Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Metaepistemology" by J. Adam Carter and Ernest Sosa
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- Carter, J. Adam, Benjamin W. Jarvis, and Katherine Rubin, 2016, “Belief without Credence”, Synthese, 193(8): 2323–2351. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6 (Scholar)
- Carter, J. Adam and Robin McKenna, 2021, “Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology”, Erkenntnis, 86(5): 1139–1159. doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w (Scholar)
- Carter, J. Adam, Duncan Pritchard, and Joshua Shepherd, 2019, “Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4): 701–734. doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9 (Scholar)
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- Côté-Bouchard, Charles and Clayton Littlejohn, 2018, “Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory”, in Metaepistemology, Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna (eds.), Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 147–171. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_7 (Scholar)
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- DeRose, Keith, 1992, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52(4): 913–929. doi:10.2307/2107917 (Scholar)
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- Feltz, Adam and Chris Zarpentine, 2010, “Do You Know More When It Matters Less?”, Philosophical Psychology, 23(5): 683–706. doi:10.1080/09515089.2010.514572 (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1996, “The A Prioricity of Logic”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 359–380. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.359 (Scholar)
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