Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Knowledge How" by Carlotta Pavese
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- Adams, Marcus P., 2009, “Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction”, Synthese, 170(1): 97–114. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9349-z (Scholar)
- Allen, Collin and Marc Bekoff, 1999, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/6395.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Alter, Torin, 2001, “Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis”, Theoria, 67(3): 229–239. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2001.tb00205.x (Scholar)
- Anderson, John R., 1983, The Architecture of Cognition,
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- Annas, Julia, 1995, “Virtue as a Skill”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3(2): 227–243. doi:10.1080/09672559508570812 (Scholar)
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- Anscombe, G. E. M., 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Audi, Robert, 1986, “Intending, Intentional Action, and Desire”, in The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting, Joel Marks (ed.), Chicago, IL: Precedent, pp. 17–38. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “On intellectualism in the theory of action”, Journal of the American philosophical association 3(3): 284. doi:10.1017/apa.2017.29 (Scholar)
- Bach, Kent, 2012, “Review of Know How, by Jason
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- Baker, Carl Leroy, 1968, Indirect Questions in English,
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- Baker, Mark, 1996, “On the Structural Positions of Themes
and Goals”, in Phrase Structure and the Lexicon, Johan
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Self-Consciousness and Paradoxical Effects of Incentives on Skillful
Performance”, Journal of Personality and Social
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- Beddor, Bob and Carlotta Pavese, 2020, “Modal Virtue
Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 101(1): 61–79. doi:10.1111/phpr.12562 (Scholar)
- Beilock, Sian L. and Thomas H. Carr, 2001, “On the Fragility of Skilled Performance: What Governs Choking under Pressure?”, Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 130(4): 701–725. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.130.4.701 (Scholar)
- Bengson, John and Marc A. Moffett, 2007, “Know-How and Concept Possession”, Philosophical Studies, 136(1): 31–57. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9146-4 (Scholar)
- –––, 2011a, “Nonpropositional Intellectualism”, in Bengson and Moffett 2011c: 161–195. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence”, in Bengson and Moffett 2011c: 3–55. (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 2011c, Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Bengson, John, Marc A. Moffett, and Jennifer C. Wright, 2009, “The Folk on Knowing How”, Philosophical Studies, 142(3): 387–401. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x (Scholar)
- Biernat, Monica and Diane Kobrynowicz, 1997, “Gender- and
Race-Based Standards of Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher
Ability Standards for Devalued Groups”, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 72(3): 544–557.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.3.544 (Scholar)
- Birch, Jonathan, 2019, “Joint Know-How”,
Philosophical Studies, 176(12): 3329–3352.
doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1176-6 (Scholar)
- Boghossian, Paul Artin, 1996, “Analyticity Reconsidered”, Noûs, 30(3): 360–391. doi:10.2307/2216275 (Scholar)
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- Bratman, Michael, 1987, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Bresnan, Joan and Jane Grimshaw, 1978, “The Syntax of Free
Relatives in English”, Linguistic Inquiry, 9(3):
331–391. (Scholar)
- De Brigard, Felipe, 2019, “Know-How, Intellectualism, and Memory Systems”, Philosophical Psychology, 32(5): 719–758. doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280 (Scholar)
- Brogaard, Berit, 2009, “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(2): 439–467. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00250.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Knowledge-How: A Unified Account”, in Bengson and Moffett 2011c: 136–160. (Scholar)
- Brown, Jessica A., 2013, “Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science”, Analysis, 73(2): 220–227. doi:10.1093/analys/ant003 (Scholar)
- Brownstein, Michael and Eliot Michaelson, 2016, “Doing without Believing: Intellectualism, Knowledge-How, and Belief-Attribution”, Synthese, 193(9): 2815–2836. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0888-9 (Scholar)
- Butterfill, Stephen A. and Corrado Sinigaglia, 2014,
“Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action”,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(1):
119–145. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x (Scholar)
- Carr, David, 1979, “The Logic of Knowing How and Ability”, Mind, 88(1): 394–409. doi:10.1093/mind/lxxxviii.1.394 (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, “Knowledge in Practice”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18(1): 53–61. (Scholar)
- Carroll, Lewis, 1895, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, Mind, 4(14): 278–280. doi:10.1093/mind/iv.14.278 (Scholar)
- Carter, J. Adam and Jesús Navarro, 2017, “The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3): 662–685. doi:10.1111/phpr.12441 (Scholar)
- Carter, J. Adam and Duncan Pritchard, 2015a, “Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4): 799–816. doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.997767 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015b, “Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1): 181–199. doi:10.1111/phpr.12094 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015c, “Knowledge-How and Epistemic
Luck: Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck”, Noûs,
49(3): 440–453. doi:10.1111/nous.12054 (Scholar)
- Carter, J. Adam, Duncan Pritchard, and Joshua Shepherd, 2019, “Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4): 701–734. doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9 (Scholar)
- Cath, Yuri, 2009, “The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How”, Noûs, 43(1): 137–156. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01699.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Knowing How Without Knowing That”, in Bengson and Moffett 2011c: 113–135. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Regarding a Regress”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(3): 358–388. doi:10.1111/papq.12004 (Scholar)
- –––, 2015a, “Knowing How and
‘Knowing How’”, in The Palgrave Handbook of
Philosophical Methods, Christopher Daly (ed.), Basingstroke,
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- –––, 2015b, “Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier”, Philosophical Studies, 172(1): 7–27. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0263-y (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Intellectualism and testimony”, Analysis, 77(2): 259–266. doi:10.1093/analys/anx066 (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Knowing How”, Analysis, 79(3): 487–503. doi:10.1093/analys/anz027 (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, “Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence”, in Fridland and Pavese 2020: 157–167. (Scholar)
- Christensen, Wayne, 2019, “Skilled Action”, Philosophy Compass, 14(11): e12631. doi:10.1111/phc3.12631 (Scholar)
- Christensen, Wayne, John Sutton, and Doris McIlwain, 2016, “Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control and the varieties of skill experience”, Mind & Language, 31(1): 37–66. doi:10.1111/mila.12094 (Scholar)
- Christensen, Wayne, John Sutton, and Kath Bicknell, 2019, “Memory Systems and the Control of Skilled Action”, Philosophical Psychology, 32(5): 692–718. doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1607279 (Scholar)
- Cohen, N. J. and L. R. Squire, 1980, “Preserved Learning and
Retention of Pattern-Analyzing Skill in Amnesia: Dissociation of
Knowing How and Knowing That”, Science, 210(4466):
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- Collins, Patricia Hill, 1990 [2007]***2007*, “Black Feminist Epistemology”, in Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, Bostin: Unwin Hyman; second edition, New York: Routledge, 2000, 251–271. Reprinted as “Black Feminist Epistemology [1990]”, in Contemporary Sociological Theory, second edition, Craig J. Calhoun (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007, 327–336. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Some Group Matters:
Intersectionality, Situated Standpoints, and Black Feminist
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- Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman, 1998, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism”, Philosophical Studies, 89(1): 1–29. doi:10.1023/a:1004243308503 (Scholar)
- Constantin, Jan, 2018, “A dispositional account of practical
knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, 175(9):
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- Coope, Ursula, 2020, “Aristotle on Productive Understanding
and Completeness”, in Productive Knowledge in Ancient
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- Devitt, Michael, 2011, “Methodology and the Nature of Knowing How”, Journal of Philosophy, 108(4): 205–218. doi:10.5840/jphil2011108412 (Scholar)
- Dickie, Imogen, 2012, “Skill Before Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(3): 737–745. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00638.x (Scholar)
- Ditter, Andreas, 2016, “Why Intellectualism Still Fails”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(264): 500–515. doi:10.1093/pq/pqv115 (Scholar)
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Husserl’s and Searle’s Representationalist Accounts of
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- –––, 2002, “Intelligence without Representation—Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(4): 367–383. doi:10.1023/a:1021351606209 (Scholar)
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- Elzinga, Benjamin, forthcoming, “Intellectualizing Know How”, Synthese, first online: 4 March 2019. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02160-6 (Scholar)
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