Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Responsibility" by Matthew Talbert
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The special issues of Midwest Studies in Philosophy
cited in the Introduction are Volume 30 (2006) and Volume 38 (2014),
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1985, “Involuntary Sins”, The Philosophical Review, 94(1): 3–31. doi:10.2307/2184713 (Scholar)
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, T. Irwin (ed. and trans.),
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- Arneson, Richard, 2003, “The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert”, in Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 233–258. (Scholar)
- Arpaly, Nomy, 2003, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195152042.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Ayer, A. J., 1954, “Freedom and Necessity”, in his Philosophical Essays, London: MacMillan, pp. 271–284. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, Mark, 2010, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Bennett, Jonathan, 1980, “Accountability”, in Zak van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–80. (Scholar)
- Benson, Paul, 1987, “Freedom and Value”, The Journal of Philosophy, 84(9): 465–486. doi:10.2307/2027060 (Scholar)
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- Björnsson, Gunnar, 2017, “Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability”, in Shoemaker 2017a: 141–162. (Scholar)
- Bobzien, Susanne, 1998, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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- Brink, David O. and Dana K. Nelkin, 2013, “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility1”, in Shoemaker 2013: 284–314. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0013 (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D., 1934, Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism: An Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Caruso, Gregg D., 2016, “Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model (Presidential Address)”, Southwest Philosophy Review, 32(1): 25–48. doi:10.5840/swphilreview20163214 (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick, 1964, “Human Freedom and the Self”, The Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas. Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 26–37. (Scholar)
- Christman, John, 1991, “Autonomy and Personal History”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21(1): 1–24. doi:10.1080/00455091.1991.10717234 (Scholar)
- Clarke, Randolph, 2003, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 13–24. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00103.x (Scholar)
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- –––, 2014, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347520.001.0001 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions”, in Nelkin and Rickless 2017a: 63–83. (Scholar)
- Coates, D. Justin and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2013a, “The Contours of Blame”, in Coates and Tognazzini 2013b: 3–26. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.003.0001 (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 2013b, Blame: Its Nature and Norms, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Darwall, Stephen, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Demetriou (Mickelson), Kristin, 2010, “The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(4): 595–617. doi:10.1080/00048400903382691 (Scholar)
- Doris, John M. and Dominic Murphy, 2007, “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31: 25–55. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00149.x (Scholar)
- Dworkin, Gerald, 1970, “Acting Freely”, Noûs, 4(4): 367–383. doi:10.2307/2214680 (Scholar)
- Ekstrom, Laura, 2000, Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Boulder CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- Enoch, David, 2012, “Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency”, in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95–132. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0005 (Scholar)
- Enoch, David and Andrei Marmor, 2007, “The Case Against Moral Luck”, Law and Philosophy, 26(4): 405–436. doi:10.1007/s10982-006-9001-3 (Scholar)
- Eshleman, Andrew, 2014, “Worthy of Praise: Responsibility
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- Fara, Michael, 2008, “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism”, Mind, 117(468): 843–865. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078 (Scholar)
- Fine, Cordelia and Jeanette Kennett, 2004, “Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment”, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27(5): 425–443. doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2004.06.005 (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”, in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Responsibility and Manipulation”, The Journal of Ethics, 8(2): 145–177. doi:10.1023/b:joet.0000018773.97209.84 (Scholar)
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- –––, 2010, “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories”, The Philosophical Review, 119(3): 315–336. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-002 (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas (eds.), 2007, Four Views on Free Will, (Great Debates in Philosophy), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1993a, “Introduction”, in Fischer and Ravizza 1993b: 1–41. (Scholar)
- ––– (eds.), 1993b, Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 (Scholar)
- Fischer, John Martin and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2009, “The Truth about Tracing”, Noûs, 43(3): 531–556. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00717.x (Scholar)
- FitzPatrick, William J., 2008, “Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge”, Ethics, 118(4): 589–613. doi:10.1086/589532 (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Unwitting Wrongdoing,
Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness”, in Phillip
Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The
Epistemic Condition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
29–46. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23): 829–839. doi:10.2307/2023833 (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1): 5–20. doi:10.2307/2024717 (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Schoeman 1987: 27–45. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625411.002">10.1017/cbo9780511625411.002 (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Some Thoughts Concerning PAP”, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, David Widerker and Michael McKenna (eds.), Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 339–445. (Scholar)
- Franklin, Christopher Evan, 2018, A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190682781.001.0001 (Scholar)
- Fricker, Miranda, 2010, “The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of Distance”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84: 151–177. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00190.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation”, Noûs, 50(1): 165–183. doi:10.1111/nous.12067 (Scholar)
- Ginet, Carl, 1966, “Might We Have No Choice?”, in Freedom and Determinism, Keith Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, pp. 87–104. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “In Defense of the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s
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- Glannon, Walter, 1997, “Psychopathy and Responsibility”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14(3): 263–275. doi:10.1111/1468-5930.00062 (Scholar)
- Greenspan, Patricia S., 2003, “Responsible Psychopaths”, Philosophical Psychology, 16(3): 417–429. doi:10.1080/0951508032000121797 (Scholar)
- Guerrero, Alexander A., 2007, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution”, Philosophical Studies, 136(1): 59–97. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7 (Scholar)
- Haji, Ishtiyaque, 1998, Moral Appraisability, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hanna, Nathan, 2014, “Moral Luck Defended: Moral Luck Defended”, Noûs, 48(4): 683–698. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00869.x (Scholar)
- Harman, Elizabeth, 2011, “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?”:, Ratio, 24(4): 443–468. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x (Scholar)
- Hartman, Robert J., 2017, In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Hieronymi, Pamela, 2001, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(3): 529–555. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00073.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Force and Fairness of Blame”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1): 115–148. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00023.x (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Responsibility for Believing”, Synthese, 161(3): 357–373. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9089-x (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “Reflection and Responsibility: Reflection and Responsibility”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 42(1): 3–41. doi:10.1111/papa.12024 (Scholar)
- Hobart, R. E., 1934, “Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It”, Mind, 43(169): 1–27. doi:10.1093/mind/xliii.169.1 (Scholar)
- Hobbes, Thomas, 1654 [1999], Of Liberty and Necessity, Reprinted in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, Vera Chappell (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–42. (Scholar)
- Honderich, Ted, 2002, How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, David, 1748 [1978], An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hunt, David P., 2000, “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action”, Philosophical Studies, 97(2): 195–227. doi:10.1023/a:1018331202006 (Scholar)
- Jefferson, Anneli, 2019, “Instrumentalism about Moral Responsibility Revisited”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 69(276): 555–573. doi:10.1093/pq/pqy062 (Scholar)
- Kane, Robert, 1996, The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 (Scholar)
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- Kelly, Erin I., 2013, “What Is an Excuse?”, in Coates
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- Kennett, Jeanette, 2019, “Competence, Attributability, and
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Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 5, D.
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- Khoury, Andrew C., 2012, “Responsibility, Tracing, and
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- –––, 2018, “The Objects of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 175(6): 1357–1381. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0914-5 (Scholar)
- King, Matt, 2013, “The Problem with Manipulation”, Ethics, 124(1): 65–83. doi:10.1086/671391 (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “Traction without Tracing: A (Partial) Solution for Control-Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility”, European Journal of Philosophy, 22(3): 463–482. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00502.x (Scholar)
- Lehrer, Keith, 1968, “Cans without Ifs”, Analysis, 29(1): 29–32. doi:10.1093/analys/29.1.29 (Scholar)
- Levy, Neil, 2003, “Cultural Membership and Moral Responsibility”:, The Monist, 86(2): 145–163. doi:10.5840/monist200386211 (Scholar)
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- Locke, Don, 1975, “Three Concepts of Free Action: I”,
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