Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Modularity of Mind" by Philip Robbins

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Anderson, M. L., 2010. Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 245–313. (Scholar)
–––, 2014. After phrenology: Neural reuse and the interactive brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Antony, L. M., 2003. Rabbit-pots and supernovas: On the relevance of psychological data to linguistic theory. In A. Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47–68. (Scholar)
Arbib, M., 1987. Modularity and interaction of brain regions underlying visuomotor coordination. In J. L. Garfield (ed.), Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 333–363. (Scholar)
Ariew, A., 1999. Innateness is canalization: In defense of a developmental account of innateness. In V. G. Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 117–138. (Scholar)
Balcetis, E. and Dunning, D., 2006. See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91: 612–625. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. Wishful seeing: More desired objects are seen as closer. Psychological Science, 21: 147–152. (Scholar)
Bargh, J. A. and Chartrand, T. L., 1999. The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54: 462–479. (Scholar)
Barrett, H. C., 2005. Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity. Mind & Language, 20: 259–287. (Scholar)
Barrett, H. C. and Kurzban, R., 2006. Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113: 628–647. (Scholar) (Scholar)
Borg, E., 2004. Minimal Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bruner, J. and Goodman, C. C., 1947. Value and need as organizing factors in perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 42: 33–44. (Scholar)
Barrett, H. C. and Kurzban, R., 2006. Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113: 628–647. (Scholar)
Buller, D., 2005. Adapting Minds, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Buller, D. and Hardcastle, V. G., 2000. Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity. Brain and Mind, 1: 302–325. (Scholar)
Carruthers, P., 2002. The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25: 657–725. (Scholar)
–––, 2006. The Architecture of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Churchland, P., 1988. Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science, 55: 167–187. (Scholar)
Coltheart, M., 1999. Modularity and cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3: 115–120. (Scholar)
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J., 1992. Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, eds., The Adapted Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 163–228. (Scholar)
Cowan, R., 2014. Cognitive penetrability and ethical perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6: 665–682. (Scholar)
Cowie, F., 1999. What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Currie, G. and Sterelny, K., 2000. How to think about the modularity of mind-reading. Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 145–160. (Scholar)
Firestone, C. and Scholl, B. J., 2016. Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39. (Scholar)
Fodor, J. A., 1983. The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1984. Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science, 51: 23–43. (Scholar)
–––, 1988. A reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality.” Philosophy of Science, 55: 188–198. (Scholar)
–––, 2000. The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Frith, U., 2003. Autism: Explaining the enigma, 2nd edition, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J.C., and Anderson, A. W., 2000. Expertise for cars and birds recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 3: 191–197. (Scholar)
Hansen, T., Olkkonen, M., Walter, S., and Gegenfurtner, K. R., 2006. Memory modulates color appearance. Nature Neuroscience, 9: 1367–1368. (Scholar)
Hermer, L. and Spelke, E. S., 1996. Modularity and development: The case of spatial reorientation. Cognition, 61: 195–232. (Scholar)
Kurzban, R., Tooby, J., and Cosmides, L., 2001. Can race be erased? Coalitional computation and social categorization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98: 15387–15392. (Scholar)
Levin, D. and Banaji, M., 2006. Distortions in the perceived lightness of faces: The role of race categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135: 501–512. (Scholar)
Machery, E., 2015. Cognitive penetrability: A no-progress report. In J. Zeimbekis and A. Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Machery, E. and Barrett, H. C., 2006. Debunking Adapting Minds. Philosophy of Science, 73: 232–246. (Scholar)
Marslen-Wilson, W. and Tyler, L. K., 1987. Against modularity. In J. L. Garfield (ed.), Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
McCauley, R. N. and Henrich, J., 2006. Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 79–101. (Scholar)
McGurk, H. and Macdonald, J., 1976. Hearing lips and seeing voices. Nature, 391: 756. (Scholar)
Pinker, S., 1997. How the Mind Works, New York: W. W. Norton & Company. (Scholar)
Prinz, J. J., 2006. Is the mind really modular? In R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 22–36. (Scholar)
Pylyshyn, Z., 1984. Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999. Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive penetrability of vision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 341–423. (Scholar)
Rabaglia, C. D., Marcus, G. F., and Lane, S. P., 2011. What can individual differences tell us about the specialization of function? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 28: 288–303. (Scholar)
Ramus, F., 2006. Genes, brain, and cognition: A roadmap for the cognitive scientist. Cognition, 101: 247–269. (Scholar)
Robbins, P., 2007. Minimalism and modularity. In G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds., Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 303–319. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. Modularity and mental architecture. WIREs Cognitive Science, 4: 641–649. (Scholar)
Rosch, E., Mervis, C., Gray, W., Johnson, D., and Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 8: 382–439. (Scholar)
Samuels, R., 2000. Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture. In P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain, eds., Evolution and the Human Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13–46. (Scholar)
–––, 2005. The complexity of cognition: Tractability arguments for massive modularity. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, and S. Stich, eds., The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 107–121. (Scholar)
Scholl, B. J. and Leslie, A. M., 1999. Modularity, development and ‘theory of mind’. Mind & Language, 14: 131–153. (Scholar)
Segal, G., 1996. The modularity of theory of mind. In P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 141–157. (Scholar)
Segall, M., Campbell, D. and Herskovits, M. J., 1966. The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception, New York: Bobbs-Merrill. (Scholar)
Shams, L., Kamitani, Y., and Shimojo, S., 2000. Illusions: What you see is what you hear. Nature, 408: 788. (Scholar)
Siegel, S., 2011. Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification. Nous, 46: 201–222. (Scholar)
Spelke, E., 1994. Initial knowledge: Six suggestions. Cognition, 50: 435–445. (Scholar)
Sperber, D., 1994. The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (eds.), Mapping the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2002. In defense of massive modularity. In I. Dupoux (ed.), Language, Brain, and Cognitive Development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 47–57. (Scholar)
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D., 2002. Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. Mind & Language, 17: 3–23. (Scholar)
Stokes, D., 2012. Perceiving and desiring: A new look at the cognitive penetrability of experience. Philosophical Studies, 158: 479–492. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. Cognitive penetrability of perception. Philosophy Compass, 8: 646–663. (Scholar)
Stokes, D. and Bergeron, V., 2015. Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: A dilemma. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 5: 315–338. (Scholar)
Stone, V. E., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Kroll, N., and Knight, R. T., 2002. Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99: 11531–11536. (Scholar)
Stromswold, K., 1999. Cognitive and neural aspects of language acquisition. In E. Lepore and Z. Pylyshyn, eds., What Is Cognitive Science?, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 356–400. (Scholar)
Sugiyama, L. S., Tooby, J., and Cosmides, L., 2002. Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99: 11537–11542. (Scholar)
Tettamanti, M. and Weniger, D., 2006. Broca’s area: A supramodal hierarchical processor? Cortex, 42: 491–494. (Scholar)
Warren, R. M., 1970. Perceptual restoration of missing speech sounds. Science, 167: 392–393. (Scholar)
Warren, R. M. and Warren, R. P., 1970. Auditory illusions and confusions. Scientific American, 223: 30–36. (Scholar)
Wilson, R. A., 2008. The drink you’re having when you’re not having a drink. Mind & Language, 23: 273–283. (Scholar)
Witt, J. K., Linkenauger, S. A., Bakdash, J. Z. and Proffitt, D. R., 2008. Putting to a bigger hole: Golf performance relates to perceived size. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 15: 581–585. (Scholar)
Witt, J. K., Proffitt, D. R. and Epstein, W., 2004. Perceiving distances: A role of effort and intent. Perception, 33: 577–590. (Scholar)
Woods, A. J., Philbeck, J. W., and Danoff, J. V., 2009. The various perceptions of distance: An alternative view of how effort affects distance judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 35: 1104–1117. (Scholar)
Woodward, J. F. and Cowie, F., 2004. The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock, ed., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 312–334. (Scholar)

Generated Mon May 29 12:49:39 2023

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...