Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Disjunctive Theory of Perception" by Matthew Soteriou
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- Davies, M., 1992, “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series), 92: 21–45. (Scholar)
- Dorsch, Fabian, 2010,“Transparency and Imagining Seeing”, Philosophical Explorations, 13(3): 173–200. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Evans, Gareth, 1981, “Understanding Demonstratives”, in Meaning and Understanding, H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Berlin: W. de Gruyter, pp. 291–321. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Farkas, K., 2006, “Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series), 106: 39–59. (Scholar)
- Fish, William C., 2008, “Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 144–167. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- French, Craig, 2018, “Epistemological Disjunctivism and its
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- French, Craig, and Gomes, Anil, 2019, “How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience”, Philosophical Quarterly, 69(275): 41–63. (Scholar)
- Genone, James, 2014, “Appearance and Illusion”, Mind, 123(490): 329–376. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 1979, “What is Justified Belief?”, in Justification and Knowledge, George Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–23. (Scholar)
- Gomes, Anil, and French, Craig, 2016, “On the Particularity of Experience”, Philosophical Studies, 173(2): 451–460. (Scholar)
- Grice, H.P., 1961, “The Causal Theory of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 35: 121–52. (Scholar)
- Haddock, Adrian, 2011,“The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving”, Philosophical Explorations, 14(1): 23–42. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and
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- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, 2008a, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, 2008b, “Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–24. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, in Philosophical Perspectives, 4, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 31–52. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John and Kovakovich, Karson, 2006, “Disjunctivism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 80: 145–183. (Scholar)
- Hellie, Benj, 2007, “Factive Phenomenal Characters”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21: 259–306. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013,“The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination”, in Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, F. MacPherson and D. Platchias (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 149–174. (Scholar)
- Hinton, J.M., 1967, “Visual Experiences”, Mind, 76(April): 217–227. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, “Phenomenological Specimenism”, Analysis, 40(January): 37–41. (Scholar)
- Hornsby, J. 2008, “A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 244–261. (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, Jonathan, 2009, “Dreaming and Imagination”, Mind and Language, 24(1): 103–121. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 2004, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”, Philosophical Studies, 103: 113–83. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, Mark, 2011, “Color Illusion”, Noûs, 45(4): 751–775. (Scholar)
- Langsam, Harold, 1997, “The Theory of Appearing Defended”, Philosophical Studies, 120: 33–59. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “The Intuitive Case for Naïve Realism”, Philosophical Explorations, 20(1): 106–122. (Scholar)
- Littlejohn, Clayton, 2019, “Niether/Nor”, in Casey
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- Loar, Brian, 2002, “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia”, in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, A. Jokic and Q. Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–96. (Scholar)
- Logue, Heather, 2012a, “What should the naïve realist say about total hallucinations?”, Philosophical Perspectives, 26(1): 173–199. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012b, “Why Naïve
Realsim?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112:
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- –––, 2013, “Good News for the
Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases”, Philosophy and
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- –––, 2014, “Experiential Content and Naïve Realism: A Reconcilliation”, in Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford: Oxford Unicersity Press, pp. 220–241. (Scholar)
- Longworth, Guy, 2019, “Settling a Question: Austin and
Disjunctivism”, in Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn and Duncan
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- Lowe, E. J., 2008, “Against Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 95–111. (Scholar)
- Martin, M.G.F., 1997, “The Reality of Appearances”, in Thought and Ontology, M. Sainsbury (ed.), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 77–96. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind”, in Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, A. O’Hear (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–179. (Scholar)
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- McDowell, John, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility and
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- –––, 2008, “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 376–389. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism”, Philosophical Explorations, 13(3): 243–255. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism
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- McGinn, Colin, 1982, The Character of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mehta, Neil, 2014, “The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience”, Journal of Philosophy, 111(6): 311–331. (Scholar)
- Mehta, Neil, and Ganson, Todd, 2016, “On the Generality of Experience: a reply to French and Gomes”, Philosophical Studies, 173(12): 3223–3229. (Scholar)
- Millar, Alan, 1996, “The Idea of
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- –––, 2008, “Perceptual-recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 330–347. (Scholar)
- Millar, Boyd, 2015, “Naïve Realism and Illusion”, Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2: 607–625. (Scholar)
- Mitova, Veli, 2019, “Either Epistemological or Metaphysical
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- Nagel, Thomas, 1974, “What is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83(October): 435–450. (Scholar)
- Neta, Ram, 2008, “In Defence of Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 311–329. (Scholar)
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- Robinson, Howard, 1985, “The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism”, In Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration, J. Foster and H. Robinson (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 163–186. (Scholar)
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