Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Logical Pluralism" by Gillian Russell and Christopher Blake-Turner
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- Beall, JC and Greg Restall, 2000, “Logical Pluralism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78(4): 475–493. doi:10.1080/00048400012349751 (Scholar)
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- –––, 2006, Logical Pluralism, Oxford: Clarendon. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Blake-Turner, Christopher, 2020, “Deflationism About Logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 49(3): 551–571. doi:10.1007/s10992-019-09529-5 (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Reasons, Basing, and the Normative Collapse of Logical Pluralism”, Philosophical Studies, 178(12): 4099–4118. doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01638-9 (Scholar)
- Blake-Turner, Christopher and Gillian Russell, 2021,
“Logical Pluralism without the Normativity”,
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- Boghossian, Paul Artin, 1996, “Analyticity Reconsidered”, Noûs, 30(3): 360–391. doi:10.2307/2216275 (Scholar)
- Burgess, John P., 1997, “Quinus Ab Omni Nævo Vindicatus”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 23: 25–65. doi:10.1080/00455091.1997.10715961 (Scholar)
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- Caret, Colin R., 2017, “The Collapse of Logical Pluralism Has Been Greatly Exaggerated”, Erkenntnis, 82(4): 739–760. doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9841-7 (Scholar)
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- Carnap, Rudolf, 1934, Logische Syntax der Sprache, (Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung), Wien: J. Springer. (Scholar)
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- Cook, Roy T., 2010, “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism”, Philosophy Compass, 5(6): 492–504. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00286.x (Scholar)
- Cosmides, Leda, 1989, “The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task”, Cognition, 31(3): 187–276. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1 (Scholar)
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- Davidson, Donald, 1973 [1984], “Radical
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- Dicher, Bogdan, 2021, “Requiem for Logical Nihilism, or: Logical Nihilism Annihilated”, Synthese, 198(8): 7073–7096. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02510-4 (Scholar)
- Eklund, Matti, 2012, “The Multitude View on Logic”, in
New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Greg Restall and Gillian
Russell (eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 217–240.
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- –––, 2020, “Making Sense of Logical Pluralism”, Inquiry, 63(3–4): 433–454. doi:10.1080/0020174x.2017.1321499 (Scholar)
- Estrada-González, Luis, 2012, “Models of Possibilism and Trivialism”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 21(2): 175–205. doi:10.12775/llp.2012.010 (Scholar)
- Etchemendy, John, 1999, On the Concept of Logical
Consequence, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 2009, “Pluralism in Logic”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2(2): 342–359. doi:10.1017/s1755020309090182 (Scholar)
- Figg, Travis, 2022, “The Death of Logic?”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 11(2): 72–77. doi:10.5840/tht20232289 (Scholar)
- Finn, Suki, 2021, “Limiting Logical Pluralism”, Synthese, 198(S20): 4905–4923. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02134-8 (Scholar)
- Fjellstad, Andreas, 2021, “Logical Nihilism and the Logic of ‘Prem’”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 30(2): 311–325. doi:10.12775/llp.2020.023 (Scholar)
- Franks, Curtis, 2015, “Logical Nihilism”, in Logic Without Borders: Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, Åsa Hirvonen, Juha Kontinen, Roman Kossak, and Andrés Villaveces (eds.), Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 147–166. doi:10.1515/9781614516873.147 (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1918 [1956], “Der Gedanke. Eine logische
Untersuchung”, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen
Idealismus, 1: 58–77. Translated, 1956, as “The
Thought: A Logical Inquiry”, A.M. Quinton and Marcella Quinton
(trans.), Mind, 65(259): 289–311.
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- French, Rohan, 2021, “A Dialogical Route to Logical Pluralism”, Synthese, 198(S20): 4969–4989. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02404-5 (Scholar)
- Griffiths, Owen and A. C. Paseau, 2022, One True Logic: A Monist Manifesto, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829713.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Goddu, G. C., 2002, “What Exactly Is Logical Pluralism?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80(2): 218–230. (Scholar)
- Haack, Susan, 1974, Deviant Logic: Some Philosophical Issues, London/New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic:
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- Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt, 2022, “Reversing Logical Nihilism”, Synthese, 200(3): article 215. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03471-x (Scholar)
- Hjortland, Ole Thomassen, 2013, “Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2): 355–373. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.648945 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic”, Philosophical Studies, 174(3): 631–658. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0701-8 (Scholar)
- Kant, Immanuel, 1800 [1885], Jäsche Logic, Gottlob
Benjamin Jäsche (ed.). The introduction translated in
Kant’s Introduction to his Logic and his Essay on the
Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
(trans.), London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1885. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David, 1989, “Demonstratives. An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”, in Themes from Kaplan, Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 481–563. (Scholar)
- Keefe, Rosanna, 2014, “What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be”, Synthese, 191(7): 1375–1390. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0333-x (Scholar)
- Kouri [Kouri Kissel], Teresa, 2019, “A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism”, Topoi, 38(2): 305–314. doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9423-y (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Metalinguistic Negotiation and Logical Pluralism”, Synthese, 198(S20): 4801–4812. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02264-z (Scholar)
- Lynch, Michael P., 2008, “Alethic Pluralism, Logical
Consequence and the Universality of Reason”, in Midwest
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- MacFarlane, John, 2005 [2017], “Logical Constants”,
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- Mortensen, Chris, 1989, “Anything Is Possible”, Erkenntnis, 30(3): 319–337. doi:10.1007/bf00168284 (Scholar)
- Paoli, Francesco, 2003, “Quine and Slater on Paraconsistency and Deviance”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32(5): 531–548. doi:10.1023/a:1025648722188 (Scholar)
- Payette, Gillman and Nicole Wyatt, 2018, “Logical Particularism” in J. Wyatt, Pederson, and Kellen 2018: 277–299. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_12 (Scholar)
- Plunkett, David and Tim Sundell, 2013, “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 13: article 23. [Plunkett and Sundell 2013 available online] (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 1979, “Two Dogmas of Quineanism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 29(117): 289– 301. doi:10.2307/2219445 (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, Oxford/New York: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199263280.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008a, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is, second edition, (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy), Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. First edition 2001. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511801174 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “Logical Pluralism Hollandaise”, The Australasian Journal of Logic, 6: 210–214. doi:10.26686/ajl.v6i0.1802 (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1960, “The Runabout Inference-Ticket”, Analysis, 21(2): 38–39. doi:10.1093/analys/21.2.38 (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1936 [1966], “Truth by Convention”, in Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 90–124. Reprinted in his Quine 1966: 70–99 (chapter 9). (Scholar)
- –––, 1953a, “Reference and
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- Rahman, Shahid and Juan Redmond, 2008, “Hugh Maccoll and the
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- –––, 2002, “Carnap’s Tolerance,
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- Rosenblatt, Lucas, 2022, “Should the Non-Classical Logician Be Embarrassed?*”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 104(2): 388–407. doi:10.1111/phpr.12770 (Scholar)
- Russell, Gillian, 2008, “One True Logic?”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37(6): 593–611. doi:10.1007/s10992-008-9082-6 (Scholar)
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- Schurz, Gerhard, 1999, “Tarski and Carnap on Logical Truth—or: What Is Genuine Logic?”, in Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle: Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism, Jan Woleński and Eckehart Köhler (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 77–94. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0689-6_7 (Scholar)
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