Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Normative Status of Logic" by Florian Steinberger

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Adams, Ernest W., 1998, A Primer of Probability Logic, Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
Beall, J.C. and Greg Restall, 2005, Logical Pluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001 (Scholar)
Besson, Corine, 2012, “Logical Knowledge and Ordinary Reasoning”, Philosophical Studies, 158(1): 59–82. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9672-3 (Scholar)
Boghossian, P., 2003, “Blind Reasoning”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 77: 225–248. (Scholar)
Broome, J., 2000, “Normative Requirements”, in J. Dancy, Editor, Normativity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Rationality Through Reasoning, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. (Scholar)
Buchak, Lara, 2014, “Belief, Credence, and Norms”, Philosophical Studies, 169(2): 285–311. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0182-y (Scholar)
Caret, Colin R. and Ole T. Hjortland (eds), Foundations of Logical Consequence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001
Cherniak, Christopher, 1986, Minimal Rationality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Chrisman, Matthew, 2012, “‘Ought’ and Control”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3): 433–451. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.611151 (Scholar)
Christensen, David, 2004, Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199263256.001.0001 (Scholar)
Conant, James, 1991, “The Search for Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege and the Tractatus”, Philosophical Topics, 20(1): 115–180. doi:10.5840/philtopics19922015 (Scholar)
Dancy, Jonathan, 1977, “The Logical Conscience”, Analysis, 37(2): 81–84. doi:10.1093/analys/37.2.81 (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel, 1987, Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Dogramaci, Sinan, 2012, “Reverse Engineering Epistemic Rationality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(3): 513–530. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00566.x (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning”, Noûs, 49(4): 776–799. doi:10.1111/nous.12025 (Scholar)
Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, 2015, “A Dialogical, Multi-Agent Account of the Normativity of Logic”, Dialectica, 69(4): 587–609. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12118 (Scholar)
Easwaran, Kenny, 2015, “Truthlove, Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probability”, Noûs, first published 20 June 2015. 10.1111/nous.12099 (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard and Earl Conee, 1985, “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 48(1): 15–34. doi:10.1007/bf00372404 (Scholar)
Field, Hartry, 2009a, “What is the Normative Role of Logic?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83(1): 251–268. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00181.x (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, “Pluralism in Logic”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 2(2): 342–359. doi:10.1017/s1755020309090182 (Scholar)
–––, 2009c, “Epistemology Without Metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, 143(2): 249–290. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “What is Logical Validity?”, In Caret and Hjortland 2015: ch. 2. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.003.0002 (Scholar)
Fitelson, Branden, 2008, “Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37(6): 613–643. doi:10.1007/s10992-008-9083-5 (Scholar)
Fitelson, Branden and Kenny Easwaran, 2015, “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2015: ch. 3. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0003 (Scholar)
Foley, Richard, 1993, Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Frege, Gottlob, 1893/1903/2009, Grundgesetze Der Arithmetik, Paderborn: Mentis. (Scholar)
–––, 1897/1979, “Logic”, in Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, and Friedrich Kaulbach (eds), Posthumous Writings, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pages 126–152. (Scholar)
Geach, P.T., 1958 [1972], “Entailment”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume) 32: 157–172. Reprinted in his 1972 Logic Matters, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pages 174–186. Page numbers from the latter. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, “Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic?”, Philosophia, 11(1): 1–12. doi:10.1007/bf02378802 (Scholar)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 5, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.001.0001
Gibbard, Allan, 2003, “Thoughts and Norms”, Philosophical Issues, 13(1): 83–98. doi:10.1111/1533-6077.00006 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Truth and Correct Belief”, Philosophical Issues, 15(1): 338–350. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00070.x (Scholar)
Goldman, Alvin I., 1980, “The Internalist Conception of Justification”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, volume 5, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pages 27–52. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Halpern, Joseph Y., 2003, Reasoning About Uncertainty, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Harman, Gilbert, 1984, “Logic and Reasoning”, Synthese, 60(1): 107–127. doi:10.1007/bf00485621 (Scholar)
–––, 1986, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Internal Critique: a Logic is Not a Theory of Reasoning and Theory of Reasoning is Not a Logic”, in Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: the Turn Towards the Practical, volume 1 of Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pages 171–186. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Field on the Normative Role of Logic”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109: 333–335. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “Epistemology as Methodology”, in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup (eds), A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, pages 152–156. doi:10.1002/9781444315080 (Scholar)
Hájek, Alan, 2001, “Probability, Logic, and Probability Logic”, in Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Blackwell, pages 362–384 (ch. 16). (Scholar)
Hawthorne, James, 2009, “The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief”, in Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009: 49–74. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_3">10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_3 (Scholar)
Huber, Franz and Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds), 2009, Degrees of Belief, Springer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8 (Scholar)
Jeffrey, Richard C., 1970, “Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief”, in Swain 1970: 157–185. (Scholar)
Joyce, James M., 1998, “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism”, Philosophy of Science, 65(4): 575–603. doi:10.1086/392661 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for An Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief”, in Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009: 263–297. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_11 (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1781/1787 [1998] [KRV], Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason), Hamburg: Meiner. (Scholar)
–––, 1974 [1800], Logic, New York: Dover. (Scholar)
Kaplan, Mark, 1996, Decision Theory as Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Keynes, John Maynard, 1921, A Treatise on Probability, Mineola, NY: Dover. (Scholar)
Kolodny, Niko, 2005, “Why be Rational?”, Mind, 114(455): 509–563. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi509 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107: 229–263. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00220.x (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Why be Disposed to be Coherent?” Ethics, 118(3): 437–463. doi:10.1086/528783 (Scholar)
Kyburg, Henry E. Jr, 1970, “Conjunctivitis”, in Swain 1970: 55–82. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-3390-9_4 (Scholar)
Leitgeb, Hannes, 2013, “The Stability of Belief”, Philosophical Review, 123(2): 131–171. doi:10.1215/00318108-2400575 (Scholar)
MacFarlane, John Gordon, 2000, What Does it Mean to Say that Logic is Formal? PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh. [MacFarlane 2000 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism”, The Philosophical Review, 111(1): 25–65. doi:10.1215/00318108-111-1-25 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Assessment Sensitivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
MacKenzie, Jim, 1989, “Reasoning and Logic”, Synthese, 79(1): 99–117. doi:10.1007/bf00873257 (Scholar)
Maher, Patrick, 1993, Betting on Theories, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Makinson, D.C., 1965, “The Paradox of the Preface”, Analysis, 25(6): 205–207. doi:10.2307/3326519 (Scholar)
Millar, Alan, 2004, Understanding People, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Milne, Peter, 2009, “What is the Normative Role of Logic?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83(1): 269–298. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00182.x (Scholar)
Murzi, Julian and Florian Steinberger, 2013, “Is Logical Knowledge Dispositional?”, Philosophical Studies, 166(supplement 1): 165–183. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0063-9 (Scholar)
Oza, Manish, 2020, “The Value of Thinking and the Normativity of Logic”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 20(25): 1–23. (Scholar)
Pettigrew, Richard, 2017, “Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic”, Logos and Episteme, 8(4): 455–492. (Scholar)
Priest, Graham, 2006, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 1994, “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity”, in his Words and Life, James Conant (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pages 245–263. (Scholar)
Russell, Gillian, 2020, “Logic Isn't Normative”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 63(3–4): 371–388. (Scholar)
Sainsbury, R.M., 2002, “What Logic Should We Think With?” in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought and Language (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/s1358246100008055 (Scholar)
Schroeder, Mark, 2011, “Ought agents, and actions”, The Philosophical Review, 120(1): 1–41. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-017 (Scholar)
Searle, John R., 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, Making the Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Shah, Nishi, 2003, “How Truth Governs Belief”, Philosophical Review, 112(4): 447–482. doi:10.1215/00318108-112-4-447 (Scholar)
Sher, Gila, 2011, “Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?” Synthese, 181(2): 353–365. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9796-1 (Scholar)
Shoaibi, Nader, 2021, “Veritism and the Normativity of Logic”, Ratio, 34(1): 7–19. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, Robert, 1984, Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Steinberger, Florian, 2016, “Explosion and the Normativity of Logic”, Mind, 125: 383–419. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv203 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic”, Synthese, 194(1): 143–162; doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0880-4 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(12): 1-19. (Scholar)
Streumer, Bart, 2007, “Reasons and Entailment”, Erkenntnis, 66(3): 353–374. doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9041-6 (Scholar)
Sturgeon, Scot, 2008, “Reason and the Grain of Belief”, Noûs, 42(1): 139–165. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00676.x (Scholar)
Swain, Marshall (ed.), 1970, Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief, New York: Humanities Press. (Scholar)
Taschek, William W., 2008, “Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on ‘The Essence of Logic’”, Mind, 117(466): 375–401. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn039 (Scholar)
Titelbaum, Michael G., 2015, “Rationality’s Fixed Point (Or: in Defence of Right Reason)”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2015: ch. 9. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.003.0009 (Scholar)
Tolley, Clinton, 2006, “Kant and the Nature of Logical Laws”, Philosophical Topics, 34(1/2): 371–407. (Scholar)
Way, Jonathan, 2010, “The Normativity of Rationality”, Philosophy Compass, 5(12): 1057–1068. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x (Scholar)
Wedgwood, Ralph, 2002, “Internalism Explained”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 349–369. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Meaning of ‘Ought’”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 1, pages 127–160. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Normativism Defended”, in Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan D. Cohen (eds), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “The Normativity of the Intentional”, in Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0026 (Scholar)
Williams, J. Robert G., 2015, “Accuracy, Logic and Degree of Belief”, in Caret and Hjortland 2015: ch. 13. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.003.0013 (Scholar)
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Zangwill, Nick, 2005, “The Normativity of the Mental”, Philosophical Explorations, 8(1): 1–19. doi:10.1080/1386979042000336126 (Scholar)

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