Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Eliminative Materialism" by William Ramsey
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- Beer, R., 2000, “Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive
Science,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 4(3):
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- Bickle, J., 1992, “Revisionary Physicalism,” Biology and Philosophy, 7(4): 411–430. (Scholar)
- Bogdan, R., 1991, “The Folklore of the Mind,” in R. Bogdan (ed), Mind and Common Sense, New York: Cambridge University Press: 1–14. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P., 1990, “The Status of Content,” Philosophical Review, 99: 157–84. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “The Status of Content Revisited,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 71: 264–78. (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London, Routledge & Kegan. (Scholar)
- Brooks, R., 1991, “Intelligence Without Representation,” Artificial Intelligence, 47: 139–159. (Scholar)
- Chemero, A., 2009, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P. M., 1981, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, Matter and Consciousness,
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- –––, 1993, “Evaluating Our Self Conception,” Mind and Language, 8(2): 211–222. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P.S., 1986, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Can Neurobiology Teach us Anything about Consciousness?,” Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67(4): 23–40. (Scholar)
- Clark, A. and Toribio, J., 1994, “Doing Without Representing?,” Synthese, 101: 401–431. (Scholar)
- Cling, A., 1989, “Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistency,” Philosophical Studies, 56: 53–75. (Scholar)
- Cornman, J., 1968, “On the Elimination of Sensations and Sensations,” Review of Metaphysics, XXII: 15–35. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 1978, “Why You Can’t Make a Computer that
Feels Pain,” in: Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press:
190–229. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, The Intentional Stance,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Quining Qualia,” in: A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, New York, Oxford University Press, 42–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Versus Folk Science, and Belief Versus Opinion,” in: J. Greenwood, (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M., 1990, “Transcendentalism About Content,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 71: 247–63. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. & Rey, G., 1991, “Transcending Transcendentalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72: 87–100. (Scholar)
- Feyerabend, P., 1963, “Mental Events and the Brain,”
Journal of Philosophy, 40:295–6. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z., 1984, “Connectionism and
Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis,”
Cognition, 28: 3–71. (Scholar)
- Forster, M. and Saidel, E., 1994, “Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Psychology, 7: 437–452. (Scholar)
- Frankish, K., 2016, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23: 11–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, Illusionism: As a Theory of Consciousness, Exeter: Imprint Academic Publishing. (Scholar)
- Gibson, J.J., 1950, The Perception of the Visual World, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 1992, “In Defense of the Simulation Theory,” Mind and Language, 7: 104–119. (Scholar)
- Gopnik, A. and Wellman, H., 1992, “Why the Child’s
Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory,” Mind and Language,
7: 145–171. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R., 1986, “Folk psychology as Simulation,” Mind and Language, 1: 158–171. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “The Simulation Theory: Objections and Misconceptions,” Mind and Language, 7: 11–34. (Scholar)
- Greenwood, J., 1991, The Future of Folk Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Griffiths, P., 1997, What Emotions Really Are, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Haldane, J., 1988, “Understanding Folk,”
Aristotelian Society Supplement, 62: 222–46. (Scholar)
- Hannan, B., 1993, “Don’t Stop Believing: The Case
Against Eliminative Materialism,” Mind and Language,
8(2): 165–179. (Scholar)
- Hardcastle, V., 1999, The Myth of Pain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 1991, “Being Indiscrete,” in J. Greenwood (ed.): The Future of Folk Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 120–134. (Scholar)
- Holbach, P., 1970; 1770, The System of Nature: Or, Laws of the Moral and Physical World, translated by H.D. Robinson, New York, B. Franklin. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., 1993, “The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology,” Mind and Language, 8: 282–297. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and Graham, G., 1990, “In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism,” Philosophical Studies, 62: 107–134 (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and Woodward, J., 1985, “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay,” Philosophical Review, 94: 197–226. (Scholar)
- Hume, D., 1977; 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (eds.), 2nd edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Hutto, D., and Myin, E., 2012 Radical Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Irvine, E., 2013, Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective, New York, NY: Springer Press. (Scholar)
- Irvine, E. and Sprevak, M., Forthcoming, “Eliminativism
About Consciousness,” in U. Kreigel (ed.), Oxford Handbook
of the Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University
Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. & Pettit, P., 1990, “In Defense of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 31–54. (Scholar)
- Kitcher, P. S., 1984, “In Defense of Intentional Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy, 81: 89–106. (Scholar)
- Lahav, R., 1992, “The Amazing Predictive Power of Folk Psychology,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 99–105. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1972, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3): 207–15. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W. and Pappas, G., 1972, “What Is Eliminative Materialism?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 149–59. (Scholar)
- Machery, E., 2009, Doing Without Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Precise of: Doing Without Concepts (and Reviews),” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 195–244. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, B. and Warfield, T., 1994, “The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined,” Synthese, 101: 365–400. (Scholar)
- Murphy, D. and Stich, S., 1999, “Griffiths, Elimination and
Psychopathology,” Metascience, 8: 13–25. (Scholar)
- Nisbett, R. and Wilson, T., 1977, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” The Psychological Review, 84(3): 231–258. (Scholar)
- Pylyshyn, Z., 1984, Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, W., Stich, S. and Garon, J., 1990, “Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 499–533. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, W., 1991, “Where Does the Self-Refutation Objection Take Us?,” Inquiry, 33: 453–65. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Representation Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Was Rorty an Eliminative Materialist?,” in A. Malachowski (ed.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Rorty, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Reppert, V., 1992, “Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question,” Metaphilosophy, 23: 378–92. (Scholar)
- Rey, G., 1983, “A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness,” in R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation (Volume 3), New York, Plenum: 1–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “A Question About Consciousness,” in H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 5–24. (Scholar)
- Rorty, R., 1965, “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,” Review of Metaphysics, 19: 24–54. (Scholar)
- Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchison. (Scholar)
- Savitt, S., 1974, “Rorty’s Disappearance
Theory,” Philosophical Studies, 28: 433–36. (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1997, The Mystery of Consciousness, New York:
The New York Review of Books. (Scholar)
- Sellars W., 1956, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Volume 1), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 253–329. (Scholar)
- Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Do True Believers
Exist?,” Aristotelian Society Supplement, 65:
229–44. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Deconstructing the Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilkes, K., 1988, “Yishi, Duh, Um and Consciousness,” in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Relationship Between
Scientific and Common Sense Psychology,” in S. Christensen and
D. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind,
Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp 144–187. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Losing Consciousness,” in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. (Scholar)
- van Gelder, T., 1992, “What Might Cognition Be, If Not
Computation?,” Journal of Philosophy, 92:
345–381. (Scholar)
- van Gelder, T., and Port, R., 1995, Mind as Motion,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bogdan, R., 1991, Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P. and Smith, P.K., 1996, Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Christensen, S.M. and Turner, D.R., 1993, Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P. M., 1989, A Neurocomputational Perspective, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Feyerabend, P., 1963, Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem,
Review of Metaphysics 17: 49–66. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V., 1966, On Mental Entities, in The Ways of
Paradox, Random House. (Scholar)
- Rorty, R. (1970). In Defense of Eliminative Materialism,
Review of Metaphysics 24: 112–121. (Scholar)
- Smolensky, P., 1988, On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 1–74. (Scholar)
- Wellman, H., 1990, The Child’s Theory of Mind,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)