Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning" by Julie Dickson

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Aarnio, A., 1987, The Rational as Reasonable, Reidel, Dordrecht, Boston & Lancaster. (Scholar)
Alexy, R., 1989, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Alexy, R. & Peczenik, A., 1990, ‘The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality’, Ratio Juris, 3: 130–47. (Scholar)
Baker, G.P., & Hacker, P.M.S., 1984, Scepticism, Rules and Language, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
Baker, G.P. & Hacker, P.M.S., 1985, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Vol. 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
Bix, B., 1993, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Bobbit, P., 1991, Constitutional Interpretation, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
Bobbit, P., 1996, ‘Constitutional Law and interpretation’, in Patterson, D. (ed.) A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell, Oxford 1996. (Scholar)
Bork, R., 1990, The Tempting of America, New York Free Press, New York. (Scholar)
Brest, P., 1980, ‘The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding’, Boston University Law Review, 60: 204–38. (Scholar)
Coleman, J.C., & Leiter, B., 1995, ‘Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority’ in Marmor, A., Law and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Cornell, D., 1992, The Philosophy of the Limit, Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, NY. (Scholar)
Dancy, J., 1993, Moral Reasons, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
Dickson, J., 2001, Evaluation and Legal Theory, Hart Publishing, Oxford. (Scholar)
Dickson, J., 2004, ‘Methodology in Jurisprudence: a critical survey’, Legal Theory, 10: 117–56. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 1977, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 1985, ‘How Law is like Literature’ in Dworkin. R., A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 1986, Law's Empire, Fontana Press, London. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 1991, ‘On Gaps in the Law’ in Amselek and MacCormick, eds. Controversies About Law's Ontology, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 2006, Justice in Robes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. (Scholar)
Endicott, T.A.O., 1994, ‘Putting Interpretation In Its Place’, Law and Philosophy, 13: 451–79. (Scholar)
Finnis, J., 1987, ‘On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire’ Law and Philosophy, 6: 357–380. (Scholar)
Fish, S., 1989, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. & Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Fiss, O., 1982, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’, Stanford Law Review, 34: 739–763. (Scholar)
Hart, H.L.A., 1958, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review, 71: 593–629. (Scholar)
Hart, H.L.A., 1994, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn., with a postscript edited by P.A. Bulloch & J. Raz, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Holtzman, S. & Leich, C. (eds.), 1981, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (Scholar)
Hurley, S., 1989, Natural Reasons, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Hurley, S., 1990, ‘Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 10: 221–51. (Scholar)
Kavanagh, A., 2002, ‘Original Intention, Enacted Text and Constitutional Interpretation’, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 47: 255–98. (Scholar)
Kavanagh, A., 2003, ‘The Idea of a Living Constitution’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 16: 55–89. (Scholar)
Kavanagh, A., 2009, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
Kelsen, H., 1967, The Pure Theory of Law, 2nd edn. trans. M. Knight, University of California Press, Berkeley, Ca. (Scholar)
Kress, K., 1984, ‘Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions’, California Law Review, 72: 369–402. (Scholar)
Kress, K., 1996, ‘Coherence’, in Patterson, D. (ed.) A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell, Oxford 1996. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an Elementary Exposition, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
Levenbook, B.B., 1984, ‘The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning’, Law and Philosophy, 3: 355–74. (Scholar)
Levinson, L., 1982, ‘Law as Literature’, Texas Law Review, 60: 392–402. (Scholar)
Marmor, A., 1992, Interpretation and Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Marmor, A. (ed.), 1995, Law and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Marmor, A., 2005, Interpretation and Legal Theory, revised 2nd edition, Hart Publishing, Oxford. (Scholar)
MacCallum, G.C., 1968, ‘Legislative Intent’ in R.S. Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
MacCormick, N., 1978, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
MacCormick, N., 1984, ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’, in A. Peczenik et al. (eds.), Theory of Legal Science, D. Reidel Publishing, Dordrecht. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1984, ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, Synthèse, 58: 325–363. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1992, ‘Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVII: 40–52. (Scholar)
Moore, M., 1985, ‘A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation’ Southern California Law Review, 58: 277–398. (Scholar)
Peczenik, A., 1989, On Law and Reason, Kluwer, Dordrecht. (Scholar)
Peczenik, A., 1994, ‘Law, Morality, Coherence and Truth’, Ratio Juris, 7: 146–76. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1979, The Authority of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1994, Ethics in the Public Domain, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1994a, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ in Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1995, ‘Interpretation Without Retrieval’, in Marmor, A. (ed.), Law and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1996a, ‘On The Nature of Law’, Archive fur Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, 82: 1–25. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1996b, ‘Why Interpret?’, Ratio Juris, 9: 349–63. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1996c, ‘Intention in Interpretation’, in George, R.P., (ed.), The Autonomy of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1998a, ‘Postema on Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical Comment’, Legal Theory, 4: 1–20. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 1998b, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries’, in Alexander, L., (ed.), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, Cambridge University Press, 1998. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 2001, ‘Reasoning With Rules’, Current Legal Problems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 54: 1. (Scholar)
Raz, J., 2009, Between Authority and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Réaume, D., 1989, ‘Is integrity a virtue? Dworkin's theory of legal obligation’, University of Toronto Law Journal, 39: 380–409. (Scholar)
Rubenfeld, J., 1998, ‘Legitimacy and Interpretation’, in Alexander, L., (ed.), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, Cambridge University Press, 1998. (Scholar)
Sager, L., 2004, Justice in Plainclothes, A Theory of American Constitutional Practice, Yale University Press, 2004. (Scholar)
Sartorius, R., 1968, ‘The Justification of the Judicial Decision’, Ethics, 78: 171–87. (Scholar)
Sartorius, R., 1971, ‘Social Policy and Judicial Legislation’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 8: 151–60. (Scholar)
Smith, G.A., 1990, ‘Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 3: 155–186. (Scholar)
Stavropoulos, N., 2003, ‘Interpretivist Theories of Law’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/law-interpretivist/>. (Scholar)
Stone, M., 1995, ‘Focusing the Law: What Legal Interpretation is Not’ in Marmor, A. (ed.), Law and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
Sunstein, C., 1996, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford. (Scholar)
Waluchow, W., 2006, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
Weinreb, L., 2005, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (Scholar)
Williams, B., 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Fontana, London. (Scholar)
Wittgenstein, L., 1967, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn. trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)

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