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Other Important Works

• Ellis, Brian, 1988, “Solving the Problem of Induction Using a Values Based Epistemology”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39(2): 141–160. doi:10.1093/bjps/39.2.141 (Scholar)
• Fallis, Don, 2004, “Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics”, Minds and Machines, 14(1): 101–117. doi:10.1023/b:mind.0000005138.57370.df (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation”, Episteme, 2(1): 39–55. doi:10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.39 (Scholar)
• Fricker, Miranda, 2009, “The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 64: 121–138. doi:10.1017/s1358246109000034 (Scholar)
• Gardiner, Georgi, 2012, “Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value”, Acta Analytica, 27(2): 163–181. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0152-6 (Scholar)
• Hannon, Michael, 2014, “Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge”, Synthese, 191(6): 1119–1146. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0315-z (Scholar)
• Horwich, Paul, 2006, “The Value of Truth”, Noûs, 40(2): 347–360. doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00613.x (Scholar)
• Hyman, John, 2010, “The Road to Larissa”, Ratio, 23(4): 393–414. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00475.x (Scholar)
• Kvanvig, Jonathan L., 1992, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
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