinted in H. Kornblith 2001. [Page reference is to the reprint.] (Scholar)
- Feldman, Richard, 2006. "BonJour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism, and Basic Beliefs," Philosophical Studies, 131: 713-728. (Scholar)
- Fumerton, Richard, 1995. Meta-Epistemology and Scepticism, Lanham, MD: Rowman-Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 1975. Knowledge, Perception, and Memory,
Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 1979. “What is Justified Belief,” in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin. 1999. “Internalism Exposed,” Journal of Philosophy, 96(6): 271–293; reprinted in H. Kornblith (ed.) 2001. [Page reference is to the reprint.] Also reprinted in A. Goldman, Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 2009. “Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification,” Journal of Philosophy, 106(6): 309-338. Reprinted in Goldman, 2012. Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kornblith, Hilary (ed.), 2001. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Leite, Adam, 2004. "On Justifying and Being Justified," Philosophical Perspectives (Noûs Supplement), 14: 219–253. (Scholar)
- Prichard, H.A., 1950. Knowledge and Perception, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Steup, Matthias, 1999. “A Defense of Internalism,” in L. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd edition, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing. (Scholar)
- Wedgwood, Ralph, 2002. "Internalism Explained," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 349-369. (Scholar)