Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Theory" by Julia Driver

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Alicke, Mark, David Rose and Dori Bloom, 2011, “Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control,” Journal of Philosophy, 108(12): 670–696. (Scholar)
Annas, Julia, 2011, Intelligent Virtue, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Arpaly, Nomy, 2002, Unprincipled Virtue, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Baier, Annette, 1985, Postures of the Mind, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Baron, Marcia, 1991, “Impartiality and Friendship,” Ethics, 101(4): 836–857. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Clarke, Stanley G, 1987, “Anti-Theory in Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 24(3): 237–244. (Scholar)
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson, 2000 , “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1): 65–90. (Scholar)
Darwall, Stephen, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Dreier, Jamie, 1993, “Structures of Normative Theories,” The Monist, 76(1): 22–40. (Scholar)
Driver, Julia, 2012, “What the Objective Standard is Good For,” in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 28–44. (Scholar)
Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Foot, Philippa, 1967, “Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford Review, 5: 5–15. (Scholar)
Graham, Peter, 2010, “In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation,” Ethics, 121(1): 88–115. (Scholar)
Hare, R. M., 1965, Freedom and Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Herman, Barbara, 1985, “The Practice of Moral Judgment,” Journal of Philosophy, 82(8): 414–436. (Scholar)
Hill, jr., Thomas E., 1987, “The Importance of Autonomy,” in Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers (ed.) Women and Moral Theory, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 129–138. (Scholar)
Hooker, Brad, 2000, Ideal Code, Real World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hurka, Thomas, 2001, Virtue, Vice, and Value, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1999, On Virtue Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson, Frank, 1991, “Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics, 101(3): 461–482. (Scholar)
Jeske, Diane, 2008, Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Joyce, Richard, 2001, The Myth of Morality, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Keas, Michael, 2018, “Systematizing the Theoretical Virtues,” Synthese, 195: 2761–2793. (Scholar)
Kagan, Shelley, 1989, The Limits of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kamm, Frances, 2007, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kant, Immanuel, 1785 [2012], Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. (Scholar)
Knobe, Joshua, 2003, “Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation,” Philosophical Psychology, 16(2): 309–325. (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Louden, Robert, 1990, “Virtue Ethics and Anti-Theory,” Philosophia, 20(1–2): 93–114. (Scholar)
Markovits, Julia, 2014, Moral Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mason, Elinor, 2003, “Consequentialism and the ‘Ought Implies Can’ Principle,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(4): 319–331. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McDowell, John, 1979, “Virtue and Reason,” The Monist, 62(3): 331–350. (Scholar)
Moody-Adams, Michelle, 2002, Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Moore, G. E., 1903 [1993], Principia Ethica, ed. Thomas Baldwin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. (Scholar)
Nagel, Thomas, 1979, “The Fragmentation of Value,” in Mortal Questions, New York: Cambridge University Press, 128–141. (Scholar)
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1887 [1998], On the Genealogy of Morality, Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (trans.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. (Scholar)
Norcross, Alastair, 2020, Morality By Degrees, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Olson, Jonas, 2004, “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons,” Philosophical Quarterly, 54(215): 295–300. (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Pettit, Phillip, 1997, “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in The Three Methods of Ethics, by Marcia Baron, Phillip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Oxford: Blackwell, 92–174. (Scholar)
Pettit, Phillip, and Michael Smith, 2000, “Global Consequentialism,” in Brad Hooker, et al. (eds.), Morality, Rules, and Consequences, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 121–133. (Scholar)
Phillips, David, 2019, Rossian Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Piper, Adrian, 1987, “Moral Theory and Moral Alienation,” Journal of Philosophy, 82(2): 102–118. (Scholar)
Portmore, Douglas, 2011, Commonsense Consequentialism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2004, “The Strike of the Demon: on Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value,” Ethics, 114(3): 391–423. (Scholar)
Railton, Peter, 1984, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13(2): 134–171. (Scholar)
Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Moral Dimensions, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Scheffler, Samuel, 1982, The Rejection of Consequentialism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Schneewind, J. B., 1963, “First Principles and Common-sense Morality in Sidgwick’s Ethics,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 45(2): 137–156. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” Ethics, 101(1): 42–63. (Scholar)
Schofield, Paul, 2021, Duty to Self: Moral, Political, and Legal Self-Relation, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Sen, Amartya, 2000, “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy, 47(9): 477–502. (Scholar)
Sidgwick, Henry, 1874 [1907], The Methods of Ethics, London: Macmillan. [The seventh edition was published in 1907.] (Scholar)
Singer, Marcus, 1986, “Ethics and Common Sense,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 40(158): 221–258. (Scholar)
Slote, Michael, 1985, Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Smith, Holly, 2018, Making Morality Work, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Smith, Michael, 2009, “Two Kinds of Consequentialism,” Philosophical Issues, 19(1): 257–272. (Scholar)
Stark, Cynthia, 1997, “Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness and Impartiality,” Noûs, 31(4): 478–495. (Scholar)
Stocker, Michael, 1976, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy, 73(14): 453–466. (Scholar)
Strawson, Peter, 1961, “Social Morality and Individual Ideal,” Philosophy, 36(136): 1–17. (Scholar)
Street, Sharon, 2006, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies, 127(1): 109–166. (Scholar)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1976, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist, 59(2): 204–217. (Scholar)
Wiland, Eric J, “The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory,” Acta Analytica, 25(3): 279–284. (Scholar)
Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wolf, Susan, 1982, “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy, 79(8): 419–439. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “Loving Attention: Lessons in Love from The Philadelphia Story,” in Susan Wolf and Christopher Grau (eds.), Understanding Love: Philosophy, Film, and Fiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 369–386. (Scholar)
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkhaus, 2017, Exemplarist Moral Theory, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Mar 17 01:59:27 2025

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