Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Ordinary Objects" by Daniel Z. Korman

This is an automatically generated and experimental page

If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.

Almotahari, Mahrad, 2014, ‘The Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter’, Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 387–406. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘‘Not’ Again! Another Essay on the Metaphysics of Material Objects’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94: 711–737. (Scholar)
Antony, Michael V., 2006, ‘Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies, 128: 515–538. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague?’, Erkenntnis, 68: 239–263. (Scholar)
Armstrong, David M., 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism (Volume 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Árnadóttir, Steinvör Thöll, 2015, ‘Overdetermination and Elimination’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23: 479–503. (Scholar)
Ayers, Michael R., 1974, ‘Individuals without Sortals’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 113–148. (Scholar)
Azzouni, Jody, 2017, Ontology Without Borders, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Bagwell, Jeffrey N., forthcoming, ‘Eliminativism and Evolutionary Debunking’, Ergo. (Scholar)
Bailey, Andrew M., 2011, ‘The Incompatibility of Composition as Identity, Priority Pluralism, and Irreflexive Grounding’, Analytic Philosophy, 52: 171–174. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, ‘Composition and the Cases’, Inquiry, 59:453–470. (Scholar)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1997, ‘Why Constitution is not Identity,’ The Journal of Philosophy, 94: 599–621. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, Persons and Bodies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, ‘Review of Objects and Persons’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 97–98. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Balaguer, Mark, 2018, ‘Why the Debate about Composition is Factually Empty’, Synthese, 195: 3975–4008. (Scholar)
Balashov, Yuri, 2005, ‘On Vagueness, 4D and Diachronic Universalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 523–531. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘About Stage Universalism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 21–39. (Scholar)
Barker, Jonathan, forthcoming, ‘Debunking Arguments and Metaphysical Laws’, Philosophical Studies. (Scholar)
Barker, Stephen and Mark Jago, 2014, ‘Monism and Material Constitution’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95: 189–204. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory’, Philosophical Studies 175: 2969–2986. (Scholar)
Barnes, Elizabeth, 2005, ‘Vagueness in Sparseness: A Study in Property Ontology’, Analysis, 65: 315–321. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition’, Mind, 116: 105–113. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Metaphysically Indeterminate Existence’, Philosophical Studies, 166: 495–510. (Scholar)
Båve, Arvid, 2011, ‘How To Precisify Quantifiers’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 40: 103–111. (Scholar)
Baxter, Donald L. M., 1988, ‘Many-One Identity’, Philosophical Papers, 17: 193–216. (Scholar)
Beebee, Helen, 2017, ‘Do Ordinary Objects Exist? Yes’, in Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics, New York: Routledge, pp. 149–163. (Scholar)
Belleri, Delia, 2018, ‘Two Species of Merely Verbal Disputes’, Metaphilosophy, 49: 691–710. (Scholar)
Bennett, Karen, 2004, ‘Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 118: 339–371. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 38–76. (Scholar)
Benovsky, Jiri, 2015, ‘From Experience to Metaphysics’, Noûs 49: 684–697. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Bernstein, Sara, 2016, ‘Overdetermination Underdetermined’, Erkenntnis 81: 17–40. (Scholar)
Bigelow, John and Robert Pargetter, 2006, ‘Real Work for Aggregates’, Dialectica, 60: 485–503. (Scholar)
Biro, John, 2017, ‘Saving the Ship’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 13: 43–54. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Constitution and Identity’, Erkenntnis 83: 1127–1138. (Scholar)
Bohn, Einar D., 2009a, ‘An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition’, Analysis, 69: 27–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, ‘Must There Be a Top Level?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 59: 193–201. (Scholar)
Bowers, Jason, 2019, ‘A Teleological Answer to the Special Composition Question’, Dialectica, 73: 231–246. (Scholar)
Braddon-Mitchell, David and Kristie Miller, 2006, ‘Talking about a Universalist World’, Philosophical Studies, 130: 499–534. (Scholar)
Brenner, Andrew, 2015a, ‘Mereological Nihilism and Theoretical Unification’, Analytic Philosophy, 56: 318–337. (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, ‘Mereological Nihilism and the Special Arrangement Question’, Synthese 192: 1295–1314. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology’, Philosophical Quarterly, 67: 464–485. (Scholar)
–––, 2018a, ‘Easy Ontology, Application Conditions and Infinite Regress’, Analysis, 78: 605–614. (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, ‘Science and the Special Composition Question’, Synthese 195: 657–678. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘Mereology and Ideology’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Bricker, Phillip, 2016, ‘Composition as a Kind of Identity’, Inquiry, 59: 264–294. (Scholar)
Brzozowski, Jacek, 2016, ‘Monism and Gunk’, in Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–74. (Scholar)
Builes, David, forthcoming, ‘The World Just Is the Way It Is’, The Monist. (Scholar)
Burke, Michael B., 1980, ‘Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence’, Mind 89: 391–405. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, ‘Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account’, Analysis, 52: 12–17. (Scholar)
–––, 1994a, ‘Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle’, The Journal of Philosophy, 91: 129–139. (Scholar)
–––, 1994b, ‘Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 591–624. Reprinted in Rea 1997a. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, ‘Tibbles the Cat: A Modern Sophisma’, Philosophical Studies, 84: 63–74. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, ‘Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel’, Analysis, 57: 11–18. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, ‘Is My Head a Person?’, in K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 107–125. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, ‘Dion, Theon, and the Many-Thinkers Problem’, Analysis, 64: 242–250. (Scholar)
Button, Tim, 2020, ‘Deflationary Metaphysics and Ordinary Language, Synthese, 197: 33–57. (Scholar)
Byrne, Alex, 2019, ‘Perception and Ordinary Objects’, in Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–26. (Scholar)
Calosi, Claudio, 2016, ‘Composition is Identity and Mereological Nihilism’, Philosophical Quarterly 66: 219–235. (Scholar)
Cameron, Ross P., 2007, ‘The Contingency of Composition’, Philosophical Studies, 136: 99–121. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, ‘There Are No Things That Are Music Works’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 48: 295–314. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, ‘Truthmakers and Necessary Connections’, Synthese, 161: 27–45. (Scholar)
–––, 2008c, ‘Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment’, Philosophical Studies, 140: 1–18. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, ‘How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology’, Philosophical Studies, 151: 249–264. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, ‘Quantification, Naturalness and Ontology’, in Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 8–26. (Scholar)
–––, 2010c, ‘Vagueness and Naturalness’, Erkenntnis, 72: 281–293. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, ‘Composition as Identity Doesn’t Settle the Special Composition Question’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84: 531–554. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Parts Generate the Whole, But They Are Not Identical To It’, in A. J. Cotnoir and Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 90–107. (Scholar)
Campdelacreu, Marta, 2010, ‘Naturalness, Vagueness, and Sortals’, Metaphysica, 11: 79–91. (Scholar)
Carmichael, Chad, 2011, ‘Vague Composition Without Vague Existence’, Noûs, 45: 315–327. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93: 475–490. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, ‘Deep Platonism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92: 307–328. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, ‘How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head’, Mind, 129: 205–224. (Scholar)
Carrara, Massimiliano and Giorgio Lando, 2017, ‘Composition and Relative Counting’, Dialectica, 71: 489–529. (Scholar)
Carroll, John W. and William R. Carter, 2005, ‘An Unstable Eliminativism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86: 1–17. (Scholar)
Carter, William R., 1983, ‘In Defense of Undetached Parts’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 126–143. (Scholar)
Cartwright, Richard, 1975, ‘Scattered Objects’, in Keith Lehrer (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics, Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 153–171. (Scholar)
Caves, Richard L. J., 2018, ‘Emergence for Nihilists’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99: 2–28. (Scholar)
Chalmers, David, 2009, ‘Ontological Anti-Realism’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–129. (Scholar)
Chihara, Charles S., 1994, ‘The Many Persons Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 76: 45–49. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1973, ‘Parts as Essential to Their Wholes’, Review of Metaphysics, 26: 581–603. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, Person and Object, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. “Identity Through Time” (Ch. 3) is reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, ‘Self-Profile’, in Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Roderick M. Chisholm, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 3–77. (Scholar)
Colyvan, Mark, 1998, ‘Can the Eleatic Principle be Justified?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28: 313–336. (Scholar)
Comesaña. Juan, 2008, ‘Could There Be Exactly Two Things?’, Synthese, 162: 31–35. (Scholar)
Contessa, Gabriele, 2012, ‘The Junk Argument: Safe Disposal Guidelines for Mereological Universalists’, Analysis, 72: 455–457. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘One’s a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary-Object Eliminativism’, Analytic Philosophy, 55: 199–221. (Scholar)
Corcoran, Kevin J., 1999, ‘Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 37: 1–20. (Scholar)
Cornell, David, 2016, ‘Taking Monism Seriously’, Philosophical Studies 173: 2397–2415. (Scholar)
Cotnoir, Aaron J., 2010, ‘Antisymmetry and Non-Extensional Mereology’, Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 396–405. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, ‘Composition as General Identity’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 8: 295–322. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, ‘Parts as Counterparts’, Thought, 2: 228–241. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Universalism and Junk’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92: 649–664. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, ‘Does Universalism Entail Extensionalism?’, Noûs 50: 121–132. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, ‘How Many Angels Can Be in the Same Place at the Same Time? A Defense of Mereological Universalism’, Mind 125: 959–965. (Scholar)
Cotnoir, Aaron J. and Donald L. M. Baxter, 2014, Composition as Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Cowling, Sam, 2013, ‘Ideological Parsimony’, Synthese, 190: 3889–3908. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95: 246–60. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘Advice for Eleatics’, in Chris Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, Palgrave, pp. 306–330. (Scholar)
Crane, Judith K., 2012, ‘Biological–Mereological Coincidence’, Philosophical Studies, 161: 309–325. (Scholar)
Cray, Wesley, 2014, ‘Inconstancy and Content’, Dialectica, 68: 337–353. (Scholar)
Daly, Chris and David Liggins, 2010, ‘In Defence of Error Theory’, Philosophical Studies 149: 209–230. (Scholar)
–––, 2016a, ‘Dorr on the Language of Ontology’, Philosophical Studies, 173: 3301–3315. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, ‘Is Ontological Revisionism Uncharitable?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46: 405–425. (Scholar)
Dasgupta, Shamik, 2009, ‘Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics’, Philosophical Studies, 145: 35–67. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Essentialism and the Nonidentity Problem’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96: 540–570. (Scholar)
Davidson, Donald, 1974, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47: 5–20. (Scholar)
–––, 1989/2008, ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath (eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 124–133. (Scholar)
Denkel, Arda, 1995, ‘Theon’s Tale: Does a Cambridge Change Result in a Substantial Change?’, Analysis, 55: 166–170. (Scholar)
deRosset, Louis, 2011, ‘What is the Grounding Problem?’, Philosophical Studies, 156: 173–197. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘Analyticity and Ontology’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 9: 129–170. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘What is Conservatism?’, Analysis. (Scholar)
Dershowitz, Naomi, forthcoming, ‘Nihilism, but Not Necessarily’, Erkenntnis. (Scholar)
Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny, 1999, Language and Reality, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Doepke, Fred, 1982, ‘Spatially Coinciding Objects’, Ratio, 24: 45–60. Reprinted in Rea 1997a. (Scholar)
–––, 1986a, ‘In Defence of Locke’s Principle: a Reply to Peter M. Simons’, Mind, 95: 238–241. (Scholar)
–––, 1986b, ‘The Trees of Constitution’, Philosophical Studies, 49: 385–392. (Scholar)
Donnelly, Maureen, 2009, ‘Mereological Vagueness and Existential Vagueness’, Synthese, 168: 53–79. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘A Linguistic Account of Mereological Vagueness’, in Akiba, Ken and Ali Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 43–65. (Scholar)
Dorr, Cian, 2003, ‘Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 711–718. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology’, in Mark Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 234–286. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘There are no Abstract Objects’, in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 32–63. (Scholar)
Dowland, S. Clint, 2016, ‘Embodied Mind Sparsism’, Philosophical Studies 173: 1853–1872. (Scholar)
Dyke, Heather, 2008, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Effingham, Nikk, 2009, ‘Universalism, Vagueness, and Supersubstantivalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87: 35–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2011a, ‘Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument’, Philosophical Studies, 154: 241–250. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, ‘Undermining Motivations for Universalism’, Noûs, 45: 696–713. (Scholar)
–––, 2011c, ‘Universalism and Classes’, Dialectica, 65: 451–472. (Scholar)
Einheuser, Iris, 2006, ‘Counterconventional Conditionals’, Philosophical Studies, 127: 459–482. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, ‘Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem’, Noûs, 45: 300–314. (Scholar)
Eklund, Matti, 2002, ‘Peter van Inwagen on Material Beings’, Ratio, 15: 245–256. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 557–579. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Neo-Fregean Ontology’, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 95–121. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump’, in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 382–396. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, ‘The Existence of Personites’, Synthese, 177: 2051–2071. (Scholar)
Elder, Crawford L., 2000, ‘Familiar Objects and the Sorites of Decomposition’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 37: 79–89. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, Real Natures and Familiar Objects, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘On the Phenomenon of “Dog-Wise Arrangement”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 132–155. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Against Universal Mereological Composition’, Dialectica, 62: 433–454. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Familiar Objects and Their Shadows, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Evans, Gareth, 1978, ‘Can There be Vague Objects?’, Analysis, 38: 208. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
Evnine, Simon, 2016a, Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2016b, ‘Much Ado About Something-From-Nothing: Problems for Ontological Minimalism’, in Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology After Carnap, Oxford University Press, pp. 145–164. (Scholar)
Fairchild, Maegan, 2017, ‘A Paradox of Matter and Form’, Thought, 6: 33–42. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘The Barest Flutter of the Smallest Leaf: Understanding Material Plenitude’, Philosophical Review, 128: 143–178. (Scholar)
Fairchild, Maegan and John Hawthorne, 2018, ‘Against Conservatism in Metaphysics’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 82: 45–75. (Scholar)
Falls, Edward, forthcoming, ‘Composition as Identity, Universalism, and Generic Quantifiers’, Erkenntnis. (Scholar)
Fara, Delia Graff, 2008, ‘Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory’, Review of Symbolic Logic, 1: 167–189. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, ‘Possibility Relative to a Sortal’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 7: 3–40. (Scholar)
Fine, Kit, 1982, ‘Acts, Events, and Things’, in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank (eds.), Language and Ontology, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 97–105. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘Things and Their Parts’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23: 61–74. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, ‘A Counter-example to Locke’s Thesis’, The Monist, 83: 357–361. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, ‘The Non-identity of a Thing and its Matter’, Mind, 112: 195–234. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Arguing for Non-Identity: A Response to King and Frances’, Mind, 115: 1059–1082. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Coincidence and Form’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 82: 101–118. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, The Question of Ontology, in David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157–177. (Scholar)
Frances, Bryan, 2006, ‘The New Leibniz’s Law Arguments for Pluralism’, Mind, 115: 1007–1021. (Scholar)
Francescotti, Robert, 2019, ‘Maximality, Function, and the Many’, Metaphysica, 20: 175–193. (Scholar)
French, Steven, 2010, ‘The Interdependence of Structure, Objects and Dependence’, Synthese, 175: 89–109. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gabriel, John, 2017, ‘Particularism About Composition’, Ratio 30: 15–30. (Scholar)
Gallois, André, 2004, ‘Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 648–657. (Scholar)
Gauker, Christopher, 1986, ‘The Principle of Charity’, Synthese, 69: 1–25. (Scholar)
Geach, Peter T., 1980, Reference and Generality, 3rd edition, Ithaca: Cornell. (Scholar)
Gibbard, Allan, 1975, ‘Contingent Identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221. Reprinted in Rea 1997a and in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
Giberman, Daniel, 2015a, ‘Junky-Non-Worlds’, Erkenntnis, 80: 437–443. (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, ‘A Topological Theory of Fundamental Concrete Particulars’, Philosophical Studies, 172: 2679–2704. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘Plurdurance’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 19: 1–19. (Scholar)
Gilmore, Cody, 2010, ‘Sider, the Inheritance of Intrinsicality, and Theories of Composition’, Philosophical Studies, 151: 177–197. (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 1985, ‘Plantinga and the Philosophy of Mind’, in James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 199–223. (Scholar)
Goff, Philip, 2012, ‘There is More than One Thing’, in Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 113–22. (Scholar)
Goldwater, Jonah P. B., 2015, ‘No Composition, No Problem: Ordinary Objects as Arrangements’, Philosophia 43: 367–379. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Physicalism and the Sortalist Conception of Objects’, Synthese, 195: 5497–5519. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming a, ‘How Many There Are Isn’t’, Philosophia.
–––, forthcoming b, ‘The Lump and the Ledger: Material Coincidence at Little-to-No Cost’, Erkenntnis. (Scholar)
Goodman, Nelson, 1978, Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
Goodman, Nelson and W. V. Quine, 1947, ‘Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12: 105–122. (Scholar)
Goswick, Dana, 2018a, ‘The Hard Question for Hylomorphism’, Metaphysics, 1: 52–62. (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, ‘Review of Ontology Made Easy’, Philosophical Review, 127: 145–149. (Scholar)
Graham, Andrew, 2015, ‘From Four- to Five-Dimensionalism’, Ratio, 28: 14–28. (Scholar)
Grandy, Richard, 1973, ‘Reference, Meaning, and Belief’, The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 439–452. (Scholar)
Grupp, Jeffrey, 2006, ‘Mereological Nihilism: Quantum Atomism and the Impossibility of Material Constitution’, Axiomathes, 16: 245–386. (Scholar)
Guillon, Jean-Baptiste, forthcoming, ‘Coincidence as Parthood’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Harte, Verity, 2002, Plato on Parts and Wholes, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Hawley, Katherine, 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Vagueness and Existence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 102: 125–140. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, ‘Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple’, The Monist, 87: 385–404. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 481–493. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2006, Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Superficialism in Ontology’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 213–230. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John and Andrew Cortens, 1995, ‘Towards Ontological Nihilism’, Philosophical Studies, 79: 143–165. (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John and Michaelis Michael, 1996, ‘Compatibilist Semantics in Metaphysics: A Case Study’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 117–134. (Scholar)
Heil, John, 2003, From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Heller, Mark, 1984, ‘Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects’, Philosophical Studies, 46: 323–334. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter, New York: Cambridge University Press. “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects” (Ch. 1) is reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘Varieties of Four Dimensionalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71: 47–59. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, ‘Temporal Overlap Is Not Coincidence’, The Monist, 83: 362–380. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘The Donkey Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 140: 83–101. (Scholar)
Hershenov, David, 2003, ‘Can There be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33: 1–22. (Scholar)
Hestevold, H. Scott, 1981, ‘Conjoining’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41: 371–385. (Scholar)
Hirsch, Eli, 1976, ‘Physical Identity’, The Philosophical Review, 85: 357–389. (Scholar)
–––, 1978, ‘A Sense of Unity’, The Journal of Philosophy, 75: 470–494. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1982, The Concept of Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, Dividing Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘The Vagueness of Identity’, Philosophical Topics, 26: 139–159. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, ‘Objectivity Without Objects’, Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, 5: 189–197. Page references are to Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2002a, ‘Against Revisionary Ontology’, Philosophical Topics, 30: 103–127. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011 and in Kim et. al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2002b, ‘Quantifier Variance and Realism’, Philosophical Issues, 12: 51–73. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2004a, ‘Comments on Theodore Sider’s Four Dimensionalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68: 658–664. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2004b, ‘Sosa’s Existential Relativism’, in John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 224–232. Page references are to Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70: 67–97. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, ‘Language, Ontology, and Structure’, Noûs, 42: 509–528. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, ‘Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifier Variance’, in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 367–381. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Ontology and Alternative Languages’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 231–259. Reprinted in Hirsch 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Quantifier Variance and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Charity to Charity’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 435–442. (Scholar)
Hobbes, Thomas, 1655, Part II of De Corpore (“Concerning Body”). (Scholar)
Hoffman, Joshua and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, 1997, Substance: Its Nature and Existence, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Hofweber, Thomas, 2016, Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘Replies to Bennett, Rayo, and Sattig’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94: 488–504. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘Empirical Evidence and the Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects’, in Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–47. (Scholar)
Holden, Thomas, 2004, The Architecture of Matter, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Horden, John, 2014, ‘Ontology in Plain English’, Philosophical Quarterly, 255: 225–242. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘Devious Stipulations’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10: 63–73. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terence, 1991, ‘Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics’, Erkenntnis, 34: 297–322. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘On What There Isn’t’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 693–700. (Scholar)
Horgan, Terence and Matjaž Potrč, 2000, ‘Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence’, Facta Philosophica, 2: 249–270. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, ‘Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism’, in Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 51–76. (Scholar)
Hossack, Keith, 2000, ‘Plurals and Complexes’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 51: 411–443. (Scholar)
Howard-Snyder, Frances, 1997, ‘De Re Modality Entails De Re Vagueness’, in Rea 1997a, pp. 290–301. (Scholar)
Hudson, Hud, 2000, ‘Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 547–560. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Confining Composition’, The Journal of Philosophy, 103: 631–651. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Simples and Gunk’, Philosophy Compass, 2: 291–302. (Scholar)
Hughes, Christopher, 1997, ‘Same-Kind Coincidence and the Ship of Theseus’, Mind, 106: 53–67. (Scholar)
Inman, Ross, 2014, ‘Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude’, Philosophical Studies, 168: 583–597. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Jackson, Brendan Balcerak, 2013, ‘Metaphysics, Verbal Disputes and the Limits of Charity’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86: 412–434. (Scholar)
Jago, Mark, 2016, ‘Essence and the Grounding Problem’, in Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making, Oxford University Press, pp. 99–120. (Scholar)
Johnston, Mark, 1992, ‘Constitution Is Not Identity’, Mind, 101: 89–105. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Hylomorphism’, The Journal of Philosophy, 103: 652–698. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, ‘The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?’, Noûs, 50: 617–644. (Scholar)
Jones, Nicholas K., 2015, ‘Multiple Constitution’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 9: 217–261. (Scholar)
Joyce, Richard, 2006, The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Jubien, Michael, 1993, Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, ‘Thinking about Things’, Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 1–15. (Scholar)
Kantin, Holly, forthcoming, ‘Why Compositional Nihilism Dissolves Puzzles’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Keller, John A., 2015, ‘Paraphrase, Semantics, and Ontology’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 10: 89–128. (Scholar)
Kelly, Thomas, 2008, ‘Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32: 53–78. (Scholar)
Kim, Jaegwon, 1976, ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’, in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 159–177. Reprinted in Laurence and MacDonald 1998. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Kim, Jaegwon, Daniel Z. Korman, and Ernest Sosa, 2011, Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. (Scholar)
King, Jeffrey C., 2006, ‘Semantics for Monists’, Mind, 115: 1023–1058. (Scholar)
Kitamura, Naoaki, 2016, ‘Defending Priority Views from the Gunk/Junk Argument’, Philosophia, 44: 155–165. (Scholar)
Kitsik, Eve, 2020, ‘Explication as a Strategy for Revisionary Philosophy’, Synthese, 197: 1035–1056. (Scholar)
Kment, Boris, 2014, Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Korman, Daniel Z., 2008a, ‘Review of Austere Realism’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, ‘Unrestricted Composition and Restricted Quantification’, Philosophical Studies, 140: 319–334. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Eliminativism and the Challenge from Folk Belief’, Noûs, 43: 242–264. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, ‘Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds, and the Charge of Arbitrariness’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 5: 119–144. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, ‘Review of Familiar Objects and Their Shadows’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Scholar)
–––, 2014a, ‘Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 14: 1–21. (Scholar)
–––, 2014b, ‘The Vagueness Argument Against Abstract Artifacts’, Philosophical Studies, 167: 57–71. (Scholar)
–––, 2015a, ‘Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room’, Noûs, 49: 298–321. (Scholar)
–––, 2015b, Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2015c, ‘Review of The Double Lives of Objects’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Scholar)
––– 2019a), ‘Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics’, in Alvin Goldman and Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 337–363. (Scholar)
–––, 2019b, ‘Easy Ontology Without Deflationary Metaontology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99: 236–243. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘Conservatism, Counterexamples, and Debunking’, Analysis. (Scholar)
Korman, Daniel Z. and Chad Carmichael, 2016, ‘Composition’, Oxford Handbooks Online. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘What Do the Folk Think About Composition and Does It Matter?’, in David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics, London: Bloomsbury, pp.187–206. (Scholar)
Koslicki, Kathrin, 2003, ‘The Crooked Path from Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism’, Philosophical Studies, 114: 107–134. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology’, Dialectica, 61: 127–159. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, The Structure of Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018a, Form, Matter, Substance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, ‘Towards a Hylomorphic Solution to the Grounding Problem’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 82: 333–364. (Scholar)
Kovacs, David Mark, 2010, ‘Is There a Conservative Solution to the Many Thinkers Problem?’, Ratio, 23: 275–290. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming a, ‘How to be an Uncompromising Revisionary Ontologist’, Synthese.
–––, forthcoming b, ‘Intuitions about Objects: From Teleology to Elimination’, Mind. (Scholar)
Kriegel, Uriah, 2011, ‘Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology’, Dialectica, 65: 177–204. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Composition as a Secondary Quality’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89: 359–383. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 13: 1–30. (Scholar)
Kripke, Saul, 1971, ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Milton K. Kunitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation, New York: New York University Press, pp. 135–164. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
Kurtsal Steen, İrem, 2010, ‘Three-Dimensionalist’s Semantic Solution to Diachronic Vagueness’, Philosophical Studies, 150: 79–96. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Almost-Ontology: Why Epistemicism Cannot Help Us Avoid Unrestricted Composition or Diachronic Plenitude’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95: 130–139. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘The Sorites Paradox in Metaphysics’, in Sergi Oms and Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 207–228. (Scholar)
Lando, Giorgio, 2017, Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction, London: Bloomsbury. (Scholar)
Laurence, Stephen and Cynthia MacDonald, 1998, Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Le Bihan, Baptiste, 2013, ‘Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism about Objects’, Studia Philosophica Estonica, 6: 1–14. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist’, Philosophical Papers 44: 207–232. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, ‘Super-Relationism: Combining Eliminativism about Objects and Relationism about Spacetime’, Philosophical Studies 173: 2151–2172. (Scholar)
Lechthaler, Manuel, forthcoming, ‘No Universalism without Gunk? Composition as Identity and the Universality of Identity’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Leonard, Henry S. and Nelson Goodman, 1940, ‘The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5: 45–55. (Scholar)
Leslie, Sarah-Jane, 2011, ‘Essence, Plenitude, and Paradox’, Philosophical Perspectives, 25: 277–296. (Scholar)
Leśniewski, Stanisław, 1916/1922, ‘Foundations of the General Theory of Sets I’, in S. J. Surma, J. Srzednicki, D. I. Barnett, and F. V. Rickey (eds.), Collected Works (Volume 1), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 129–173. (Scholar)
Lewis, David, 1971, ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’, The Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
–––, 1974, ‘Radical Interpretation’, Synthese, 23: 331–344. (Scholar)
–––, 1976, ‘Survival and Identity’, in his Philosophical Papers (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–70. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. Reprinted in Lewis 1999 and in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1984, ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62: 221–236. Reprinted in Lewis 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Malden: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, ‘Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood’, Analysis, 48: 128–130. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, Parts of Classes, Cambridge: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘Many, But Almost One’, in Keith Campbell, John Bacon and Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–42. Reprinted in Lewis 1999 and in Kim et al. 2011. Page references are to Lewis 1999. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Liebesman, David, forthcoming, ‘Double-Counting and the Problem of the Many’, Philosophical Studies: 1–26. (Scholar)
Liebesman, David and Matti Eklund, 2007, ‘Sider on Existence’, Noûs, 41: 519–528. (Scholar)
Liggins, David, 2008, ‘Nihilism without Self-Contradiction’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 62: 177–196. (Scholar)
Long, Joseph, 2019, ‘One’s an Illusion: Organisms, Reference, and Non-Eliminative Nihilism’, Philosophia, 47: 459–475. (Scholar)
Longenecker, Michael, 2018, ‘Non-Concrete Parts of Material Objects’, Synthese, 195: 5091–5111. (Scholar)
López de Sa, Dan, 2006, ‘Is “Everything” Precise?’, Dialectica, 60: 397–409. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Lewis vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many’, Synthese, 191: 1105–1117. (Scholar)
Loss, Roberto, 2018a, ‘Against ‘Against ‘Against Vague Existence’’’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 11: 278–287. (Scholar)
–––, 2018b, ‘A Sudden Collapse to Nihilism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 370–375. (Scholar)
Lowe, E. J., 1982, ‘The Paradox of the 1,001 Cats’, Analysis, 42: 27–30. (Scholar)
–––, 1983a, ‘Instantiation, Identity and Constitution’, Philosophical Studies, 44: 45–59. (Scholar)
–––, 1983b, ‘On the Identity of Artifacts’, The Journal of Philosophy, 80: 220–231. (Scholar)
–––, 1989, Kinds of Being, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, ‘Vague Identity and Quantum Indeterminacy’, Analysis, 54: 110–114. (Scholar)
–––, 1995, ‘The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution’, Analysis, 55: 179–182. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Material Coincidence and the Cinemato-Graphic Fallacy: A Response to Olson’, Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 369–372. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a, ‘In Defense of Moderate-Sized Specimens of Dry Goods’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 704–710. (Scholar)
–––, 2003b, ‘Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence’, Ratio, 16: 140–160. (Scholar)
–––, 2005a, ‘How are Ordinary Objects Possible?’, The Monist, 88: 510–533. (Scholar)
–––, 2005b, ‘Vagueness and Endurance’, Analysis, 65: 104–112. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Review of Metaphysical Essays’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, More Kinds of Being, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, ‘Vagueness and Metaphysics’, in G. Ronzitti (ed.), Vagueness: A Guide, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 19–53. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, ‘Against Monism’, in Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 92–112. (Scholar)
–––, 2013a, ‘Mereological Extensionality, Supplementation, and Material Constitution’, The Monist, 96: 131–148. (Scholar)
–––, 2013b, ‘Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism and Metaphysical Realism’, Metaphysica, 14: 265–274. (Scholar)
Mackie, Penelope, 1993, ‘Ordinary Language and Metaphysical Commitment’, Analysis, 53: 243–251. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Coincidence and Modal Predicates’, Analysis, 67: 21–31. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Coincidence and Identity’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 62: 151–176. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘Persistence and Modality’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Madden, Rory, 2019, ‘How Can Thought Select Between Coincident Material Things?’, in Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 149–172. (Scholar)
Magidor, Ofra, 2015, ‘Why Neither Diachronic Universalism Nor the Argument from Vagueness Establish Perdurantism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45: 113–126. (Scholar)
–––, 2016, ‘Endurantism vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered’, Noûs 50: 509–532. (Scholar)
Markosian, Ned, 1998a, ‘Brutal Composition’, Philosophical Studies, 92: 211–249. (Scholar)
–––, 1998b, ‘Simples’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 213–228. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, ‘What Are Physical Objects?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 375–395. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, ‘Two Arguments from Sider’s “Four-Dimensionalism”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68: 665–673. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘Against Ontological Fundamentalism’, Facta Philosophica, 7: 69–83. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Restricted Composition’, in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 341–364. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity’, In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity, MIT Press, pp. 127–148. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘A Spatial Approach to Mereology’, in Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 69–90. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘The Right Stuff’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93: 665–687. (Scholar)
McDaniel, Kris, 2001, ‘Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects’, Philosophical Studies, 104: 269–290. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, ‘Modal Realism with Overlap’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 137–152. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Extended Simples’, Philosophical Studies, 133: 131–141. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Against Composition as Identity’, Analysis, 68: 128–133. (Scholar)
–––, 2010a, ‘Being and Almost Nothingness’, Noûs, 44: 628–649. (Scholar)
–––, 2010b, ‘Composition as Identity Does Not Entail Universalism’, Erkenntnis, 73: 97–100. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, The Fragmentation of Being, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McGee, Vann and Brian McLaughlin, 2000, ‘Lessons of the Many’, Philosophical Topics, 28: 129–151. (Scholar)
McGrath, Matthew, 1998, ‘Van Inwagen on Universalism’, Analysis, 58: 116–121. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘No Objects, No Problem?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 457–486. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘Conciliatory Metaontology and the Vindication of Common Sense’, Noûs, 42: 482–508. (Scholar)
McKay, Thomas J., 2006, Plural Predication, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
McKinnon, Neil, 2002, ‘Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many’, Philosophical Quarterly, 52: 320–359. (Scholar)
Merricks, Trenton, 2000, ‘‘No Statues’’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 47–52. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Objects and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism” (Ch. 3) is reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, ‘Replies’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 727–744. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘Composition and Vagueness’, Mind, 114: 615–637. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Remarks on Vagueness and Arbitrariness’, Mind, 116: 115–119. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Review of Structure of Objects’, The Journal of Philosophy, 106: 301–307. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘Do Ordinary Objects Exist? No.’, in Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics, Routledge, pp. 135–148. (Scholar)
Merrill, G. H., 1980, ‘The Model-Theoretic Argument against Realism’, Philosophy of Science, 47: 69–81. (Scholar)
Miller, Kristie, 2005, ‘Blocking the Path from Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism’, Ratio, 18: 317–331. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics’, Dialectica, 63: 23–49. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency’, Erkenntnis, 73: 211–235. (Scholar)
Miller, Kristie & Johann Hariman, 2017, ‘What is an Ersatz Part?’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 94: 524–551. (Scholar)
Moran, Alex, 2018, ‘The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts’, Ratio, 31: 273–284. (Scholar)
Morreau, Michael, 2002, ‘What Vague Objects are Like’, Journal of Philosophy, 99: 333–361. (Scholar)
Moyer, Mark, 2006, ‘Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence’, Synthese, 148: 401–423. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘A Survival Guide to Fission’, Philosophical Studies, 141: 299–322. (Scholar)
Newman, Andrew, 2013, ‘On the Constitution of Solid Objects out of Atoms’, The Monist, 96: 149–171. (Scholar)
Nolan, Daniel, 2005, David Lewis, London: Acumen. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Vagueness, Multiplicity, and Parts’, Noûs, 40: 716–737. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Metaphysical Language, Ordinary Language and Peter van Inwagen’s Material Beings’, Humana.Mente, 13: 237–246. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Balls and All’, in Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–116. (Scholar)
Noonan, Harold W., 1988, ‘Reply to Lowe on Ships and Structures’, Analysis, 48: 221–223. (Scholar)
–––, 1991, ‘Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates’, Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 183–193. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, ‘Review of Material Beings’, Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 239–242. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘Constitution is Identity’, Mind, 102: 133–146. (Scholar)
–––, 1999a, ‘Identity, Constitution, and Microphysical Supervenience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99: 273–288. (Scholar)
–––, 1999b, ‘Tibbles the Cat: Reply to Burke’, Philosophical Studies, 95: 215–218. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘A Flaw in Sider’s Vagueness Argument for Unrestricted Mereological Composition’, Analysis, 70: 669–672. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Tollensing van Inwagen’, Philosophia, 42: 1055–1061. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, ‘Against Strong Pluralism’, Philosophia, 43: 1081–1087. (Scholar)
O’Connor, Timothy, 2007, ‘Review of All the Power in the World’, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (Scholar)
Oddie, Graham, 1982, ‘Armstrong on the Eleatic Principle and Abstract Entities’, Philosophical Studies, 41: 285–295. (Scholar)
Oderberg, David, 1996, ‘Coincidence Under a Sortal’, Philosophical Review, 105: 145–171. (Scholar)
Olson, Eric T., 1995, ‘Why I Have no Hands’, Theoria, 61: 182–197. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, ‘Composition and Coincidence’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 77: 374–403. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, ‘Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem’, Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 337–355. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘The Ontology of Material Objects: Critical Notice of Objects and Persons’, Philosophical Books, 39: 252–254. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, What Are We?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Ethics and the Generous Ontology’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 31: 259–270. (Scholar)
Osborne, Robert C., 2016, ‘Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7: 197–221. (Scholar)
Papineau, David, 1993, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
Parfit, Derek, 1971, ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review, 80: 3–27. (Scholar)
Parsons, Josh, 2004, ‘Dion, Theon, and DAUP’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 85–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition’, Inquiry, 56: 327–339. (Scholar)
Parsons, Terence, 1987, ‘Entities Without Identity’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 1–19. (Scholar)
Parsons, Terence and Peter Woodruff, 1994, ‘Worldly Indeterminacy of Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 171–191. (Scholar)
Paul, L. A., 2002, ‘Logical Parts’, Noûs, 36: 578–596. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Coincidence as Overlap’, Noûs, 40: 623–659. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘The Puzzles of Material Constitution’, Philosophy Compass, 5: 579–590. (Scholar)
Pearce, Kenneth L., 2017, ‘Mereological Idealism’, in Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 200–216. (Scholar)
Perry, John, 1970, ‘The Same F’, Philosophical Review, 79: 181–200. (Scholar)
Petersen, Steve, 2019, ‘Composition as Pattern’, Philosophical Studies, 176: 1119–1139. (Scholar)
Pickel, Bryan, 2010, ‘There is no ‘Is’ of Constitution’, Philosophical Studies, 147: 193–211. (Scholar)
Price, Marjorie S., 1977, ‘Identity Through Time’, The Journal of Philosophy, 74: 201–217. (Scholar)
Putnam, Hilary, 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, ‘Truth and Convention: On Davidson’s Refutation of Conceptual Relativism’, Dialectica, 41: 69–77. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, ‘The Question of Realism’, in his Words and Life, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 295–312. (Scholar)
Quine, W. V., 1953, ‘Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis’, in his From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 65–79. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1981a, Theories and Things, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981b, ‘What Price Bivalence?’, The Journal of Philosophy, 78: 90–95. Reprinted in Quine 1981a. (Scholar)
Rea, Michael C., 1995, ‘The Problem of Material Constitution’, Philosophical Review, 104: 525–552. (Scholar)
–––, 1997a, Material Constitution, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
–––, 1997b, ‘Supervenience and Co-Location’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 367–375. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, ‘In Defense of Mereological Universalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 347–360. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘McGrath on Universalism’, Analysis, 59: 201–204. (Scholar)
–––, 2000, ‘Constitution and Kind Membership’, Philosophical Studies, 97: 169–193. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, ‘How to be an Eleatic Monist’, Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 129–151. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, World Without Design, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Remhof, Justin, 2017, Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
Renz, Graham, 2016, ‘It’s All in your Head: a Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence’, Philosophia, 44: 1387–1407. (Scholar)
Rettler, Bradley, 2016, ‘The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment’, Philosophical Studies 173: 1405–1425. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99: 842–868. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘Quantification in the Ontology Room’, Dialectica, 73: 563–585. (Scholar)
Richard, Mark, 2006, ‘Context, Vagueness, and Ontology’, in Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 162–174. (Scholar)
Robinson, Denis, 1985, ‘Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63: 299–319. (Scholar)
Rose, David and Jonathan Schaffer, 2017, ‘Folk Mereology is Teleological’, Noûs, 51: 238–270. (Scholar)
Rosen, Gideon, 2006, ‘The Limits of Contingency’, in Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–39. (Scholar)
Rosen, Gideon and Cian Dorr, 2002, ‘Composition as Fiction’, in Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 151–174. (Scholar)
Rosenberg, Jay F., 1993, ‘Comments on Peter van Inwagen’s Material Beings’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 701–708. (Scholar)
Saenz, Noël B., 2015, ‘A Grounding Solution to the Grounding Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 172: 2193–2214. (Scholar)
–––, 2018, ‘Sums and Grounding’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96: 102–117. (Scholar)
Salmon, Nathan, 1981, Reference and Essence, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Sanford, David H., 1979, ‘Nostalgia for the Ordinary: Comments on Papers by Unger and Wheeler’, Synthese, 41: 175–184. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology’, Noûs, 27: 219–228. (Scholar)
Sanson, David, 2016, ‘Worlds Enough for Junk’, Res Philosophica, 93: 45–62. (Scholar)
Sattig, Thomas, 2015, The Double Lives of Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘Metaphysical Ambitions in the Ontology of Objects’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94: 481–487. (Scholar)
Saucedo, Raúl, 2011, ‘Parthood and Location’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 6: 223–284. (Scholar)
Schaffer, Jonathan, 2007, ‘From Nihilism to Monism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85: 175–191. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, ‘The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects’, Philosophical Books, 50: 142–157. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, ‘On What Grounds What’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 347–383. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Monism: The Priority of the Whole’, Philosophical Review, 119: 31–76. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, ‘Why the World Has Parts: Reply to Horgan and Potrč’, in Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 77–91. (Scholar)
Shagrir, Oron, 2002, ‘Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities, and Anti-Individualism’, Philosophical Studies, 109: 171–196. (Scholar)
Shoemaker, Sydney, 1979, ‘Identity, Properties, and Causality’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 321–342. (Scholar)
–––, 1988, ‘On What There Are’, Philosophical Topics, 16: 201–223. (Scholar)
–––, 2012, ‘Coincidence Through Thick and Thin’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 7: 227–253. (Scholar)
Shorter, J. M., 1977, ‘On Coinciding in Space and Time’, Philosophy, 52: 399–408. (Scholar)
Sidelle, Alan, 1989, Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: a Defense of Conventionalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1992a, ‘Identity and Identity-Like’, Philosophical Topics, 20: 269–292. (Scholar)
–––, 1992b, ‘Rigidity, Ontology, and Semantic Structure’, The Journal of Philosophy, 89: 410–430. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, ‘A Sweater Unraveled: Following One Thread of Thought for Avoiding Coincident Entities’, Noûs, 32: 423–448. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, ‘Is There a True Metaphysics of Material Objects?’, Philosophical Issues, 12: 118–145. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Conventionalism and the Contingency of Conventions’, Noûs, 43: 224–241. (Scholar)
–––, 2010, ‘Modality and Objects’, Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 109–125. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Does Hylomorphism Offer a Distinctive Solution to the Grounding Problem?’, Analysis, 74: 397–404. (Scholar)
Sidelle, Alan, 2016, ‘Coincidence: The Grounding Problem, Object-Specifying Principles, and Some Consequences’, Philosophical Papers, 45: 497–528. (Scholar)
Sider, Theodore, 1993, ‘Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk’, Analysis, 53: 285–289. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, ‘All the World’s a Stage’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1997, ‘Four-Dimensionalism’, Philosophical Review, 106: 197–231. (Scholar)
–––, 2001a, Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. “The Argument from Vagueness” (§4.9) is reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 2001b, ‘Maximality and Intrinsic Properties’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 357–364. (Scholar)
–––, 2003a, ‘Against Vague Existence’, Philosophical Studies, 114: 135–146. (Scholar)
–––, 2003b, ‘What’s So Bad About Overdetermination’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 719–726. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, ‘Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 674–687. (Scholar)
–––, 2007a, ‘Against Monism’, Analysis, 67: 1–7. (Scholar)
–––, 2007b, ‘Parthood’, Philosophical Review, 116: 51–91. (Scholar)
–––, 2008a, ‘Temporal Parts’, in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 241–262. (Scholar)
–––, 2008b, ‘Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Coincident Entities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77: 613–624. (Scholar)
–––, 2009a, ‘Against Vague and Unnatural Existence: Reply to Liebesman and Eklund’, Noûs, 43: 557–567. (Scholar)
–––, 2009b, ‘Ontological Realism’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 384–423. (Scholar)
–––, 2011, Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Against Parthood’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 8: 237–293. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Hirsch’s Attack on Ontologese’, Noûs, 48: 565–572. (Scholar)
Siderits, Mark, 2003, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons, Burlington: Ashgate. (Scholar)
Silva, Paul, 2013, ‘Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94: 69–88. (Scholar)
Simon, Jonathan A., 2017a, ‘The Hard Problem of the Many’, Philosophical Perspectives, 31: 449–468. (Scholar)
–––, 2017b, ‘Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ Has No Borderline Cases’, Philosophical Studies, 174: 2105–2123. (Scholar)
Simons, Peter, 1985, ‘Coincidence of Things of a Kind’, Mind, 94: 70–75. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Real Wholes, Real Parts: Mereology Without Algebra’, The Journal of Philosophy, 103: 597–613. (Scholar)
Skiles, Alexander, 2015, ‘Against Grounding Necessitarianism’, Erkenntnis, 80: 717–751. (Scholar)
Smith, Deborah, 2019, ‘Gunky Objects, Junky Worlds, and Weak Mereological Universalism’, Erkenntnis, 84: 41–55. (Scholar)
Smith, Donald, 2006, ‘The Vagueness Argument for Mereological Universalism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87: 357–368. (Scholar)
Smith, Nicholas J. J., 2005, ‘A Plea for Things That Are Not Quite All There’, The Journal of Philosophy, 102: 381–421. (Scholar)
Sosa, Ernest, 1987, ‘Subjects Among Other Things’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 155–187. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘Existential Relativity’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23: 132–143. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
Spencer, Joshua, 2012, ‘All Things Must Pass Away’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 7: 67–92. (Scholar)
–––, 2017, ‘Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special Composition Question’, Erkenntnis, 82: 857–872. (Scholar)
–––, 2020, ‘The Limits of Neo‐Aristotelian Plenitude’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101: 74–92. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘On the Explanatory Demands of the Special Composition Question’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Spolaore, Giuseppe, 2012, ‘Not Just a Coincidence: Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis’, Thought, 1: 108–115. (Scholar)
Spolaore, Giuseppe and Pierdaniele Giaretta, 2018, ‘Michelangelo’s Puzzle’, Philosophia, 46: 453–464. (Scholar)
Stalnaker, Robert, 1988, ‘Vague Identity’, in David F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 349–360. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
Steen, Mark, 2008, ‘Chisholm’s Changing Conception of Ordinary Objects’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 76: 1–56. (Scholar)
Steen, Mark, 2017, ‘Temporally Restricted Composition’, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 17: 431–440. (Scholar)
Stone, Jim, 2002, ‘Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus’s Puzzle’, Analysis, 62: 216–223. (Scholar)
Street, Sharon, 2006, ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’, Philosophical Studies, 127: 109–166. (Scholar)
Strohminger, Margot, 2013, ‘Modal Humeanism and Arguments from Possibility’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113: 391–401. (Scholar)
Sutton, C. S., 2012, ‘Colocated Objects, Tally-Ho: A Solution to the Grounding Problem’, Mind, 121: 703–730. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Against the Maximality Principle’, Metaphysica, 15: 381–390. (Scholar)
Tahko, Tuomas E., 2009, ‘Against the Vagueness Argument’, Philosophia, 37: 335–340. (Scholar)
Tallant, Jonathan, 2014, ‘Against Mereological Nihilism’, Synthese, 191: 1511–1527. (Scholar)
Thomasson, Amie, 2003, ‘Realism and Human Kinds’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 580–609. (Scholar)
–––, 2006, ‘Metaphysical Arguments Against Ordinary Objects’, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 340–359. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, Ordinary Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2009, ‘Answerable and Unanswerable Questions’, in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 444–471. (Scholar)
–––, 2015, Ontology Made Easy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘Replies to Comments on Ontology Made Easy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99: 251–264. (Scholar)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1983, ‘Parthood and Identity Across Time’, The Journal of Philosophy, 80: 201–220. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, ‘The Statue and the Clay’, Noûs, 32: 149–173. (Scholar)
Tichý, Pavel, 1987/2004, ‘Individuals and Their Roles’, in Vladimir Svoboda, Bjørn Jesperson, and Colin Cheyne (eds.), Pavel Tichý’s Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy, Otago: Otago University Press, pp. 711–748. (Scholar)
Tillman, Chris and Joshua Spencer, forthcoming, ‘Advanced D&D’, Analysis. (Scholar)
Toner, Patrick, 2006, ‘Meta-Ontology and Accidental Unity’, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 550–561. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘On Merricks’s Dictum’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 33: 293–297. (Scholar)
Torza, Alessandro, 2017, ‘Vague Existence’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 10: 201–234. (Scholar)
Turner, Jason, 2011, ‘Ontological Nihilism’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 6: 3–54. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Existence and Many-One Identity’, Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 313–329. (Scholar)
Tye, Michael, 1990, ‘Vague Objects’, Mind, 99: 535–557. (Scholar)
–––, 1992, ‘Review of Material Beings’, Philosophical Review, 101: 881–884. (Scholar)
–––, 1996a, ‘Fuzzy Realism and the Problem of the Many’, Philosophical Studies, 81: 215–225. (Scholar)
–––, 1996b, ‘Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 679–685. (Scholar)
Unger, Peter, 1979a, ‘I Do Not Exist’, in G. F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity, New York: Macmillan, pp. 235–251. Reprinted in Rea 1997a. (Scholar)
–––, 1979b, ‘There Are No Ordinary Things’, Synthese, 41: 117–154. (Scholar)
–––, 1979c, ‘Why There Are No People’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 177–222. (Scholar)
–––, 1980, ‘The Problem of the Many’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 411–467. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, ‘The Mental Problems of the Many’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1: 195–222. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, All the Power in the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Uzquiano, Gabriel, 2004, ‘Plurals and Simples’, Noûs, 87: 429–451. (Scholar)
Van Cleve, James, 1986, ‘Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 141–156. (Scholar)
–––, 2008, ‘The Moon and Sixpence: A Defense of Mereological Universalism’, in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 321–340. (Scholar)
van Elswyk, Peter, 2018, ‘Contrast and Constitution’, Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 158–174. (Scholar)
van Inwagen, Peter, 1981, ‘The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. Reprinted in Rea 1997a. (Scholar)
–––, 1987, ‘When Are Objects Parts?’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 21–47. Reprinted in Kim et al. 2011. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell. (Scholar)
–––, 1993, ‘Reply to Reviewers’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 709–719. (Scholar)
–––, 1994, ‘Composition as Identity’, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 207–220. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Introduction: Inside and Outside the Ontology Room’, in his Existence: Essays in Ontology, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–14. (Scholar)
–––, 2019, ‘Against Analytic Existence Entailments’, in Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173–197. (Scholar)
Vander Laan, David, 2010, ‘A Relevance Constraint on Composition’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88: 135–145. (Scholar)
Varzi, Achille C., 2002, ‘Words and Objects’, in Andrea Bottani, Massimiliano Carrara, and Daniele Giaretta (eds.), Individuals, Essence, and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 49–75. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, ‘Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 208–215. (Scholar)
–––, 2005, ‘Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument From Vagueness’, Dialectica, 59: 485–498. (Scholar)
Vavova, Katia, 2015, ‘Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism’, Philosophy Compass, 10: 104–116. (Scholar)
Wake, Andrew V., 2011, ‘Spacetime and Mereology’, Erkenntnis, 74: 17–35. (Scholar)
Wallace, Megan B., 2011a, ‘Composition as Identity: Part 1’, Philosophy Compass, 6: 804–816. (Scholar)
–––, 2011b, ‘Composition as Identity: Part 2’, Philosophy Compass, 6: 817–827. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Counterparts and Compositional Nihilism: A Reply to A. J. Cotnoir’, Thought, 2: 242–247. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘The Argument from Vagueness for Modal Parts’, Dialectica, 68: 355–373. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘Counterexamples and Commonsense’, Analysis. (Scholar)
Wasserman, Ryan, 2002, ‘The Standard Objection to the Standard Account’, Philosophical Studies, 111: 197–216. (Scholar)
Watson, Duncan, 2010, ‘An Argument Against an Argument Against the Necessity of Universal Mereological Composition’, Analysis, 70: 78–82. (Scholar)
Weatherson, Brian, 2003, ‘Many Many Problems’, Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 481–501. (Scholar)
Wheeler, Samuel C., 1979, ‘On That Which is Not’, Synthese, 41: 155–173. (Scholar)
Wiggins, David, 1968, ‘On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time’, Philosophical Review, 77: 90–95. Reprinted in Rea 1997a. (Scholar)
–––, 2001, Sameness and Substance Renewed, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Wilkins, Shane, 2016, ‘Why Paraphrase Nihilism Fails’, Synthese, 193: 2619–2632. (Scholar)
Williams, J. Robert G., 2006a, ‘An Argument for the Many’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106: 411–417. (Scholar)
–––, 2006b, ‘Illusions of Gunk’, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 493–513. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, ‘Eligibility and Inscrutability’, Philosophical Review, 116: 361–399. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘Part-Intrinsicality’, Noûs, 47: 431–452. (Scholar)
Williamson, Timothy, 1994, Vagueness, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
–––, 2007, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Wilson, Jessica M., 2010, ‘What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80: 595–637. (Scholar)
–––, 2013, ‘A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy’, Inquiry, 56: 359–385. (Scholar)
Witmer, D. Gene, 2003, ‘Review of World Without Design’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 603–606. (Scholar)
Woods, Evan T., forthcoming, ‘Many, But One’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Woodward, Richard, 2011, ‘Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Existence’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 6: 183–197. (Scholar)
Yablo, Stephen, 1987, ‘Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility’, The Journal of Philosophy, 84: 293–314. (Scholar)
–––, 2014, ‘Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology’, Journal of Philosophy, 111: 470–501. (Scholar)
Yang, Eric, 2013, ‘Eliminativism, Interventionism and the Overdetermination Argument’, Philosophical Studies, 164: 321–340. (Scholar)
Yi, Byeong-Uk, 1999, ‘Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?’, Philosophical Studies, 93: 141–160. (Scholar)
–––, forthcoming, ‘Is Composition Identity?’, Synthese. (Scholar)
Zerbudis, Ezequiel, 2018, ‘El Conservadurismo Realista Acerca de la Composición de Daniel Korman’, Cuadernos de Filosofía, 36: 33–53. (Scholar)
Zimmerman, Dean W., 1995, ‘Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution’, Philosophical Review, 104: 53–110. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for ‘Atomless Gunk’’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 1–29. (Scholar)
–––, 1999, ‘Review of Substance: Its Nature and Existence’, Philosophical Review, 108: 118–122. (Scholar)

Generated Mon Sep 2 17:54:45 2024

Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
Philosophy of biology	Philosophy of language	Philosophy of mind	Philosophy of religion	Science Logic and Mathematics	More ...