Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Responsibility" by Matthew Talbert

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Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1985, “Involuntary Sins”, The Philosophical Review, 94(1): 3–31. doi:10.2307/2184713 (Scholar)
Aristotle, 1999, Nicomachean Ethics, T. Irwin (ed. and trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
Arneson, Richard, 2003, “The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert”, in Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 233–258. (Scholar)
Arpaly, Nomy, 2003, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195152042.001.0001 (Scholar)
Ayer, A. J., 1954, “Freedom and Necessity”, in his Philosophical Essays, London: MacMillan, pp. 271–284. (Scholar)
Bell, Macalester, 2013, “The Standing to Blame: A Critique”, in Coates and Tognazzini 2013b: 263–281. (Scholar)
Bennett, Jonathan, 1980, “Accountability”, in Zak van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–80. (Scholar)
Benson, Paul, 1987, “Freedom and Value”, The Journal of Philosophy, 84(9): 465–486. doi:10.2307/2027060 (Scholar)
–––, 2001, “Culture and Responsibility: A Reply to Moody-Adams”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 32(4): 610–620. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.0011 (Scholar)
Bernstein, Sara, 2016, “Causal and Moral Indeterminacy”, Ratio, 29: 434–447. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility”, in Shoemaker 2017a: 164–182. (Scholar)
Björnsson, Gunnar, 2017a, “Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability”, in Shoemaker, 2017a: 141–162. (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 146–62. (Scholar)
Bobzien, Susanne, 1998, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0199247676.001.0001 (Scholar)
Brink, David O. and Dana K. Nelkin, 2013, “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility”, in Shoemaker 2013: 284–314. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0013 (Scholar)
Carlsson, Andreas Brekke, 2017, “Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt”, Journal of Ethics, 21: 89–115. (Scholar)
–––, (ed.), 2022, Self Blame and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Caruso, Gregg D., 2016, “Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model (Presidential Address)”, Southwest Philosophy Review, 32(1): 25–48. doi:10.5840/swphilreview20163214 (Scholar)
Caruso, Gregg and Derk Pereboom, 2022, Moral Responsibility Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick, 1964, “Human Freedom and the Self”, The Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas. Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 26–37. (Scholar)
Christman, John, 1991, “Autonomy and Personal History”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21(1): 1–24. doi:10.1080/00455091.1991.10717234 (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, 2003, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 13–24. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00103.x (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism”, Mind, 118(470): 323–351. doi:10.1093/mind/fzp034 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347520.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism”, Journal of Ethics, 20: 121–137. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions”, in Nelkin and Rickless 2017a: 63–83. (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, Michael McKenna, and Angela Smith (eds.), 2015, The Nature of Moral Responsibility , New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Coates, D. Justin and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2013a, “The Contours of Blame”, in Coates and Tognazzini 2013b: 3–26. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.003.0001 (Scholar)
––– (eds.), 2013b, Blame: Its Nature and Norms, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.001.0001 (Scholar)
D’Arms, Justin, 2022, “Fitting Emotions”, in C. Howard and R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 105–129. (Scholar)
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson, 2023, Rational Sentimentalism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Demetriou (Mickelson), Kristin, 2010, “The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(4): 595–617. doi:10.1080/00048400903382691 (Scholar)
Dowe, Phil, 2000, Physical Causation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Duggan, A. P., 2018, “Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21: 291–309. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Gerald, 1970, “Acting Freely”, Noûs, 4(4): 367–383. doi:10.2307/2214680 (Scholar)
Edwards, James, 2019, “Standing to Hold Responsible”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16: 437–462. (Scholar)
Enoch, David, 2012, “Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency”, in Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95–132. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.003.0005 (Scholar)
Enoch, David and Andrei Marmor, 2007, “The Case Against Moral Luck”, Law and Philosophy, 26(4): 405–436. doi:10.1007/s10982-006-9001-3 (Scholar)
Eshleman, Andrew, 2014, “Worthy of Praise: Responsibility and Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency”, in Shoemaker and Tognazzini 2014: 216–242. (Scholar)
Fara, Michael, 2008, “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism”, Mind, 117(468): 843–865. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078 (Scholar)
Fine, Cordelia and Jeanette Kennett, 2004, “Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punishment”, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27(5): 425–443. doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2004.06.005 (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, 2002, “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”, in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–26. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Responsibility and Manipulation”, The Journal of Ethics, 8(2): 145–177. doi:10.1023/b:joet.0000018773.97209.84 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Cards That Are Dealt You”, The Journal of Ethics, 10(1–2): 107–129. doi:10.1007/s10892-005-4594-6 (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories”, The Philosophical Review, 119(3): 315–336. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-002 (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas (eds.), 2007, Four Views on Free Will, (Great Debates in Philosophy), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1993a, “Introduction”, in Fischer and Ravizza 1993b: 1–41. (Scholar)
–––, (eds.), 1993b, Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2009, “The Truth about Tracing”, Noûs, 43(3): 531–556. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00717.x (Scholar)
FitzPatrick, William J., 2008, “Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge”, Ethics, 118(4): 589–613. doi:10.1086/589532 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Unwitting Wrongdoing, Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 29–46. (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23): 829–839. doi:10.2307/2023833 (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1): 5–20. doi:10.2307/2024717 (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Schoeman 1987: 27–45. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625411.002">10.1017/cbo9780511625411.002 (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Some Thoughts Concerning PAP”, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, David Widerker and Michael McKenna (eds.), Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 339–445. (Scholar)
Fricker, Miranda, 2010, “The Relativism of Blame and Williams’s Relativism of Distance”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84: 151–177. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00190.x (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation”, Noûs, 50(1): 165–183. doi:10.1111/nous.12067 (Scholar)
Fritz, Kyle G. and Daniel Miller, 2018, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99: 118–139. (Scholar)
–––, 2022, “A Standing Asymmetry Between Blame and Forgiveness”, Ethics, 132: 759–786. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 1966, “Might We Have No Choice?”, in Freedom and Determinism, Keith Lehrer (ed.), New York: Random House, pp. 87–104. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 403–417. (Scholar)
Graham, Peter, 2014, “A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88: 388–409. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “The Epistemic Condition on Moral Blameworthiness: A Theoretical Epiphenomenon”, in Robichaud and Wieland 2017: 163–79. (Scholar)
Guerrero, Alexander A., 2007, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution”, Philosophical Studies, 136(1): 59–97. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9143-7 (Scholar)
Gunnemyr, Mattias and Caroline Torpe Touborg, 2023, “You Just Didn’t Care Enough: Quality of Will, Causation, and Blameworthiness for Actions, Omissions, and Outcomes”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 24: 1–35. (Scholar)
Hanna, Nathan, 2014, “Moral Luck Defended: Moral Luck Defended”, Noûs, 48(4): 683–698. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00869.x (Scholar)
Harman, Elizabeth, 2011, “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?”, Ratio, 24(4): 443–468. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x (Scholar)
Hartman, Robert J., 2017, In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Hieronymi, Pamela, 2001, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(3): 529–555. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00073.x (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “The Force and Fairness of Blame”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1): 115–148. doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00023.x (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Responsibility for Believing”, Synthese, 161(3): 357–373. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9089-x (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Reflection and Responsibility: Reflection and Responsibility”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 42(1): 3–41. doi:10.1111/papa.12024 (Scholar)
Hobbes, Thomas, 1654 [1999], Of Liberty and Necessity, Reprinted in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, Vera Chappell (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–42. (Scholar)
Honderich, Ted, 2002, How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hume, David, 1748 [1978], An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hunt, David P., 2000, “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action”, Philosophical Studies, 97(2): 195–227. doi:10.1023/a:1018331202006 (Scholar)
Jefferson, Anneli, 2019, “Instrumentalism about Moral Responsibility Revisited”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 69(276): 555–573. doi:10.1093/pq/pqy062 (Scholar)
Jeppsson, Sofia and Daphne Brandenburg, 2022, “Patronizing Praise”, The Journal of Ethics, 26: 663–682. (Scholar)
Kaiserman, Alex. (2016). “Causal Contribution”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116: 387–394. (Scholar)
–––, 2024. “Responsibility and Causation”, in M. Kiener (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility, New York: Routledge, pp. 164–176. (Scholar)
Kane, Robert, 1996, The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Libertarianism”, in Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas 2007: 5–43. (Scholar)
Kelly, Erin I., 2013, “What Is an Excuse?”, in Coates and Tognazzini 2013b: 244–262. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.003.0013 (Scholar)
Khoury, Andrew C., 2012, “Responsibility, Tracing, and Consequences”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42(3–4): 187–207. doi:10.1080/00455091.2012.10716774 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 165(3): 735–752. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9976-6 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, “The Objects of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 175(6): 1357–1381. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0914-5 (Scholar)
King, Matt, 2013, “The Problem with Manipulation”, Ethics, 124(1): 65–83. doi:10.1086/671391 (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Traction without Tracing: A (Partial) Solution for Control-Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility”, European Journal of Philosophy, 22(3): 463–482. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00502.x (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “Skepticism about the Standing to Blame”, in D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 6, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 265–288. (Scholar)
Kutz, Christopher, 2000, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Lawson, Brian, 2013, “Individual complicity in collective wrongdoing”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16: 227–43. (Scholar)
Lehrer, Keith, 1968, “Cans without Ifs”, Analysis, 29(1): 29–32. doi:10.1093/analys/29.1.29 (Scholar)
Levy, Neil, 2003, “Cultural Membership and Moral Responsibility”, The Monist, 86(2): 145–163. doi:10.5840/monist200386211 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1(2): 1–16. doi:10.26556/jesp.v1i2.6 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 14(2): 129–138. doi:10.1353/ppp.0.0003 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick”, Ethics, 119(4): 729–741. doi:10.1086/605018 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility”, Law and Philosophy, 31(5): 477–493. doi:10.1007/s10982-012-9128-3 (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1981, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”, Theoria, 47(3): 113–121. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x (Scholar)
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, 2020, “Why the Moral Equality Account of the Hypocrite’s Lack of Standing to Blame Fails”, Analysis, 80: 666–674. (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Praising Without Standing”, The Journal of Ethics, 26: 229–246. (Scholar)
Locke, Don, 1975, “Three Concepts of Free Action: I”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 49: 95–112. (Scholar)
Macnamara, Coleen, 2013, “‘Screw you! & ‘Thank you’”, Philosophical Studies, 165: 893–914. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Blame, Communication, and Morally Responsible Agency”, in Clarke, McKenna, and Smith 2015: 211–236. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199998074.003.0010 (Scholar)
Mason, Elinor, 2015, “Moral Ignorance and Blameworthiness”, Philosophical Studies, 172(11): 3037–3057. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0456-7 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Moral Incapacity and Moral Ignorance”, in Rik Peels (ed.), Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 30–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833604.001.0001 (Scholar)
Matheson, Benjamin, 2014, “Compatibilism and Personal Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 170(2): 317–334. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0220-9 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “In Defence of the Four-Case Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 173(7): 1963–1982. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0587-x (Scholar)
McGeer, Victoria, 2015, “Building a Better Theory of Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies, 172(10): 2635–2649. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0478-1 (Scholar)
McKenna, Michael, 2004, “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents”, Philosophical Topics, 32(1/2): 169–192. doi:10.5840/philtopics2004321/222 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Reasons Reactivity and Incompatibilist Intuitions”, Philosophical Explorations, 8(2): 131–143. doi:10.1080/13869790500091508 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77(1): 142–159. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00179.x (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Conversation and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740031.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms”, in Shoemaker 2013: 151–183. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.000 (Scholar)
McKiernan, Amy, 2016, “Standing Conditions and Blame”, Southwest Philosophy Review, 32: 145–151. (Scholar)
Menges, Leonhard, 2017, “The Emotion Account of Blame”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 257–273. (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred R., 1995, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195150430.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-Case Argument’ for Incompatibilism”, Analysis, 65(1): 75–80. doi:10.1093/analys/65.1.75 (Scholar)
–––, 2006a, “Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Ethics, 10(3): 283–294. doi:10.1007/s10892-005-5780-2 (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, Free Will and Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2008, “Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Ethics, 12(3–4): 263–286. doi:10.1007/s10892-008-9035-x (Scholar)
Mele, Alfred R. and David Robb, 1998, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases”, The Philosophical Review, 107(1): 97–112. doi:10.2307/2998316 (Scholar)
Milam, Per-Erik, 2016, “Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(1): 102–122. doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1146032 (Scholar)
Moody-Adams, Michele, 1990, “On the Old Saw that Character is Destiny”, in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 111–32. (Scholar)
Moore, G. E., 1912, Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nagel, Thomas, 1976 [1979], “Moral Luck”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 50: 137–151. Reprinted in his Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 24–38. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/50.1.115 (Scholar)
Nefsky, Julia, 2017, “How You Can Help, Without Making a Difference”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 2743–2767. (Scholar)
Nelkin, Dana Kay, 2008, “Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(4): 497–515. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00333.x (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Making Sense of Free Will and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Nelkin, Dana Kay and Samuel C. Rickless (eds.), 2017a, The Ethics and Law of Omissions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190683450.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, “Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing View”, in Nelkin and Rickless 2017a: 106–130. (Scholar)
Peels, Rik, 2015, “A Modal Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(1): 73–87. (Scholar)
Pereboom, Derk, 1995, “Determinism al Dente”, Noûs, 29(1): 21–45. doi:10.2307/2215725 (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories”, Philosophical Perspectives, 14: 119–137. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Living Without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498824 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Hard Incompatibilism”, in Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas 2007: 85–125. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685516.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Responsibility, Regret, and Protest”, in Shoemaker 2017a: 121–140. (Scholar)
Piovarchy, Adam, 2020, “Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second-Personal Authority”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101: 603–627. (Scholar)
Robichaud, Philip, 2014, “On Culpable Ignorance and Akrasia”, Ethics, 125(1): 137–151. doi:10.1086/677139 (Scholar)
Robichaud, Philip and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), 2017, Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Rosen, Gideon, 2003, “Culpability and Ignorance”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103(1): 61–84. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00064.x (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Perspectives, 18: 295–313. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility”, in Clarke, McKenna, and Smith 2015: 65–88. (Scholar)
Rossi, Benjamin, 2018, “The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21: 553–567. (Scholar)
Rudy-Hiller, Fernando, 2017, “A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(S1): 398–426. doi:10.1111/papq.12190 (Scholar)
Russell, Paul, 1992, “Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility”, Ethics, 102(2): 287–302. doi:10.1086/293397 (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195152905.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense”, Philosophical Topics, 32(1/2): 287–305. doi:10.5840/philtopics2004321/24 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Free Will Pessimism”, in Shoemaker 2017a: 93–120. (Scholar)
Salles, Ricardo, 2005, The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
Sartorio, Carolina, 2016, Causation and Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746799.001.0001 (Scholar)
Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Schlick, Moritz, 1930 [1966], “When is a Man Responsible?”, in his Fragen der Ethik, Vienna: Verlag von Julius Springer. Translated in his Problems of Ethics, David Rynin (trans.), New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. Reprinted in Bernard Berofsky (ed.), Free Will and Determinism, New York: Harper & Row, 1966, 54–63. (Scholar)
Schoeman, Ferdinand (ed.), 1987, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625411 (Scholar)
Schlossberger, Eugene, 2021, Moral Responsibility Beyond our Fingertips, London: Lexington Books. (Scholar)
Seim, Maria, 2019, “The Standing to Blame and Meddling”, Teorema, 38: 7–26. (Scholar)
Schramme, Thomas (ed.), 2014, Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Shabo, Seth, 2010, “Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2): 349–383. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00328.x (Scholar)
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