Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Natural Kinds" by Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Fine, K., 1994. “Essence and Modality : The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
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Franklin-Hall, L. R., 2015. “Natural Kinds as Categorical Bottlenecks”, Philosophical Studies, 172: 925–948. (Scholar)
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Godman, M, Mallozzi, A. and Papineau, D., 2020. “Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6: 316–334. (Scholar)
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Hacking, I., 1983. Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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–––, 1991a. “A Tradition of Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Studies, 61: 109–126. (Scholar)
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–––, 2007a. “Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 61: 203–239. (Scholar)
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Hawley, K. and Bird, A., 2011. “What are Natural Kinds?”, Philosophical Perspectives, 25: 205–221. (Scholar)
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–––, 2010. “Ontological Reduction and Molecular Structure”, Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41: 183–191. (Scholar)
Hull, D. L., 1965. “The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy–Two Thousand Years of Stasis (I)”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 15: 314–326. (Scholar)
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Kendig, C. and Grey, J., 2021. “Can the Epistemic Value of Natural Kinds Be Explained Independently of Their Metaphysics?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(2): 359–376; first online 31 January, 2019. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz004 (Scholar)
Keinänen, M and Tahko, T.E. 2019. “Bundle Theory with Kinds”. Philosophical Quarterly, 69: 838–857. (Scholar)
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Kitcher, P., 1984. “Species”, Philosophy of Science, 51: 308–333. (Scholar)
Kitts, D. B. and Kitts, D. J., 1979. “Biological Species as Natural Kinds”, Philosophy of Science, 46: 613–622. (Scholar)
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