Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Justice and Bad Luck" by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Adler, M. and Holtug, N., 2019, “Prioritarianism: A Response to Critics”, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 18(2): 101–144. (Scholar)
- Albertsen, A. and Nielsen, L., 2020, “What Is the Point of the Harshness Objection”, Utilitas, 32: 427–443. (Scholar)
- Anderson, E., 1999, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Ethics, 109: 287–337. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 36: 1–23. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Equality”, in D. Estlund
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 40–57. (Scholar)
- Arneson, R. J., 1989, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77–93. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 158–194. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Egalitarianism and Responsibility”, Journal of Ethics, 3: 225–247. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism”, Ethics, 110: 339–349. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Luck and Equality”,
Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 75: 73–90. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Luck Egalitarianism: An
Interpretation and Defense”, Philosophical Topics, 32:
1–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Luck Egalitarianism – A Primer”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, in C. Knight and Z. Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 24–50. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Ronald Dworkin and Luck
Egalitarianism: A Comparison”, in S. Olsaretti (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (Scholar)
- Axelsen, D. and Nielsen, L., 2015, “Sufficiency As Freedom
From Duress”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 23:
406–426. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A. J., 1982, “Freedom and Necessity”, reprinted
in Watson (ed.) 1982, pp. 15–23. (Scholar)
- Barry, B., 1989, Theories of Justice Vol. 1, Berkeley:
University of California Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Why Social Justice Matters,
Cambridge: Polity Press. (Scholar)
- Barry, N., 2006, “Defending Luck Egalitarianism”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23: 89–107. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Reassessing Luck
Egalitarianism”, Journal of Politics, 70:
136–150. (Scholar)
- Bognar, G., 2019, “Catering for Responsibility”, Economics and Philosophy, 35: 259–281. (Scholar)
- Brouwer, H. and Mulligan, T., 2019, “Why not be a desertist?”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 2271–2288. (Scholar)
- Caney, S., 2005, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Casal, P., 2007, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”, Ethics, 107: 296–326. (Scholar)
- Cohen, G. A., 2000, If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come
You’re So Rich?, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 1984, Elbow Room, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Dworkin, R., 2000, Sovereign Virtue, Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited”, Ethics, 113: 106–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Equality, Luck and Hierarchy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31: 190–198. (Scholar)
- Elford, G., 2013, “Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16: 39–49. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017a, “Relational Equality and
Distribution” (Survey Article), Journal of Political
Philosophy, 25: 80–99. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017b, “The Coherence of Luck Egalitarianism” (Survey Article), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20: 617–626. (Scholar)
- Eyal, N., 2007, “Egalitarian Justice and Innocent
Choice”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2:
1–18. (Scholar)
- Feldman, F., 1997, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Fischer, J. M., 2006, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fischer, J. M. and M. Ravizza, 1998, Responsibility and Control, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Fleurbaey, M., 1995, “Equal Opportunity for Equal Social Outcome”, Economics and Philosophy, 11: 25–55. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Egalitarian Opportunities”, Law and Philosophy, 20: 499–530. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Forst, R., 2020, “The Point of Justice”, in J. Handle
and S. Roberts-Cady (ed.), Rawls: Debating the Major
Questions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 148–162. (Scholar)
- Fourie, C., F. Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), 2015, Social Equality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, H., 1988, The Importance of What We Care
About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Freeman, S., 2007, “Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism”, in
S. Freeman (ed.), Justice and the Social Contract, New York:
Oxford University Press, 111–142. (Scholar)
- Gheaus, A., 2018, “Hikers in Flip-Flops:
Luck-Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality and the Distribuenda of
Justice”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 35:
54–69. (Scholar)
- Hinton, T., 2001, “Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and Respect?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30: 72–87. (Scholar)
- Holtug, N., 2010, Persons, Interests, and Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hurley, S., 1993, “Justice without Constitutive Luck”, in Ethics, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, vol. 35, A. P. Griffith (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179–212. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Luck and Equality”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 75: 51–72. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Luck, Responsibility, and the Natural Lottery’”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 10: 79–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Justice, Luck and Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Replies”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 447–465. (Scholar)
- Huseby, R., 2010, “Sufficiency: Restated and Defended”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 18: 178–197. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Luck Egalitarianism and the
Distributive Trilemma”, Social Theory and Practice, 45:
1–19. (Scholar)
- Inoue, R., 2022, “The Harshness Objection is Not (too) Harsh
for Luck Egalitarianism”, Philosophia, 50(5):
2571–2583. (Scholar)
- Kagan, S., 2012, The Geometry of Desert, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (Scholar)
- Kaufman, A., 2004, “Choice, Responsibility and
Equality”, Political Studies, 52: 819–836. (Scholar)
- Klein, M., 1990, Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Knight, C. 2005, “In defence of luck egalitarianism”, Res Publica, 11: 55–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “An Argument for All-Luck Egalitarianism”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 49: 350–378. (Scholar)
- Knight, C. and C. Stemplowska (eds.), 2011, Responsibility and
Distributive Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kymlicka, W., 2002, Contemporary Political Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lang, G., 2009, “Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 6: 317–338. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, Strokes of Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Latus, A., 2003, “Constitutive Luck”, Metaphilosophy, 34: 460–475. (Scholar)
- Lazenby, H., 2010, “One Kiss Too Many? Luck Egalitarianism
and Other-affecting Choice”, Journal of Political
Philosophy, 18: 271–286. (Scholar)
- Levy, N., 2014, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and
Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lippert-Rasmussen, K., 2001, “Equality, Option Luck, and
Responsibility”, Ethics, 111: 548–579. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-neutralizing Aim”, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 4: 249–265. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Egalitarianism and Collective
Responsibility”, in Knight, C. and Stemplowska, Z.,
Egalitarianism and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University,
98–114. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015a, “Luck egalitarians versus relational egalitarians: on the prospects of a pluralist account of egalitarian justice”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45: 220–241. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015b, Luck Egalitarianism, London: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, Relational Egalitarianism: Living As Equals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Mandle, J., 2009, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice: An
Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Mason, A., 2006, Levelling the Playing Field: The Ideal of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Miller, D., 2007, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “The Incoherence of Luck
Egalitarianism”, in A. Kaufman (eds.), Distributive Justice
and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131–150. (Scholar)
- Matravers, M., 2007, Responsibility and Justice, Cambridge: Polity Press. (Scholar)
- Miklosi, Z., 2018, “Varieties of Relational Egalitarianism”, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 4: 110–140. (Scholar)
- Moles, A. and T. Parr, 2019, “Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account”, Political Studies, 67, 132–148. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E., 1955 [1912], Ethics, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1979, “Moral Luck”, reprinted in his Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 24–38. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, Equality and Partiality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Navin, M., 2011, “Luck and Oppression”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 14: 533–547. (Scholar)
- Olsaretti, S., 2009, “Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 109: 165–188. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1974, State, Anarchy, and Utopia, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Otsuka, M., 2002, “Luck, Insurance, and Equality”, Ethics, 113: 40–54. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Equality, Insurance and
Ambition”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 78:
151–166. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1995, “Equality or Priority?”, Lindley
Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas. (Scholar)
- Persson, I., 2006, “A Defence of Extreme
Egalitarianism”, in N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.),
Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of
Equality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Preda, A. and Voigt, K., 2022, “Shameless Luck Egalitarians”, Journal od Social Philosophy, first online 08 March 2022. doi:10.1111/josp.12463 (Scholar)
- Price, T. L., 1999, “Egalitarian Justice, Luck, and the Costs of Chosen Ends”, American Philosophical, Quarterly, 36: 267–278. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2005, Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D. and Whittington, L. J. (eds.), 2015, The Philosophy of Luck, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Rakowski, E., 1991, Equal Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Rescher, N., 1993, “Moral Luck” in Statman (ed.), 141–166. (Scholar)
- Roemer, J. E., 1993, “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22: 146–166. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Theories of Distributive
Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Equality of Opportunity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Sandbu, P., 2004, “On Dworkin’s brute-luck-option-luck
distinction and the consistency of brute-luck egalitarianism”,
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 3: 283–312. (Scholar)
- Sandel, M. J., 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T. M., 1975, “Preference and Urgency”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 655–669. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Justice, Responsibility, and the Demands of Justice?”, in C. Sypnowich (ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 70–87. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, Why Does Equality Matter?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, S., 1992, “Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21: 299–323. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “What is Egalitarianism?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31: 5–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality”, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 4: 5–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Is the Basic Structure Basic?”, in C. Sypnowich (ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 102–129. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “The Practice of
Equality”, in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer
(eds.), Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21–44. (Scholar)
- Schemmel, C., 2021, Justice and Egalitarian Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Segall, S., 2007, “In Solidarity with the Imprudent: A Defence of Luck-Egalitarianism”, Social Theory & Practice, 33: 177–198. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, Health, Luck, and Justice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15: 507–519. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, Equality of Opportunity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Seligman, M., 2007, “Luck, Leverage, and Equality: A Bargaining Problem for Luck Egalitarians”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35: 266–292. (Scholar)
- Sher, G., 1987, Desert, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, Equality for Inegalitarians, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Scholar)
- Shields, L., 2012, “The Prospects for Sufficientarianism”, Utilitas, 24: 101–117. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, Just Enough, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
- Smilansky, S., 1997, “Egalitarian Justice and the Importance of the Free Will Problem”, Philosophia, 25: 153–161. (Scholar)
- Statman, D. (ed.), 1993, Moral Luck, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. (Scholar)
- Steiner, H., 2002, “How Equality Matters”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 19: 342–56. (Scholar)
- Stemplowska, Z., 2008, “Holding People Responsible for what They Do Not Control”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 7: 377–399. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Making Justice Sensitive to
Responsibility”, Political Studies, 57:
237–259. (Scholar)
- Stone, P., 2007, “Why Lotteries Are Just”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 15: 276–295. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G., 1994, “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 75: 5–24. (Scholar)
- Talbert, M., 2019, “Moral Responsibility”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/moral-responsibility/>. (Scholar)
- Tan, K.–C., 2008, “A Defense of Luck
Egalitarianism”, Journal of Philosophy, 105:
665–690. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, Justice, Institutions, and Luck:
The Site, Ground and Scope of Equality, Oxford: Oxford University
Press. (Scholar)
- Temkin, L., 1993, Inequality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003(a), “Egalitarianism
Defended”, Ethics, 113: 764–82. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003(b), “Exploring the Roots of
Egalitarian Concerns”, Theoria, 69: 125–51. (Scholar)
- Vallentyne, P., 2002, “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities”, Ethics, 112: 529–557. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Hurley on Justice and Responsibility”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 433–438. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Brute Luck and Responsibility”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 7: 57–80. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Justice, Interpersonal
Morality, and Luck Egalitarianism”, in A. Kaufman (ed.),
Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s
Egalitarianism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
40–49. (Scholar)
- Voigt, K. 2007, “The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10: 389–407. (Scholar)
- Watson, G., 1982a, “Free Agency” in Watson (ed.) 1982, 96–110. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1982b, Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “The Problematic Role of Responsibility in Contexts of Distributive Justice”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 425–432. (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1981, “Moral Luck”, in his Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20–39. (Scholar)
- Wolff, J., 1998, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27: 97–122. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited”, Journal of Ethics, 14: 335–350. (Scholar)
- Zaitchik, Allan, 1977, “On deserving to deserve”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 370–388. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, M. J., 1993, “Luck and Moral
Responsibility”, in Statman (ed.), 1993, pp. 217–34. (Scholar)