Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Contents of Perception" by Susanna Siegel

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Bermudez, J. and Macpherson, F., 1999. “Nonconceptual Content and the Nature of Perceptual Experience,” The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Issue 6. [Available online. (Scholar)
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Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D., 2003. “Color Realism Revisited,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26: 791–4. (Scholar)
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Chisholm, R., 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
Chuard, P., 2007. “The Riches of Experience,” in R. Genarro (ed.), The Interplay between Consciousness and Concepts, Special Issue, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14 (9–10): 20–42. (Scholar)
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Condillac, E., 1947. Traite des senations, Oeuvres Philosophiques de Condillac (Volume 1), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 219–314. (Scholar)
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Crane, T., 2003. “The Intentional Structure of Consciousness,” in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1998, “The Waterfall Illusion,” in Y. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Non-conceptual content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 231–36 (Scholar)
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Cussins, A., 1990. “Content, Conceptual Content, and Nonconceptual Content,” in Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Y. Gunther (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 133–163. (Scholar)
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Davies, M., 1996. “Externalism and experience,” Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning, A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, and J. M. Larrazabal (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer. Reference to the reprinting in The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 309–28. (Scholar)
–––, 1991. “Individualism and Perceptual Content,” Mind, 100: 485–94. (Scholar)
–––, 1992. “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92: 21–45. (Scholar)
Dennett, D., 1991. Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. (Scholar)
Dretske, F., 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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Ducasse, C. J., 1942. “Moore’s ‘The Refutation of Idealism,’” in P. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, Evanston, IL: Northwestern Press. (Scholar)
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Egan, A., 2006a. “Appearance Properties?” Noûs , 40 (3): 495–521. (Scholar)
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–––, 2010. “Projectivism without Error,” in B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, New York: Oxford University Press, 68–96. (Scholar)
Egan, F., 1991. “Must Psychology be individualistic?” Philosophical Review, 100: 179–203. (Scholar)
Evans, G., 1982. The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1981. “Understanding Demonstratives,” in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 280–303. (Scholar)
Fales, E., 1990. Causation and Universals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
Francescotti, R., 1991. “Externalism and Marr’s Theory of Vision,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42: 227–38. (Scholar)
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Fotopoulou, A. et al., 2009. “Self-observation reinstates motor awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia,” Neuropsychologia, 47: 1256–1260. (Scholar)
Gibson, J.J., 1977. “The Theory of Affordances,” in R. Shaw and J. Bransford (eds.), Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing. Toward an Ecological Psychology, Hillsdale: NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 67–82; revised and republished as Chapter 8 of J.J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1979. (Scholar)
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Greenberg, G., 2018. “Content and Target in Pictorial Representation,” Ergo, 5(33). doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.033 (Scholar)
Grice, H.P., 1961. “The Causal Theory of Perception,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 35: 121–53. (Scholar)
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Holman, E., 2002. “Color eliminativism and color experience,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 83: 38–56. (Scholar)
Horgan, T. and J. Tienson, 2002. “The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality,” in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 520–33. (Scholar)
Hurley, Susan, 2000. “Consciousness in Action” European Journal of Philosophy, 8 (1): 106–110. (Scholar)
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Jackson, F., 1977. Perception: A Representative Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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Lyons, J., 2005a. “Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds,” Philosophical Topics, 33 (1):185–206. (Scholar)
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