Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Relativism" by Chris Gowans
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Accetti, C., 2015, Relativism and Religion: Why Democratic Societies Do Not Need Moral Absolutes, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- American Anthropological Association Executive Board, 1947,
“Statement on Human Rights,” American
Anthropologist, 49: 539–43. (Scholar)
- Appiah, K. A., 2006, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, New York: W.W. Norton. (Scholar)
- Audi, R., 2007, Moral Value and Human Diversity, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ayars, A. and S. Nichols, 2020, “Rational Learners and Metaethics: Universalism, Relativism, and Evidence from Consensus,” Mind and Language, 35: 67–89. (Scholar)
- Baghramian, M., 2004, Relativism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Beebe, J.R., 2010, “Moral Relativism in Context,” Nous, 44: pp. 691–724. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments,” in H. Sarkissian and J.C. Wright (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology, London: Bloomsbury, 167–87. (Scholar)
- –––, Forthcoming, “The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism,” in T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Vol. 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beebe, J.R. et al., 2015, “Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 15: 386–401. (Scholar)
- Benbaji, Y. and M. Fisch, 2004, “Through Thick and Thin: A New Defense of Cultural Relativism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 42: 1–24. (Scholar)
- Benedict, R, 1934, Patterns of Culture, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Scholar)
- Berlin, I., 1998, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in
Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays,
H. Hardy and R. Hausheer (eds.), New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
pp. 1–16. Original Publication Date: 1988. (Scholar)
- Bilgrami, A., 2011,“Secularism, Liberalism, and Relativism,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 326–45. (Scholar)
- Bjornsson, G. and S. Finlay, 2010, “Metaethical Contextualism Defended,” Ethics, 121: 7–36. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, S., 1984, Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?,” Inquiry, 42: 213–28. (Scholar)
- Bloomfield, P., 2003, “Is There a Moral High Ground?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41: 511–26. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P., 2006, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011,“Three Kinds of Relativism,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 53–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Relativism about Morality,” in K. Neges et al. (eds.), Realism-Relativism-Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 301–12. (Scholar)
- Bok, S., 1995, Common Values, Columbia, MO: University of
Missouri Press. (Scholar)
- Brady, M., 2010, “Disappointment,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 84: 179–98. (Scholar)
- Brandt, R.B., 1954, Hopi Ethics: A Theoretical Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Relativism Refuted?,” The Monist, 67: 297–307. (Scholar)
- Brogaard, B., 2008, “Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 385–409. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50: 538–56. (Scholar)
- Bush, L.S. and D. Moss, 2020, “Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism,” Diametros, 17: 6–21. (Scholar)
- Capps, D., M.P. Lynch and D. Massey, 2008, “A Coherent Moral Relativism,” Synthese, 151: 1–26. (Scholar)
- Code, L., 1995, “Must a Feminist Be a Relativist After
All?,” in Code, Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered
Locations, New York: Routledge, pp. 185–207. (Scholar)
- Coliva, A. and S. Moruzzi, 2012, “Truth Relativists
Can’t Trump Moral Progress,” Analytic Philosophy,
53: 48–57. (Scholar)
- Collier-Spruel, L.A., et al., 2019, “Relativism or Tolerance? Defining, Assessing, Connecting, and Distinguishing Two Moral Personality Features with Prominent Roles in Modern Societies,” Journal of Personality, 87: 1170–88. (Scholar)
- Cook, J.W., 1999, Morality and Cultural Differences, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cooper, D., 1978, “Moral Relativism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 3: 97–108. (Scholar)
- Copp, D., 1995, Morality, Normativity, and Society, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Corradetti, C., 2009, Relativism and Human Rights: A Theory of Pluralistic Universalism, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
- Cova, F., et al., 2018, “Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0400-9 (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1984a, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” in Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 183–98. Original Publication Date: 1973–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984b [2004a], “Expressing
Evaluations” in D. Davidson, Problems of Rationality,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 19–37; originally published
in Expressing Evaluations, Lindley Lecture, Lawrence, Kansas:
University of Kansas, 1984. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995 [2004b], “The Objectivity of
Values” in D. Davidson, Problems of Rationality, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, pp. 39–57; originally published in El
Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente, edited by
Carlos Gutiérrez, Bogatá: Editorial ABC, 1995,
59–69. (Scholar)
- Donnelly, J., 1984, “Cultural Relativism and Universal Human
Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, 6: 400–419. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, Universal Human Rights in Theory
and Practice, Third Edition, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press. (Scholar)
- Doris, J.M. and A. Plakias, 2008, “How to Argue about
Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism,” in W.
Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The
Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 303–31. (Scholar)
- Dreier, J., 1990, “Internalism and Speaker Relativism,” Ethics, 101: 6–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism,” in D. Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 240–64. (Scholar)
- Duncker, K., 1939, “Ethical Relativity?”, Mind, 48: 39–57. (Scholar)
- Dyke, M.M., 2020, “Group Agency Meets Metaethics: How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 15, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 219–40. (Scholar)
- Earp, B.D., 2016, “Between Moral Relativism and Moral Hypocrisy: Reframing the Debate on ‘FGM’,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 26: 105–44. (Scholar)
- Egan, A., 2012, “Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50: 557–82. (Scholar)
- Elgin, C. Z., 1989, “The Relativity of Fact and the
Objectivity of Value,” in M. Krausz (ed.), Relativism:
Interpretation and Confrontation, Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, pp. 86–98. (Scholar)
- Evers, D., 2021, “Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 61: 75–87. (Scholar)
- Feltz, A. and E.T. Cokely, 2008, “The Fragmented Folk: More Evidence of Stable Individual Differences in Moral Judgments and Folk Intuitions,” in B.C. Love, K. McRae and V.M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, 1771–76. (Scholar)
- Fisher, M. et al., 2017, “The Influence of Social
Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity,”
Cognitive Science, 41: 1119–34. (Scholar)
- Fleischacker, S., 1992, Integrity and Moral Relativism, Leiden: E.J. Brill. (Scholar)
- Foot, P., 1978a, “Moral Arguments,” in Foot,
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 96–109, Original Publication Date:
1958. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978b, “Moral Beliefs,” in
Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 110–31, Original Publication Date:
1958–59. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002a, “Morality and Art,” in Foot, Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 5–19, Original Publication Date: 1972. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b, “Moral Relativism,” in Foot, Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 20–36, Original Publication Date: 1979. (Scholar)
- Frick, M-L., 2017, “A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing
‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism,” in K. Neges
et al. (eds.), Realism-Relativism-Constructivism: Proceedings
of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg,
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 327–38. (Scholar)
- Fricker, M., 2010, “The Relativism of Blame and
Williams’s Relativism of Distance,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 84: 151–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Styles of Moral Relativism: A Critical Family Tree,” in R. Crisp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 793–817. (Scholar)
- Gaitán, A. and H. Viciana, 2018, “Relativism of Distance—A Step in the Naturalization of Meta-ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21: 311–27. (Scholar)
- Garcia, J.L.A., 1988, “Relativism and Moral Divergence,” Metaphilosophy, 19: 264–81. (Scholar)
- Geertz, C., 2000, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Gewirth, A., 1994, “Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?,” in E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, pp. 22–43. (Scholar)
- Gill, M.B., 2008, “Metaethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 387–401. (Scholar)
- Gillespie, R., 2016, “Normative Reasoning and Moral Argumentation in Theory and Practice,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, 49: 49–73. (Scholar)
- Goodwin, G.P. and J.M. Darley, 2008, “The Psychology of Meta-ethics: Exploring Objectivism,” Cognition, 106: 1339–66. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 161–88. (Scholar)
- Gowans, C., (ed.), 2000, Moral Disagreements: Classic and Contemporary Readings, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “A Priori Refutations
of Disagreement Arguments against Moral Objectivity: Why Experience
Matters,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 38:
141–57. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011,“Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 391–410. (Scholar)
- Graham, G., 1996, “Tolerance, Pluralism, and Relativism,” in D. Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 44–59. (Scholar)
- Hales, S., 2009, “Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology,” Synthese, 166: 431–47. (Scholar)
- –––, (ed.), 2011, A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Hampshire, S., 1983, “Morality and Conflict,” in Hampshire, Morality and Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 140–169. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Innocence and Experience, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hare, R.M., 1981, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1996, “Moral Relativism,” in G. Harman and J.J. Thompson (eds.), Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 3–64. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000a, “Moral Relativism
Defended,” in Harman, Explaining Value: And Other Essays in
Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3–19.
Original Publication Date: 1975. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000b, “Is There a Single True Morality?,” in Harman, Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 77–99. Original Publication Date: 1984. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Moral Relativism is Moral Realism,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 855–63. (Scholar)
- Harrison, G., 1976, “Relativism and Tolerance,” Ethics, 86: 122–35. (Scholar)
- Hatch, E., 1983, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Herskovits, M.J., 1972, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism, F. Herskovits (ed.), New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- Heyd, D., (ed.), 1996, Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Hills, A, 2013, “Faultless Moral Disagreement,” Ratio, 26: 410–27. (Scholar)
- Hopster, J., 2019, “The Meta-ethical Significance of Experiments about Folk Moral Objectivism,” Philosophical Psychology, 32: 831–52. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and M. Timmons, 2006, “Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 73–98. (Scholar)
- Ivanhoe, P.J., 2009, “Pluralism, Toleration, and Ethical Promiscuity,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 37: 311–29. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Kellenberger, J., 2001, Moral Relativism, Moral Diversity, and Human Relationships, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Moral Relativism: A Dialogue. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. (Scholar)
- Khader, S.J., 2019, Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kim, H-K. and M. Wreen, 2003, “Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance,” Metaphilosophy, 34: 447–59. (Scholar)
- Kirchin, S., 2000, “Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism,” Inquiry, 43: 413–28. (Scholar)
- Klenk, M., 2019, “Moral Philosophy and the
‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology,” Zeitschrift
für Ethik und Moralphilosophie, 2: 331–53. (Scholar)
- Kölbel, M., 2004, “Faultless Disagreement,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104: 53–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Moral Relativism,” in T.
Tännsjö and D. Westerstahl (eds.), Lectures on
Relativism, Philosophical Communications, Red Series No. 40,
Göteburg University, pp. 51–72. (Scholar)
- Krausz, M., (ed.), 1989, Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 2010, Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Varieties of Relativism and the Reach of Reasons,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 70–84. (Scholar)
- Krausz, M. and J.W. Meiland, (eds.), 1982, Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- Küng, H., (ed.), 1996, Yes to a Global Ethic: Voices from Religion and Politics, New York: Continuum. (Scholar)
- Ladd, J., 1957, The Structure of a Moral Code: A Philosophical Analysis of Ethical Discourse Applied to the Ethics of the Navaho Indians, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1985, Ethical Relativism.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America. (Scholar)
- Laidlaw, J., 2017, “Ethics/Morality,” in F. Stein
et al., (eds), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Anthropology,
first online 19 May 2017, doi:10.29164/17ethics
[Laidlaw 2017 available online]. (Scholar)
- Levy, N., 2002, Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction, Oxford: Oneworld Publications. (Scholar)
- ––– 2003, “Descriptive Relativism: Assessing the Evidence,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 37: 165–77. (Scholar)
- Li, Y., 2019, “Moral Ambivalence: Relativism or Pluralism?,” Acta Analytica, 34: 473–91. (Scholar)
- Lillehammer, H., 2007, “Davidson on Value and Objectivity,” Dialectica, 61: 203–17. (Scholar)
- Long, G., 2004, Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism, Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. (Scholar)
- López de Sa, 2011,“The Many Relativisms: Index,
Context, and Beyond,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to
Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 102–17. (Scholar)
- Lukes, S., 2008, Moral Relativism, New York: Picador. (Scholar)
- Lyons, D., 1976, “Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence,” Ethics, 86: 107–21 (Scholar)
- MacIntyre, A., 1988, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Moral Relativism, Truth and
Justification,” in L. Gormally (ed.), Moral Truth and
Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth
Anscombe, Blackrock, County Dublin: Four Courts Press, pp.
6–24. (Scholar)
- Macklin, R., 1999, Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mead, M., 1928, Coming of Age in Samoa, New York: William
Morrow. (Scholar)
- Miller, C.B., 2002, “Rorty and Moral Relativism,” European Journal of Philosophy, 10: 354–74. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Moral Relativism and Moral Psychology,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 346–67. (Scholar)
- Moody-Adams, M.M., 1997, Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Moser, P.K. and T.L. Carson, (eds.), 2001, Moral Relativism: A Reader, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Myers, R.H., 2004, “Finding Value in Davidson,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34: 107–36. (Scholar)
- Nichols, S., 2004, “After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral Judgment,” Philosophical Psychology, 17: 3–26. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M.C., 1993, “Non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach” in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds.), The Quality
of Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 242–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Judging Other Cultures: The
Case of Genital Mutilation,” in Nussbaum, Sex and Social
Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
118–29. (Scholar)
- Okin, S.M., 1998, “Feminism, Women’s Human Rights, and
Cultural Differences,” Hypatia, 13: 32–52. (Scholar)
- Olinder, R.F., 2012, “Moral and Metaethical Pluralism: Unity in Variation,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50: 583–601. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Moral Relativism, Error Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes,” The Journal of Philosophy, 110: 564–80. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Some Varieties of Metaethical
Relativism,” Philosophy Compass, 11: 529–40. (Scholar)
- Paul, E.F., F.D. Miller and J. Paul (eds.), 2008, Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Plakias, A., 2020, “Moral Relativism and Moral
Disagreement,” in M. Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of
Philosophy of Relativism, London: Routledge, pp.
155–64. (Scholar)
- Pölzler, T., 2017, “Revisiting Folk Moral Realism,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8: 455–76. (Scholar)
- Pölzler, T. and J.C. Wright, 2019, “Empirical Research on Folk Moral Objectivism,” Philosophy Compass, 14: 1–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, “Anti-Realist Pluralism: A New Approach to Folk Metaethics,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11: 53–82. (Scholar)
- Prinz, J.J., 2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “The Significance of Moral Variation: Replies to Tiberius, Gert and Doris,” Analysis Reviews, 69: 731–45. (Scholar)
- Quintelier, K.J.P. and M.T. Fessler, 2012, “Varying Versions
of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative
Relativism,” Biology and Philosophy, 27:
95–113. (Scholar)
- Rachels, J., 1999, “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed., New York: Random House, pp. 20–36. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 2003, The Practice of Value, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Renteln, A.D., 1985, “The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, 7: 514–40. (Scholar)
- Rescher, N., 2008, “Moral Objectivity,” in E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 393–409. (Scholar)
- Rorty, R., 1991, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Rose, D. and S. Nichols, Forthcoming, “From Punishment to
Universalism,” Mind and Language. (Scholar)
- Rovane, C., 2002, “Earning the Right to Realism or Relativism in Ethics,” Noûs, 36 (Supplement): 264–85. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Relativism Requires Alternatives, Not Disagreement or Relative Truth,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 31–52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Ryan, J.A., 2003, “Moral Relativism and the Argument from Disagreement,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 34: 377–86. (Scholar)
- Sarkissian, H., 2016, “Aspects of Folk Morality: Objectivism and Relativism,” in W. Buckwalter and J. Sytsma (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, London: Blackwell, pp. 212–24. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Folk Platitudes as the Explananda of Philosophical Metaethics: Are They Accurate? And Do They Help or Hinder Inquiry?,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34: 565–75. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Well-functioning
Daos and Moral Relativism,” Philosophy East &
West. (Scholar)
- Sarkissian, H. et. al., 2011, “Folk Moral Relativism,” Mind & Language, 26: 482–505. (Scholar)
- Sarkissian, H. and M. Phelan, 2019, “Moral Objectivism and a Punishing God,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 80: 1–7. (Scholar)
- Sauer, H., 2019, “The Argument from Agreement: How Universal Values Undermine Moral Realism,” Ratio, 32: 339–52. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T.M., 1995, “Fear of Relativism,” in R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp, 219–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Schafer, K, 2012, “Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50: 602–20. (Scholar)
- Seipel, P., 2020a, “Famine, Affluence, and
Philosophers’ Biases,” Philosophical Studies,
177: 2907–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020b, “Moral Relativism,”
in M. Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of
Relativism, London: Routledge, pp. 165–73. (Scholar)
- Shafer-Landau, R., 2003, Moral Realism: A Defense, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “A Defense of Categorical Reasons,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109 (2): 189–206. (Scholar)
- Shweder, R.A., 1991, Thinking Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 2009, “Mixed-up Meta-ethics,” Philosophical Issues, 19: 235–56. (Scholar)
- Smith, M., 1991, “Realism,” in P. Singer
(ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
pp. 399–410. (Scholar)
- Snare, F., 1980, “The Diversity of Morals,” Mind, 89: 353–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, The Nature of Moral Thinking, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Sreenivasan, G., 2001, “Understanding Alien Morals,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: 1–32. (Scholar)
- Stout, J., 1988, Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents, Boston: Beacon Press. (Scholar)
- Streiffer, R., 2003, Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, N.L., 1994, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism,” in E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 80–115. (Scholar)
- Suikkanen, J., 2019, “Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 14, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47–69. (Scholar)
- Sumner, W.G., 1906, Folkways, Boston: Ginn and Company. (Scholar)
- Tännsjö, T., 2007, “Moral Relativism,” Philosophical Studies, 135: 123–43. (Scholar)
- Tasioulas, J., 1998, “Relativism, Realism, and Reflection,” Inquiry, 41: 377–410. (Scholar)
- Tersman, F., 2006, Moral Disagreement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Tiberius, V., 2009, “The Practical Irrelevance of Relativism,” Analysis Reviews, 69: 722–31. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J.D., 2015, Foundations for Moral Relativism, Second Expanded Edition, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. (Scholar)
- Vicente, A. and A. Arrieta, 2016, “Moral Ambivalence, Relativism, and Pluralism,” Acta Analytica, 32: 207–23. (Scholar)
- Walzer, M., 1994, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- Wattles, J., 1996, The Golden Rule, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wellman, C., 1963, “The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity,” The Journal of Philosophy, 60: 169–84. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975, “Ethical Disagreement and Objective Truth,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 12: 211–21. (Scholar)
- Westermarck, Edward, 1906–8, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, 2 volumes, New York: The Macmillan Company. (Scholar)
- –––, 1932, Ethical Relativity, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1990–91, “Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91: 61–85. (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1972, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Harper & Row. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, “The Truth in Relativism,” in Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 132–43. Original Publication Date: 1974–75. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Wong, D.B., 1984, Moral Relativity, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “On Moral Realism without Foundations,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24 (Supplement): 95–113. (Scholar)
- ––– ,1996, “Pluralistic Relativism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Moral Concepts, 20: 378–399. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011,“Relativist Explanation of Interpersonal and Group Disagreement,” in S.D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 411–29. (Scholar)
- –––, 2020, “Moral Ambivalence,”
in M. Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of
Relativism, London: Routledge, pp. 147–54. (Scholar)
- Wreen, M., 2018, “What is Moral Relativism?,” Philosophy, 93: 337–54. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Moral Relativism and Majority Rule,” Metaphilosophy, 50: 361–76. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., 2008, “Fear of Relativism?,” Philosophical Studies, 141: 379–90. (Scholar)
- Wright, J.C. 2018, “The Fact and Function of
Meta-Ethical Pluralism: Exploring the Evidence,” in T. Lombrozo,
J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in
Experimental Philosophy, Vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 119–50. (Scholar)
- Wright, J.C., J. Cullum and N. Schwab, 2008, “The Cognitive
and Affective Dimensions of Moral Conviction: Implications for
Attitudinal and Behavioral Measures of Interpersonal Tolerance,”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34:
1461–76. (Scholar)
- Wright, J.C., P.T. Grandjean and C.B. McWhite, 2013, “The Meta-ethical Grounding of our Moral Beliefs: Evidence for Meta-ethical Pluralism,” Philosophical Psychology, 26: 336–61. (Scholar)
- Wright, J. C., C.B. McWhite and P.T. Grandjean, 2014, “The Cognitive Mechanisms of Intolerance: Do Our Meta-Ethical Commitments Matter,” in T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28–61. (Scholar)
- Xiao, Y. and Y. Huang, (eds.), 2014, Moral Relativism and
Chinese Philosophy: David Wong and his Critics, Albany, NY: SUNY
Press. (Scholar)
- Zhuangzi, 2020, The Complete Writings, translated by
Brook Ziporyn, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)