Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Non-Naturalism" by Michael Ridge
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Ayer, A.J., 1952. Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publications. (Scholar)
- Baldwin, T., 1985. “Ethical Non-naturalism,” in Hacking 1985, 23–45. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990. G.E. Moore, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Ball, S., 1988. “Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G.E. Moore’s Open-Question Argument,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 25: 197–213. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991. “Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Bedke, M., 2009. “Intuitive Non-naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90(2): 188–209. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, S., 1984. Spreading the Word, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988. “Supervenience Revisited” in Sayre-McCord 1988a. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990. “Just Causes” Philosophical Studies, reprinted in Blackburn 1993. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998. Ruling Passions, Clarendon Press: Oxford. (Scholar)
- Boyd, R., 1988. “How to be a Moral Realist” in Sayre-McCord 1988a. (Scholar)
- Brink, D., 1986. “Externalist Moral Realism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Supplement), 24: 23–42. (Scholar)
- Broad, C.D., 1942. “Certain Features in Moore’s Ethical Doctrines,” in Schilpp 1942, 41–68. (Scholar)
- Chappell, R., 2019. “Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 56(2): 125–134. (Scholar)
- Copp, D., 2007. “Why Naturalism?” in Morality in a Natural World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Crisp, R., 1996. “Naturalism and Non-Naturalism in Ethics,” in S. Lovibond and S.G. Williams (eds.), Identity, Truth and Value, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 113–129. (Scholar)
- Cuneo, T. and R. Shafer-Landau, 2014. “The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Non-Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies, 171: 399–433. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 1981. “On Moral Properties,” Mind, 90: 367–385. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. “Real Values in a Humean Context,” Ratio, 9: 171–183. (Scholar)
- Darwall, S., 1983. Impartial Reason, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Dreier, J., 2019. “Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?” Philosophical Studies, 176 (6):1391–1408 (2019) (Scholar)
- Eklund, M., 2017. Choosing Normative Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Enoch, D., 2011. Taking Morality Seriously, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fitzpatrick, W., 2012. “Ethical Non-Naturalism and Normative Properties,” New Waves in Metaethics, ed. Michael Brady, Palgrave MacMillan: 7–35. (Scholar)
- Foot, P., 1972. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” reprinted in Foot 1978. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978. Virtues and Vices, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Frankena, W., 1939. “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, 48: 464–477. (Scholar)
- Gert, J., 2019. “Moral Supervenience and Distinctness: Comments on Dreier,” Philosophical Studies, 176(6): 1409–1416. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 2002. “Normative Concepts and Recognitional Concepts,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 151–162. (Scholar)
- Hacking, I. (ed.), 1985. Exercises in Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hayward, M., 2019. “Immoral Realism,” Philosophical Studies, 176(4): 897–914. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. and P. Pettit, 1995. “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 20–40. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R., 2001. The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1983. “New Work For a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–377. (Scholar)
- Little, M., 1994. “Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalism,” Philosophical Books, 35: 225–232. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
- Mabrito, R., 2005, “Does Shafer-Landau Have a Problem With Supervenience?” Philosophical Studies, 126: 297–311. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1998. Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McPherson, T., 2012, “Ethical Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience” Oxford Studies in Meta-ethics (volume 7), ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 205–234. (Scholar)
- Moberger, V., 2019. “The Mackiean Supervenience Challenge.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22(1): 219–236. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1903. Principia Ethica, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1942. “A Reply to My Critics,” in Schilpp 1942, 533–678. (Scholar)
- Nuccetelli, S. and S. Gary (eds.), 2007. Themes From G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 2011. On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pigden, C., 1993. “Naturalism,” in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell: Oxford, 421–431. (Scholar)
- Railton, P., 1986. “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, 4(3): 163–207. (Scholar)
- Ridge, M., 2007. “Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4(3): 330–348. (Scholar)
- Robb, D., 1997, “The Properties of Mental Causation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 178–194. (Scholar)
- Ross, W.D., 1930. The Right and The Good, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Savavarsdottir, S., 1999. “Moral Cognitivism and Motivation” Philosophical Review, 108: 161–219. (Scholar)
- Sayre-McCord, G. (ed.), 1988a. Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988b. “Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence” in Sayre-McCord 1988a. 256–281. (Scholar)
- Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), 1942. The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (The Library of Living Philosophers), Evanston: Northwestern University. (Scholar)
- Shafer-Landau, R., 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. “Replies to Critics,” Philosophical Studies, 126: 313–329. (Scholar)
- Shaver, R., 2000. “Sidgwick’s Minimal Meta-ethics,” Utilitas, 12(3): 261–277. (Scholar)
- Sidgwick, H., 1907. The Methods of Ethics, New York: Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Smith, M., 1994. The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Stevenson, C., 1944. Ethics and Language, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Street, S., 2006. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” Philosophical Studies, 127: 109–66. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011. “Why Quasi-Realists Can’t Have it Both Ways” Oxford Studies in Meta-ethics (Volume 6), Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1–32. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, N., 1988. “Moral Explanations” in Sayre-McCord 1988a, 229–255. (Scholar)
- Tresan, J., 2006. “De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism” Noûs, 40: 143–165. (Scholar)
- Vallentyne, P., 1998. “The Nomic Role Account of Carving Reality at the Joints,” Synthese, 115: 171–198. (Scholar)
- Vavova, K., forthcoming. “Evolutionary Debunking in Ethics,” Philosophical Compass. (Scholar)
- Wedgwood, R., 2009 The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, J., 2010 “What is Hume’s Dictum and Why Should We Believe it?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80: 596–637. (Scholar)
