Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Laws of Nature" by John W. Carroll
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Armstrong, D., 1978, A Theory of Universals, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, What Is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “What Makes Induction Rational?,” Dialogue, 30: 503–511. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 421–422. (Scholar)
- Beebee, H., 2000, “The Nongoverning Conception of Laws of Nature,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 571–594. (Scholar)
- Berenstain, N. and Ladyman, J., 2012, “Ontic Structural Realism and Modality,” in E. Landry and D. Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality. Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
- Bigelow, J., Ellis, B., and Lierse, C., 1992, “The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43: 371–388. (Scholar)
- Bird, A., 2005, “The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws,” Foundations of Science, 10: 353–370. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, S., 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Morals and Modals,” in
Fact, Science and Morality, G. Macdonald and C. Wright
(eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Carroll, J., 1990, “The Humean Tradition,” The Philosophical Review, 99: 185–219. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Laws of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, (ed.), 2004, Readings on Laws of Nature, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Nailed to Hume’s
Cross?,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J.
Hawthorne, T. Sider and D. Zimmerman, (eds.), Oxford: Basil
Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ___, 2018, “Becoming Humean,” in Laws of
Nature, W. Ott and L. Patton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, N., 1980, “Do the Laws of Physics state the Facts,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 75–84. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1946, “The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional,” Mind, 55: 289–307. (Scholar)
- –––, 1955, “Law Statements and
Counterfactual Inference,” Analysis, 15:
97–105. (Scholar)
- Cross, T., 2012, “Goodbye, Humean Supervenience,” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7: 129–153. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Demerest, H., 2012, “Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange,” Philosophy of Science, 79: 333–344. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature” Philosophy Compass, 10: 334–344. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1977, “Laws of Nature,” Philosophy of Science, 44: 248–268. (Scholar)
- Earman, J., 1978, “The Universality of Laws,” Philosophy of Science, 45: 173–181. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Laws of Nature: The Empiricist
Challenge,” in D. M. Armstrong, R. Bogdan (ed.),
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Earman, J., Glymour, C., and Mitchell, S., (eds.), 2003,
Ceteris Paribus Laws, Berlin: Springer. (Scholar)
- Earman, J. and Roberts, J., 1999, “Ceteris Paribus,
There is No Problem of Provisos,” Synthese, 118:
439–478. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005a, “Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (Part I),” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 1–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005b, “Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (Part II),” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 253–286. (Scholar)
- Ellis, B., 2001, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009 Metaphysics of Scientific
Essentialism, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press. (Scholar)
- Ellis, B. and Lierse, C., 1994, “Dispositional Essentialism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 27–45. (Scholar)
- Emery, N., 2019, “Laws and Their Instances” Philosophical Studies, 176: 1535–1561. (Scholar)
- Fales, E., 1990, Causation and Universals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1989, “Making Mind Matter More,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 59–79. (Scholar)
- Foster, J., 1983, “Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83: 87–101. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, The Divine Lawmaker, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Friend, T., 2016, “Laws are Conditionals,” European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 6: 123–144. (Scholar)
- Giere, R., 1999, Science Without Laws, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1947, “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals,” Journal of Philosophy, 44: 113–128. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hall, N, 2015, “Humean Reductionism about Laws,” in
A Companion to David Lewis, B. Loewer and J. Schaffer (eds.),
Oxford: John Wiley and Sons. (Scholar)
- Hempel, C. and Oppenheim, P., 1948, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, 15: 135–175. (Scholar)
- Hildebrand, T., 2013, “Can Primitive Laws Explain?” Philosophers’ Imprint 13(5) (July) [Available online]. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities?,” Philosophical Studies, 167 (3): 569–584 (Scholar)
- Ismael, J., 2015, “How to be Humean,” in A Companion to David Lewis, B. Loewer and J. Schaffer (eds.). Oxford: John Wiley and Sons. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. and Pargetter, R., 1980, “Confirmation and the Nomological,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10: 415–428. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lange, M., 1993, “Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos,” Erkenntnis, 38: 233–248. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Natural Laws in Scientific Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 227–41. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Laws and Lawmakers, New
York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws,” Philosophical Studies, 164: 255–61. (Scholar)
- Lange, M., et al., 2011, “Counterfactuals All the
Way Down? Marc Lange: Laws and Lawmakers,”
Metascience, 20: 27–52. (Scholar)
- Langford, C., 1941, Review of “An Interpretation of Causal
Laws,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 6: 67–68. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, Philosophical Papers, Volume
II, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” Mind, 103: 473–390. (Scholar)
- Loewer, B., 1996, “Humean Supervenience,” Philosophical Topics, 24: 101–126. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Two Accounts of Laws and Time,” Philosophical Studies, 160: 115–137. (Scholar)
- Loewer, B. and Lepore, E., 1987, “Mind Matters,” Journal of Philosophy, 84: 630–642. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “More on Making Mind Matter,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 175–191. (Scholar)
- Lyon, A., 1976–1977, “The Immutable Laws of Nature,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 77: 107–126 (Scholar)
- Marshall, D., 2015, “Humean Laws and Explanations,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 3145–3165. (Scholar)
- Maudlin, T., 2007, The Metaphysics Within Physics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mill, J.S., 1843, A System of Logic, London: Longmans,
Green and Co. (Scholar)
- Miller, E., 2015, “Humean Scientific Explanation,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 1311–1332. (Scholar)
- Mumford, S., 2004, Laws in Nature, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Pietroski, P. and Rey, G., 1995, “When Other Things
Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from
Vacuity,” British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 46: 81–110. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F., 1978, Foundations, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Roberts, J., 1998, “Lewis, Carroll, and Seeing through the Looking Glass,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 426–438. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, The Law-Governed Universe, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Roski, S., 2018, “Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations,” Philosophical Studies,175, 1985–2003. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J., 2008, “Causation and Laws of Nature: Reductionism,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J. Hawthorne, T. Sider, and D. Zimmerman, (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Schiffer, S., 1991, “Ceteris Paribus Laws,”
Mind, 100: 1–17. (Scholar)
- Schneider, S., 2007, “What is the Significance of the Intuition that Laws of Nature Govern?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85: 307–324. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1980, “Causality and Properties,” in Time and Cause, P. van Inwagen, (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Causal and Metaphysical Necessity,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79: 59–77. (Scholar)
- Shumener, E., 2017, “Laws of Nature, Explanation, and
Semantic Circularity,” The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 70: 787–815. (Scholar)
- Sidelle, A., 2002, “On the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws of Nature,” in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne, (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Sober, E., 1988, “Confirmation and Lawlikeness,” Philosophical Review, 97: 93–98. (Scholar)
- Swoyer, C., 1982, “The Nature of Natural Laws,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60: 203–223. (Scholar)
- Tooley, M., 1977, “The Nature of Laws,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7: 667–698. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Tweedale, M., 1984, “Armstrong on Determinable and Substantival Universals,” in D.M. Armstrong, R. Bogdan (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Unger, P., 1971, “A Defense of Skepticism” The Philosophical Review 80, 198–219. (Scholar)
- Vetter, B., 2012, “Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws
of Nature,” Properties, Powers and Structures, A. Bird,
B. Ellis, and H. Sankey (eds.), New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, B., 1987, “Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 243–259. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Armstrong, Cartwright, and
Earman on Laws and Symmetry,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 53: 431–444. (Scholar)
- Ward, B., 2002, “Humeanism without Humean supervenience: A projectivist account of laws and possibilities,” Philosophical Studies, 107: 191–218. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85: 537–552. (Scholar)
- Woodward, J., 1992, “Realism about Laws,” Erkenntnis, 36: 181–218. (Scholar)