Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism" by Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever
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- Dancy, Jonathan, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Moral Particularism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/moral-particularism/> (Scholar)
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- Garfield, Jay, 2000, “Particularity and Principle: the structure of moral knowledge,” in Hooker and Little (eds.), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Grove, William M., David H. Zald, Boyd S. Lebow, Beth E. Snitz, and Chad Nelson, 2000, “Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: a meta-analysis”, Psychological Assessment, 12(1): 19–30. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.12.1.19 (Scholar)
- Habermas, Jürgen, 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Originally published as Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, 1983, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. (Scholar)
- Hare, R.M., 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/019881092x.001.0001 (Scholar)
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- Hill, Thomas E., Jr., 1989, “Kantian Constructivism in Ethics”, Ethics, 99(4): 752–70. doi:10.1086/293120 (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules”, Philosophical Perspectives (Volume 6: Ethics), James Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview, 285–304. doi:10.2307/2214249 (Scholar)
- Holton, Richard, 2002, “Principles and Particularisms”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 76: 191–209. doi:10.1111/1467-8349.00095 (Scholar)
- Holtzman, Steven H. and Christopher M. Leich (eds), 1981, Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Hooker, Brad, 2000, “Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad”, in Hooker and Little 2000: 1–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Dancy on How Reasons are Related to Oughts”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41(S1): 114–120. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00980.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Particularism and the Real World”, in Lance, Potrč, and Strahovnik 2008: 75–106. (Scholar)
- Hooker, Brad and Margaret Little, (eds), 2000, Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Horty, John, 2007, “Reasons as Defaults,“ Philosopher's Imprint, 7: 1–28. (Scholar)
- Hurka, Thomas, 2014, British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233625.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Irwin, T.H., 2000, “Ethics as an Inexact Science”, in Hooker and Little 2000: 100–129. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith, 2000, “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”, in Hooker and Little 2000: 79–99. (Scholar)
- Kant, Immanuel, 1785, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), Riga. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, Christine M., 2008, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552795.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lance, Mark Norris and Margaret Little, 2004, “Defeasibility and the Normative Grasp of Context”, Erkenntnis, 61: 435–455. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Where the Laws Are”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 2: 149–171. (Scholar)
- Lance, Mark Norris, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko Strahovnik, 2008, Challenging Moral Particularism, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Lechler, Andrea, 2012, “Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?” Ethics, 122(4): 763–772. doi:10.1086/666326 (Scholar)
- Leibowitz, Uri D., 2009, “A Defense of a Particularist Research Program”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12(2): 181–199. doi:10.1007/s10677-008-9135-5 (Scholar)
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- Lind, Andreas and Johan Brännmark, 2008, “Particularism in Question: An Interview with Jonathan Dancy”, Theoria, 74: 3–17. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00002.x (Scholar)
- Little, Margaret, 1994, “Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalism”, Philosophical Books, 35(4): 225–233. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1994.tb02885.x (Scholar)
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- McDowell, John, 1979, “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist, 62(3): 331–350. doi:10.5840/monist197962319 (Scholar)
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- McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael, 2005, “What Does Holism Have to do with Particularism?”, Ratio, 18: 93–103. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199290652.001.0001 (Scholar)
- McNaughton, David, 1988, Moral Vision, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, David and Piers Rawling, 2000, “Unprincipled Ethics”, in Hooker and Little 2000: 256–275. (Scholar)
- Miller, Alexander, 2003, Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Cambridge: Polity Press. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1922 [1903], Principia Ethica, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
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- Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 (Scholar)
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