• Anderson, C. A. (1984). “General intensional logic,” in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II, Chapter II.7, pp. 355–385, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
• Anderson, C. A. (1998). “Alonzo Church’s contributions to philosophy and intensional logic,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 4: 129–171. (Scholar)
• Beaney, M. (1997). The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Bressan, A. (1972). A General Interpreted Modal Calculus, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
• Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Enlarged edition 1956. (Scholar)
• Church, A. (1940). “A formulation of the simple theory of types,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5: 56–58.
• Church, A. (1944). Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Part I, Princeton University Press. Revised and enlarged, 1956. (Scholar)
• Church, A. (1946). “A formulation of the logic of sense and denotation (abstract),” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, XI: 31.
• Church, A. (1951). “A formulation of the logic of sense and denotation,” in P. Henle (Ed.), Structure, Method and Meaning, New York: The Liberal Arts Press. pp 3–24.
• Church, A. (1973). “Outline of a revised formulation of the logic of sense and denotation (part I),” Noûs, 7: 24–33. (Scholar)
• Church, A. (1974). “Outline of a revised formulation of the logic of sense and denotation (part II),” Noûs, 8: 135–156. (Scholar)
• Fagin, R. F. and J. Y. Halpern (1988). “Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning,” Artificial Intelligence, 34: 39–76. (Scholar)
• Fitting, M. C. (2004). “First-order intensional logic,” Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 127: 171–193. (Scholar)
• Fitting, M. C. (2005). “The logic of proofs, semantically,” Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 132 (1): 1–25. (Scholar)
• Fitting, M. C. (2006), “FOIL axiomatized,” Studia Logica, 84: 1–22.
• Fitting, M. C. and R. Mendelsohn (1998). First-Order Modal Logic, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Frege, G. (1892). Über Sinn und Bedutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100: 25–50. English translation as ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung,’ in (Beaney 1997). (Scholar)
• Gallin, D. (1975). Intensional and Higher-Order Modal Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland. (Scholar)
• Hughes, G. E. and M. J. Cresswell (1996). A New Introduction to Modal Logic, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Kalyvianaki, E. and Y. N. Moschovakis (2008). Two aspects of situated meaning. In F. Hamm and S. Kepser (Eds.), Logics for Linguistic Structures, pp. 57–86. Mouton de Gruyter. (Scholar)
• Kripke, S. (1963). “Semantical considerations on modal logics,” in Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16: 83–94. (Scholar)
• Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity (Second edition), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Marcus, R. (1946). “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 11: 1–16. (Scholar)
• Marcus, R. (1947). “The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12: 12–15. (Scholar)
• Marcus, R. (1953). “Strict Implication, Deducibility and the Deduction Theorem,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 18: 234–236. (Scholar)
• Marcus, R. (1961) “Modalities and intensional Languages,” Synthese, XIII: 303–322. Reprinted in Modalities, Philosophical Essays, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Oxford University Press, 1993. (Scholar)
• Montague, R. (1960). “On the nature of certain philosophical entities,” The Monist, 53: 159–194. Reprinted in (Thomason 1974), 148–187. (Scholar)
• Montague, R. (1970). “Pragmatics and intensional logic,” Synthèse, 22: 68–94. Reprinted in (Thomason 1974), 119–147. (Scholar)
• Moschovakis, Y. N. (1989). The formal language of recursion. 54, 1216–1252. (Scholar)
• Moschovakis, Y. N. (1994). Sense and denotation as algorithm and value. In J. Oikkonen and J. Vaananen (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Logic, Volume 2, pp. 210–249. Springer. [Full version of proof of Theorem 4.1 from that paper is available online.] (Scholar)
• Moschovakis, Y. (2006). “A logical calculus of meaning and synonymy,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 29: 27–89.
• Quine, W. V. (1963). “Reference and modality,” in From a Logical Point of View (second ed.), Chapter VIII, pp. 139–159. New York: Harper Torchbooks. (Scholar)
• Russell, B. (1905). “On denoting,” Mind, 14: 479–493. Reprinted in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, by Bertrand Russell, London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. (Scholar)
• Stalnaker, R. and R. Thomason (1968). “Abstraction in first-order modal logic,” Theoria, 34: 203–207. (Scholar)
• Thomason, R. and R. Stalnaker (1968). “Modality and reference,” Noûs, 2: 359–372. (Scholar)
• Thomason, R. H. (Ed.) (1974). Formal Philosophy, Selected Papers of Richard Montague, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
• Tichý, P. (1971). “An Approach to Intensional Analysis,” Noûs, 5: 273–297. (Scholar)
• Tichý, P. (1988). The foundations of Frege’s logic, Berlin and New York: De Gruyter. (Scholar)
• van Benthem, J. (1991). “Reflections on epistemic logic,” Logique & Analyse, 133/134: 5–14. (Scholar)
• Whitehead, A. N. and B. Russell (1925). Principia Mathematica (second ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (three volumes). (Scholar)
• Wittgenstein, L. (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
• Zalta, E. (1988). Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)

Additional Reading

• Aczel, P. (1989). “Algebraic semantics for intensional logics,” I. In G. Chierchia, B. Partee, and R. Turner (Eds.), Properties, Types and Meaning. Volume I: Foundational Issues, pp. 17–45, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Bealer, G. (1998). “Intensional entities,” in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Fitting, M. (2002). Types, Tableaus, and Gödel’s God, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
• Kripke, S. (2008). “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes,” Theoria, 74: 181–218. (Scholar)
• Menzel, C. (1986). “A complete, type-free second order logic and its philosophical foundations,” Technical Report CSLI-86-40, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications.
• Searle, R. (1983). An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Svoboda, V., Jespersen, B., Cheyne, C. (Eds.) (2004): Pavel Tichý’s Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy, Prague: Filosofia, and Dunedin: Otago University Press, Dunedin. (Scholar)
• Thomason, R. (1980). “A model theory for propositional attitudes,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 4: 47–70.
• van Benthem, J. (1988). A Manual of Intensional Logic, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)