Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Varieties of Modality" by Boris Kment

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Armstrong, D., 1983, What Is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “What Makes Induction Rational?”, Dialogue, 30: 503–511. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 421–422. (Scholar)
Ayer, A. J., 1946, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Gollancz, 2nd ed. (Scholar)
Bacon, A. 2018, “The Broadest Necessity”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47: 733–783. (Scholar)
Bealer, G., 2002, “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance”, in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–125. (Scholar)
Berger, A., 2011, Saul Kripke, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Bird, A., 2005, “The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws”, Foundations of Science, 10: 353–370. (Scholar)
Block, N. and R. Stalnaker, 1999, “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”, Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. (Scholar)
Bostock, D., 1988, “Necessary Truth and A Priori Truth”, Mind, 97: 343–379. (Scholar)
Byrne, A. and J. Pryor, 2006, “Bad Intensions”, in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, M. Garcia-Carprintero and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 38–54. (Scholar)
Cameron, R., 2007, “The Contingency of Composition”, Philosophical Studies, 136: 99–121. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 473–496. (Scholar)
–––, 2002a, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–200. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, “On Sense and Intension”, Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 135–82. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 153–226. (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 575–606. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Ontological Anti-realism”, in Metametaphysics, D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–129. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Nature of Epistemic Space”, in Epistemic Modality, A. Egan and B. Weatherson (eds.), Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Constructing the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D. and F. Jackson, 2001, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review, 110: 315–61. (Scholar)
Davies, M., 2004, “Reference, Contingency, and the Two-Dimensional Framework”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 83–131. (Scholar)
Davies, M. and I. L. Humberstone, 1980, “Two Notions of Necessity”, Philosophical Studies, 38: 1–30. (Scholar)
Ditter, A., 2020, “The Reduction of Necessity to Essence”, Mind, 129: 351–80. (Scholar)
Donnellan, K., 1979, “The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators”, in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, P. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 45–60. (Scholar)
Dorr, C., 2016, “To Be F is to be G”, Philosophical Perspectives, 30: 1–97. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1977, “Laws of Nature”, Philosophy of Science, 44: 248–268. (Scholar)
Egan, A. and B. Weatherson, (eds.), 2011, Epistemic Modality, Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Ellis, B., 2001, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Ellis, B. and C. Lierse, 1994, “Dispositional Essentialism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 27–45. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1979, “Reference and Contingency”, Monist, 62: 161–189. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fales, E., 1990, Causation and Universals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Are Causal Laws Contingent?”, Ontology, Causality and Mind, J. Bacon, K. Campbell, and L. Reinhardt (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121–144. (Scholar)
Fine, K., 1994, “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Senses of Essence”, in Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, W. Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–73. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “The Varieties of Necessity”, in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 253–282. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fitch, G., 1977, “Are There Contingent A Priori Truths”, The Journal of Critical Analysis, 6: 119–123. (Scholar)
French, P., T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, 1979, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Gendler, T. and J. Hawthorne, 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Hale, B., 1996, “Absolute Necessities”, Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 93–117. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “The Source of Necessity”, Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 299–319. (Scholar)
Hill, C. 2006, “Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness”, in The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretense, Possibility, and Fiction, S. Nichols (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–236. (Scholar)
Hill, C. and B. McLaughlin, 1999, “There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 445–454. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Why We Need A-Intensions”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Possibility for Representation and Credence: Two Space-ism versus One Space-ism”, in Epistemic Modality, A. Egan and B. Weatherson, Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 131–143. (Scholar)
Kaplan, D., 1989a, “Demonstratives”, in Themes from Kaplan, J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563. (Scholar)
–––, 1989b, “Afterthoughts”, in Themes from Kaplan, J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 565–612. (Scholar)
Kitcher, P., 1980, “A Priority and Necessity”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58: 89–101. (Scholar)
Kment, B. 2006a, “Counterfactuals and the Analysis of Necessity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 237–302. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, “Counterfactuals and Explanation”, Mind, 115: 261–310. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015a, “Modality, Metaphysics, and Method”, Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 179–207. (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, “Replies to Sullivan and Lange”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91: 516–539. (Scholar)
Kratzer, A., 1977, “What Must and Can Must and Can Mean”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 1: 337–55. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “The Notional Category of Modality”, in Words, Worlds, and Contexts: New Approaches in Word Semantics, H. J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser (eds.), Berlin: W. de Gruyter, pp. 38–74. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, “Modality”, in Semantics: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research, A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich (eds.), Berlin: W. de Gruyter, pp. 639–50. (Scholar)
Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Lange, M., 1999, “Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood”, Philosophy of Science, 66: 243–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Natural Laws in Scientific Practice, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 227–41. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “A Counterfactual Analysis of the Concepts of Logical Truth and Necessity”, Philosophical Studies, 125: 277–303. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory Reasoning”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91: 508–515. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1973a, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1973b, “Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 418–446. (Scholar)
–––, 1979a, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”, Nous, 13: 455–76. (Scholar)
–––, 1979b, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
–––, 1981, “Index, Context, and Content”, in Philosophy and Grammar, S. Kanger and S. Ohlman (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 79–100. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind, 103: 473–390. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, “Naming the Colours”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. (Scholar)
Loar, B., 1999, “David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 465–472. (Scholar)
McFetridge, I., 1990, “Logical Necessity: Some Issues”, in Logical necessity, and other essays, J. Haldane and R. Scruton (eds.), London: Aristotelian Society, pp. 135–54. (Scholar)
Oppy, G., 1987, “Williamson and the Contingent A Priori”, Analysis, 47: 188–193. (Scholar)
Perry, J., 1979, “The problem of the Essential Indexical”, Noûs, 13: 3–21. (Scholar)
Putnam, H., 1972, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 131–193. Reprinted in Putnam 1975, pp. 215–271. (Scholar)
–––, 1975, Mind, Language, and Reality, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Rayo, A., 2013, The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Richard, M., 1990, Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Roca-Royes, S., 2011, “Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge”, Noûs, 45: 22–49. (Scholar)
Rosen, G., 2006, “The Limits of Contingency”, in Identity and Modality, F. MacBride (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, “What is Normative Necessity?”, in Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality: Themes from Kit Fine, M. Dumitru (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–233. (Scholar)
Salmon, N., 1986, Frege’s Puzzle, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Salmon, N. and S. Soames (eds.), 1988, Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schaffer, J., 2017, “The Ground Between the Gaps”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 17: 1–26. (Scholar)
Shalkowski, S., 1997, “Essentialism and Absolute Necessity”, Acta Analytica, 12: 41–56. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Logic and Absolute Necessity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 101: 55–82. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, S., 1980, “Causality and Properties”, in Time and Cause, P. van Inwagen, (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 109–35. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “Causal and Metaphysical Necessity”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79: 59–77. (Scholar)
Sidelle, A., 1989, Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “On the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws of Nature”, in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 309–336. (Scholar)
Smith, Q., 2001, “The Metaphysical Necessity of Natural Laws”, Philosophica, 67: 901–925. (Scholar)
Soames, S., 1987, “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content”, Philosophical Topics, 15: 47–87, reprinted in Salmon and Soames 1988. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, Beyond Rigidity: the Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Reference and Description: The Case against Two-Dimensionalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Reply to Critics of Reference and Description”, Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association. [preprint available online from the author] (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary A posteriori ”, in Saul Kripke, A. Berger (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 78–99. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, R., 1978, “Assertion”, Syntax and Semantics, 9: 315–332. Reprinted in Stalnaker 1999, pp. 78–95. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, “Possible Worlds”, Noûs, 10: 65–75. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Context and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “On Considering a Possible World as Actual”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. 75: 141–156. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a, “Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity”, in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003b, Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 299–322. (Scholar)
Swoyer, C., 1982, “The Nature of Natural Laws”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60: 203–223. (Scholar)
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Tooley, M., 1977, “The Nature of Laws”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7: 667–698. (Scholar)
Tweedale, M., 1984, “Armstrong on Determinable and Substantival Universals”, in D.M. Armstrong, R. Bogdan (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 171–89. (Scholar)
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Williamson, T., 1986, “The Contingent A Priori: Has It Anything To Do With Indexicals?”, Analysis, 46: 113–117. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “The Contingent A Priori: A Reply”, Analysis, 48: 218–221. (Scholar)
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–––, 2002, “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda”, in Conceivability and Possibility, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 441–492. (Scholar)

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