Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Analysis of Knowledge" by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Almeder, Robert, 1999, Harmless Naturalism. The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
Alston, William P., 1991, Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D.M., 1973, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Bird, Alexander, 2007, “Justified Judging”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1): 81–110. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x (Scholar)
Blome-Tillmann, Michael, 2009a, “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(2): 315–331. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00280.x (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Knowledge and Presuppositions”, Mind, 118(470): 241–294. doi:10.1093/mind/fzp032 (Scholar)
Boh, Ivan, 1985, “Belief, Justification and Knowledge: Some Late Medieval Epistemic Concerns”, Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association, 6: 87–103. (Scholar)
Bogardus, Tomas, 2014, “Knowledge Under Threat”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 289–313. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00564.x (Scholar)
Brown, J., 2006, “Contextualism and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres”, Philosophical Studies, 130(3): 407–435. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-5747-3 (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1977, Theory of Knowledge, 2^nd edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Theory of Knowledge, 3^rd edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
Clark, Michael, 1963, “Knowledge and Grounds. A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper”, Analysis, 24(2): 46–48. doi:10.2307/3327068 (Scholar)
Cohen, Stewart, 1988 “How to be a Fallibilist”, Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology, 2: 91–123. doi:10.2307/2214070 (Scholar)
Comesaña, Juan, 2005, “Unsafe Knowledge”, Synthese, 146(3): 395–404. doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6213-7 (Scholar)
Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman, 2004, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001 (Scholar)
Craig, Edward, 1990, Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198238797.001.0001 (Scholar)
DeRose, Keith, 1995, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”, The Philosophical Review, 104(1): 1–52. doi:10.2307/2186011 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3): 697–706. doi:10.2307/2653824 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, The Case for Contextualism, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001 (Scholar)
Dougherty, Trent, 2011, Evidentialism and its Discontents, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001 (Scholar)
Dretske, Fred, 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information”, in Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 169–187. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “The Need to Know”, in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Boulder: Westview Press: 89–100. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “The Case Against Closure”, in Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell: 13–25. (Scholar)
Dreyfus, George B.J., 1997, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. (Scholar)
Dutant, Julien, 2015, “The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis”, Philosophical Perspectives, 29(1): 95–145. doi:10.1111/phpe.12061 (Scholar)
Fantl, Jeremy & Matthew McGrath, 2009, Knowledge in an Uncertain World, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001 (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard and Earl Conee, 1985, “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 48(1): 15–34. doi:10.1007/bf00372404 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Internalism Defended”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38(1): 1–18. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman 2004: 53–82. doi:10.1093/0199253722.003.0004 (Scholar)
Fodor, Jerry, 1998, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0198236360.001.0001 (Scholar)
Gerken, Mikkel, forthcoming, On Folk Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gettier, Edmund L., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23(6): 121–123. doi:10.2307/3326922 (Scholar)
Gibbons, John, 2013, The Norm of Belief, Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673391.001.0001 (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I., 1967, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, The Journal of Philosophy, 64(12): 357–372. doi:10.2307/2024268 (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy, 73(20): 771–791. doi:10.2307/2025679 (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “What is Justified Belief?” in Justification and Knowledge, George S. Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 1–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Internalism Exposed”, The Journal of Philosophy, 96(6): 271–93. doi:10.2307/2564679 (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, “Replies to Discussants”, in G. Schurz & M. Werning (eds.), Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman, Amsterdam: Rodopi: 245–288. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification”, The Journal of Philosophy, 106(6): 309–338. doi:10.5840/jphil2009106611 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Reliabilism”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/reliabilism/>. (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I. and Erik J. Olsson, 2009, “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge”, in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 19–41. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001 (Scholar)
Greco, John, 2009, “Knowledge and Success from Ability”, Philosophical Studies, 142(1): 17–26. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9307-0 (Scholar)
Greenough, Patrick & Dirk Kindermann forthcoming, “The Semantic Error Problem for Epistemic Contextualism”, in Ichikawa forthcoming-b: 305–320. (Scholar)
Greenough, Patrick & Duncan Pritchard, 2009, Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001 (Scholar)
Hazlett, Allan, 2010, “The Myth of Factive Verbs”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(3): 497–522. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00338.x (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2002, “Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 247–69. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00201.x (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Knowledge and Lotteries, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 (Scholar)
Ichikawa, Jonathan J., 2011, “Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(2): 287–313. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00427.x (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming-a, Contextualising Knowledge: Epistemology and Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– (ed.), forthcoming-b, Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, New York: Taylor & Francis. (Scholar)
Ichikawa, Jonathan J., Benjamin Jarvis, & Katherine Rubin, 2012, “Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology”, Analytic Philosophy, 53(4): 327–42. doi:10.1111/j.2153-960x.2012.00564.x (Scholar)
Kaplan, David, 1977, “Demonstratives”, paper presented at a symposium on Demonstratives at the March 1977 meetings of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. Printed in Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), 1989, Themes From Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kaplan, Mark, 1985, “It’s Not What You Know that Counts”, The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7): 350–63. doi:10.2307/2026524 (Scholar)
Kornblith, Hilary, 2002, Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199246319.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Knowledge Needs No Justification”, in Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 5–23. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0002 (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul A., 2011, “Nozick on Knowledge”, in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 162–224. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0007 (Scholar)
Lewis, David K., 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Elusive Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4): 549–567. doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 (Scholar)
Littlejohn, Clayton, 2012, Justification and the Truth-Connection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Lowy, Catherine, 1978, “Gettier’s Notion of Justification”, Mind, 87(345): 105–108. doi:10.1093/mind/lxxxvii.1.105 (Scholar)
Lyons, Jack C., 2009, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001 (Scholar)
McGlynn, Aidan, 2014, Knowledge First?, Basingstoke: Palgrave. doi:10.1057/9781137026460 (Scholar)
McKinnon, Rachel, 2013, “Getting Luck Properly Under Control”, Metaphilosophy, 44(4):496–511. doi:10.1111/meta.12044 (Scholar)
Merricks, Trenton, 1995, “Warrant Entails Truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(4): 841–855. doi:10.2307/2108335 (Scholar)
Miracchi, Lisa, 2015, “Competence to Know”, Philosophical Studies, 172(1): 29–56. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0325-9 (Scholar)
Myers-Schulz, Blake & Eric Schwitzgebel, 2013, “Knowing that P without Believing that P”, Noûs, 47(2): 371–384. doi:10.1111/nous.12022 (Scholar)
Nagel, Jennifer, 2010, “Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1): 407–35. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00198.x (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Knowledge as a Mental State”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 4: 275–310. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0010 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Owens, David, 2000, Reason Without Freedom: Problem of Epistemic Normativity, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Phillips, Stephen H. and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya (trans.), 2004, Epistemology of Perception: Gaṅgeśa’s “Tattvacintāmaṇi”, New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies. (Scholar)
Plantinga, Alvin, 1993, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Respondeo”, in Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Pollock, John J., 1986, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Pritchard, Duncan, 2005, Epistemic Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 (Scholar)
Pritchard, Duncan, Alan Millar, & Adrian Haddock, 2010, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001 (Scholar)
Radford, Colin, 1966, “Knowledge—By Examples”, Analysis, 27(1): 1–11. doi:10.2307/3326979 (Scholar)
Rose, David & Jonathan Schaffer, 2013, “Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief”, Philosophical Studies, 166(supplement 1): 19–50. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0052-z (Scholar)
Rysiew, Patrick, 2001, “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”, Noûs, 35(4): 477–514. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00349 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Epistemic Contextualism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/contextualism-epistemology/> (Scholar)
Schaffer, Jonathan, 2004, “From Contextualism to Contrastivism”, Philosophical Studies, 119(1–2): 73–104. doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000029351.56460.8c (Scholar)
Schiffer, Stephen, 1996, “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96(1): 317–333. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.317 (Scholar)
Shope, Robert K., 1983, The Analysis of Knowing. A Decade of Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Sosa, Ernest, 1999, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”, Noûs, (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology), 33(s13): 141–153. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.7 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Volume I), New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001 (Scholar)
Stanley, Jason, 2005, Knowledge and Practical Interests, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Know How, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001 (Scholar)
Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn, 2010, “Luck as an Epistemic Notion”, Synthese, 176 (3): 361–377. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9569-x (Scholar)
Stine, G.C., 1976, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”, Philosophical Studies, 29(4): 249–261. doi:10.1007/bf00411885 (Scholar)
Sturgeon, Scott, 1993, “The Gettier Problem”, Analysis, 53(3): 156–164. doi:10.2307/3328464 (Scholar)
Sutton, Jonathan, 2007, Without Justification, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
Unger, Peter, 1968, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge”, The Journal of Philosophy, 65(6): 157–70. doi:10.2307/2024203 (Scholar)
Weatherson, Brian, 2012, “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests”, in Knowledge Ascriptions, Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–103. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0004 (Scholar)
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–––, 2005, “Knowledge, Context, and the Agent’s Point of View”, in Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 91–114. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Reply to Alvin Goldman”, in Williamson on Knowledge, Greenough & Pritchard 2009: 305–312. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0017 (Scholar)
Worsnip, Alex, forthcoming, “Contextualism and Knowledge Norms”, in Ichikawa forthcoming-b: chapter 14. (Scholar)
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Zagzebski, Linda, 1994, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174): 65–73. doi:10.2307/2220147 (Scholar)

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