Cited Works

• Asgeirsson, Hrafn, 2020, The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing. (Scholar)
• Austin, J.L., 1962, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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• Carston, Robyn, 2013, “Legal Texts and Canons of Construction: A View from Current Pragmatic Theory” in Michael Freeman and Fiona Smith (eds.), Law and Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8–33. (Scholar)
• Chiassoni, Pierluigi, 2019, Interpretation without Truth: A Realistic Enquiry, Cham: Springer. (Scholar)
• Coleman, Jules (ed.), 2001, Hart’s Postscript, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Coleman, Jules and Simchen, Ori, 2003, “Law,” Legal Theory, 9: 1–41. (Scholar)
• Dascal, Marcelo and Wróblewski, Jerzy, 1988, “Transparency and Doubt: Understanding and Interpretation in Pragmatics and in Law,” Law and Philosophy, 7: 203–224. (Scholar)
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• Dworkin, Ronald, 1986a, “Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?” in A Matter of Principle, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. (Scholar)
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• Endicott, Timothy, 2000, Vagueness in Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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• –––, 2014, “Interpretation and Indeterminacy,” Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, 10:46–56. (Scholar)
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• Finnis, John, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Greenawalt, Kent, 2001, “Vagueness and Judicial Responses to Legal Indeterminacy,” Legal Theory, 7: 433–445. (Scholar)
• Greenberg, Mark, 2011, “Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication” in Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 217–256. (Scholar)
• –––, 2021, “Legal Interpretation,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/legal-interpretation/>. (Scholar)
• Grice, H.P., 1975, “Logic and Conversation” in P.Cole and J.Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, New York: Elsevier, 41–58. (Scholar)
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• Lanius, David, 2019, Strategic Indeterminacy in the Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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• Schiffer, Stephen, 2001, “A Little Help from your Friends?” Legal Theory, 7: 421–431. (Scholar)
• –––, 2017, “Philosophical and Jurisprudential Issues of Vagueness,” in Geert Keil and Ralf Poscher (eds.), Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Soames, Scott, 2008, “Interpreting Legal Texts: What is, and What is not, Special about the Law” in Philosophical Essays, Volume 1: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 403–424. (Scholar)
• Solum, Larry, 2013, “Communicative Content and Legal Content” Notre Dame Law Review, 89: 479–520. (Scholar)
• Von Wright, Georg Henrik, 1963, Norm and Action, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
• Wróblewski, Jerzy, 1983, Meaning and Truth in Judicial Decision, Aulis Aarnio (ed.), 2nd edition, Helsinki: A-TIETO. (Scholar)
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Further Reading

• Alchourrón, Carlos, and Bulygin, Eugenio, 1971, Normative Systems, Vienna: Springer. (Scholar)
• Bix, Brian, 1996, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Blackburn, Simon, 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press; especially pages 205–209. (Scholar)
• Brink, David O., 1988, “Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17: 105–48. (Scholar)
• Bulygin, Eugenio, 1982, “Norms, normative propositions and legal statements”, in G. Floistad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy A New Survey, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 157–163. (Scholar)
• Endicott, Timothy, 2002, “How to Speak the Truth,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46: 229–248. (Scholar)
• –––, 2005, “The Value of Vagueness,” in Vijay K. Bhatia, Jan Engberg, Maurizio Gotti and Dorothee Heller (eds.), Vagueness in Normative Texts, Bern: Peter Lang, Chapter 1, 27–48. (Scholar)
• Fish, Stanley, 1989, Doing What Comes Naturally, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Green, Michael, 2003, “Dworkin’s Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us about the Law”, Virginia Law Review, 89: 1897–1952. (Scholar)
• Greenawalt, Kent, 1992, Law and Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Greenberg, Mark and Harry Litman, 1998, “The Meaning of Original Meaning,” Georgetown Law Journal, 86: 569. (Scholar)
• Moore, Michael, 1985, “A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,” Southern California Law Review, 58: 277 (Scholar)
• Patterson, Dennis, 1996, Law and Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Perelman, Chaim, 1963, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
• Plunkett, David and Tim Sundell, 2014, “Antipositivist Arguments from Legal Thought and Talk: The Metalinguistic Response,” in G. Hubbs and D. Lind (eds.), Pragmatism, Law, and Language, London: Routledge, 56–75. (Scholar)
• Stavropoulos, Nicos, 1996, Objectivity in Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Williams, Glanville, 1945–1946, “Language and the Law”, Law Quarterly Review, 61: 71, 179, 293, 384; 62: 387. (Scholar)