The bibliography presented here is a short list of pieces recommended as further reading along with those referred to in the text above. A more comprehensive bibliography is available in the entry on moral particularism and moral generalism.

• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Roger Crisp (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
• Audi, R., 1998, ‘Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgement’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1: 15–44 (especially pp. 36–41). (Scholar)
• Bakhurst, D. J., Hooker, B. and Little, M. (eds.), 2013, Thinking about Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Berker, S., 2007, ‘Particular Reasons’, Ethics, 118: 109–39. (Scholar)
• Crisp, R., 2000, ‘Particularizing Particularism’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 23–47. (Scholar)
• Dancy, J., 1983, ‘Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties’, Mind, 92: 530–47. (Scholar)
• –––, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 2004, Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Darwall, S., 2013, ‘Morality and Principle’, in Bakhurst et al. 2013, pp. 168‐91. (Scholar)
• Dworkin, G., 1995, ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume 20: Moral Concepts), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 224–39. (Scholar)
• Hooker, B. W., 2000, ‘Moral Particularism—Wrong and Bad’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 1–23. (Scholar)
• –––, and Little, M. (eds.), 2000, Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
• Jackson, F., Pettit, P., and Smith, M., 2000, ‘Ethical Particularism and Patterns’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 79–99. (Scholar)
• Kagan, S., 1988, ‘The Additive Fallacy’, Ethics, 99: 5–31. (Scholar)
• Lance M., Potrč, M. and Strahovnik, V. (eds.), 2008, Challenging Moral Particularism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
• Lance, M. and Little, M., 2007, ‘Where the Laws Are’, in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149–71. (Scholar)
• Little, M., 2000, ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 276–304. (Scholar)
• –––, 1994, ‘Moral Realism: Non-Naturalism’, Philosophical Books, 35: 225–32. (Scholar)
• McDowell, J., 1979, ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist, 62: 331–50. (Scholar)
• McKeever, S. and Ridge, M., 2006, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• McNaughton, D. A., 1988, Moral Vision, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
• –––, 1996, ‘An Unconnected Heap of Duties?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 46: 433–47. (Scholar)
• McNaughton, D. A. and Rawling, P., 2000, ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 256–75. (Scholar)
• Raz, J., 2000, ‘The Truth in Particularism’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 48–78. (Scholar)
• –––, 2006, ‘The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy’s Version)’, Mind, 115: 99–120. (Scholar)
• Richardson, H. S., 1990, ‘Specifying Norms’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 279–310. (Scholar)
• Ross, W. D., 1930, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
• Shafer-Landau, R., 1997, ‘Moral Rules’, Ethics, 107: 584–611. (Scholar)
• Väyrenen, P., 2009, ‘A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles’, in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 4), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–132. (Scholar)