Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Sentimentalism" by Antti Kauppinen

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Aaltola, E., 2014, “Affective Empathy as Core Moral Agency: Psychopathy, Autism and Reason Revisited,” Philosophical Explorations, 17 (1): 76–92. (Scholar)
Allman, J. and J. Woodward, 2008, “What Are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective,” Philosophical Issues, 18: 164–185. (Scholar)
Audi, R., 2013, Moral Perception, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Ayer, A.J., 1936, Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz. (Scholar)
Bagnoli, C. (ed.), 2011, Morality and the Emotions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Barker, S., 2000, “Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?” Analysis, 60: 268–279. (Scholar)
Bishop, J. D., 1996, “Moral Motivation and the Development of Francis Hutcheson’s Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 57 (2): 277–295. (Scholar)
Björnsson, G. and Finlay, S., 2010, “Metaethical Contextualism Defended,” Ethics, 121(1): 7–36. (Scholar)
Blackburn, S., 1971, “Moral Realism”, in J. Casey (ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning, London: Methuen, pp. 101–124. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Supervenience Revisited”, in Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 47–68. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12(1): 361–375. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Circles, Finks, Smells, and Biconditionals,” Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 259–279. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Précis of Ruling Passions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(1): 122–135. (Scholar)
Bloom, P., 2017, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
Boisvert, D., 2008, “Expressive-Assertivism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(2): 169–203. (Scholar)
Brady, M. S., 2010, “Virtue, Emotion and Attention,” Metaphilosophy, 41: 115–131. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Brandt, R.B., 1955, “The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ Theory in Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15(3): 407–413. (Scholar)
Brink, D., 1986, “Externalist Moral Realism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24(Supplement): 23–42. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Broad, C. D., 1944–45, “Some Reflections on Moral–Sense Theories in Ethics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 45: 131–166. (Scholar)
Callahan, L. F., 2018, “Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 68 (272): 437–459. (Scholar)
Carter, J. A., 2019, “Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem,” Philosophical Studies, 1–26. (Scholar)
Cohon, R., 2008, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cowan, R., 2018, “Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness,” Evaluative Perception, 219. (Scholar)
Cuneo, T., 2001, “Are Moral Qualities Response-Dependent?” Noûs, 35(4): 569–591. (Scholar)
D’Arms, J., 2011, “Empathy, Approval, and Disapproval in Moral Sentimentalism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(Supplement): 134–141. (Scholar)
D’Arms, J. and D. Jacobson, 2000a, “Sentiment and Value,” Ethics, 110(4): 722–48. (Scholar)
–––, 2000b, “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 65–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, D. Copp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 186–218. (Scholar)
Darwall, S., 1998, “Empathy, Sympathy, and Care,” Philosophical Studies, 89: 261–282. (Scholar)
Deonna, J. and Teroni, F., 2012, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Emotions as Attitudes,” Dialectica 69 (3):293–311. (Scholar)
de Sousa, R.B., 1987, The Rationality of Emotion, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
de Waal, F., 2009, The Age of Empathy, New York: Harmony Books. (Scholar)
Döring, S., 2007, “Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation,” dialectica, 61: 363–393. (Scholar)
Dreier, J., 1990, “Internalism and Speaker Relativism,” Ethics, 101: 6–26. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement,” Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1): 79–110. (Scholar)
Driver, J., 2011, “The Secret Chain: A Limited Defense of Sympathy,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49 (Supplement): 234–238. (Scholar)
Egan, A., 2012, “Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(4): 557–582. (Scholar)
Enoch, D., 2005, “Why Idealize?” Ethics, 115(4): 759–787. (Scholar)
Echeverri, S., 2019, “Emotional Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98 (3): 541–566. (Scholar)
Ewing, A. C., 1948, The Definition of Good, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Feldman, F., 2004, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Finlay, S., 2017, “Disagreement Lost and Found,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 12: 187–205. (Scholar)
Firth, R., 1952, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12: 317–345. (Scholar)
Flanagan, O., 2016, The Geography of Morals: Varieties of Moral Possibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Fleischacker, S., 2019, Being Me Being You: Adam Smith and Empathy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
Fletcher, G., 2016, “Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 11, Oxford University Press, pp. 45–73. (Scholar)
Fletcher, G. and M. Ridge, 2014, Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Frost, K., 2014, “On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit,” Philosophical Review, 123 (4): 429–484. (Scholar)
Gendler, T. S., 2008, “Alief in Action (and Reaction),” Mind & Language, 23 (5): 552–585. (Scholar)
Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003. Thinking How to Live, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Greene, J.D., 2008, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) 2008, Vol. 3, pp. 35–80. (Scholar)
Greene, J.D., R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen, 2001, “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science, 293: 2105–2108. (Scholar)
Greene, J.D. and J. Haidt, 2002, “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12): 517–523. (Scholar)
Greene, J.D., F.A. Cushman, L.E. Stewart, K. Lowenberg, L.E. Nystrom, and J.D. Cohen, 2009, “Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment,” Cognition, 111(3): 364–371. (Scholar)
Goldie, P., 2000, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Seeing What Is the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality,” dialectica, 61(3): 347–361. (Scholar)
Gordon, R.M., 1995, “Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator,” Ethics, 105(4): 727–742. (Scholar)
Greenspan, P., 1988, Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry into Emotional Justification, Routledge. (Scholar)
Grouchy, S. de, 1798, Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy, translated by S. Bergès, with an introduction by S. Bergès and E. Schliesser, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. (Scholar)
Haidt, J., 2001, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review, 108: 814–34. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, The Righteous Mind, New York: Pantheon. (Scholar)
Haidt, J. and F. Björklund, 2008, “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Moral Psychology,” in Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) 2008, Vol. 2, pp. 181–217. (Scholar)
Hare, R.M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1975, “Moral Relativism Defended,” Philosophical Review, 84: 3–22. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “What Is Moral Relativism?” reprinted in Explaining Value, New York: Oxford University Press, 20–38. (Scholar)
Hayward, M. K., 2019, “Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes,” Noûs, 53 (1): 51–75. (Scholar)
Helm, B., 2001, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Hills, A., 2009, “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” Ethics, 120 (1): 94–127. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Understanding Why,” Noûs, 50 (4): 661–688. (Scholar)
Howard, N. R., 2018, “Sentimentalism About Moral Understanding,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21 (5): 1065–1078. (Scholar)
Huemer, M., 2001, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Ethical Intuitionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Hume, D., 1739–40 [T], A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2^nd rev. edn., P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. (Scholar)
–––, 1751, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. J. B. Schneewind. Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983. (Scholar)
Hutcheson, F., 1725, An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, W. Leidhold (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2004. [Hutcheson 1725 available online] (Scholar)
–––, 1728, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of Passions, With Illustrations on the Moral Sense, A. Garrett (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002. [Hutcheson 1728 available online] (Scholar)
Jacobson, D., 2012, “Moral Dumbfounding and Moral Stupefaction,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 2: 289–316. (Scholar)
James, A., 2007, “Constructivism About Practical Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(2): 302–325. (Scholar)
Johnston, M., 1989, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63(Supplement): 139–174. (Scholar)
Joyce, R., 2013, “Error Theory,” in H. LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. (Scholar)
Kahane, G., 2012, “On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology,” Mind and Language, 27(5): 519–545. (Scholar)
Kahneman, D. and G. Klein, 2009, “Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree,” American Psychologist, 64(6): 515–526. (Scholar)
Kauppinen, A., 2010, “What Makes a Sentiment Moral?” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5: 225–256. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(3): 360–381. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, “Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment,” in Empathy and Morality, H. Maibom (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–121. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, “Fittingness and Idealization,” Ethics 124(3): 572–588. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation,” in Motivational Internalism, G. Björnsson, C. Strandberg, R. F. Olinder, J. Eriksson, and F. Björklund (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 237–259. (Scholar)
Kenny, A., 1963, Action, Emotion, and the Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Kopajtic, L., 2020, “Adam Smith’s Sentimentalist Conception of Self-Control,” Adam Smith Review, 12: 7–27. (Scholar)
Korsgaard, C., 1986, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy, 83(1): 5–25. (Scholar)
Kriegel, U., 2012, “Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3): 469–486. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion,” European Journal of Philosophy 22(3): 420–442. (Scholar)
Koons, J.R., 2003, “Why Response-Dependence Theories of Morality are False,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6(3): 275–294. (Scholar)
Locke, J., 1694 [1975], An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press (original work, 2^nd ed., first published 1694). (Scholar)
Lenman, J., 1999, “The Externalist and the Amoralist,” Philosophia, 27(3–4): 441–457. (Scholar)
Lewis, D. K., 1989, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63(Supplement): 113–137. (Scholar)
Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Lyons, W., 1980, Emotion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Mackie, J., 1980, Hume’s Moral Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Maibom, H. L., 2005, “Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy,” Mind and Language, 20 (2): 237–257. (Scholar)
Markie, P., 2005, “The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification,” Philosophical Studies, 126 (3): 347–373. (Scholar)
May, J., 2018, Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1978, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 52(Supplement): 13–29. Reprinted in McDowell 1998: 95–111. (Scholar)
–––, 1979, “Virtue and Reason,” The Monist, 62: 331–350. Reprinted in McDowell 1998: 50–73. (Scholar)
–––, 1985, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in Morality and Objectivity, T. Honderich (ed.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 110–129; reprinted in McDowell 1998: 131–150. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, “Projection and Truth in Ethics,”, pamphlet, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas; reprinted in McDowell 1998: 151–166. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, “Might There Be External Reasons?” in World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 387–398; reprinted in McDowell 1998: 95–111. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
McNaughton, D., 1988, Moral Vision, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Milona, M. and Naar, H., 2020, “Sentimental Perceptualism and the Challenge from Cognitive Bases,” Philosophical Studies, 177(10): 3071–3096. (Scholar)
Mitchell, J., 2017, “The Epistemology of Emotional Experience,” Dialectica 71(1):57–84. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, “The Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotion,” Philosophical Studies. (Scholar)
Moll, J., R. de Oliveira-Souza, and P.J. Eslinger, 2003, “Morals and the Human Brain: A Working Model,” Neuroreport, 14(3): 299–305. (Scholar)
Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Moore, G.E., 1912, Ethics, London: Williams and Norgate. (Scholar)
Murdoch, I. 1970. Sovereignty of the Good. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Nichols, S., 2004, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “Innateness and Moral Psychology,” in The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, and S. Stich (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 353–430. (Scholar)
Oddie, G., 2005, Value, Reality, and Desire, Oxford University Press on Demand. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 11: 74–101. (Scholar)
Parfit, D., 2011, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pelser, A. C., 2014, “Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification,” in Roeser and Todd (eds.) 2014: 107–123. (Scholar)
Pettit, P., 1991, “Realism and Response-Dependence,” Mind, 100: 587–626. (Scholar)
Prinz, J., 2004, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Explorations, 9(1): 29–43. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Emotional Construction of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Against Empathy,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49: 214–233. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, W. and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004, “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value,” Ethics, 114(3): 391–423. (Scholar)
Radcliffe, E., 2006, “Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics,” Synthese, 152(3): 353–370. (Scholar)
Railton, P., 2003, “Red, Bitter, Good,” in Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 131-147. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement,” Ethics, 124 (4): 813–859. (Scholar)
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Roeser, S., 2011, Moral Emotions and Intuitions, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Roeser, S. and C. Todd, 2014, Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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Sinhababu, N., 2017, Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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