Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility" by Fernando Rudy-Hiller
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- Alexander, Lawrence and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 2009, Crime
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- Amaya, Santiago and John M. Doris, 2015, “No Excuses:
Performance Mistakes in Morality”, in Jens Clausen and Neil Levy
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- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1963, “Two Kinds of Error in Action”, Journal of Philosophy, 60(14): 393– 401. doi:10.2307/2022824 (Scholar)
- Arpaly, Nomy, 2003, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195152042.001.0001 (Scholar)
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- Austin, J.L., 1957 [1962], “A Plea for Excuses”,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57(1): 1–30.
Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, J.O. Urmson and G.J.
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- Benson, Paul, 2001, “Culture and Responsibility: A Reply to Moody-Adams”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 32(4): 610–620. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.00117 (Scholar)
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 2017a, “Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 146–162. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017b, “Explaining Away Epistemic
Skepticism about Culpability”, in David Shoemaker (ed.),
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 4, Oxford:
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- Calhoun, Cheshire, 1989, “Responsibility and Reproach”, Ethics, 99(2): 389–406. doi:10.1086/293071 (Scholar)
- Clarke, Randolph, 2014, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347520.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017a, “Ignorance, Revision, and Commonsense”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 233–251. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017b, “Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions”, in Nelkin and Rickless 2017b: 63–83. (Scholar)
- Clarke, Randolph, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith (eds.), 2015, The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Domsky, Darren, 2004, “There Is No Door: Finally Solving the Problem of Moral Luck”, Journal of Philosophy, 101(9): 445–464. doi:10.5840/jphil2004101930 (Scholar)
- Faraci, David, and David Shoemaker, 2014, “Huck vs. JoJo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame”, in Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo, and Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7–27. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0002 (Scholar)
- Fields, Lloyd, 1994, “Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness”, Philosophy, 69(270): 397–415. doi:10.1017/s0031819100047239 (Scholar)
- Finkelstein, Claire Oakes, 2005, “Responsibility for
Unintended Consequences”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal
Law, 2(2): 579–599. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2009, “The Truth about Tracing”, Noûs, 43(3): 531–556. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00717.x (Scholar)
- FitzPatrick, William J., 2008, “Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge”, Ethics, 118(4): 589–613. doi:10.1086/589532 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Unwitting Wrongdoing,
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- Frankfurt, Harry, 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 66(23): 829–39. doi:10.2307/2023833 (Scholar)
- Franklin, Christopher Evan, 2013, “A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas”, Philosophical Studies, 163(2): 479–502. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9826-y (Scholar)
- Fricker, Miranda, 2010, “The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of Distance”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84: 151–177. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00190.x (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 2000, “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 267–277. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.14 (Scholar)
- Graham, Peter A., 2014, “A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 388–409. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00608.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “The Epistemic Condition on
Moral Blameworthiness: A Theoretical Epiphenomenon”, in
Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 163–179. (Scholar)
- Guerrero, Alexander A., 2007, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution”, Philosophical Studies, 136(1): 59–97. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Intellectual Difficulty and
Moral Responsibility”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017:
199–218. (Scholar)
- Haji, Ishtiyaque, 1997, “An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(3): 523–544. doi:10.2307/2953747 (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Incompatibilism’s Allure:
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- Harman, Elizabeth, 2011, “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?” Ratio, 24(4): 443–468. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty”, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 10, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 53–79. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0003 (Scholar)
- Hart, H.L.A., 1961 [2008], “Negligence, Mens Rea,
and Criminal Responsibility”, Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work, Anthony Gordon Guest (ed.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29–49. Reprinted in
Punishment and Responsibility, second edition, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, pp. 136–157. First edition 1968.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.003.0006 (Scholar)
- Husak, Douglas, 2011, “Negligence, Belief, Blame, and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 5(2): 199–218. doi:10.1007/s11572-011-9115-z (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190604684.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Isaacs, Tracy, 1997, “Cultural Context and Moral Responsibility”, Ethics, 107(4): 670–684. doi:10.1086/233765 (Scholar)
- Kelly, Erin I., 2012, “What is an Excuse?”, in D.
Justin Coates, and Neil A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature
and Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 244–262.
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- King, Matt, 2009, “The Problem with Negligence”, Social Theory and Practice, 35(4): 577–595. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200935433 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Tracing the Epistemic
Condition”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 266– 280. (Scholar)
- Levy, Neil, 2003, “Cultural Membership and Moral Responsibility”, The Monist, 86(2): 145– 163. doi:10.5840/monist200386211 (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(2): 2–16. doi:10.26556/jesp.v1i2.6 (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Doxastic Responsibility”, Synthese, 155(1): 127–155. doi:10.1007/s11229-005-3983-5 (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick”, Ethics, 119(4): 729–741. doi:10.1086/605018 (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Moral Responsibility and
Consciousness: Two Challenges, One Solution”, in Nicole A.
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- –––, 2014, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704638.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Culpable Ignorance: A Reply to Robichaud”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 41: 263–271. doi:10.5840/jpr201672778 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Methodological Conservatism
and the Epistemic Condition”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017:
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- Littlejohn, Clayton, 2014, “The Unity of Reason”, in
Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New
Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford: Oxford
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- Mason, Elinor, 2015, “Moral Ignorance and Blameworthiness”, Philosophical Studies, 172(11): 3037–3057. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0456-7 (Scholar)
- Mason, Elinor and Alan T. Wilson, 2017, “Vice, Blameworthiness, and Cultural Ignorance”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 82–100. (Scholar)
- Mele, Alfred, 2010, “Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions”, Philosophical Explorations, 13(2): 101–111. doi:10.1080/13869790903494556 (Scholar)
- Montmarquet, James A., 1995, “Culpable Ignorance and Excuses”, Philosophical Studies, 80(1): 41– 49. doi:10.1007/bf00990535 (Scholar)
- –––,1999, “Zimmerman on Culpable Ignorance”, Ethics, 109(4): 842–845. doi:10.1086/233949 (Scholar)
- Moody-Adams, Michelle M., 1994, “Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance”, Ethics, 104(2): 291–309. doi:10.1086/293601 (Scholar)
- Moore, Michael S. and Heidi M. Hurd, 2011, “Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Selfish, and the Weak: The Culpability of Negligence”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 5(2): 147–198. doi:10.1007/s11572-011-9114-0 (Scholar)
- Murray, Samuel, 2017, “Responsibility and Vigilance”, Philosophical Studies, 174(2): 507–527. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0694-3 (Scholar)
- Murray, Samuel, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Felipe De Brigard, 2019, “Responsibility for Forgetting”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 1177–1201. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3 [Murray et al. forthcoming preprint available from the author] (Scholar)
- Murray, Samuel and Manuel Vargas, 2020, “Vigilance and Control”, Philosophical Studies, 177(3): 825–843. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1208-2 (Scholar)
- Nelkin, Dana Kay, 2011, “Review of George Sher’s Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness”, Ethics, 121(3): 675–680. doi:10.1086/659370 (Scholar)
- Nelkin, Dana Kay and Samuel C. Rickless, 2015, “Review of
Randolph Clarke’s Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and
Responsibility”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
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- –––, 2017a, “Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing View”, in Nelkin and Rickless 2017b: 106–130. (Scholar)
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- Peacock, Mark, 2011, “Inability, Culpability, and Affected Ignorance”, History of the Human Sciences, 24(3): 65–81. doi:10.1177/0952695111412865 (Scholar)
- Peels, Rik, 2011, “Tracing Culpable Ignorance”, Logos and Episteme, 2(4): 575–582. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme2011246 (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues”, Philosophical Quarterly, 64(256): 478–96. doi:10.1093/pq/pqu013 (Scholar)
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- Pleasants, Nigel, 2008, “Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 39(1): 96–115. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00413.x (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph, 2011, “Responsibility and the Negligence
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- Robichaud, Philip, 2014, “On Culpable Ignorance and Akrasia”, Ethics, 125(1): 137–151. doi:10.1086/677139 (Scholar)
- Robichaud, Philip and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), 2017, Responsibility: the Epistemic Condition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rosen, Gideon, 2003, “Culpability and Ignorance”,
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- –––, 2004, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 295–313. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00030.x (Scholar)
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- Schnall, Ira M., 2004, “Ignorance and Blame”, Philosophical Topics, 32(1/2): 307–329. doi:10.5840/philtopics2004321/26 (Scholar)
- Sher, George, 2009, Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001 (Scholar)
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