Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Epistemology of Modality" by Antonella Mallozzi, Anand Vaidya and Michael Wallner

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Boghossian, Paul and Timothy Williamson, 2020, Debating the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198851707.001.0001 (Scholar)
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–––, 2020, The Routledge Handbook of Modality, New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315742144 (Scholar)
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–––,1963, “P.F. Strawson on linguistic naturalism”, in P. A. Schlipp (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. La Salle, Illinois: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 2010, “Knowledge and Modality”, Synthese, 172(3): 341–359. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9396-5 (Scholar)
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–––, 2012c, Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777860.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Articulating the A Priori–A Posteriori Distinction1”, in Casullo and Thurow 2013: 248–271. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0012 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Four Challenges to the a Priori—a Posteriori Distinction”, Synthese, 192(9): 2701–2724. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0341-x (Scholar)
Casullo, Albert and Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), 2013, The A Priori in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001 (Scholar)
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–––, 2004, “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”, Philosophical Studies, 118(1/2): 153–226. doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000019546.17135.e0 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001 (Scholar)
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–––, 2019b, “Metaphysical and absolute possibility”, Synthese, 198 (Supplement 8): 1861–1872. (Scholar)
Contim, Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim and Sébastien Motta, 2012, Modal Matters, special issue of Philosophia Scientiæ, 16(2). (Scholar)
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Cowling, Sam, 2013, “The Modal View of Essence”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(2): 248–266. doi:10.1080/00455091.2013.827395 (Scholar)
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Della Rocca, Michael, 1996a, “Essentialism: Part 1”, Philosophical Books, 37(1): 1–13. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1996.tb02508.x (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, “Essentialism: Part 2”, Philosophical Books, 37(2): 81–89. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1996.tb02954.x (Scholar)
Deng, Duen-Min, 2016, “On the Alleged Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality”, Philosophia, 44: 479–495. (Scholar)
Devitt, Michael, 2021, “Defending Intrinsic Biological Essentialism”, Philosophy of Science, 88(1): 67–82. doi:10.1086/710029 (Scholar)
Dumsday, Travis, 2012, “A New Argument For Intrinsic Biological Essentialism”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 62(248): 486–504. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00048.x (Scholar)
Ereshefsky, Marc, 2010, “What’s Wrong with the New Biological Essentialism”, Philosophy of Science, 77(5): 674–685. doi:10.1086/656545 (Scholar)
Evnine, Simon, 2008, “Modal Epistemology: Our Knowledge of Necessity and Possibility”, Philosophy Compass, 3(4): 664–684. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00147.x (Scholar)
Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. doi:10.2307/2214160 (Scholar)
Fischer, Bob [Robert], 2017, “Theory Selection in Modal Epistemology”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(4): 381–395. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “C. I. Lewis and the Benacerraf Problem”, Episteme, 15(2): 154–165. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.52 (Scholar)
Fischer, Bob and Felipe Leon (eds.), 2017, Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, (Synthese Library 378), Cham: Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6 (Scholar)
Geirsson, Hemir, 2005, “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification”, Philosophical Studies, 122(3): 279–304. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-6522-9 (Scholar)
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Godman, Marion, Antonella Mallozzi, and David Papineau, 2020, “Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(3): 316–334. doi:10.1017/apa.2019.48 (Scholar)
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–––, 2013, Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669578.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Essence and Definition by Abstraction”, Synthese, 198(S8): S2001–S2017. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1726-7 (Scholar)
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