Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Meaning Holism" by Henry Jackman
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Adams, F. & K. Aizawa, 2010, “Causal Theories of Mental Content”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/content-causal/>. (Scholar)
- Antony, L., 1993, “Conceptual Connection and the Observation/Theory Distinction”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 46: 135–161. (Scholar)
- Becker, K., 1998, “On the Perfectly General Nature of Instability in Meaning Holism”, The Journal of Philosophy, XCV(12): 635–640. (Scholar)
- Bilgrami, A., 1986, “Meaning, Holism and Use”, in E.
Lepore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, Belief and Meaning, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Why Holism is Harmless and Necessary”, Noûs (Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology), 32: 105–126. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Secularism, Liberalism, and Relativism”, in S. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell, chapter 17. (Scholar)
- Block, N., 1986, “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Studies in the Philosophy of Mind), 10: 615–678. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality”, Philosophical Issues, 3: 37–72. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “An Argument for Holism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series, 95: 151–169. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Holism, Mental and Semantic”, in E. Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P., 1989, “The Rule Following Considerations”, Mind, 98: 507–549. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Naturalizing Content”, in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his critics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 65–86. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Analyticity Reconsidered”, Noûs, 30: 360–91. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “How are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?” Philosophical Studies, 106: 1–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Blind Reasoning”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 77(Supple Vol.): 225–48. (Scholar)
- Brandom, R., 1994, Making it Explicit, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Articulating Reasons, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Inferentialism and Some of its Challenges”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 651–76. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Between Saying and Doing, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Reason in Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Perspectives on Pragmatism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Brown, C., 2011, “Narrow Mental Content”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/content-narrow/>. (Scholar)
- Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4(Studies in Metaphysics): 73–121. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Intellectual norms and the Foundations of Mind”, The Journal of Philosophy, 83(12): 697–720. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P., 1979, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology”, reprinted in P.M. Churchland, 1989, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp.77–110. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Conceptual Similarity across Sensory and Neural Diversity: the Fodor/Lepore Challenge Answered”, Journal of Philosophy, 95: 5–32. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M., 1980, Designation, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 7(Logic and Language): 281–306. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Coming to Our Senses, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Dresner, E., 2002, “Holism, Language Acquisition and Algebraic Logic”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 25(4): 419–52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “ A Measurement Theoretic Account of Propositions”, Synthese, 153: 1–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Meaning Holism”, Philosophy Compass, 7(9): 611–619. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Holism, Meaning Similarity and Inferential Space – a Measurement Theoretic Approach”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48: 611–630. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge: MIT. (Scholar)
- Dummett, M., 1973, Frege, Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)”, reprinted in M. Dummett, The Seas of Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Evans, G., 1973, “The Causal Theory of Names”, reprinted in G. Evans, 1985, Collected Papers, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–24. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1977, “Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role”, The Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV(7): 379–409. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1987, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. & E. Lepore, 1991, “Why Meaning (Probably)
isn’t Conceptual Role”, reprinted in Fodor & Lepore
2002, pp. 9–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, Holism: A Shoppers Guide,
Cambridge: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 1993, Holism: A Consumers Update, Amsterdam: Rodopi. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “All at Sea in Semantic Space:
Churchland on Meaning Similarity”, Journal of
Philosophy, 96: 381–403. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, The Compositionality Papers,
New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Brandom Beleaguered”,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74:
677–691. (Scholar)
- Fultner, B., 1998, “Of Parts and Wholes: The Molecularist Critique of Semantic Holism”, Protosociology, 11: 41–65 (Scholar)
- Guttenplan, S., 1994, “Holism”, in S. Guttenplan
(ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge:
Blackwell, p. 347. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1973, Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Meaning Holism Defended”, in Fodor and Lepore 1993, pp. 163–171. (Scholar)
- Heal, J., 1994, “Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy”,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 94:
325–339. (Scholar)
- Hempel, C.G., 1950, “Problems and changes in the empiricist criterion of meaning”, Revue internationale de Philosophie, 41(11): 41–63. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P., 2005, Reflections on Meaning, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackman, H., 1999a, “Moderate Holism and the Instability Thesis”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 36(4): 361–369. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999b, “We Live Forwards but Understand Backwards: Linguistic Practices and Future Behavior”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80: 157–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a, “Charity, Self-Interpretation, and Belief”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 28: 145–170. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, “Foundationalism, Coherentism and Rule Following Skepticism”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 11(1): 25–41. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Descriptive Atomism and Foundational Holism: Semantics between the Old Testament and the New”, Protosociology 21(Compositionality, Concepts and Representations I): 5–19. (Scholar)
- Jönsson, M., 2014, “Semantic Holism and Language Learning”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43: 725–59. (Scholar)
- Jorgensen, A., 2009, “Holism, Communication, and the Emergence of Public Meaning: Lessons from an Economic Analogy”, Philosophia, 37: 133–147. (Scholar)
- Khalidi, M. A., 1993, “Review of Holism: a shoppers
guide”, Mind, New Series, 102(408):
650–654. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lau, J. & M. Deutsch, 2012, “Externalism About Mental Content”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/content-externalism/>. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–377. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Putnam’s Paradox”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 221–236. (Scholar)
- Lormand, E., 1996, “How to be a Meaning Holist”, The Journal of Philosophy, XCIII(2): 51–73. [preprint available online] (Scholar)
- MacFarlane, J., 2007, “Relativism and Disagreement”, Philosophical Studies, 132: 17–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “Relativism”, in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Delia Graff Fara and Gillian Russell (eds.), New York: Routledge, pp. 132–142. (Scholar)
- Margolis, E. and S. Laurence, 1998, “Multiple Meanings and the Stability of Content”, The Journal of Philosophy, XCV(5): 255–63. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Concepts and Cognitive Science”, in E. Margolis & S. Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 3–81. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1986, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, in P. Pettit & J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.137–168. (Scholar)
- Pacherie, E., 1994, “Holophobia” Acta Analytica, 105–112. (Scholar)
- Pagin, P., 1997, “Is Compositionality Compatible with Holism?” Mind & Language, 12(1): 11–33. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Meaning Holism”, in E. Lepore and B.C. Smith (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 214–232. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D., 1987, Reality and Representation, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C., 1995, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Holism”, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 227–247. (Scholar)
- Pietroski, P., 2003, “The Character of Natural Language Semantics”, in Epistemology of Language, Alex Barber (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.217–256. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Meaning Before Truth”, in Contextualism in Philosophy, G. Preyer and G. Peters (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 255–302. (Scholar)
- Podlaskowski, A.C., 2010, “Reconciling Semantic Dispositionalism with Semantic Holism”, Philosophia, 38:169–178 (Scholar)
- Pollock, J., 2020, “Holism, Conceptual Role, and Conceptual Similarity”, Philosophical Psychology, 33(3): 396–420 (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of
‘Meaning’”, Reprinted in his Mind Language and
Reality, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.
215–271. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V., 1951, “Two dogmas of empiricism”, reprinted in W.V. Quine, 1953, From a logical point of view, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 20–46. (Scholar)
- Rey, G., 2008, “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/analytic-synthetic/>. (Scholar)
- Rovane, C., 2013, “The Larger Philosophical Significance of Holism”, in E. Lepore and K. Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 395–409. (Scholar)
- Russell, G., 2008, Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction, New York: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
- Salis, P., 2016, “Counterfactually Robust Inferences, modally Rules out Inferences, and Semantic Holism”, Al-Mukhatabat Journal, 16: 111–135 (Scholar)
- Schroeder, T., 2007, “A Recipe for Content Similarity”, Mind and Language, 22: 68–91 (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1948, “Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable without Them”, Philosophy of Science, 15(4): 287–315 (Scholar)
- –––, 1954, “Some Reflections on Language Games”, in W. Sellars, Science Perception and Reality, London: Routledge, pp. 321–358. (Scholar)
- –––, 1974, “Meaning as Functional Classification”, Synthese, 27: 417–37. (Scholar)
- Stampe, D.W., 1979, “Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2(Contemporary Perspectives in The Philosophy of Language): 42–63. (Scholar)
- Stanley, J., 2008, “Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century” The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, London: Routledge Press, pp. 382–437 (Scholar)
- Talmage, C.J.L., 1998, “Semantic Localism and the Locality of Content”, Erkenntnis, 48(1): 101–111. (Scholar)
- Warfield, T., 1993, “On a Semantic Argument Against Conceptual Role Semantics”, Analysis, 53: 298–304. (Scholar)
- White, S.L., 1982, “Partial Character and the Language of Thought”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63(October): 347–65. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2003, “Blind Reasoning”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 77(1): 249–293. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations, third edition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)