Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification" by Nicholas Silins
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- Berger, Jacob, 2020, “Perceptual Consciousness Plays No Epistemic Role”, Philosophical Issues, 30: 7– 23. (Scholar)
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- Chudnoff, Elijah & Didomenico, David, 2015, “The Epistemic Unity of Perception”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(4): 535–549. (Scholar)
- Churchland, Paul M., 1979, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor”, Philosophy of Science, 55: 167–187. (Scholar)
- Clarke, Thompson, 1965, “Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects”, in Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America, Ithaca: Cornell University Press., 98–114. (Scholar)
- Cohen, S., 1984, “Justification and Truth”, Philosophical Studies, 46: 279–295. (Scholar)
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- Conee, E., 2007, “Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism”, Philosophical Issues, 17(1): 16–36. (Scholar)
- Conee, E. & R. Feldman, 2001, “Internalism Defended”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38(1): 1–18. Reprinted in E. Conee & R. Feldman (eds.), Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1986, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in Truth And Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ernest LePore (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 307–19. (Scholar)
- Delk, J.L. & S. Fillenbaum, 1965, “Differences in Perceived Colour as a Function of Characteristic Color”, The American Journal of Psychology, 78: 290–93. (Scholar)
- DePaul, M. (ed), 2001, Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, CITY: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Deroy, O., 2013, “Object Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”, Philosophical Studies, 162: 87–107 (Scholar)
- Descartes, René, [PW], The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume II), John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Dretske, Fred, 2004, “Change Blindness”, Philosophical Studies, 120(1–3): 1–18. doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000033749.19147.88 (Scholar)
- Ericsson, K. A. (ed.)., 2006, The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Firestone, Chaz & Scholl, Brian J., 2016, “Cognition Does Not Affect Perception: Evaluating the Evidence for ‘Top-down’ Effects”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39: 1–72. (Scholar)
- Fish, W., 2013, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry, 1983, The Modularity of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Observation Reconsidered”, Philosophy of Science, 51: 23–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “A Reply to Churchland’s ‘Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality’”, Philosophy of Science, 55: 188–198. (Scholar)
- Gendler, Tamar S. & John Hawthorne (eds.), 2006, Perceptual Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ginsborg, Hannah, 2006, “Reasons for Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(2): 286–318. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., 2008, “Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism”, in Smith 2008: 63–82. (Scholar)
- Greco, Daniel, 2019, “Justifications and Excuses in Epistemology”, Noûs, first online 08 August 2019. doi:10.1111/nous.12309 (Scholar)
- Green, E. J., 2020, “The Perception-Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division”, Philosophical Review, 129(3): 323–393. (Scholar)
- Haddock, A. & F. MacPherson (eds.), 2008, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Hanson, N.R., 1958, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawley, Katherine & Fiona MacPherson (eds.), 2009, The Admissible Contents of Experience, Special issue of Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236); reprinted 2011, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwater. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne J. & K. Kovakovich, 2006, “Disjunctivism”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 80(1): 145–183. (Scholar)
- Hohwy, Jakob, 2013, The Predictive Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Huemer, M., 2001, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1): 30–55. (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, Jonathan, 2009, “Dreaming and Imagination”, Mind and Language, 24(1): 103–121. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Alexander, 2011, “Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(3): 564–593. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M., 2004, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”, Philosophical Studies, 120(1–3): 113–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Better than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness”, in Gendler & Hawthorne 2006: 260–290. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, Uriah, 2011, “The Veil of Abstracta”, Philosophical Issues, 21(1): 245–267. (Scholar)
- Kuhn, T.S., 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; reprinted, 1996. (Scholar)
- Lamme, V., 2003, “Why Visual Attention and Awareness are Different”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7: 12–18. (Scholar)
- Lehrer, Keith & Stewart Cohen, 1983, “Justification, Truth, and Coherence”, Synthese, 55(2): 191–207. (Scholar)
- Levin, R. & M. Banaji, 2006, “Distortions in the Perceived Lightness of Faces: The Role of Race Categories”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135(4): 501–512. [Levin and Banaji 2006 available online] (Scholar)
- Littlejohn, Clayton, 2012, Justification and the Truth-Connection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lyons, Jack, 2005, “Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks”, Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1): 237–256. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Perception and Basic Beliefs, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”, Philosophical Issues, 21(1): 289–311. (Scholar)
- Macpherson, Fiona, 2012, “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 24–62. (Scholar)
- Markie, Peter, 2005, “The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification”, Philosophical Studies, 126(3): 347–373. (Scholar)
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- Martin, M., 2002, “The Transparency of Experience”, Mind and Language, 17: 376–425. (Scholar)
- Marshall, H. and Halligan, P. , 1988, “Blindsight and Insight in Visuo-Spatial Neglect”, Nature, 83(2): 766–767. (Scholar)
- Masrour, Farid, 2011, “Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(2): 366–397. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–79. Also in J. Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1995, “Knowledge and the Internal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(4): 877–93. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in Haddock & Macpherson 2008: 376–390. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McGrath, Matthew, 2013, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples”, in Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2017, “Knowing What Things Look Like”, Philosophical Review, 126(1): 1–41. (Scholar)
- Millar, A., 2000, “The Scope of Perceptual Knowledge”, Philosophy, 75(291): 73–88. (Scholar)
- Miracchi, Lisa, forthcoming, “Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem”, in Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mole, C., 2011, Attention is Cognitive Unison, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mole, Christopher, Declan Smithies, & Wayne Wu (eds.), 2011, Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E., 1918, “Some Judgments of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 19: 1–28. (Scholar)
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- Morrison, John, 2016, “Perceptual Confidence”, Analytic Philosophy, 57(1): 15–48. (Scholar)
- Munton, Jessie, 2016, “Visual Confidences and Direct Perceptual Justification”, Philosophical Topics, 44(2): 301–326. (Scholar)
- Naccache, L. & S. Dehaene, 2001, “Unconscious semantic priming extends to novel unseen stimuli”, Cognition, 80: 215–229. (Scholar)
- Noë, Alva, 2005, Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Odegaard, B., Chang, M. Y., Lau, H., & Cheung, S. H, 2018, “Inflation Versus Filling-In: Why We Feel We See More Than We Actually Do In Peripheral Vision”, Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London (Series B: Biological Sciences), 373(1755): 20170345. doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0345 (Scholar)
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- Pautz, Adam, 2009, “What are the Contents of Experiences?”, Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236): 483–507. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2010, “Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?”, in B. Nanay, Perceiving the World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Phillips, Ian B. and Block, Ned, 2016, “Debate on Unconscious Perception”, in B. Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Pollock, John, 1974, Knowledge and Justification, Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Pollock 1974 available online] (Scholar)
- Popper, Karl, 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson. (Scholar)
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- Pylyshyn, Z.W., 1999, “Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, (1999), 22(3): 341–365. (Scholar)
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- Silins, Nicholas & Susanna Siegel, 2014, “Consciousness, Attention, and Justification”, in Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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