Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Naturalism in Legal Philosophy" by Brian Leiter and Matthew X. Etchemendy

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Allen, Ronald J. and Brian Leiter (2001). “Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence,” Virginia Law Review, 87: 1491–1550. (Scholar)
Bix, Brian (ed.) (1998). Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Bjarup, Jes (1999). “Scandinavian Legal Realism,” in C.B. Gray (ed.), The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, New York: Garland. (Scholar)
Blackburn, Thomas (1988). “The Elusiveness of Reference,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12: 179–194. (Scholar)
Brink, David O. (1988). “Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 17: 105–148. (Scholar)
––– (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
––– (2001). “Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality,” in B. Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Broughton, Gabriel and Brian Leiter (2021). “The Naturalized Epistemology Approach to Evidence,” in C. Dalhman, A. Stein & G. Tuzet (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Coleman, Jules L (1998). “Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions,” in Bix (1998). (Scholar)
––– (2001). The Practice of Principle, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Cummins, Robert (1999). “Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium,” in M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, Md.: Rownman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Ronald (1986). Law’s Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Eng, Svein (2011). “Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges Between Hart and Ross,” Ratio Juris, 24: 194–246. (Scholar)
Etchemendy, Matthew X. (2016). “New Directions in Legal Expressivism,” Legal Theory, 22: 1–21. (Scholar)
––– (2021). “Legal Realism and Legal Reality,” Tennessee Law Review (forthcoming). (Scholar)
Evans, Gareth (1973). “The Causal Theory of Names,” reprinted in The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. (Scholar)
Farrell, Ian (2006). “H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence,” Texas Law Review, 84: 983–1011. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I. (1978). “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition,” Journal of Philosophy, 75: 509–523. (Scholar)
––– (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
––– (1994). “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19: 301–320. (Scholar)
––– (1999). Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Green, Leslie (2009). “Legal Positivism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/> (Scholar)
Greenberg, Mark (2011). “Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law, Parts I and II,” Law and Philosophy, 30: 419–476 (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert (1994). “Doubts About Conceptual Analysis,” in M. Michael & J. O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
Hart, H.L.A. (1959). “Scandinavian Realism,” reprinted in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. (Scholar)
––– (1961). The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hintikka, Jaakko (1999). “The Emperor’s New Intuitions,” Journal of Philosophy, 96: 127–147. (Scholar)
Holtermann, Jakob v. H. (2014). “Naturalizing Alf Ross’s Legal Positivism: A Philosophical Reconstruction,” Revus, 24: 165–186. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Kar, Robin Bradley (2006). “The Deep Structure of Law and Morality,” Texas Law Review, 84: 877–942. (Scholar)
Kim, Jaegwon (1988). “What is ‘Naturalized’ Epistemology?” Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 381–405. (Scholar)
Kitcher, Philip (1992). “The Naturalists Return,” Philosophical Review, 101: 53–114. (Scholar)
Kornblith, Hilary (ed.) (1994a) Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edition, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
––– (1994b) “Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?” in Kornblith (1994a). (Scholar)
Langlinais, Alex and Brian Leiter (2016). “The Methodology of Legal Philosophy,” in H. Cappellen et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Laurence, Stephen and Eric Margolis (1999). “Concepts and Cognitive Science,” in E. Margolis & S. Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Leiter, Brian (1997). “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,” Texas Law Review, 76: 267–315. Reprinted in Leiter (2007). (Scholar)
––– (1998). “Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence,” in Bix (1998). (Scholar)
––– (2001a). “Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered,” Ethics, 111: 278–301. Reprinted in Leiter (2007). (Scholar)
––– (2001b). “Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,” in J.L. Coleman (ed.), The Postscript: Essays on Hart’s Postscript to The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in Leiter (2007). (Scholar)
––– (2007). Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
––– (2011). “Naturalized Jurisprudence and American Legal Realism Revisited,” Law and Philosophy, 30: 499–516. (Scholar)
––– (2018). “Legal Positivism About the Artifact Law: A Retrospective Assessment,” in L. Burazin, K. Himma & C. Roversi (eds.), Law as an Artifact, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Llewellyn, Karl (1930). The Bramble Bush, New York: Oceana. (Scholar)
Moore, Underhill and Charles Callahan (1943). “Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control,” Yale Law Journal, 53: 1–136. (Scholar)
Moore, Michael S. (1985). “A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,” Southern California Law Review, 58: 277–398. (Scholar)
––– (1992a). “Law as a Functional Kind,” in R. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
––– (1992b). “Moral Reality Revisited,” Michigan Law Review, 90: 2424–2533. (Scholar)
Munzer, Stephen R. (1985). “Realistic Limits on Realist Interpretation,” Southern California Law Review, 58: 459–475. (Scholar)
Olivecrona, Karl (1971). Law as Fact (2nd Edition), London: Stevens & Sons. (Scholar)
Pattaro, Enrico (2009). “From Hägerström to Ross and Hart,” Ratio Juris, 22: 532–548. (Scholar)
Paulson, Stanley (2001). Review of Bix (1998), Philosophical Books, 42: 76–80. (Scholar)
Perry, Stephen R. (1987). “Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7: 215–257. (Scholar)
Powe, Jr., Lucas A. (2000). The Warren Court and American Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Pritchett, C. Herman (1948). The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947, New York: Macmillan Co. (Scholar)
Quine, W.V.O. (1951). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953. (Scholar)
––– (1969). “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
Railton, Peter (1986). “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, 95: 163–205. (Scholar)
––– (1990). “Naturalism and Prescriptivity,” in E.F. Paul, et al. (eds), Foundations of Moral and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Raz, Joseph (1985). “Authority, Law and Morality,” The Monist, 68: 295–324. (Scholar)
––– (1998). “Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison,” reprinted in Jules Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. (Scholar)
Ross, Alf (1959). On Law and Justice, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
––– (1962). Review of Hart (1961), Yale Law Journal, 71: 1185–1190. (Scholar)
––– (2020). On Law and Justice, Jakob v. H. Holtermann (ed.), Uta Bindreiter (trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sandin, Robert T. (1962). “The Founding of the Uppsala School,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 23: 496–512. (Scholar)
Segal, Jeffrey A. & Harold J. Spaeth (1993). The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Spaak, Torben (2009). “Naturalism in American and Scandinavian Realism: Similarities and Differences,” in M. Dahlberg (ed.), De Lege. Uppsala-Minnesota Colloquium: Law, Culture and Values, Uppsala: Lustus Forlag. (Scholar)
––– (2014). A Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy, Cham: Springer. (Scholar)
Stavropoulos, Nicos (1996). Objectivity in Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Stich, Stephen P (1994). “Could Man Be an Irrational Animal?” in Kornblith (1994a). (Scholar)
Talbott, William J. & Alvin I. Goldman (1998). “Games Lawyers Play: Legal Discovery and Social Epistemology,” Legal Theory, 4: 93–163. (Scholar)
Toh, Kevin (2005). “Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project,” Legal Theory, 11: 75–123. (Scholar)
––– (2011). “Legal Judgments as Plural Acceptances of Norms,” in L. Green & B. Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Waluchow, W.J. (1994). Inclusive Legal Positivism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)

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