Cited Works

• Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Thomas Gilby et al. (trans.), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964–1975.
• Blackburn, Simon, 1996, “Dilemmas: Dithering, Plumping, and Grief,” in Mason (1996): 127–139. (Scholar)
• Brink, David, 1994, “Moral Conflict and Its Structure,” The Philosophical Review, 103: 215–247; reprinted in Mason (1996): 102–126. (Scholar)
• Coady, C.A.J., 2008. Messy Morality: The Challenge of Politics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Conee, Earl, 1982, “Against Moral Dilemmas,” The Philosophical Review, 91: 87–97; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 239–249. (Scholar)
• Dahl, Norman O., 1996, “Morality, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Requirements,” in Mason (1996): 86–101. (Scholar)
• Dietz, Alexander, 2022, “Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity, ” Utilitas, 34: 57–69. (Scholar)
• Donagan, Alan, 1977, The Theory of Morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1984, “Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems,” The Journal of Philosophy, 81: 291–309; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 271–290. (Scholar)
• Edson, Margaret, 1999/1993. Wit, New York: Faber and Faber. (Scholar)
• Freedman, Monroe, 1975, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. (Scholar)
• Gowans, Christopher W. (editor), 1987, Moral Dilemmas, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Greene, Joshua, 2013, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, New York: Penguin Books. (Scholar)
• Greenspan, Patricia S., 1983, “Moral Dilemmas and Guilt,” Philosophical Studies, 43: 117–125. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Haidt, Jonathan, 2012, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, New York: Pantheon. (Scholar)
• Hill, Thomas E., Jr., 1996, “Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues: A Kantian Perspective,” in Mason (1996): 167–198. (Scholar)
• Holbo, John, 2002, “Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Obligation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 39: 259–274. (Scholar)
• Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1999, On Virtue Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1971/1797, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary J. Gregor (trans.), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. (Scholar)
• Lemmon, E.J., 1962, “Moral Dilemmas,” The Philosophical Review, 70: 139–158; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 101–114. (Scholar)
• –––, 1965, “Deontic Logic and the Logic of Imperatives,” Logique et Analyse, 8: 39–71. (Scholar)
• Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 1980, “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency,” The Journal of Philosophy, 77: 121–136; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 188–204. (Scholar)
• Mason, H.E., (editor), 1996, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• McConnell, Terrance, 1978, “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8: 269–287; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 154–173. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, “Interpersonal Moral Conflicts,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 25: 25–35. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, “Moral Residue and Dilemmas,” in Mason (1996): 36–47. (Scholar)
• –––, 2009, “Conflicting Role-Related Obligations in Wit,” in Sandra Shapshay (ed.), Bioethics at the Movies, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Scholar)
• Mill, John Stuart, 1979/1861, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
• Parrish, John, 2007, Paradoxes of Political Ethics: From Dirty Hands to Invisible Hands, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Plato, The Republic, trans, Paul Shorey, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930.
• Ross, W.D., 1930, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1939, The Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Santurri, Edmund N. 1987, Perplexity in the Moral Life: Philosophical and Theological Considerations, Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press. (Scholar)
• Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1957/1946, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” Trans, Philip Mairet, in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, New York: Meridian, 287–311, (Scholar)
• –––, 1946, “Dirty Hands,”, in No Exit and Three Other Plays, New York: Vintage Books. (Scholar)
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1988, Moral Dilemmas, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
• Smith, Holly M., 1986, “Moral Realism, Moral Conflict, and Compound Acts,” The Journal of Philosophy, 83: 341–345. (Scholar)
• Styron, William, 1980, Sophie’s Choice, New York: Bantam Books. (Scholar)
• Taylor, Erin, 2011, “Irreconciliable Differences,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 181–192. (Scholar)
• Tessman, Lisa, 2015, Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Thomason, Richmond, 1981, “Deontic Logic as Founded on Tense Logic,” in Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Dordrecht: Reidel, 165–176. (Scholar)
• Trigg, Roger, 1971, “Moral Conflict,” Mind, 80: 41–55. (Scholar)
• Vallentyne, Peter, 1987, “Prohibition Dilemmas and Deontic Logic,” Logique et Analyse, 30: 113–122. (Scholar)
• –––, 1989, “Two Types of Moral Dilemmas,” Erkenntnis, 30: 301–318. (Scholar)
• Van Fraassen, Bas, 1973, “Values and the Heart’s Command,” The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 5–19; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 138–153. (Scholar)
• Walzer, Michael, 1973, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2: 160–180. (Scholar)
• Williams, Bernard, 1965, “Ethical Consistency,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplement), 39: 103–124; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 115–137. (Scholar)
• Zimmerman, Michael J., 1988, An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, The Concept of Moral Obligation, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)

Other Worthwhile Readings

• Anderson, Lyle V., 1985, “Moral Dilemmas, Deliberation, and Choice,” The Journal of Philosophy 82: 139–162, (Scholar)
• Atkinson, R.F., 1965, “Consistency in Ethics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplement), 39: 125–138. (Scholar)
• Baumrin, Bernard H., and Peter Lupu, 1984, “A Common Occurrence: Conflicting Duties,” Metaphilosophy, 15: 77–90. (Scholar)
• Bradley, F. H., 1927, Ethical Studies, 2^nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Brink, David, 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
• Bronaugh, Richard, 1975, “Utilitarian Alternatives,” Ethics, 85: 175–178. (Scholar)
• Carey, Toni Vogel, 1985, “What Conflict of Duty is Not,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 204–215. (Scholar)
• Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1974, The Structure of Morality, Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. (Scholar)
• –––, 1978, “Conflicts of Duties and Morality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 38: 564–574. (Scholar)
• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1963, “Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic,” Analysis, 24: 33–36. (Scholar)
• Conee, Earl, 1989, “Why Moral Dilemmas are Impossible,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 26(2): 133–141. (Scholar)
• Dahl, Norman O., 1974, “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Deontic Logic,” Philosophia, 4: 485–511. (Scholar)
• DeCew, Judith Wagner, 1990, “Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism,” Ethics, 101: 27–41. (Scholar)
• Donagan, Alan, 1996, “Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy,” Ethics, 104: 7–21; reprinted in Mason (1996): 11–22. (Scholar)
• Feldman, Fred, 1986, Doing the Best We Can, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. (Scholar)
• Foot, Philippa, 1983, “Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma,” The Journal of Philosophy, 80: 379–398; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 271–290. (Scholar)
• Gewirth, Alan, 1978, Reason and Morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
• Goldman, Holly Smith, 1976, “Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection,” The Philosophical Review, 85: 449–487, [See also, Holly Smith.] (Scholar)
• Gowans, Christopher W., 1989, “Moral Dilemmas and Prescriptivism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 26: 187–197. (Scholar)
• –––, 1994, Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Wrongdoing, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, “Moral Theory, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Responsibility,” in Mason (1996): 199–215. (Scholar)
• Griffin, James, 1977, “Are There Incommensurable Values?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7: 39–59. (Scholar)
• Guttenplan, Samuel, 1979–80, “Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 80: 61–80. (Scholar)
• Hansson, Sven O., 1998, “Should We Avoid Moral Dilemmas?,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 32: 407–416. (Scholar)
• Hare, R.M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods, and Point, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Hill, Thomas E., Jr, 1983, “Moral Purity and the Lesser Evil,” The Monist, 66: 213–232. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules,” Philosophical Perspectives, 6: 285–304. (Scholar)
• Hoag, Robert W., 1983, “Mill on Conflicting Moral Obligations,” Analysis, 43: 49–54. (Scholar)
• Howard, Kenneth W., 1977, “Must Public Hands Be Dirty?” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 11: 29–40. (Scholar)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1965/1797, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, John Ladd (trans.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. (Scholar)
• Kolenda, Konstantin, 1975, “Moral Conflict and Universalizability,” Philosophy, 50: 460–465. (Scholar)
• Ladd, John, 1958, “Remarks on Conflict of Obligations,” The Journal of Philosophy, 55: 811–819. (Scholar)
• Lebus, Bruce, 1990, “Moral Dilemmas: Why They Are Hard to Solve,” Philosophical Investigations, 13: 110–125. (Scholar)
• MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1990, “Moral Dilemmas,” Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 50: 367–382. (Scholar)
• Mallock, David, 1967, “Moral Dilemmas and Moral Failure,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 45: 159–178, (Scholar)
• Mann, William E., 1991, “Jephthah’s Plight: Moral Dilemmas and Theism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 5: 617–647. (Scholar)
• Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 1996, “More about Moral Dilemmas,” in Mason (1996): 23–35. (Scholar)
• Marino, Patricia, 2001, “Moral Dilemmas, Collective Responsibility, and Moral Progress,” Philosophical Studies, 104: 203–225. (Scholar)
• Mason, H.E., 1996, “Responsibilities and Principles: Reflections on the Sources of Moral Dilemmas,” in Mason (1996): 216–235. (Scholar)
• McConnell, Terrance, 1976, “Moral Dilemmas and Requiring the Impossible,” Philosophical Studies, 29: 409–413. (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, “Moral Absolutism and the Problem of Hard Cases,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 9: 286–297. (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, “Moral Blackmail,” Ethics, 91: 544–567. (Scholar)
• –––, 1981, “Utilitarianism and Conflict Resolution,” Logique et Analyse, 24: 245–257. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, “More on Moral Dilemmas,” The Journal of Philosophy, 82: 345–351. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, “Dilemmas and Incommensurateness,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 27: 247–252. (Scholar)
• McDonald, Julie M., 1995, “The Presumption in Favor of Requirement Conflicts,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 26: 49–58. (Scholar)
• Mothersill, Mary, 1996, “The Moral Dilemmas Debate,” in Mason (1996): 66–85. (Scholar)
• Nagel, Thomas, “War and Massacre,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 123–144. (Scholar)
• –––, 1979, “The Fragmentation of Value,” in Mortal Questions, New York: Cambridge University Press; reprinted in Gowans (1987): 174–187. (Scholar)
• Nozick, Robert, 1968, “Moral Complications and Moral Structures,” Natural Law Forum, 13: 1–50. (Scholar)
• Paske, Gerald H., 1990, “Genuine Moral Dilemmas and the Containment of Incoherence,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 24: 315–323. (Scholar)
• Pietroski, Paul, 1993, “Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory,” Ethics, 103: 489–515. (Scholar)
• Price, Richard, 1974/1787, A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Prior, A.N., 1954, “The Paradoxes of Derived Obligation,” Mind, 63: 64–65. (Scholar)
• Quinn, Philip, 1978, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, “Moral Obligation, Religious Demand, and Practical Conflict,” in Robert Audi and William Wainwright (eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 195–212. (Scholar)
• Rabinowicz, Wlodzimierz, 1978, “Utilitarianism and Conflicting Obligations,” Theoria, 44: 1924. (Scholar)
• Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
• Railton, Peter, 1992, “Pluralism, Determinacy, and Dilemma,” Ethics, 102: 720–742. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, “The Diversity of Moral Dilemma,” in Mason (1996): 140–166. (Scholar)
• Sartorius, Rolf, 1975, Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account of Social Union and the Rule of Law, Encino, CA: Dickenson Publishing. (Scholar)
• Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 1986, “Deontic Logic and the Priority of Moral Theory,” Noûs, 20: 179–197. (Scholar)
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1984, “‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies ‘Can’,” The Philosophical Review, 93: 249–261. (Scholar)
• –––, 1985, “Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 22: 321–329. (Scholar)
• –––, 1987, “Moral Dilemmas and ‘Ought and Ought Not’,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17: 127–139. (Scholar)
• –––, 1987, “Moral Realisms and Moral Dilemmas,” The Journal of Philosophy, 84: 263–276. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, “Moral Dilemmas and Rights,” in Mason (1996): 48–65. (Scholar)
• Slote, Michael, 1985, “Utilitarianism, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Cost,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 22: 161–168. (Scholar)
• Statman, Daniel, 1996, “Hard Cases and Moral Dilemmas,” Law and Philosophy, 15: 117–148. (Scholar)
• Steiner, Hillel, 1973, “Moral Conflict and Prescriptivism,” Mind, 82: 586–591. (Scholar)
• Stocker, Michael, 1971, “’Ought’ and ‘Can’,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49: 303–316. (Scholar)
• –––, 1986, “Dirty Hands and Conflicts of Values and of Desires in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 67: 36–61. (Scholar)
• –––, 1987, “Moral Conflicts: What They Are and What They Show,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 104–123. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, Plural and Conflicting Values, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Strasser, Mark, 1987, “Guilt, Regret, and Prima Facie Duties,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 25: 133–146. (Scholar)
• Swank, Casey, 1985, “Reasons, Dilemmas, and the Logic of ‘Ought’,” Analysis, 45: 111–116. (Scholar)
• Tännsjö, Torbjörn, 1985, “Moral Conflict and Moral Realism,” The Journal of Philosophy, 82: 113–117. (Scholar)
• Thomason, Richmond, 1981, “Deontic Logic and the Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation,” in Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Dordrecht: Reidel, 177–186. (Scholar)
• Vallentyne, Peter, 1992, “Moral Dilemmas and Comparative Conceptions of Morality,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30: 117–124. (Scholar)
• Williams, Bernard, 1966, “Consistency and Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplement), 40: 1–22. (Scholar)
• –––, 1972, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Harper & Row. (Scholar)
• Zimmerman, Michael J., 1987, “Remote Obligation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 24: 199–205. (Scholar)
• –––, 1988, “Lapses and Dilemmas,” Philosophical Papers, 17: 103–112. (Scholar)
• –––, 1990, “Where Did I Go Wrong?” Philosophical Studies, 58: 83–106. (Scholar)
• –––, 1992, “Cooperation and Doing the Best One Can,” Philosophical Studies, 65: 283–304. (Scholar)
• –––, 1995, “Prima Facie Obligation and Doing the Best One Can,” Philosophical Studies, 78: 87–123. (Scholar)