Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Legal Interpretivism" by Nicos Stavropoulos
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- Brink, David, 2001, “Legal Interpretation and
Morality”, in B. Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and
Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12–65. (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler, 1986, “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 697–720. (Scholar)
- Burley, Justine (ed.), 2004, Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Cohen, Marshall (ed.), 1984, Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- Coleman, Jules, 2001a, The Practice of Principle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 2001b, Hart’s Postscript,
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Correia, F. and B. Schnieder (eds.), 2012, Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Draghi, Mario, 2012, “Speech”, President of the
European Central Bank, Global Investment Conference in London 26 July
2012. [Draghi 2012 available online] (Scholar)
- Dworkin, Ronald, 1978, Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth. Relevant sections include “The Model of Rules I” (Ch.2), “The Model of Rules II” (Ch.3), “Hard Cases” (Ch.4), “Reply to Critics” (Appendix). (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Natural Law
Revisited”, University of Florida Law Review, 34:
165. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “My Reply to Stanley Fish (and
Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk about Objectivity any
More”, in Mitchell 1983: 287–313. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “A Reply to Critics”, in
Cohen 1984: 256–60. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, A Matter of Principle,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Relevant sections include
“Political Judges and the Rule of Law” (Ch.1), “The
Forum of Principle” (Ch.2), “Principle, Policy,
Procedure” (Ch.3), “Is there Really No Right Answer in
Hard Cases?” (Ch.5), “How Law is Like Literature”
(Ch.6), “On Interpretation and Objectivity” (Ch.7).
(Scholar)
- –––, 1986, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25: 88. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Comment”, in Scalia
1998: 115–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Justice in Robes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Relevant sections include “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy” (Ch.6), “Thirty Years On” (Ch.7), “The Concepts of Law” (Ch.8). (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Especially “Law” (Ch.19). (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 2012, “A Guide to Ground”, in Correia and Schnieder 2012: 37–80. (Scholar)
- Finnis, John, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “On Reason and Authority
in Law’s Empire”, Law and Philosophy, 6:
357–380. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “Law as Co-ordination”, Ratio Juris, 2: 97–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Natural Law and Legal
Reasoning”, in R. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 134–57. (Scholar)
- Gardner, John, 2012, “How Law Claims, What Law Claims”, in M. Klatt (ed.), Institutionalized Reason, The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–44. (Scholar)
- George, Robert (ed.), 1992, Natural Law Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Greenberg, Mark, 2004, “How Facts Make Law”, Legal Theory, 10: 157. [Greenberg 2004 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “The Prism of Rules”, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07–31. [Greenberg 2007 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2011a, “The Standard Picture and Its Discontents”, in Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–106. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “Legislation as Communication”, in Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 217–256. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “The Moral Impact Theory”, Yale Law Journal, 123(5): 1288. (Scholar)
- Hart, H.L.A., 1982, Essays on Bentham, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, The Concept of Law,
2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Hershovitz, Scott (ed.), 2006a, Exploring Law’s Empire,
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Integrity and Stare Decisis”, in Hershovitz 2006a: 103–118. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “The End of Jurisprudence”, Yale Law Journal, 124(4): 1160. (Scholar)
- Kelsen, Hans, 1952, Principles of International Law,
New York: Rinehart & Co. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Leiter, Brian, 2003, “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The
Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence”, American Journal of
Jurisprudence 48: 17–51. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mitchell. W.J.T. (ed.), 1983, The Politics of
Interpretation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 2005, “The Problem of Global Justice”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 113–47. (Scholar)
- Rey, G., 1998, “What Implicit Conceptions Are Unlikely to Do,” Philosophical Issues: 9: 93–104. (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph, 1980, The Concept of a Legal System, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1972, “Legal Principles and the
Limits of Law”, The Yale Law Journal, 81(5): 823–854;
reprinted in Cohen 1984, 73–87. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Practical Reason and Norms,
2nd edition with Postscript, Princeton: Princeton University Press;
originally published London: Hutchinson, 1975. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Dworkin: a New Link in the
Chain”, California Law Review, 74(3): 1103. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Two Views about the Nature of
Law”, in Coleman (ed.) 2001b: 1–37. (Scholar)
- Ripstein, A. (ed.), 2007, Ronald Dworkin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Scalia, Antonin, 1998, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law (with commentary edited by Amy Gutmann),
Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Schauer, F., 1996, “Positivism as Pariah,” in R.P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal, Positivism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 31–55. (Scholar)
- Schaus, S. 2015, “How To Think About Law as Morality: A Comment on Greenberg and Hershovitz
”, Yale Law Journal, 124:
224. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Scott, 2007, “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’
Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed”, in Ripstein
2007: 22–55. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Legality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, Dale, 2010, “Theoretical Disagreement and the Semantic Sting”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 30: 635. (Scholar)
- Stavropoulos, Nicos, 1996, Objectivity in Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries”, Ratio Juris, 22: 339–358. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Obligations, Interpretivism, and the Legal
Point of View”, in A. Marmor (ed.), The Routledge Companion
to Philosophy of Law, New York: Routledge, pp. 76–92. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Words and Obligations”,
in Andrea Dolcetti, Luís Duarte d’Almeida and James Edwards,
Reading HLA Hart’s ‘The Concept of Law’, Oxford:
Hart Publishing, pp. 224–81. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “The Debate That Never Was”, Harvard Law Review, 130: 2082. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2007, “Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity,” in T. Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 73–133. (Scholar)