Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Metaphysics" by Peter van Inwagen, Meghan Sullivan and Sara Bernstein
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Andler, Matthew, 2021, “The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction”, Hypatia, 36(2):259–275. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, David, 1989, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, CO: Westview. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ásta, 2018, Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories, New York, USA: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2000, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Barcan [Barcan Marcus], Ruth, 1946, “A Functional Calculus
of First Order Based on Strict Implication”, Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 11: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Barnes, Elizabeth, 2016, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Barnes, Elizabeth, 2017, “Realism and social structure”, Philosophical Studies, 174(10): 2417–2433. (Scholar)
- Beebee, Helen, 2004, “Causing and Nothingness”, in Causation and Counterfactuals, John Collins, Ned Hall and Laurie Paul (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 291–308. (Scholar)
- Bennett, Karen, 2021, “Why I am Not a Dualist” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, 1: 208–231. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, Making Things Up, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bernstein, Sara, 2014, “Omissions as Possibilities”, Philosophical Studies, 167(1): 1–23. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Causal proportions and moral responsibility” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4, David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 165–182. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, “The Metaphysics of Intersectionality”, Philosophical Studies, 177(2): 321–335. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Could a Middle Level be the Most Fundamental?”, Philosophical Studies, 178(4): 1065–1078. (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Lund Humphries. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald, 1967, “Causal Relations”, Journal of Philosophy, 64: 691–703. (Scholar)
- Dembroff, Robin A, 2016, “What Is Sexual Orientation?”, Philosophers’ Imprint 16. (Scholar)
- Demirtas, Huzeyfe, 2022, “Causation Comes in Degrees”, Synthese, 200(1): 1–17. (Scholar)
- Díaz-León, Esa, 2015, “What Is Social Construction?”, European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4): 1137–1152. (Scholar)
- Epstein, Brian, 2019, “What are Social Groups? Their
Metaphysics and How to Classify Them”, Synthese, 196
(12): 4899–4932. (Scholar)
- –––, “Social Ontology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 2001, “The Question of Realism”, Philosopher’s Imprint, 1: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hacking, Ian, 1999, The Social Construction of What?, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Jorba, Marta & Rodó de Zárate, Maria, 2019,
“Beyond Mutual Constitution: The Properties Framework for
Intersectionality Studies”, Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society, 45(1): 175–200. (Scholar)
- Kaiserman, Alex, 2018, “‘More of a Cause’: Recent Work on Degrees of Causation and Responsibility”, Philosophy Compass, 13(7): e12498. (Scholar)
- Korman, Daniel Z, 2020, “The Metaphysics of Establishments”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98 (3): 434–448. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1972, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Laurence, Stephen and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), 1998, Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1973, “Causation”, Journal of Philosophy, 70: 556–67. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 2006, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford: The Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Mason, R. & Ritchie, K., 2020, “Social Ontology”, in Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, R. Bliss and J. Miller (eds.), Routledge, pp. 312–324. (Scholar)
- McKitrick, J, 2018, “Feminist Metaphysics: Can This Marriage Be Saved?”, The Bloomsbury Companion to Academic Feminism, Pieranna Garavaso (ed.), London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 58–79. (Scholar)
- McDaniel, Kris, 2013, “Degrees of Being”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 13. (Scholar)
- McGinn, Colin, 1993, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McTaggart, J.M. E., 1908, “The Unreality of Time”,
Mind, 17: 457–474. (Scholar)
- Mikkola, Mari, 2017, “On the Apparent Antagonism between Feminist and Mainstream Metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, 174(10): 2435–2448. (Scholar)
- Passinsky, Asya, 2020, “Should Bitcoin Be Classified as Money?”, Journal of Social Ontology, 6(2): 281–292. (Scholar)
- –––, “Finean Feminist Metaphysics”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 64(9): 937–954. (Scholar)
- Paul, L.A. and Ned Hall, 2013, Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: The Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Politis, Vasilis, 2004, Aristotle and the Metaphysics, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Prior, A.N., 1998, “The Notion of the Present”, in
Metaphysics: The Big Questions, Peter van Inwagen and Dean
Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Press, pp. 80–82. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1948, “On What There Is”, in Quine
1961: 1–19. (Scholar)
- –––, 1953, “Reference and
Modality”, in Quine 1961: 139–159. (Scholar)
- –––, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1961, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Rea, Michael (ed.), 1997, Material Constitution: A Reader, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Richardson, Kevin, forthcoming, “The Metaphysics of Gender is (Relatively) Substantial”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
- –––, 2022, “Social Groups Are Concrete Material Particulars”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52(4): 468–483. (Scholar)
- Ritchie, Katherine, 2020b, “Social Structures and the
Ontology of Social Groups”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 100(2): 402–424. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “The Metaphysics of Social Groups”, Philosophy Compass 10(5): 310–321. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “What are groups?” Philosophical Studies, 166(2): 257–272. (Scholar)
- Ruben, David-Hillel, 1985, The Metaphysics of the Social World, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Sartorio, Carolina, 2004, “How to be Responsible for Something Without Causing it”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1): 315–336. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, “More of a Cause?”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 37(3): 346–363. (Scholar)
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1949, Situations III, Paris:
Gallimard. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, Jonathan, 2004, “Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to Their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation”, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, C. Hitchcock (ed.), Malden MA: Blackwell, pp. 197–216. (Scholar)
- ––– 2010, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole”, Philosophical Review, 119: 31–76. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 2012, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert, 1968, “A Theory of Conditionals”, in Studies in Logical Theory, Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 98–112. (Scholar)
- Sullivan, Meghan, 2012, “The Minimal A-Theory”, Philosophical Studies, 158: 149–174. (Scholar)
- Thomasson, Amie, 2009, “Answerable and Unanswerable Questions”, in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 444–471. (Scholar)
- Uzquiano, Gabriel, 2004, “The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle”, Noûs, 38 (1): 135–153. (Scholar)
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1998, “The Statue and Clay”,
Noûs, 32: 149–173 (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, Bas C., 2002, The Empirical Stance, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, Peter, 1998, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom”, in Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 365–374. (Scholar)
- Wallace, Meg, 2019, “The Lump Sum: A Theory of Modal Parts”, Philosophical Papers, 48(3) :403–435. (Scholar)
- Warmke, Craig, 2021, “What is Bitcoin?”, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2013, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Dean W. (ed.), 2006, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 2), Oxford: The Clarendon Press. (Scholar)