Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Naturalism" by David Papineau

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Alter, T. and Pereboom, D., 2019, “Russellian Monism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/russellian-monism/>. (Scholar)
Armstrong, D., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
Baker, A., 2005, “Are there Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?”, Mind, 114: 223–38. (Scholar)
Batterman, R., 2010, “On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61: 1–25. (Scholar)
Bennett, K., 2003, “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It”, Nous, 37: 471–97. (Scholar)
Bickle, J., 2013, “Multiple Realizability”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/multiple-realizability/>. (Scholar)
Blackburn, S., 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Boyd, R., 1988, “How to Be a Moral Realist”, in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 181–228. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Nola, R. (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brandom, R., 2001, “Reason, Expression, and the Philosophical Enterprise”, in C. Ragland and S. Heidt (eds.), What Is Philosophy?, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Brown, C., 2017, “A Properly Physical Russellian Physicalism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24: 31–50. (Scholar)
Burge, T., 1993a, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice”, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993b, “Content Preservation”, Philosophical Review, 102: 457–88. (Scholar)
Butterfield, J., 2011, “Less is Different: Emergence and Reduction Reconciled”, Foundations of Physics, 41(6): 1065–1135. (Scholar)
Cappelen, H., 2012, Philosophy without Intuitions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cappelen, H., David Plunkett, D. and Burgess, A., 2019, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, Constructing the World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Craig, W. and J. Moreland (eds.), 2000, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Daly, C. and S. Langford, 2009, “Mathematical Explanation and Indispensability Arguments”, Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 641–658. (Scholar)
Davidson, D., 1970, “Mental Events”, in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory, London: Duckworth. Reprinted in Davidson 1980. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
DePaul, M. and W. Ramsey (eds.), 1998, Rethinking Intuition, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
Draper, P., 2005, “God, Science, and Naturalism”, in W. Wainwright (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Elkana, Y., 1974, The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy, London: Hutchinson. (Scholar)
Enoch, D., 2011, Taking Morality Seriously, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Feigl, H., 1958, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Field, H., 1980, Science Without Numbers, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Realism, Mathematics and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Fodor, J., 1974, “Special Sciences or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis”, Synthese, 28: 97–115. (Scholar)
Gibbard, A., 2003, Thinking How To Live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Goldman, A. 2007: “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74: 1–26. (Scholar)
Hale, B. and C. Wright, 2003, The Reason’s Proper Study: Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Hare, R., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Harman, G., 1986, “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24: 69–78. (Scholar)
Hempel, C., 1969, “Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets”, in S. Morgenbesser et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, New York: St Martin’s Press. (Scholar)
Honderich, T., 1982, “The Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Analysis, 42: 59–64. (Scholar)
Hornsby, J., 1997, Simple-Mindedness: In Defence of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–36. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291–5. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, “Armchair Metaphysics”, in J. O’Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Mind and Illusion”, in A. O’Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Jenkins, C., 2008, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, “A Priori Knowledge: The Conceptual Approach”, in A. Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, London: Continuum Press. (Scholar)
Joyce, R., 2015, “Moral Anti-Realism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/moral-anti-realism/>. (Scholar)
Kalderon, M., 2005, Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Kim, J., 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism”, Journal of Philosophical Research, APA Centennial Volume: 83–98. (Scholar)
Knobe J. and Nichols, S. (eds.), 2008, Experimental Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––,“Experimental Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/experimental-philosophy/>. (Scholar)
Kornblith, H., 2002, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Krikorian, Y. (ed.), 1944, Naturalism and the Human Spirit, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
Kroedel, T., 2015, “Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem”, Nous, 49: 357–75. (Scholar)
Leng, M., 2013, Mathematics and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Leng, M., 2016, “Taking Morality Mathematically: Enoch’s Indispensability Argument” in U. Leibowitz and N. Sinclair, N. (eds.) Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 204–15. (Scholar)
Lenman, J., 2014, “Moral Naturalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/naturalism-moral/>. (Scholar)
Lewis, D., 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy, 63: 17–25. (Scholar)
–––, 1970, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–46. (Scholar)
List, C. and P. Menzies, 2009, “Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle”, Journal of Philosophy, 106: 475–502. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, “The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences”, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Loewer, B., 2007, “Counterfactuals and the Second Law”, in H. Price and R. Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Lowe, E.J., 2000, “Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism”, Philosophy, 75: 571–85. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation”, in S. Walter and H.-D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation, Exeter: Imprint Academic. (Scholar)
MacBride, F., 2003, “Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo-Logicism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54: 103–63. (Scholar)
McDowell, J., 1996, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Mackie, J., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Scholar)
Maddy, P., 1990, Realism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Mellor D., 1995, The Facts of Causation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Menon, T. and C. Callender, 2013, “Turn and Face the Strange … Ch-ch-changes”, in R. Batterman (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Menzies, P., 2008, “Causal Exclusion, the Determination Relation, and Contrastive Causation”, in J. Kallestrup and J. Hohwy (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reductive Explanation and Special Science Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
Montero, B., 2015, “Russellian Physicalism”, in T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Montero, B. and D. Papineau, 2005, “A Defence of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism”, Analysis, 65: 233–7. (Scholar)
Moore, G., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Nagel, J., 2007, “Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophy Compass, 2/6: 792–819. (Scholar)
Nolan, D., 2011a, “Modal Fictionalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/fictionalism-modal/>. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, “Modal Fictionalism and Possible World Semantics” (supplement to “Modal Fictionalism”, Winter 2011 edition), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/fictionalism-modal/supplement3.html>. (Scholar)
Oppenheim, H. and P. Putnam, 1958, “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis”, in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
Papineau, D., 2001, “The Rise of Physicalism”, in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “Causation is Macroscopic but not Irreducible”, in S. Gibb, E. Lowe, and R. Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, “The Poverty of Conceptual Analysis”, in M. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “The Nature of A Priori Intuitions: Analytic or Synthetic?”, in E. Fischer and J. Collins (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Parfit, D., 2011, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Parsons, C., 1995, “Platonism and Mathematical Intuition in Kurt Gödel’s Thought”, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 1(1): 44–74. (Scholar)
Plantinga, A., 1996, “Methodological Naturalism?”, in J. van der Meer (ed.), Facets of Faith and Science, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. (Scholar)
Price, H., 2011, Naturalism without Mirrors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Pust, J., 2014, “Intuition”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/intuition/>. (Scholar)
Putnam, H., 1971, Philosophy of Logic, New York: Harper. (Scholar)
Ridge, M., 2014, “Moral Non-Naturalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-non-naturalism/>. (Scholar)
Robb, D. and J. Heil, 2014, “Mental Causation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mental-causation/>. (Scholar)
Rosen, G., 1990, “Modal Fictionalism”, Mind, 99: 327–54. (Scholar)
Russell, B., 1917, “On Scientific Method in Philosophy”, in his Mysticism and Logic, London: Longmans. (Scholar)
Russell, G., 2008, Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Shafer-Landau, R., 2003, Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Shapiro, S., 2000, “Frege Meets Dedekind: A Neologicist Treatment of Real Analysis”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 41: 335–64. (Scholar)
Smart, J.J.C., 1959, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review, 68: 141–56. (Scholar)
Sosa, E., 1998, “Minimal Intuition”, in DePaul and Ramsey 1998: 257–70. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition”, Philosophical Studies, 132: 99–107. (Scholar)
Spurrett, D. and Papineau, D., 1999, “A Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’”, Analysis, 59: 25–29. (Scholar)
Steward, H., 2012, A Metaphysics for Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Strevens, M., 2019, Thinking Off Your Feet, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
Stoljar, D., 2015, “Physicalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Physicalism/" target="other">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/Physicalism/>. (Scholar)
Sturgeon, N., 1985, “Moral Explanations”, in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason, and Truth, Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 49–78. (Scholar)
Turner, F., 1974, Between Science and Religion. The Reaction to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
Wedgwood, R., 2007, The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Weinberg, J., S. Nichols, and S. Stich, 2001, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophical Topics, 29: 429–460. (Scholar)
Wilson, J., 2006, “On Characterizing the Mental”, Philosophical Studies, 131: 61–99. (Scholar)
Williamson, T., 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof”, Metaphilosophy, 42(2): 215–29. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, “How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?”, in A. Casullo and J. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 291–312. (Scholar)
Woodward, J., 2005, Making Things Happen, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Woolhouse, R., 1985, “Leibniz’s Reaction to Cartesian Interaction”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 86: 69–82. (Scholar)
Wright, C., 1983, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, “Neo-Fregean Foundations for Real Analysis: Some Reflections on Frege’s Constraint”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 41: 317–34. (Scholar)
Yablo, S., 1992, “Mental Causation”, Philosophical Review, 101: 245–280. (Scholar)
Yalowitz, S., 2014, “Anomalous Monism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/anomalous-monism/>. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Dec 2 11:56:26 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...