Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Anti-Realism" by Richard Joyce

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Anscombe, G.E.M., 1958. “Modern moral philosophy,” Philosophy, 33: 1–19. (Scholar)
Ayer, A.J., [1936] 1971. Language, Truth and Logic, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Bagnoli, C., 2002. “Moral constructivism: A phenomenological argument,” Topoi, 21: 125–138. (Scholar)
Blackburn, S., 1984. Spreading the Word, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
–––, 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996. “Commentary on Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Objectivity and truth: You’d better believe it.’” Brown Electronic Article Review Service in Moral and Political Philosophy, Volume 2 [available online]. (Scholar)
–––, 1998. Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Boyd, R., 1988. “How to be a moral realist,” in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays in Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 181–228. (Scholar)
Brink, D., 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Burgess, J.P., [1978] 2007. “Against ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10: 427–439.
Carbonell, V., 2013. “De dicto desires and morality as fetish,” Philosophical Studies, 163: 459–477. (Scholar)
Carnap, R., 1935. Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. (Scholar)
Carson, T., 1984. The Status of Morality. Boston: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
Copp, D., 2001. “Realist-expressivism,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 18: 1–43. (Scholar)
Cowie, C., 2019. Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Dancy, J., 1986. “Two conceptions of moral realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 60: 167–187. (Scholar)
Dreier, J., 2004. “Meta-ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 23–44. (Scholar)
–––, 2018. “The real and the quasi-real: Problems of distinction,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 532–547. (Scholar)
Dummett, M., 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
Dworkin, R., 1996. “Objectivity and truth: You’d better believe it,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25: 87–139. (Scholar)
Firth, R., 1952. “Ethical absolutism and the ideal observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12: 317–345. (Scholar)
Foot, P., 1958. “Moral arguments,” Mind, 67: 502–513. (Scholar)
Garner, R., 1994. Beyond Morality, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “Abolishing morality,” in R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: Springer: 217–233. (Scholar)
Garner, R. & Joyce, R. (eds.), 2019. The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Gibbard, A., 1992. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Goodwin, G. & Darley, J., 2008. “The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism,” Cognition, 106: 1339–1366. (Scholar)
Hare, R.M., 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1963. Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hills, A., 2011. “Moral epistemology,” in M. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 249–263. (Scholar)
Hinckfuss, I., 1987. “The moral society: Its structure and effects,” Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy 16, Philosophy Program (RSSS), Canberra: Australian National University. (Scholar)
Hopster, J., 2019. “The metaethical significance of experiments about folk moral objectivism,” Philosophical Psychology, 32: 831–852. (Scholar)
Hussain, N.J.Z., 2004. “The return of moral fictionalism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 149–187. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Joyce, R., 2001. The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009. “Is moral projectivism empirically tractable?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12: 53–75. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. “Metaethical pluralism: How both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions,” in S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 89–109. (Scholar)
–––, 2013. “Irrealism and the genealogy of morals,” Ratio, 26: 351–372. (Scholar)
–––, 2016. “Evolution, truth-tracking, and moral skepticism,” in his Essays in Moral Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 142–158. (Scholar)
–––, 2017. “Fictionalism in metaethics,” in D. Plunkett & T. McPherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, New York: Routledge: 72–86. (Scholar)
–––, 2019. “Moral and epistemic normativity: The guilty and the innocent,” in C. Cowie & R. Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics, New York: Routledge: 53–72. (Scholar)
Kalderon, M., 2005. Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lewis, D.K., 1989. “Dispositional theories of value,” reprinted in his Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 68–94. (Scholar)
MacIntyre, A., 1984. After Virtue, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
Mackie, J.L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Scholar)
–––, 1982. The Miracle of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
McCloskey, M., Caramazza, A., & Green, B., 1980. “Curvilinear motion in the absence of external forces: Naive beliefs about the motion of objects,” Science, 210: 1139–1141. (Scholar)
McGrath, S., 2009. “The puzzle of pure moral deference,” Philosophical Perspectives, 23: 321–344. (Scholar)
–––, 2011. “Skepticism about moral expertise as a puzzle for moral realism,” Journal of Philosophy, 108: 111–137. (Scholar)
McNaughton, D., 1988. Moral Vision, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
Milo, R., 1995. “Contractarian constructivism,” The Journal of Philosophy, 92: 181–204. (Scholar)
Olson, J., 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
O’Neill, E., 2015. “Which causes of belief matter?” Philosophy of Science, 82: 1070–1080. (Scholar)
Putnam, H., 1987. The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle, IL.: Open Court. (Scholar)
Railton, P., 1986. “Moral realism,” Philosophical Review, 95: 163–207. (Scholar)
Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
Ronzoni, M., 2010. “Constructivism and practical reason: On intersubjectivity, abstraction, and judgment,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 7: 74–104. (Scholar)
Rosati, C., 2021. “Motivation internalism and externalism,” in R. Chang & K. Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Practical Reason, Oxford: Routledge: 237–250. (Scholar)
Rosen, G., 1994. “Objectivity and modern idealism: What is the question?” in M. Michael & J. O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.) Philosophy In Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer: 277–319. (Scholar)
Sayre-McCord, G., 1986. “The many moral realisms,” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 24: 1–22. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T., 1998. What We Owe To Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schroeder, M., 2009. “Hybrid expressivism: Virtues and vices,” Ethics, 119: 257–309. (Scholar)
Smith, M., 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sobel, D., 1999. “Do the desires of rational agents converge?” Analysis, 59: 137–147. (Scholar)
Stevenson, C.L., 1944. Ethics and Language, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1948. “The nature of ethical disagreement,” reprinted in his Facts and Values, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. (Scholar)
Street, S., 2006. “A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value,” Philosophical Studies, 127: 109–166. (Scholar)
–––, 2010. “What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics?” Philosophy Compass, 5: 363–384. (Scholar)
–––, 2012. “Coming to terms with contingency: Humean constructivism about practical reason,” in J. Lenman & Y. Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 40–59. (Scholar)
Svavarsdóttir, S., 2006. “How do moral judgments motivate?” in J. Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Malden, MA: Blackwell 163–181. (Scholar)
Svoboda, T., 2011. “Hybridizing moral expressivism and moral error theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 45: 37–48. (Scholar)
Toppinen, T., 2004. “Moral fetishism revisited,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104: 307–315. (Scholar)
Tropman, E., 2018. “Formulating moral objectivity,” Philosophia, 46: 1023–1040. (Scholar)
Uttich, K., Tsai, G., & Lombrozo, T., 2014. “Exploring metaethical commitments: Moral objectivity and moral progress,” in H. Sarkissian & J. Wright (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology, London: Bloomsbury Academic: 188–208. (Scholar)
Wright, C., 1988, “Realism, antirealism, irrealism, quasi-realism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12: 25–49. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)

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