Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Decision-Making Under Uncertainty" by Christian Tarsney, Teruji Thomas and William MacAskill

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Buchak, Lara Marie, 2013, Risk and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672165.001.0001
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Bykvist, Krister, 2020, “Consequentialism, Ignorance, and Uncertainty”, in The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 310–330. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.8
Carlson, Erik, 1995, Consequentialism Reconsidered (Theory and Decision Library - Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences, 20), Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-8553-8
Carr, Jennifer Rose, 2020, “Normative Uncertainty without Theories”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4): 747–762. doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1697710
Colyvan, Mark, Damian Cox, and Katie Steele, 2010, “Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions: Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions”, Noûs, 44(3): 503–529. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00754.x
Cotton-Barratt, Owen, William MacAskill, and Toby Ord, 2020, “Statistical Normalization Methods in Interpersonal and Intertheoretic Comparisons”, The Journal of Philosophy, 117(2): 61–95. doi:10.5840/jphil202011725
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Feldman, Fred, 2006, “Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility”, Philosophical Studies, 129(1): 49–79. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3021-y
Finnis, John, 2011, Natural Law and Natural Rights, second edition, (Clarendon Law Series), Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Fishburn, Peter C., 1971, “A Study of Lexicographic Expected Utility”, Management Science, 17(11): 672–678. doi:10.1287/mnsc.17.11.672
Foot, Philippa, 1967, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect”, Oxford Review, 5: 5–15.
Frick, Johann, 2015, “Contractualism and Social Risk”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 43(3): 175–223. doi:10.1111/papa.12058
Fried, Barbara H., 2012, “Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?”, The Journal of Ethics, 16(1): 39–66. doi:10.1007/s10892-011-9113-3
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Graham, Peter A., 2010, “In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation”, Ethics, 121(1): 88–115. doi:10.1086/656328
Greaves, Hilary, 2016, “Cluelessness”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(3): 311–339. doi:10.1093/arisoc/aow018
–––, 2017, “A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen–Weymark Debate on Utilitarianism”, Utilitas, 29(2): 175–213. doi:10.1017/S0953820816000169
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Gustafsson, Johan E., 2022, “Second Thoughts About My Favourite Theory”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 103(3): 448–470. doi:10.1111/papq.12408
Gustafsson, Johan E. and Olle Torpman, 2014, “In Defence of My Favourite Theory”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(2): 159–174. doi:10.1111/papq.12022
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Hansson, Sven Ove, 2003, “Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance”, Erkenntnis, 59(3): 291–309. doi:10.1023/A:1026005915919
Hare, Caspar, 2010, “Take the Sugar”, Analysis, 70(2): 237–247. doi:10.1093/analys/anp174
Harman, Elizabeth, 2015, “The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty”, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10, Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 53–79 (ch. 3). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0003
Harsanyi, John C., 1955, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”, Journal of Political Economy, 63(4): 309–321. doi:10.1086/257678
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Hausner, M., 1954, “Multidimensional Utilities”, in Decision Processes, Robert McDowell Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis (eds), New York: Wiley, 167–180.
Hedden, Brian, 2016, “Does MITE Make Right? On Decision-Making under Normative Uncertainty”, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 11, Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 102–128 (ch. 5). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0005
Helgeson, Casey, 2020, “Structuring Decisions Under Deep Uncertainty”, Topoi, 39(2): 257–269. doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9584-y
Howard-Snyder, Frances, 1997, “The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism”, Utilitas, 9(2): 241–248. doi:10.1017/S0953820800005306
Hudson, James L., 1989, “Subjectivization in Ethics”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 26(3): 221–229.
Huemer, Michael, 2010, “Lexical Priority and the Problem of Risk”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91(3): 332–351. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01370.x
Isaacs, Yoaav, 2014, “Duty and Knowledge”, Philosophical Perspectives, 28(1): 95–110. doi:10.1111/phpe.12042
Jackson, Frank, 1991, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection”, Ethics, 101(3): 461–482. doi:10.1086/293312
Jackson, Frank and Michael Smith, 2006, “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty”:, Journal of Philosophy, 103(6): 267–283. doi:10.5840/jphil2006103614
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Kosonen, Petra, 2022, “Tiny Probabilities of Vast Value”, PhD Thesis, Worcester College, Oxford University. [Kosonen 2022 available online]
Kowalczyk, Kacper, forthcoming, “Saving Fanaticism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Kumar, Rahul, 2015, “Risking and Wronging”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 43(1): 27–51. doi:10.1111/papa.12042
Lazar, Seth, 2017a, “Anton’s Game: Deontological Decision Theory for an Iterated Decision Problem”, Utilitas, 29(1): 88–109. doi:10.1017/S0953820816000236
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Lee-Stronach, Chad, 2018, “Moral Priorities under Risk”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(6): 793–811. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1415104
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MacAskill, William, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord, 2020, Moral Uncertainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198722274.001.0001
MacAskill, William and Toby Ord, 2020, “Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?”, Noûs, 54(2): 327–353. doi:10.1111/nous.12264
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Mogensen, Andreas L. and David Thorstad, 2022, “Tough Enough? Robust Satisficing as a Decision Norm for Long-Term Policy Analysis”, Synthese, 200: article 36. doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03566-5
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