Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Morality and Evolutionary Biology" by William FitzPatrick
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Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and
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Explanation of Moral Beliefs: Challenging Evolutionary
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- Foot, P., 2001, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Glover, J., 2000, Humanity: A Moral History of the
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- Haidt, J., 2001, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review, 108(4): 814–34. (Scholar)
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- Hamilton, W.D., 1964, “The Genetical Evolution of Social
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- Holldobler, B and Wilson, E.O., 2008, The Superorganism: The
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- Huemer, M., 2016, “A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism,” Philosophical Studies, 173: 1983–2010. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R., 2006, The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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- Kahane, G., 2011, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” Nous, 45(1): 103–125. (Scholar)
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- Kamm, F., 1998, “Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-versus-Not-Aiding Distinction,” Ethics, 108 (April): 463–488. (Scholar)
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- Katz, L.D. (ed.), 2000, Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives, Exeter: Imprint Academic. (Scholar)
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- Knobe, J. and Leiter, B., 2007, “The Case for Nietzschean Moral Psychology,” in Nietzsche and Morality, B. Leiter & N. Sinhababu (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C., 2006, “Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action,” in de Waal, Primates and Philosophers, pp. 98–119. (Scholar)
- Leiter, B., 2007, “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will,” Philosopher’s Imprint, 7(7): 1–15. (Scholar)
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- Locke, D., 2014, “Darwinian Normative Skepticism,” in M. Bergmann and P. Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Machery, E. and R. Mallon, 2010, “Evolution of Morality,” in J. Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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