Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Legal Probabilism" by Rafal Urbaniak and Marcello Di Bello

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

  • Aitken, Colin, Paul Roberts, and Graham Jackson, 2010, “Fundamentals of Probability and Statistical Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses” (Practitioners Guide No 1), Royal Statistical Society’s Working Group on Statistics and the Law. [Aitken, Roberts, and Jackson 2010 available online] (Scholar)
  • Aitken, Colin G.G. and Franco Taroni, 1995 [2004], Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for Forensic Scientists, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. Second edition, 2004. doi:10.1002/0470011238
  • Allen, Ronald J., 1986, “A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials”, Boston University Law Review, 66: 401–437.
  • –––, 2013, “Complexity, the Generation of Legal Knowledge, and the Future of Litigation”, UCLA Law Review, 60: 1384–1411.
  • –––, 2014, “Burdens of Proof”, Law, Probability and Risk, 13(3–4): 195–219. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgu005
  • –––, 2017, “The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible Reasoning”. International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 21(2): 133-142.
  • –––, 2020, “Legal Probabilism–––A Qualified Rejection: A Response to Hedden and Colyvan”. Journal of Political Philosophy, 28(1): 117-128.
  • –––, 2021, “Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited”, Quaestio Facti, 2: 253–283.
  • Allen, Ronald J., David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry LaRue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, and Alexander Stein, 1995, “Probability and Proof in State v. Skipper: An Internet Exchange”, Jurimetrics, 35(3): 277–310.
  • Allen, Ronald J. and Brian Leiter, 2001, “Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence”, Virginia Law Review, 87(8): 1491–1550.
  • Allen, Ronald J. and Alex Stein, 2013, “Evidence, Probability and the Burden of Proof”, Arizona Law Journal, 55(3): 557–602.
  • Allen, Ronald J. and Michael S. Pardo, 2007, “The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence”, The Journal of Legal Studies, 36(1): 107–140. doi:10.1086/508269
  • –––, 2019, “Relative Plausibility and Its Critics”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 23(1–2): 5–59. doi:10.1177/1365712718813781
  • Amaya, Amalia, 2015, The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument, Oxford: Hart Publishing.
  • Arkes, Hal R., Brittany Shoots-Reinhard, and Ryan S. Mayes, 2012, “Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making”, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(3): 276–294. doi:10.1002/bdm.734
  • Balding, David J., 2002, “The DNA Database Search Controversy”, Biometrics, 58(1): 241–244. doi:10.1111/j.0006-341X.2002.00241.x
  • –––, 2005, Weight-of-Evidence for Forensic DNA Profiles, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Balding, David J. and Peter Donnelly, 1996, “Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence When the Suspect Is Identified Through a Database Search”, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 41(4): 13961J. doi:10.1520/JFS13961J
  • Barker, Matthew J., 2017, “Connecting Applied and Theoretical Bayesian Epistemology: Data Relevance, Pragmatics, and the Legal Case of Sally Clark”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34(2): 242–262. doi:10.1111/japp.12181
  • Becker, Gary S., 1968, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of Political Economy, 76(2): 169–217. doi:10.1086/259394
  • Bernoulli, Jacobi, 1713, Ars Conjectandi, Basileae : Impensis Thurnisiorum, fratrum. Translated as The Art of Conjecture, 2005, Edith Dudley Sylla (trans), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
  • Bex, Floris J., 2011, Arguments, Stories and Criminal Evidence: A Formal Hybrid Theory (Law and Philosophy Library 92), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-0140-3
  • –––, 2015, “An Integrated Theory of Causal Stories and Evidential Arguments”, in Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL ’15), San Diego CA: ACM Press, 13–22. doi:10.1145/2746090.2746094
  • Biedermann, Alex, Tacha Hicks, Franco Taroni, Christophe Champod, and Colin Aitken, 2014, “On the Use of the Likelihood Ratio for Forensic Evaluation: Response to Fenton et al.”, Science & Justice, 54(4): 316–318. doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2014.04.001
  • Blome-Tillmann, Michael, 2017, “‘More Likely Than Not’—Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law”, in Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, & Benjamin Jarvi (eds.), Knowledge First—Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 278–292. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0014
  • Bolinger, Renèe Jorgensen, 2021, “Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry Between Statistical and Individualized Evidence”, in The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials, Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson (eds.), New York: Routledge, pages 60–76.
  • Boole, George, 1857, “On the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to the Question of the Combination of Testimonies or Judgments”, Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 21(4): 597–653. doi:10.1017/S0080456800032312
  • Bovens, Luc and Stephan Hartmann, 2004, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199269750.001.0001
  • Bradley, Darren, 2015, A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
  • Calabresi, Guido, 1961, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts”, Yale Law Journal, 70(4): 499–553.
  • Cheng, Edward K., 2009, “A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem”, Columbia Law Review, 109: 2081–2105.
  • –––, 2012, “Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof”, Yale Law Journal, 122(5): 1254–1279.
  • Cheng, Edward K. and G. Alexander Nunn, 2016, “DNA, Blue Bus, and Phase Changes”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 20(2): 112–120. doi:10.1177/1365712715623556
  • Cheng, Edward K. and Michael S. Pardo, 2015, “Accuracy, Optimality and the Preponderance Standard”, Law, Probability and Risk, 14(3): 193–212. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgv001
  • Childers, Timothy, 2013, Philosophy and Probability, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cohen, L. Jonathan, 1977, The Probable and The Provable, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.001.0001
  • –––, 1981, “Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher”, Arizona State Law Journal, 1981: 627–634.
  • Colyvan, Mark and Helen M. Regan, 2007, “Legal Decisions and the Reference Class Problem”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 11(4): 274–285. doi:10.1350/ijep.2007.11.4.274
  • Colyvan, Mark, Helen M. Regan, and Scott Ferson, 2001, “Is It a Crime to Belong to a Reference Class”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(2): 168–181. doi:10.1111/1467-9760.00123
  • Condorcet, Marquis de, 1785, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, Paris.
  • Cook, R., I.W. Evett, G. Jackson, P.J. Jones, and J.A. Lambert, 1998, “A Hierarchy of Propositions: Deciding Which Level to Address in Casework”, Science & Justice, 38(4): 231–239. doi:10.1016/S1355-0306(98)72117-3
  • Cullison, Alan D., 1969, “Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach”, Toledo Law Review, 1: 538–598.
  • Dahlman, Christian, 2017, “Unacceptable Generalizations in Arguments on Legal Evidence”, Argumentation, 31(1): 83–99. doi:10.1007/s10503-016-9399-1
  • –––, 2018, “Determining the Base Rate for Guilt”, Law, Probability and Risk, 17(1): 15–28. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgx009
  • –––, 2020, “Naked Statistical Evidence and Incentives for Lawful Conduct”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 24(2): 162–179. doi:10.1177/1365712720913333
  • Dant, Mary, 1988, “Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability”, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 22: 31–70.
  • Davidson, Barbara and Robert Pargetter, 1987, “Guilt beyond Reasonable Doubt”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65(2): 182–187. doi:10.1080/00048408712342861
  • Dawid, Alexander Philip, 1987, “The Difficulty About Conjunction”, The Statistician, 36(2/3): 91–97. doi:10.2307/2348501
  • –––, 1994, “The Island Problem: Coherent Use of Identification Evidence”, in Aspects of Uncertainty: A Tribute to D. V. Lindley, P. R. Freeman and A. F. M. Smith (eds.), Chichester/New York: Wiley, pp. 159–170.
  • –––, 2002, “Bayes’s Theorem and Weighing Evidence by Juries”, in Bayes’s Theorem, Richard Swinburne (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–90.
  • Dawid, A. Philip and Julia Mortera, 1996, “Coherent Analysis of Forensic Identification Evidence”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological), 58(2): 425–443. doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1996.tb02091.x
  • –––, 2018, “Graphical Models for Forensic Analysis”, in Handbook of Graphical Models, Marloes Maathuis, Mathias Drton, Steffen Lauritzen, and Martin Wainwright (eds.), Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 491–514.
  • DeKay, Michael L., 1996, “The Difference between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof”, Law & Social Inquiry, 21(1): 95–132. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1996.tb00013.x
  • Dempster, A. P., 1968, “A Generalization of Bayesian Inference”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological), 30(2): 205–232. doi:10.1111/j.2517-6161.1968.tb00722.x
  • Devitt, Edward J., Charles B. Blackmar and Michael A .Wolff, 1987, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, (4th ed), St. Paul: West Publishing Company.
  • de Zoete, Jacob, Marjan Sjerps, and Ronald Meester, 2017, “Evaluating Evidence in Linked Crimes with Multiple Offenders”, Science & Justice, 57(3): 228–238. doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2017.01.003
  • de Zoete, Jacob, Norman Fenton, Takao Noguchi, and David Lagnado, 2019, “Resolving the So-Called ‘Probabilistic Paradoxes in Legal Reasoning’ with Bayesian Networks”, Science & Justice, 59(4): 367–379. doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2019.03.003
  • de Zoete, Jacob and Marjan Sjerps, 2018, “Combining Multiple Pieces of Evidence Using a Lower Bound for the LR”, Law, Probability and Risk, 17(2): 163–178. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgy006
  • Diamond, Henry A., 1990, “Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define”, Columbia Law Review, 90(6): 1716–1736.
  • Di Bello, Marcello, 2019, “Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?”, Mind, 128(512): 1045–1084. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy026
  • Di Bello, Marcello and Collin O’Neil, 2020, “Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions”, Ethics, 130(2): 147–178. doi:10.1086/705764
  • Di Bello, Marcello and Bart Verheij, 2018, “Evidential Reasoning”, in Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Gerald Postema, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini, and Douglas Walton (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 447–493. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_16
  • Donnelly, Peter, 1995, “Nonindependence of Matches at Different Loci in DNA Profiles: Quantifying the Effect of Close Relatives on the Match Probability”, Heredity, 75(1): 26–34. doi:10.1038/hdy.1995.100
  • Donnelly, Peter and Richard D. Friedman, 1999, “DNA Database Searches and the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence”, Michigan Law Review, 97(4): 931–984. doi:10.2307/1290377
  • Dror, Itiel E., David Charlton, and Ailsa E. Péron, 2006, “Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications”, Forensic Science International, 156(1): 74–78. doi:10.1016/j.forsciint.2005.10.017
  • Duff, Antony, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, and Victor Tadros, 2007, The Trial on Trial (Volume 3): Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial, Oxford: Hart Publishing.
  • Earman, John, 1992, Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Ebert, Philip A., Martin Smith, and Ian Durbach, 2018, “Lottery Judgments: A Philosophical and Experimental Study”, Philosophical Psychology, 31(1): 110–138. doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1367767
  • Edwards, Ward, 1991, “Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to Reason”, Cardozo Law Review, 13: 1025–1074.
  • Eggleston, Richard, 1978, Evidence, Proof and Probability, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
  • Ekelöf, Per Olof, 1964, “Free Evaluation of Evidence”, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 8: 47–66.
  • [ENFSI] European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, 2015, ENFSI Guidelines for Evaluative Reporting in Forensic Sciences. [ENFSI 2015 available online]
  • Engel, Christoph, 2012, “Neglect the Base Rate: It’s the Law!”, Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Research on Collective Goods Preprint, 2012/23. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2192423
  • Enoch, David and Talia Fisher, 2015, “Sense and ‘Sensitivity’: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence”, Stanford Law Review, 67: 557–611.
  • Enoch, David, Levi Spectre, and Talia Fisher, 2012, “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 40(3): 197–224. doi:10.1111/papa.12000
  • Evett, I.W., 1987, “On Meaningful Questions: A Two-Trace Transfer Problem”, Journal of the Forensic Science Society, 27(6): 375–381. doi:10.1016/S0015-7368(87)72785-6
  • Evett, I.W., G. Jackson, and J.A. Lambert, 2000, “More on the Hierarchy of Propositions: Exploring the Distinction between Explanations and Propositions”, Science & Justice, 40(1): 3–10. doi:10.1016/S1355-0306(00)71926-5
  • Fenton, Norman, Daniel Berger, David Lagnado, Martin Neil, and Anne Hsu, 2014, “When ‘Neutral’ Evidence Still Has Probative Value (with Implications from the Barry George Case)”, Science & Justice, 54(4): 274–287. doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2013.07.002
  • Fenton, Norman, David Lagnado, Christian Dahlman, and Martin Neil, 2019, “The Opportunity Prior: A Proof-Based Prior for Criminal Cases”, Law, Probability and Risk, 15(4): 237–253. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgz007
  • Fenton, Norman and Martin Neil, 2013 [2018], Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis with Bayesian Networks, Boca Raton, FL: Chapman and Hall/ CRC Press. Second edition, 2018.
  • Fenton, Norman, Martin Neil, and David A. Lagnado, 2013, “A General Structure for Legal Arguments About Evidence Using Bayesian Networks”, Cognitive Science, 37(1): 61–102. doi:10.1111/cogs.12004
  • Ferguson, Andrew Guthrie, 2020, “Big Data Prosecution and Brady”, UCLA Law Review, 67: 180–256.
  • Fienberg, Stephen E. (ed.), 1989, The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the Courts, New York: Springer New York. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-3604-7
  • Finkelstein, Michael O., 2009, Basic Concepts of Probability and Statistics in the Law, New York, NY: Springer New York. doi:10.1007/b105519
  • Finkelstein, Michael O. and William B. Fairley, 1970, “A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence”, Harvard Law Review, 83(3): 489–517. doi:10.2307/1339656
  • Foreman, L.A., C. Champod, I.W. Evett, J.A. Lambert, and S. Pope, 2003, “Interpreting DNA Evidence: A Review”, International Statistical Review, 71(3): 473–495. doi:10.1111/j.1751-5823.2003.tb00207.x
  • Franklin, James, 2011, “Objective Bayesian Conceptualisation of Proof and Reference Class Problems”, Sydney Law Review, 33(3): 545–561.
  • Friedman, Ori and John Turri, 2015, “Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?”, Cognitive Science, 39(5): 1062–1080. doi:10.1111/cogs.12182
  • Friedman, Richard D., 1986, “A Diagrammatic Approach to Evidence”, Boston University Law Review, 66(4): 571–622.
  • –––, 1987, “Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay”, The Yale Law Journal, 97(4): 667–742.
  • –––, 1996, “Assessing Evidence”, (Review of Aitken & Taroni 1995 and Robertson & Vignaux 1995) Michigan Law Review, 94(6): 1810–1838.
  • –––, 2000, “A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds”, Stanford Law Review, 52(4): 873–887.
  • Gaag, Linda C. van der, Silja Renooij, Cilia L. M. Witteman, Berthe M. P. Aleman, and Babs G. Taal, 1999, “How to Elicit Many Probabilities”, UAI'99: Proceedings of the Fifteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence, pp. 647–654. [Gaag et al. 1999 available online
  • Garbolino, Paolo, 2014, Probabilità e logica della prova, Milan: Giuffrè Editore.
  • Gardiner, Georgi, 2018, “Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence”, in David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, London: Routledge, ch. 14.
  • –––, 2019, “The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 47(3): 288–318. doi:10.1111/papa.12149
  • Gastwirth, Joseph L. (ed.), 2000, Statistical Science in the Courtroom, New York, NY: Springer New York. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-1216-4 (Scholar)
  • Gastwirth, Joseph L., Boris Freidlin, and Weiwen Miao, 2000, “The Shonubi Case as an Example of the Legal System’s Failure to Appreciate Statistical Evidence”, in Gastwirth 2000: 405–413. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-1216-4_21
  • Gillies, Donald, 2000, Philosophical Theories of Probability (Philosophical Issues in Science), London: Routledge.
  • Gordon, Thomas F., Henry Prakken, and Douglas Walton, 2007, “The Carneades Model of Argument and Burden of Proof”, Artificial Intelligence, 171(10–15): 875–896. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2007.04.010
  • Griffin, Lisa, 2013, “Narrative, Truth, and Trial”, Georgetown Law Journal, 101: 281–335.
  • Haack, Susan, 2014a, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139626866
  • –––, 2014b, “Legal Probabilism: An Epistemological Dissent”, in Haack 2014a: 47–77.
  • Hacking, Ian, 1990, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511819766
  • Hájek, Alan, 2007, “The Reference Class Problem Is Your Problem Too”, Synthese, 156(3): 563–585.
  • Hamer, David, 2004, “Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements and the Errors That Are Expected to Flow from Them”, University of New England Law Journal, 1(1): 71–107.
  • Harcourt, Bernard E., 2006, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  • –––, 2018, “The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and Cost-Benefit Analysis”, The Journal of Legal Studies, 47(2): 419–447. doi:10.1086/698135
  • Harman, Gilbert, 1968, “Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation”, American Philosophical Quartely, 5(3): 164–173.
  • Hawthorne, John, 2004, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001
  • Hedden, Brian and Mark Colyvan, 2019, “Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defence”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 27(4): 448–468. doi:10.1111/jopp.12180
  • Hepler, Amanda B., A. Philip Dawid, and Valentina Leucari, 2007, “Object-Oriented Graphical Representations of Complex Patterns of Evidence”, Law, Probability and Risk, 6(1–4): 275–293. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgm005
  • Ho Hock Lai, 2008, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Horowitz, Irwin A. and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1996, “A Concept in Search of a Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts.”, Law and Human Behavior, 20(6): 655–670. doi:10.1007/BF01499236
  • Izenman, Alan Julian, 2000a, “Assessing the Statistical Evidence in the Shonubi Case”, in Gastwirth 2000: 415–443. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-1216-4_22
  • –––, 2000b, “Introduction to Two Views on the Shonubi Case”, in Gastwirth 2000: 393–403. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-1216-4_20
  • Kadane, Joseph B. and David A. Schum, 2011, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Sacco and Vanzetti Evidence, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky, 1973, “On the Psychology of Prediction”, Psychological Review, 80(4): 237–251. doi:10.1037/h0034747
  • Kaiser L. and Seber, G.A., 1983, “Paternity testing: I. Calculation of paternity indexes”, American Journal of Medical Genetics, 15(2): 323–329. doi:10.1002/ajmg.1320150216
  • Kaplan, John, 1968, “Decision Theory and the Fact-Finding Process”, Stanford Law Review, 20(6): 1065–1092.
  • Kaplow, Louis, 2012, “Burden of Proof”, Yale Law Journal, 121(4): 738–1013.
  • –––, 2014, “Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules”, American Law and Economics Review, 16(1): 1–39. doi:10.1093/aler/aht020
  • Kaye, David H., 1979a, “Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur”, Michigan Law Review, 77(6): 1456–1484.
  • –––, 1979b, “The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 47(1): 34–56.
  • –––, 1979c, “The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories”, The Arizona State Law Journal, 1979: 101–110.
  • –––, 1980, “Mathematical Models and Legal Realities: Some Comments on the Poisson Model of Jury Behavior”, Connecticut Law Review, 13(1): 1–15.
  • –––, 1982, “The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation”, American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 7(2): 487–516. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1982.tb00464.x
  • –––, 1986, “Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?” Boston University Law Review, 66: 657–672.
  • –––, 1999, “Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Rules Do and Not Do”, International Commentary on Evidence, 3(1): 1–28. doi:10.1177/136571279900300101
  • Kaye, David H. and George F. Sensabaugh, 2011, “Reference Guide on DNA Identification Evidence”, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, third edition, Federal Judicial Center, 129–210.
  • Koehler, Jonathan J., 1996, “The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(1): 1–17. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00041157
  • Koehler, Jonathan J. and Daniel N. Shaviro, 1990, “Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods”, Cornell Law Review, 75(2): 247–279.
  • Kruskal, William, 1988, “Miracles and Statistics: The Casual Assumption of Independence”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 83(404): 929–940. doi:10.1080/01621459.1988.10478682
  • Lacave, Carmen and Francisco J Díez, 2002, “A Review of Explanation Methods for Bayesian Networks”, The Knowledge Engineering Review, 17(2): 107–127. doi:10.1017/S026988890200019X
  • Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 1814, Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités, Paris. Translated as A philosophical essay on probabilities, Frederick Wilson Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory (trans), 1951, New York: Dover.
  • Laudan, Larry, 2006, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511617515
  • –––, 2010, “Need Verdicts Come in Pairs?”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 14(1): 1–24. doi:10.1350/ijep.2010.14.1.338
  • –––, 2016, The Law’s Flaws: Rethinking Trials and Errors?, London: College Publications.
  • Laudan, Larry and Harry Saunders, 2009, “Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of Trial Outcomes”, International Commentary on Evidence, 7(2): article 1. [Laudan and Saunders 2009 available online]
  • Lawlor, Krista, 2013, Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.001.0001
  • Leitgeb, Hannes, 2014, “The Stability Theory of Belief”, Philosophical Review, 123(2): 131–171. doi:10.1215/00318108-2400575
  • Lempert, Richard O., 1977, “Modeling Relevance”, Michigan Law Review, 75: 1021–1057.
  • Levanon, Liat, 2019, “Statistical Evidence, Assertions and Responsibility”, The Modern Law Review, 82(2): 269–292. doi:10.1111/1468-2230.12404
  • Lillquist, Erik, 2002, “Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability”, University of California Davies Law Review, 36(1): 85–197
  • Littlejohn, Clayton, 2020, “Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law”, Synthese, 197(12): 5253–5286. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4
  • Loftus, Elizabeth F., 1979 [1996], Eyewitness Testimony, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Revised edition, 1996.
  • Lucy, David, 2013, Introduction to Statistics for Forensic Scientists, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Lyon, Thomas D. and Jonathan J. Koehler, 1996, “Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases”, Cornell Law Review, 82(1): 43–78.
  • Malcom, Brooke G., 2008, “Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence Alone: How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible”, Columbia Law Review, 38(2): 313–338.
  • Mayo, Deborah G., 2018, Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781107286184
  • Meester, Ronald and Marjan Sjerps, 2004, “Why the Effect of Prior Odds Should Accompany the Likelihood Ratio When Reporting DNA Evidence”, Law, Probability and Risk, 3(1): 51–62. doi:10.1093/lpr/3.1.51
  • Mellor, David Hugh, 2004, Probability: A Philosophical Introduction, London: Routledge.
  • Moss, Sarah, 2018, Probabilistic Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • –––, forthcoming, “Knowledge and Legal Proof”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Nance, Dale A., 2007, “The Reference Class Problem and Mathematical Models of Inference”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 11(4): 259–273. doi:10.1350/ijep.2007.11.4.259
  • –––, 2016, The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316415771
  • National Research Council, [NRC II] 1996, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi:10.17226/5141.
  • Neapolitan, Richard E., 2004, Learning Bayesian Networks, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
  • Neil, Martin, Norman Fenton, David Lagnado, and Richard David Gill, 2019, “Modelling Competing Legal Arguments Using Bayesian Model Comparison and Averaging”, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 27(4): 403–430. doi:10.1007/s10506-019-09250-3
  • Neil, Martin, Norman Fenton, and Lars Nielson, 2000, “Building Large-Scale Bayesian Networks”, The Knowledge Engineering Review, 15(3): 257–284. doi:10.1017/S0269888900003039
  • Nelkin, Dana K., 2000, “The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality”, Philosophical Review, 109(3): 373–408. doi:10.1215/00318108-109-3-373
  • Nesson, Charles R., 1979, “Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity”, Harvard Law Review, 92(6): 1187–1225. doi:10.2307/1340444
  • Newman, Jon O., 1993, “Beyon ‘Reasonable Doub’”, New York University Law Review, 68(5): 979–1002.
  • Niedermeier, Keith E., Norbert L. Kerr, and Lawrence A. Messé, 1999, “Jurors’ Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect.”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(4): 533–542. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.533
  • Nitzan, Shmuel, 2009, Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803871
  • Papineau, David, forthcoming, “The Disvalue of Knowledge”, Synthese, first online: 4 October 2019. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02405-4
  • Pardo, Michael S., 2013, “The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 66: 547–613.
  • –––, 2019, “The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide”, Boston University Law Review, 99(1): 233–290.
  • Pardo, Michael S. and Ronald J. Allen, 2008, “Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation”, Law and Philosophy, 27(3): 223–268. doi:10.1007/s10982-007-9016-4
  • Park, Roger C., Peter Tillers, Frederick C. Moss, D. Michael Risinger, David H. Kaye, Ronald J. Allen, Samuel R. Gross, Bruce L. Hay, Michael S. Pardo, and Paul F. Kirgis, 2010, “Bayes Wars Redivivus—An Exchange”, International Commentary on Evidence, 8(1). doi:10.2202/1554-4567.1115
  • Pennington, Nancy and Reid Hastie, 1991, “A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model”, Cardozo Law Review, 13: 519–557.
  • –––, 1993, “Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making”, Cognition, 49(1–2): 123–163. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(93)90038-W
  • Picinali, Federico, 2013, “Two Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt”, The Modern Law Review, 76(5): 845–875. doi:10.1111/1468-2230.12038
  • –––, 2016, “Base-Rates of Negative Traits: Instructions for Use in Criminal Trials: Base-Rates of Negative Traits”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 33(1): 69–87. doi:10.1111/japp.12109
  • Poisson, Siméon Denis, 1837, Recherches sur la Probabilité des Jugements en Matière Criminelle et en Matière Civile, Paris: Bachelier. Translated as Researches into the Probabilities of Judgements in Criminal and Civil Cases, 2013, Oscar Sheynin (trans), Berlin: NG-Verlag.
  • Posner, Richard, 1973, The Economic Analysis of Law, Boston: Brown & Company.
  • Prakken, Henry and Giovanni Sartor, 2009, “A Logical Analysis of Burdens of Proof”, in Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic, Hendrik Kaptein, Henry Prakken, & Bart Verheij (eds.), London/New York: Routledge, pp. 223–253.
  • Redmayne, Mike, 2008, “Exploring the Proof Paradoxes”, Legal Theory, 14(4): 281–309. doi:10.1017/S1352325208080117
  • Reichenbach, Hans, 1935 [1949], Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre; eine untersuchung über die logischen und mathematischen grundlagen der wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff’s uitgeversmaatschappij. Translated as The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability, second edition, Ernest H. Hutten and Maria Reichenbach (trans), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
  • Renooij, Silja, 2001, “Probability Elicitation for Belief Networks: Issues to Consider”, The Knowledge Engineering Review, 16(3): 255–269. doi:10.1017/S0269888901000145
  • Robertson, Bernard and G.A. Vignaux, 1995 [2016], Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. Second edition is Robertson, Vignaux, and Berger 2016. (Scholar)
  • Robertson, Bernard, G.A. Vignaux, and Charles E.H. Berger, 2016, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, second edition, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. First edition is Robertson and Vignaux 1995. doi:10.1002/9781118492475
  • Ross, Lewis, 2021, “Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(1): 3–23. doi:10.1111/phpr.12622
  • Roth, Andrea, 2010, “Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict”, New York University Law Review, 85(4): 1130–1185.
  • Royall, Richard M., 1997, Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm, London/New York: Chapman & Hall.
  • Saks, Michael J. and Robert F. Kidd, 1980, “Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics”, Law and Society Review, 15(1): 123–160.
  • Schmalbeck, Richard, 1986, “The Trouble with Statistical Evidence”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 49(3): 221–236.
  • Schoeman, Ferdinand, 1987, “Statistical vs. Direct Evidence”, Noûs, 21(2): 179–198. doi:10.2307/2214913
  • Schwartz, David S. and Elliott R. Sober, 2017, “The Conjunction Problem and the Logic of Jury Findings”, William & Mary Law Review, 59(2): 619–692.
  • Schweizer, Mark, 2013, “The Law Doesn’t Say Much About Base Rates”, SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2329387
  • Scutari, Marco and Jean-Baptiste Denis, 2015, Bayesian Networks: With Examples in R, New York: Chapman and Hall/CRC. doi:10.1201/b17065
  • Sesardic, Neven, 2007, “Sudden Infant Death or Murder? A Royal Confusion About Probabilities”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(2): 299–329. doi:10.1093/bjps/axm015
  • Shafer, Glenn, 1976, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Schauer, Frederick, 2003, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
  • Shen, Qiang, Jeroen Keppens, Colin Aitken, Burkhard Schafer, and Mark Lee, 2007, “A Scenario-Driven Decision Support System for Serious Crime Investigation”, Law, Probability and Risk, 5(2): 87–117. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgl014
  • Simon, Dan, 2004, “A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making”, University of Chicago Law Review, 71: 511–586.
  • Simons, Daniel J and Christopher F Chabris, 1999, “Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events”, Perception, 28(9): 1059–1074. doi:10.1068/p281059
  • Skyrms, Brian, 1966, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic, Belmont, CA: Dickenson Pub.
  • –––, 1980, Causal Necessity: a Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  • Smith, Martin, 2018, “When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?”, Mind, 127(508): 1193–1218. doi:10.1093/mind/fzx026
  • Stein, Alex, 2005, Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198257363.001.0001
  • –––, 2008, “The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics”, Cardozo Law Review, 30(3): 1115–1140.
  • Sullivan, Sean Patrick, 2019, “A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-Finding”, University of Colorado Law Review, 90(1): 1–66.
  • Suzuki, Jeff, 2015, Constitutional Calculus: The Math of Justice and the Myth of Common Sense, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  • Sykes, Deanna L. and Joel T. Johnson, 1999, “Probabilistic Evidence Versus the Representation of an Event: The Curious Case of Mrs. Prob’s Dog”, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21(3): 199–212. doi:10.1207/S15324834BASP2103_4
  • Taroni, Franco, Alex Biedermann, Silvia Bozza, Paolo Garbolino, and Colin Aitken, 2014, Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Inference and Decision Analysis in Forensic Science, second edition, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. doi:10.1002/9781118914762
  • Thompson, William C. and Edward L. Schumann, 1987, “Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy.”, Law and Human Behavior, 11(3): 167–187. doi:10.1007/BF01044641
  • Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1986, “Liability and Individualized Evidence”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 49(3): 199–219.
  • Tillers, Peter, 1997, “Introduction: Three Contributions to Three Important Problems in Evidence Scholarship”, Cardozo Law Review, 18: 1875–1889. [The portion of this article that discusses statistical evidence is often referred to as ‘United States v. Shonubi: A Statistical Oddity' available.]
  • –––, 2005, “If Wishes Were Horses: Discursive Comments on Attempts to Prevent Individuals from Being Unfairly Burdened by Their Reference Classes”, Law, Probability and Risk, 4(1–2): 33–49. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgi001
  • Treaser, Joseph B., 1992, “Nigerian Connection Floods U.S. Airport with Asian Heroin”, New York Times, National edition, 15 February 1992, Section 1, Page 1.
  • Tribe, Laurence H., 1971, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process”, Harvard Law Review, 84(6): 1329–1393. doi:10.2307/1339610
  • Triggs, Christopher M. and John S. Buckleton, 2004, “Comment on: Why the Effect of Prior Odds Should Accompany the Likelihood Ratio When Reporting DNA Evidence”, Law, Probability and Risk, 3(1): 73–82. doi:10.1093/lpr/3.1.73
  • Urbaniak, Rafal, 2018, “Narration in Judiciary Fact-Finding: A Probabilistic Explication”, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 26(4): 345–376. doi:10.1007/s10506-018-9219-z
  • –––, 2019, “Probabilistic Legal Decision Standards Still Fail”, Journal of Applied Logics, 6(5): 865–902.
  • Urbaniak, Rafal and Pavel Janda, 2020, “Probabilistic Models of Legal Corroboration”, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 24(1): 12–34. doi:10.1177/1365712719864608
  • Urbaniak, Rafal, Alicja Kowalewska, Pavel Janda, and Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz, 2020, “Decision-Theoretic and Risk-Based Approaches to Naked Statistical Evidence: Some Consequences and Challenges”, Law, Probability and Risk, 19(1): 67–83. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgaa001
  • Venn, John, 1866, The Logic of Chance: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, with Especial Reference to Its Application to Moral and Social Science, London/Cambridge: Macmillan.
  • Verheij, Bart, 2017, “Proof with and without Probabilities: Correct Evidential Reasoning with Presumptive Arguments, Coherent Hypotheses and Degrees of Uncertainty”, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 25(1): 127–154. doi:10.1007/s10506-017-9199-4
  • Vlek, Charlotte S., Henry Prakken, Silja Renooij, and Bart Verheij, 2014, “Building Bayesian Networks for Legal Evidence with Narratives: A Case Study Evaluation”, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 22(4): 375–421. doi:10.1007/s10506-014-9161-7
  • Volokh, Alexander, 1997, “n Guilty Men”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146(2): 173–216.
  • Walen, Alec, 2015, “Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account”, Louisiana Law Review, 76(2): 355–446.
  • Walley, Peter, 1991, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, London: Chapman and Hall.
  • Wasserman, David, 2002, “Forensic DNA Typing”, in A Companion to Genethics, Justine Burley and John Harris (eds.), Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 349–363. doi:10.1002/9780470756423.ch26
  • Wells, Gary L., 1992, “Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(5): 739–752. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.5.739
  • Williams, Glanville, 1979, “The Mathematics of Proof (Parts I and II)”, Criminal Law Review, 297–312 (part I) and 340–354 (part II).
  • Wixted, John T. and Gary L. Wells, 2017, “The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis”, Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 18(1): 10–65. doi:10.1177/1529100616686966
  • Wren, Christopher S., 1999, “A Pipeline of the Poor Feeds the Flow of Heroin: Traffickers Field More ‘Swallowers’ To Evade Sophisticated Drug Crackdown”, New York Times, National Edition, 21 February 1998, section 1, page 37.
  • Wright, Richard W., 1988, “Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts”, Iowa Law Review, 73: 1001–1077.
  • Zabell, Sandy L., 2005, “Fingerprint Evidence”, Journal of Law and Policy, 13(1): 143–179.

Generated Thu Jul 22 23:38:04 2021