Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Legal Interpretation" by Mark Greenberg

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Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, 1988, “Updating Statutory Interpretation,” Michigan Law Review, 87 (1): 20–66. (Scholar)
Alexander, Larry, 2011, “Simple-Minded Originalism,” in G. Huscroft, and B. W. Miller (eds.), The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 87–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Originalism, the Why and the What,” Fordham Law Review, 82 (2): 539–544. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Legal Positivism and Originalist Interpretation,” Revista Argentina de Teoría Jurídica, 16: 1–10. (Scholar)
Alexander, Larry, and Prakash, Saikrishna, 2004, “‘Is that English You’re Speaking?’ Some Arguments for the Primacy of Intent in Interpretation,” San Diego Law Review, 41 (3): 967–996. (Scholar)
Balkin, Jack M., 2007, “Abortion and Original Meaning,” Constitutional Commentary, 24 (2): 291–352. (Scholar)
Barak, Aharon, 2005, Purposive Interpretation in Law, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Barnett, Randy, 1999, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,” Loyola Law Review, 45 (4): 611–654. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Interpretation and Construction,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 34 (1): 65–72. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “The Gravitational Force of Originalism,” Fordham Law Review, 82 (2): 411–432. (Scholar)
Barzun, Charles L., 2017, “The Positive U–Turn,” Stanford Law Review, 69 (5): 1323–1388. (Scholar)
Bassham, Gregory, 1992, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
Baude, William, 2015, “Is Originalism Our Law?,” Columbia Law Review, 115 (8): 2349–2408. (Scholar)
Baude, William, and Sachs, Stephen E., 2017, “The Law of Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review, 130 (4): 1079–1147. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Grounding Originalism,” Northwestern University Law Review, 113 (6): 1455–1492. (Scholar)
Berman, Mitchell N., 2007, “Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two about Abortion),” Constitutional Commentary, 24 (2): 383–404. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Originalism is Bunk,” New York University Law Review, 84 (1): 1–96. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Constitutional Interpretation: Non–originalism,” Philosophy Compass, 6 (6): 408–420. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “Our Principled Constitution,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 166 (6): 1325–1413. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems,” in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, and K. Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–164. (Scholar)
Berman, Mitchell N., and Toh, Kevin, 2013, “On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take,” Fordham Law Review, 82 (2): 545–576. (Scholar)
Bobbit, Philip, 1982, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Constitutional Interpretation, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Bork, Robert H., 1971, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” Indiana Law Journal, 47 (1): 1–35. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, New York: Free Press. (Scholar)
Bressman, Lisa S., and Gluck, Abbe R., 2013, “Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,” Stanford Law Review, 65 (5): 901–1026. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II,” Stanford Law Review, 66 (4): 725–802. (Scholar)
Brest, Paul, 1980, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,” Boston University Law Review, 60 (2): 204–238. (Scholar)
Breyer, Stephen, 2002, “Our Democratic Constitution,” New York University Law Review, 77 (2): 245–272. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, New York: Knopf. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View, New York: Knopf. (Scholar)
Calabresi, Steven G., and Prakash, Saikrishna B., 1994, “The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,” Yale Law Journal, 104 (3): 541–665. (Scholar)
Campos, Paul, 1993, “Three Mistakes about Interpretation,” Michigan Law Review, 92 (2): 388–397. (Scholar)
Dickerson, Reed, 1975, “Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature,” Indiana Law Journal, 50 (2): 206–237. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Ronald, 1985, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “A New Philosophy for International Law,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 4 (1): 2–30. (Scholar)
Easterbrook, Frank H., 1983, “Statutes’ Domains,” University of Chicago Law Review, 50 (2): 533–552. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 11 (1): 59–66. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “What Does Legislative History Tell Us,” Chicago–Kent Law Review, 66 (2): 441–450. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 17: 61–70. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Judges as Honest Agents,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 33 (3): 915–923. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Foreword,” in A. Scalia, and B. A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, St. Paul, MN: Thompson/West, pp. xxi–xxvi. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,” University of Chicago Law Review, 84 (1): 81–98. (Scholar)
Eisgruber, Christopher, 2001, Constitutional Self-Government, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Ekins, Richard, 2012, The Nature of Legislative Intent, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Interpretive Choice in Statutory Interpretation,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 59 (1): 1–24. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Objects of Interpretation,” Constitutional Commentary, 32 (1): 1–26. (Scholar)
Ekins, Richard, and Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, 2014, “The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative Intentions,” Sydney Law Review, 36 (1): 39–68. (Scholar)
Eskridge, Jr., William N., 1990, “The New Textualism,” UCLA Law Review, 37 (4): 621–692. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth–Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell,” George Washington Law Review, 61 (6): 1731–1753. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Interpretation of Statutes,” in D. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2nd ed.), Chichester: Wiley–Blackwell, pp. 188–196. (Scholar)
Eskridge, William N. Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, 1990, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,” Stanford Law Review, 42 (2): 321–384. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “The Making of the Legal Process,” Harvard Law Review, 107 (8): 2031–2055. (Scholar)
Eskridge, William N. Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garret, 2007, “Theories of Statutory Interpretation,” in Cases and materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy, St. Paul, MN: West, pp. 689–846. (Scholar)
Fallon, Richard H., 1987, “A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review, 100 (6): 1189–1286. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “How to Choose a Constitutional Theory,” California Law Review, 87 (3): 535–580. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Meaning of Legal ‘Meaning’ and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation,” University of Chicago Law Review, 82 (3): 1235–1308. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Farber, Daniel A., 1988, “Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution,” Minnesota Law Review, 72 (6): 1331–1378. (Scholar)
Fish, Stanley, 2005, “There Is No Textualist Position,” San Diego Law Review, 42 (2): 629–650. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Intention Is all There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law,” Cardozo Law Review, 29 (3): 1109–1146. (Scholar)
Fiss, Owen M., 1982, “Objectivity and Interpretation,” Stanford Law Review, 34 (4): 739–764. (Scholar)
Frickey, Philip P., 2006, “Structuring Purposive Statutory Interpretation: An American Perspective,” Australian Legal Journal, 80: 849. (Scholar)
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, 1997, “Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation,” Federal Law Review, 25 (1): 1–50. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism,” San Diego Law Review, 42 (2): 493–518. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism,” Philosophy Compass, 4 (4): 682–702. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “The Real Standard Picture, and How Facts Make It Law: a Response to Mark Greenberg,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 64 (2): 163–211. (Scholar)
Graglia, Lino A., 1992, “‘Interpreting’ the Constitution: Posner on Bork,” Stanford Law Review, 44 (5): 1019–1050. (Scholar)
Greenawalt, Kent, 2004, “Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation,” in J. L. Coleman, K. E. Himma and S. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 268–311. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and Contracts,” San Diego Law Review, 42 (2): 533–606. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution,” in M. D. Adler and K. E. Himma (eds.), The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–46. (Scholar)
Greenberg, Mark, 2004, “How Facts Make Law,” Legal Theory, 10 (3): 157–198; corrected version reprinted in S. Hershovitz (ed.), 2006, Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225–264. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Hartian Positivism and Normative Facts: How Facts Make Law II,” in S. Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 265–290. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation and Objective Notions of Communicative Content,” UCLA School of Law Research Paper, No. 10–35. [preprint available online.] (Scholar)
–––, 2011a, “Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication,” in A. Marmor and S. Soames (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 217–256. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “The Standard Picture and Its Discontents,” in L. Green, and B. Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Volume 1), pp. 39–106. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Moral Impact Theory of Law,” Yale Law Journal, 123 (5): 1288–1343. (Scholar)
–––, 2017a, “What Makes a Method of Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants,” Harvard Law Review Forum, 130 (4): 105–126. (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “The Moral Impact Theory, the Dependence View and Natural Law,” in G. Duke, and R. P. George (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 275–313. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “Legal Interpretation and Natural Law,” Fordham Law Review, 89 (1): 109–144. (Scholar)
Greenberg, Mark, and Litman, Harry, 1998, “The Meaning of Original Meaning,” Georgetown Law Journal, 86 (3): 569–620. (Scholar)
Grice, H. Paul, 1968, “Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word-Meaning,” Foundations of Language, 4 (3): 225–242. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Griffin, Stephen M., 1994, “Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation,” Texas Law Review, 72 (7): 1753–1769. (Scholar)
Hart, H.L.A., 1994, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hart, Henry M., and Sacks, Albert M., 1994, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (prepared for publication from the 1958 Tentative Edition by, and containing an introductory essay by, William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frick), Westbury: Foundation Press. (Scholar)
Hershovitz, Scott, 2015, “The End of Jurisprudence,” Yale Law Journal, 124 (4): 1160–1205. (Scholar)
Hurd, Heidi M., 1990, “Sovereignty in Silence,” Yale Law Journal, 99 (5): 945–1028. (Scholar)
Kay, Richard S., 1988, “Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses,” Northwestern University Law Review, 82 (2): 226–292. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, “Original Intentions, Standard Meanings, and the Legal Character of the Constitution,” Constitutional Commentary, 6 (1): 39–50. (Scholar)
Kesavan, Vasan, and Paulsen, Michael S., 2003, “The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History,” Georgetown Law Journal, 91 (6): 1113–1241. (Scholar)
Knapp, Stephen, and Michaels, Walter B., 1982, “Against Theory,” Critical Inquiry, 8 (4): 723–742. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “A Reply to Our Critics,” Critical Inquiry, 9 (4): 790–800. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Not a Matter of Interpretation,” San Diego Law Review, 42 (2): 651–668. (Scholar)
Lawson, Gary, 2017, “Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?,” Notre Dame Law Review, 92 (5): 2143–2162. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “On Reading Recipes … and Constitutions,” Georgetown Law Journal, 85 (6): 1823–1836. (Scholar)
Leiter, Brian, 1998, “Realism, Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis,” Legal Theory, 4 (4): 533–548. (Scholar)
Manning, John F., 2001, “Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,” Columbia Law Review, 101 (1): 1–127. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The Absurdity Doctrine,” Harvard Law Review, 116 (8): 2387–2486. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?,” Columbia Law Review, 106 (1): 70–111. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The New Purposivism,” Supreme Court Review, (2011): 113–182. (Scholar)
Marmor, Andrei, 2005, Interpretation and Legal Theory (2nd ed.), Portland: Hart Publishing. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,” Ratio Juris, 21 (4): 423–452. (Scholar)
McConnell, Michael W., 1997, “The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Reading of the Constitution,” Fordham Law Review, 65 (4): 1269–1294. (Scholar)
McGinnis, John O., and Rappaport, Michael B., 2007, “A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism,” Northwestern University Law Review, 101 (1): 383–398. (Scholar)
McNollgast, 1994, “Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 57 (1): 3–38. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, “Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,” Georgetown Law Review, 80 (3): 705–742. (Scholar)
Michaels, Walter B., 2009, “A Defense of Old Originalism,” Western New England Law Review, 31 (1): 21–38. (Scholar)
Molot, Jonathan, 2006, “The Rise and Fall of Textualism,” Columbia Law Review, 106 (1): 1–69. (Scholar)
Moore, Michael, 1981, “The Semantics of Judging,” Southern California Law Review, 54 (2): 151–294. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,” Southern California Law Review, 58 (Issues 1 & 2): 277–398. (Scholar)
Nelson, Caleb, 2005, “What is Textualism,” Virginia Law Review, 91 (2): 347–418. (Scholar)
Patterson, Dennis, 1996, Law and Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pojanowski, Jeffrey A., and Walsh, Kevin C., 2016, “Enduring Originalism,” Georgetown Law Journal, 105 (1): 97–158. (Scholar)
Posner, Richard A., 1983, “Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and the Courtroom,” University of Chicago Law Review, 50 (2): 800–822. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, 37 (2): 179–217. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Pragmatic Adjudication,” in M. Dickstein (ed.), The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 235–253. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, How Judges Think, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Post, Robert, 1990, “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation,” Representations, 30 (1990): 13–41. (Scholar)
Pound, Roscoe, 1907, “Spurious Interpretation,” Columbia Law Review, 7 (6): 379–386. (Scholar)
Primus, Richard A., 2008, “When Should Original Meanings Matter,” Michigan Law Review, 107 (2): 165–222. (Scholar)
Radin, Max, 1930, “Statutory Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review, 43 (6): 863–885. (Scholar)
Raz, Joseph, 1979, “Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law,” in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 37 –57. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Authority, Law, and Morality,” in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 210–237. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “Intention in Interpretation,” in R. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 249–286. (Scholar)
Rickless, Samuel, 2005, “A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication,” San Diego Law Review, 42 (2): 519–532. (Scholar)
Sachs, Stephen E., 2014, “The Constitution in Exile as a Problem for Legal Theory,” Notre Dame Law Review, 89 (5): 2253–2298. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 38 (3): 817–888. (Scholar)
Sager, Lawrence G., 2004, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Justice, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Putting Law in Its Place,” in W. Waluchow, and S. Sciaraffa (eds.), The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 117–129. (Scholar)
Scalia, Antonin, 1989a, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,” University of Cincinnati Law Review, 57 (3): 849–866. (Scholar)
–––, 1989b, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,” University of Chicago Law Review, 56 (4): 1175–1188. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Scalia, Antonin, and Garner, Bryan A., 2012, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, St. Paul, MN: Thompson/West. (Scholar)
Schaus, Steven, 2015, “How to Think About Law as Morality: A Comment on Greenberg and Hershovitz,” Yale Law Journal Forum, 124 (2014–2015): 224–245. (Scholar)
Shapiro, Scott, 2011, Legality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 2005, “Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation,” San Diego Law Review, 42 (2): 465–492. (Scholar)
Soames, Scott, 2009, “Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about the Law,” in Philosophical Essays. Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It, Vol. 1, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 403–423. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation,” New York University Journal of Law & Liberty, 6 (2): 231–259. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Deferentialism: A Post–Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation,” Fordham Law Review, 82 (2): 597–618. (Scholar)
Solum, Lawrence B., 2008, “Semantic Originalism,” Illinois Public Law Research Paper, No. 07–24. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,” Constitutional Commentary, 27 (1): 95–118. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, “Originalism and Constitutional Construction,” Fordham Law Review, 82 (2): 453–537. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, “Communicative Content and Legal Content,” Notre Dame Law Review, 89 (2): 479–520. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,” Notre Dame Law Review, 91 (1): 1–78. (Scholar)
Stavropoulos, Nicos, 2012, “Obligations, Interpretativism and the Legal Point of View,” in A. Marmor (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 76–92. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Obligation and Social Practice,” (in Spanish translation) in L. Ramírez Ludeña, and J. M. Vilajosana Rubio (eds.), Convencionalismo y derecho, Madrid: Marcial Pons, pp. 167–185. (Scholar)
Strauss, David A., 1996, “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,” University of Chicago Law Review, 63 (3): 877–936. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Living Constitution, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sunstein, Cass R., 2015, “There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is,” Constitutional Commentary, 30 (2): 193–212. (Scholar)
Vermeule, Adrian, 2006, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Waldron, Jeremy, 1995, “The Dignity of Legislation,” Maryland Law Review, 54 (2): 633–666. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation,” in A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 329–356. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs,” New York University School of Law Public Law Research Paper, No. 13–45. (Scholar)
Waluchow, Wilfrid J., 2007, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Whittington, Keith E., 1999a, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The New Originalism,” Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2 (2): 599–614. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Constructing a New American Constitution,” Constitutional Commentary, 27 (1): 119–137. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Originalism: A Critical Introduction,” Fordham Law Review, 82 (2): 375–410. (Scholar)

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