Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Ontological Commitment" by Phillip Bricker
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Adams, Robert, 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 8: 211–31. (Scholar)
- Alston, William, 1958, “Ontological Commitments”, Philosophical Studies, 9: 8–17. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1980, “Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 440–449. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Azzouni, Jody, 2004, Deflating Existential Consequence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, Mark, 1998, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bencivenga, Ermanno, 1986, “Free Logics”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. III, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 373–426. (Scholar)
- Bigelow, John, 1988, The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Boolos, 1984, “To Be is To Be the Value of A Variable (or To Be Some Values of Some Variables)”, Journal of Philosophy, 81: 430–49. (Scholar)
- Bricker, Phillip, 2014, “Truthmaking: With and without Counterpart Theory”, in A Companion to David Lewis, Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Brogaard, Berit, 2008, “Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment”, Philosophical Studies, 141: 21–42. (Scholar)
- Cameron, Ross, 2008, “Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or, How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble”, Philosophical Studies, 140: 1–18. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology”, Philosophical Studies, 151: 249–64. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Truthmakers”, in Oxford Handbook of Truth, Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Carnap, Rudolf, 1950, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4: 20–40; reprinted in Carnap 1956: 205–21. (Scholar)
- –––, 1956, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Richard, 1954, “Ontology and the Theory of Meaning”, Philosophy of Science, 21(4): 316–325. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David, 2006, “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in Two-Dimensional Semantics, M. Garcia-Carpintero and J. Macia (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55–140. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.), 2009, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Church, Alonzo, 1958, “Symposium: Ontological Commitment”, Journal of Philosophy, 55: 1008–1014. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald, 1967, “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, reprinted in his Essays on Action and Events, 1980, 105–22, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, Michael, 1980, “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 69: 433–9. (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- Eklund, Matti, 2006, “Neo-Fregean Ontology”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 95–121. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1980, Science Without Numbers, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege's Context Principle”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14: 637–62. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 1991, “The Study of Ontology”, Noûs, 25: 263–294. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “The Question of Realism”, Philosophers' Imprint, 1: 1–30. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “The Question of Ontology”, in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 2009, 157–77. (Scholar)
- Fox, John, 1987, “Truthmaker”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 188–207. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1884, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl, Breslau: W. Koebner. Translated as The Foundations of Arithmetic: A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number, by J.L. Austin, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd rev. ed., 1974. (Scholar)
- –––, 1892, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100: 25–50. Translated as “On Sense and Reference” by M. Black in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, 56–78. (Scholar)
- Gottlieb, Dale, 1974. “Reference and Ontology”, Journal of Philosophy, 71(17): 587–9. (Scholar)
- Graff Fara, Delia, 2011, “Socratizing”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 48(3): 239–48. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob, 1996, “Grundlagen §64”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97: 243–61. Reprinted in Hale and Wright 2001, 91–116. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Singular Terms (1)” and “Singular Terms (2)”, in Hale and Wright 2001, 31–71. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob and Crispin Wright, 2001, The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John, 2009, “Superficialism in Ontology”, in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 2009, 213–30. (Scholar)
- Hazen, Alan, 1993, “Against Pluralism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71: 132–44. (Scholar)
- Heil, John, 2003, From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hirsch, Eli, 2002, “Quantifier Variance and Realism”, Philosophical Issues, 12: 51–73. (Scholar)
- Hofweber, Thomas, 2005, “A Puzzle about Ontology”, Noûs, 39: 56–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Logic and Ontology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/logic-ontology/> (Scholar)
- Hylton, Peter, 2007, Quine, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank, 1980, “Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase”, Philosophy, 55: 303–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “A Puzzle About Ontological Commitment”, in J. Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 191–200. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Noneism or Allism?”, Mind, 99(393): 24–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”, Noûs, 35: 602–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Things Qua Truthmakers”, in Lillehammer and Rodriguez-Pereyra 2003, 25–38. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David and Stephanie Lewis, 1970, “Holes”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 206–12. (Scholar)
- Lillehammer, H. and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), 2003, Real Metaphysics: Essays in honor of D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Linnebo, Oystein, 2013, “Plural Quantification”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/plural-quant/>. (Scholar)
- McBride, Fraser, 2013, “Truthmakers”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<Truthmakers/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/Truthmakers/>. (Scholar)
- McGinn, Colin, 2000, Logical Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Melia, Joseph, 1995, “On What There's Not”, Analysis, 55: 223–9. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Truthmaking Without Truthmakers”, in Truthmakers, H. Beebee and J. Dodd (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D. H., 2003, “Real Metaphysics: Replies”, in Lillehammer and Rodriguez-Pereyra 2003, 212–38. (Scholar)
- Menzel, Christopher, 2013, “Possible Worlds”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/possible-worlds/>. (Scholar)
- Michael, Michaelis, 2008, “Implicit Ontological Commitment”, Philosophical Studies, 141: 143–61. (Scholar)
- Mulligan, Kevin, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, 1984, “Truth-Makers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287–321. (Scholar)
- Nolan, Daniel, 1997, “Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 535–572. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Josh, 1999, “There is no ‘Truthmaker Argument’ against Nominalism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 325–34. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Terence, 1970, “Various Extensional Notions of Ontological Commitment”, Philosophical Studies, 22: 65–74. (Scholar)
- Peacock, Howard, 2011, “Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment”, Philosophical Quarterly, 61(242): 79–104. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Potter, Michael and Timothy Smiley, 2001, “Abstraction by Recarving”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101: 327–38. (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 2001, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1971, Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1971, The Philosophy of Logic, New York: Harper. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Truth and Convention: On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Relativism”, Dialectica, 41: 41–67. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V., 1948, “On What There Is”, The Review of Metaphysics, 2(1): 21–38. Reprinted in Quine 1953: 1–19. (Scholar)
- –––, 1951a, “Ontology and Ideology”, Philosophical Studies, 2: 11–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 1951b, “On Carnap's Views on Ontology”, Philosophical Studies, 2: 65–72. (Scholar)
- –––, 1953, From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper. (Scholar)
- –––, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. (Scholar)
- –––, 1966, “Quantification and the Empty Domain”, in Selected Logic Papers, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard, 220–3. (Scholar)
- –––, 1968, “Existence and Quantification”, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 91–113. (Scholar)
- –––, 1970, Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- –––, 1974, The Roots of Reference, La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977, “Facts of the Matter”, in American Philosophy: from Edwards to Quine, R. Shahan (ed.), Normal, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 155–69. (Scholar)
- Rayo, Agustin, 2007, “Ontological Commitment”, Philosophy Compass, 2(3): 428–44. (Scholar)
- Rayo, Agustin and Stephen Yablo, 2001, “Nominalism Through De-Nominalization”, Noûs, 35: 74–92. (Scholar)
- Resnick, Michael, 1988, “Second-Order Logic Still Wild”, Journal of Philosophy, 85: 75–87. (Scholar)
- Restall, Greg, 1996, “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 331–40. (Scholar)
- Rosen, Gideon, 1993, “The Refutation of Nominalism (?)”, Philosophical Topics, 21(2): 149–86. (Scholar)
- Routley, Richard, 1982, Exploring Meinong's Jungle, Australian National University. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, Jonathan, 2008, “Truthmaker Commitments”, Philosophical Studies, 141: 7–19. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “On What Grounds What”, in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 2009, 347–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (239): 307–24. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Stewart, 2013, “Classical Logic”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/logic-classical/>. (Scholar)
- Schiffer, Stephen, 2003, The Things We Mean, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, Israel and Noam Chomsky, 1958, “What is Said to Be”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 71–82. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 1999, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment”, The Journal of Philosophy, 96: 325–47. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert, 1976, “Possible Worlds”, Noûs, 10: 65–75. (Scholar)
- Thomasson, Amie, 2008, “Existence Questions”, Philosophical Studies, 141: 63–78. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, Peter, 1998, “Meta-Ontology”, Erkenntnis, 48 (2/3): 233–50. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 1983, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Field and Fregean Platonism”, in Physicalism in Mathematics, A. Irvine (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer. Reprinted in Hale and Wright 2001, 153–68. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephan, 1998, “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72(suppl.): 229–62. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “A Paradox of Existence”, in Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzle of Non-Existence, A. Everitt and T. Hofweber (eds.), Stanford: CSLI, 275–312. (Scholar)
